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## U.S. DEFENSIVE POSTURE SEEN CRUMBLING

Article: "Continuous Offensive in The First Six Months"; Hanoi, Nhan Dan, Vietnamese, 9 July 1969, p 3

Since the early spring of 1968, the general offensive and uprising of the people and Liberation Army of heroic South Vietnam have reversed the strategic position of the enemy, transformed his base areas into wartorn fronts and shattered his aggressive will. All the 1.2 million enemy troops have been forced to give up their counter offensive "search and destroy" phase and switch over to the defensive "clear and hold" phase, in the hope of putting off the day of their total defeat. A great part of the enemy's military forces have been reorganized and assigned to the defense of cities and important bases, especially the areas around Saigon and Da Nang, and yet his defense still proves to be inept and hopeless.

Entering 1969, the enemy is on the defensive even more and has constantly been forced to redeploy his forces on the various fronts, especially around Saigon. To prevent a Liberation Army offensive against the city, the enemy has reinforced his defense lines and established a system of joint military units made up infantry, motorized and artillery troops with permanent fire bases to support his operations, hoping to force the people's liberation armed forces away from these lines. US and puppet troops have used every means to cope with the situation, such as strengthening their fortifications and trenches at the various camps, pressing their "accelerated pacification" program in the regions bordering cities, towns and communications centers and feverishly launching regimental size operations in liberated areas such as Ba Long (Quang Tri), An Hoa (Quang Nam), Ea Lang An (Quang Ngai), Chu Pa, Tay Dac To (Tay Nguyen), and U Minh Thuong (Tay Nam Bo), in order to expand defensive rings while continuing massive "police operations" in the cities. The enemy has been using aircraft, artillery, and chemical agents to level many regions, rounding up the population in regions temporarily under his control and creating free-fire zones around his important defense areas. By such schemes U.S. troops hope to reduce casualties and gradually let re-equipped puppet troops move in and assume the burden of the war.

However, from early spring to early summer of this year, the people and army of South Vietnam have launched a new series of offensives which has resulted in outstanding battles and high combat proficiency on all fronts. This new series of offensive by the people's liberation armed forces has defeated 1.2 million enemy troops entrenched in cities and bases.

### Destroying the Enemies Defenses

Jumping off from a solid offensive front which has been opened since the general uprisings, the various revolutionary armed forces -- including the regular army, local troops and guerrilla forces -- have smashed all large-scale operations of U. S. and puppet troops, causing the bankruptcy of their "accelerated pacification program," and launching continuous attacks against their important defenses.

Thousands of U.S. marines, paratroopers and infantry troops have failed to push the war from the cities and U. S. bases in the coastal plains of central Vietnam. Hundreds of U.S. puppet and satellite battalions have been unable to seal off the region around Saigon although they have set up major defense lines and integrated defenses around the city. The key defense zones of the enemy have been subjected to massive attacks by the Liberation Army on numerous occasions. It is obvious that the enemies defense has been breached, compressed and destroyed piece meal by the offensive mounted by all the strata and classes of the people's liberation armed forces.

The liberation armed forces at Tri - Thien - Hue and in the plains of central Vietnam have broken the enemy's defenses and inflicted heavy casualties on large enemy forces. Thousands of U.S. marines have been hard hit in the mountainous regions of Co Ca Va and A Bia (West Thua Thien). The defense line constituted by Route 9 has neither been able to stop the offensive of the Liberation Army, nor resist the guerilla war which is strongly developing in the coastal Tri-Thien plains. The system of defense bases of the U.S. Third Marine division stretching from Cua Viet, Dong Ha to Ca Lu has become the target of repeated attacks by artillery and infantry troops of the Liberation Army. U.S. bases at An Hoa, Tien Phuoc and Tam Ky have been encircled and mauled by all three branches of the liberation armed forces. The enemy's bases, command posts, airbases and dumps up at Danang and Chu Lai have been struck continuously. The "American" division suffered severe setbacks right at its base camps and command posts in the regions of Nam Quang and Quang Ngai.

The Liberation Army of East Nam Bo, an enemy U.S. troops were always frightened of during two previous summer counter-offensives, has grown even stronger maintaining continuous pressure on the enemy outside as well as inside the defense perimeter, and destroying large enemy forces who were entrenched in fortifications or who were airlifted in to relieve them.

Over 3 U.S. divisions and five puppet divisions, protected by a large force of APC's have been sent to defend that region, but have been unable to prevent their defenses from being reduced. After suffering a severe defeat in Tay Ninh, U.S. air cavalry troops were given a worse mauling when they pulled back to Binh Long and Phuoc Long. Even more severe setbacks were suffered when they pulled back to Bien Hoa and Long Khanh. Many troops of the 1st and 25th US infantry divisions have been destroyed on Route 13, leaving those divisions with insufficient strength to stop the people's liberation armed forces. The Liberation Army has maintained continuous pressure on the military airbases of Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa, the joint bases of Long Binh and Dong An, the oil storage dumps of Nha Be, and the rivers of Saigon and Vam Co Dong, especially the waterway system of Long Tam and Dong Nai.

It is an outstanding fact that entering 1969, the enemy had made active preparations for the battlefield of Vietnam, specially at the strategic points selected by the enemy as his defense lines. Those preparations concern such aspects as the redeployment of troops among fixed, mobile, and support forces of each region, the prediction of times targets of our offensives, and even our tactics, etc.. Therefore, the U.S. command is confident that whenever Liberation Army troops start large-scale offensives, they will be trapped in the "U.S. meat grinder" and if they launch small-scale attacks, their forces will be too small to threaten U.S. defense lines.

Nevertheless, the subjective, erroneous, and stubborn leadership common to all aggressors -- especially the U.S. imperialists -- by relying on their material force, have led themselves from failure to failure. The new continuous offensive of the South Vietnamese people and army in the first six months of the year has demonstrated that all the enemy's calculations are wrong and all his efforts have failed to stop the determination of the South Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces to attack him in a skillful and creative manner. The offensives since the night of 22 February, and on 11 May and 5 June till now, have decimated many U.S. puppet, and satellite battalions, regiments and divisions. Thousands of planes, tanks, guns and thousands of tons of bombs, gasoline and other war material of the enemy have been destroyed. Scores of command posts ranging from battalions, divisions to corps have been attacked. The enemy command apparatus, security forces, militia and civil defense corps have been crushed in the villages, hamlets and cities.

This new offensive has demonstrated the greater ability of the South Vietnamese revolutionary armed forces to maintain the initiative. The more they attack, the stronger and more enduring they become, and the greater their initiative on the battlefield. The U.S. command has to admit that "the enemy has an unlimited reserve of weapons and men, that is why they can keep on fighting. Not one high-ranking officer, including even General Abrams, can predict how long the present war will go on. It is impossible to know the plans of the enemy," (AFP, 23 March 1969). "They (Liberation

Army troops) have maintained the initiative for the past years, and have tied down Allied troops (U.S., puppet and satellite) in their camps, bases, cities and villages. Half a million U.S. troops, despite all their Huey helicopters, jets and artillery, have not escaped their strong pressure," (USIS, 6 June 1969).

The South Vietnamese people and army have maintained the initiative on all battlefields, forcing 1.2 million U.S., puppet and satellite troops into defensive positions where they have to face pressure on all sides while taking into account the offensive plans of the Liberation Army in the three tactical zones. Once again, the Liberation Army has upset deployment of enemy forces in the major defense lines. From the start of the Liberation Army's offensive in early spring, the U.S. command has had to give up its defense perimeters and create a new defense shield around Saigon, by concentrating three battalions of U.S. aircavalry troops northwest and northeast of Saigon and re-deploying the defense position of the 1st and 25th U.S. infantry divisions. The strategic position of the enemy is getting shakier and displaying more weaknesses and gaps as he is forced into a continuous defense posture. Meanwhile, the people's liberation armed forces are free to select their targets, always hitting objectives which they have precisely scouted, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy both in men and material.

#### Destroying Large U.S. and Puppet Task Forces and Material

Even dug in their defensive, fortifications and trenches, and protected by aircraft and artillery, enemy troops cannot counter the brave attacks of the Liberation Army. Whenever they send out task forces to break up sieges mounted by the South Vietnamese people and army they suffer even heavier losses. This spells out the evident failure of the "hold and clear" strategy, and the end of the U.S. military venture in the South.

The enemy has tried every means to assure his defense and stop the attacks of the Liberation Army against his base areas. But he has to admit that from the beginning of this year till now, his troops have been attacked at least 20 to 30 and sometimes even 100 times a night. Therefore, the enemy recklessly exerts "maximum pressure" on the South Vietnamese people and army in the hope of reducing their own casualties.

Many battalions from the U.S. 101st Airborne have been airlifted into the region of Hamburger Hill (A Bia) to "take a strategic hill!" The result of this reckless policy is that the 3rd group of this division has been entirely annihilated at A Bia, the 3rd battalion has been put out of action on hill 937, after which their command posts at Dong Tranh, in hamlet 5 of My Thuy village (next to the southwestern region of Hue) suffered heavy losses.

Scores of battalions of U.S. and puppet task forces in Tay Nguyen and the plains of central Vietnam which came to lift the siege of Chu Pa and the region east of Dac To have suffered heavy losses ranging from 5 to 9 battalions at both places, including the 42nd regiment and the 2nd puppet commando battalion, which have been destroyed.

The core of the U.S. divisions and puppet reserve forces stationed outside and inside the defense perimeter in eastern Nam Bo are well-protected by fortifications and intergrated military defense units and supported by fire bases giving continuous support missions and large numbers of APC's, and yet an important part of their forces has been killed and their equipment destroyed. The glorious victories of the Liberation Army in eastern Nam Bo, at Tra Cao, Ben Tranh, Tech Nich, Bu Na, on Route 13, Binh Son, Dinh Quan, Tuc Trung, La Nga and on route 20, have destroyed or caused heavy casualties among scores of U.S., puppet, and satellite battalions and their well-protected fortifications.

During the first days of Tet Ky Dau, group 3 from the U.S. cavalry division suffered a severe defeat. In May, the puppet reserve forces, consisting of the 42nd regiment, commando units, the 43rd regiment, 18th division, and Thai mercenaries have suffered heavy losses. In June, Thousands of U.S. troops of the aircavalry division, the 1st infantry division and the 11th armored regiment have experienced a severe defeat with nearly 2,000 tanks and APC's knocked out.

Another significant fact to be noted in the first six months of this year is that all the three services and the various branches, especially the infantry and artillery troops of the Liberation Army, have maintained the initiative on all fronts, launched continuous attacks, fought well and won great victories right on the defense lines of the enemy. The infantry troops of the Liberation Army can launch repeated attacks on one battlefield in a short time, hit important targets, destroy large forces of the enemy and still have high fighting effectiveness.

Although using small forces the liberation troops have been able to win great victories and inflict heavy casualties and losses to U.S. and puppet regiments and groups. The crack troops of the Liberation Army have grown ever stronger, have always maintained the initiative in searching out the enemy and attacking him in a swift, sudden manner and have destroyed or damaged scores of dumps, command posts, airbases, ports and enemy main forces. The artillery and anti-aircraft troops of the Liberation Army have also increased their fighting effectiveness and developed ways of killing the enemy on the ground as well as in the air. During the shelling of the enemy's dumps at An Dong, An Hai (Danang), his airbases at Danang, Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut and bases at Long Binh, Du Cu Chi, Dong Tam, etc.. the artillery troops of the Liberation Army detonated tens of thousands of bombs and rounds of ammunition, killed thousands of U.S. troops and destroyed hundreds of aircraft expending little ammunition. During the attacks on A Bia, western Dac To, Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Phuoc Long,

antiaircraft troops shot down hundreds of aircraft of all types, including many armed helicopters. The antiaircraft troops also laid down intense and precise fire to prevent the enemy's helicopters from landing troops and transport planes from re-supplying troops encircled in places such as Play Cau, An Hoa, Tien Phuoc, Tam Ky -- sometimes for months.

Maintaining close coordination with the regular army, the local armed forces have encircled the enemy's bases while clearing the security forces, militia and civil defense corps, eliminating stubborn elements and destroying the command apparatus of the enemy piecemeal right in their bases. The local armed forces have contributed effectively to the protection and development of the people's right of ownership and in the preservation and development of the revolutionary government in the villages and hamlets to the districts and provinces.

"Puppetization of the War Signals the Complete Failure of U.S. War of Aggression"

In their defensive position, U.S. troops have been unable to even maintain their defense lines, reduce their casualties and protect their task forces and equipment. This is clear proof of the failure of the "limited war," a war which has been "Americanized" to the highest peak.

In order to avoid complete failure, U.S. military strategists have sought to turn the war over to their puppets, admitting thereby the defeat of over 500,000 U.S. and satellite troops in the "limited war" of aggression against the South. This fact spells out the extreme stubborn nature of the U.S. imperialists. They are trying to retrieve the situation, step up and prolong the war by strengthening the puppet army and government in the hope of being relieved of the burden of the war which has weakened their position in Vietnam as well as the entire world, and of preserving their neo-colonialism in the South. This all the more spells out the stupidity of U.S. imperialist ring-leaders who are experiencing a severe defeat. Forced to an impasse, they now push the puppet army, which has already been defeated in "the special war," to resist the South Vietnamese army and people who are at present in the phase of general offensive and uprising.

The whole 1.2 million U.S., puppet and satellite troops represent half the U.S. national defense budget. "The Vietnamese war has destroyed U.S. prestige abroad, caused violence at home and made the youth leave their country (USA). It has limited American efforts in the fight against poverty and racial discrimination, created an anti-militarist psychology and forced the U.S. into isolationism. It has altered the U.S. budget, created corruption, slowed down the economy and brought about unemployment. The Vietnamese war is a cancer, the source of all other diseases (Los Angeles, 28 May 1969).

So how can the U.S. imperialists now decide to bolster the puppet army with their surplus weapons and equipment without suffering a total defeat?

The first phase of experimentation in pressuring the puppet army to assume the burden of the war has already received an answer from the reality of the battlefield.

In the Chu Pa (Tay Nguyen) operation, puppet troops suffered a heavy defeat although they were directed step by step by U.S. troops; in the following operation of "people's right" to the west of Dac To -- entirely commanded by the puppet army with U.S. air and artillery support -- they suffered a shameful defeat; out of 12 puppet battalions thrown into action 9 have been eliminated or suffered severe losses, of these, the joint commando troops and the puppet 42nd regular regiment have been annihilated.

In the successive attacks at Long Khanh a large portion of the Liberation Army of eastern Nam Bo defeated and inflicted severe losses on 8 regular puppet battalions, completely destroyed the 43rd regiment, inflicted severe losses to two command posts of the latter and the command post of the 18th division.

The puppet army has concentrated large forces on the plains of the Chu Long river, but have been unable to resist the three branches of the people's liberation armed forces even with the support of U.S. troops. The glorious victories of the liberation soldiers at Co To, Tri Ton mountains, and Ya No canal, and the destruction of the entire puppet commando battalion at Bui Dai mountain clearly show the helplessness of the puppet army in the plains of Nam Bo where the guerrilla war has developed to new heights.

The policy of "de-Americanization" of the war is a failure reflecting that the aggressive will of the U.S. has been shaken to the roots. The setbacks of this mad policy from the outset have all the more caused confusion in puppet army ranks and the puppet administration and greater tension between the U.S. and their puppets. This policy cannot but collapse and suffer total failure.

The U.S. imperialists' defeat is obvious, but they still stubbornly want to step up and prolong the war. The South Vietnamese army and people, heeding from their victorious and strong position while maintaining the initiative, are all the more determined to fight, make greater efforts, and be resolved to "fight until the U.S. pulls out and until the puppets collapse." With correct policy and leadership and a strategy of all-out offensive on the military, political and diplomatic fronts, the South Vietnamese people and army, with their skillful ways of fighting, have created a new position, a new force and a new opportunity. The more they attack the more the enemy will retreat; the more they fight the more the enemy will deteriorate. The greater the victories won by the South Vietna-

mese army and people, the more ready they are to fight and win in whatever situation and the more ready their forces will be to thwart whatever cunning plot the enemy may have and advance towards total victory.

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