


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N O R T H V I E T N A M

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NIXON FAILURES OUTLINED BY QUAN DOI NHAN DAN



Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1115 GMT 13 Jul 69 S

[13 July QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary: "6 Months of Heavy Failures of Nixon"]

[Text] The vigorous offensive and uprisings of the southern armed forces and people have won great and comprehensive victories have been proper pushing blows for Nixon and company who have stubbornly prolonged their war of aggression.

Six months since he took power in the United States, Nixon has now intensively continued the war of aggression in the southern part of our country. Through the "clear and hold" strategy, the policy of exerting maximum pressure, the accelerated pacification program, and the design to de-Americanize the war of aggression, Nixon has revealed his ambition to seek a position of strength by trying to reduce U.S. casualties and to prop up the puppet army in the hope of maintaining the U.S. neocolonialist policy in South Vietnam. But the U.S. rulers' plots have been countered by events happening on the southern battlefield in the past 6 months. All their strategic plots have been driven a serious step backward. The U.S. aggressors have ignominiously failed to achieve all their main objectives.

1--The impotent clear-and-hold strategy

Never have U.S. casualties been higher than in the past 6 months. During the first 6 months of the Nixon administration, the U.S. aggressors developed and perfected their clear-and-hold strategy. Abrams boasted: "We have the power to stop the Viet Cong attacks." The U.S. psychological warfare organ claimed: "If the Viet Cong launched attacks against U.S. bases, they would fall into the meat grinder of our allied troops." However--and this has become a rule--when the U.S. aggressors were the most subjective and boastful, they were the surprisingly attacked and suffered the heaviest defeats. In the past 6 months, the impotence of the U.S. defensive clear-and-hold strategy was manifested obviously in the following fields:

A--The U.S. aggressors were unable to safely defend their strategic posts, command headquarters, and important bases. More than 100 U.S.-puppet command headquarters--from those of the regiment, brigade, and division to field command headquarters and U.S. Army command headquarters--were repeatedly attacked by the PLAF. About 50 important airfields and hundreds of large logistic bases of the enemy were attacked several times, sustaining heavy losses. Many U.S.-puppet posts in cities, provincial capitals, and district capitals were repeatedly attacked.

The areas where the enemy concentrated the largest number of his troops were attacked the most fiercely. Saigon and Da Nang--where the enemy concentrated a very large number of his men and which were protected by many strong belts--were continually at attacked, sustaining the heaviest damages. The Tay Ninh Province capital and its vicinity were repeatedly attacked by the liberation troops.

The shellings of the Cam Ranh base, encircled by many defensive belts, demonstrated the impotence of the U.S. system of defense in depth. Two days after the series of 22 February attacks, LE FIGARO commented: "The formidable U.S. security system around large cities and military bases in South Vietnam and the intensive bombings by B-52's and troop concentrations were unable to stop the series of attacks that the liberation combatants launched in accordance with their own timing."

Obviously, they were unable to defend what they wanted to defend the most. Their most important objectives were attacked several times, sustaining heavy losses. Many of their clusters of troops in charge of defending Saigon were annihilated. The enemy's defense system was strongly shaken.

B--The U.S. aggressors have been unable to sweep the PLAF, and the U.S. and puppet troops have suffered heavy losses when conducting sweep operations. In the U.S. defensive strategy, a sweep is mainly aimed at holding. In the past 6 months, the Americans failed to hold. One of the main causes is due to their failure to sweep

In order to hold their critical positions, the Americans recently committed grave crimes. They have conducted more sweep operations than in any previous period of time. B-52's each day dropped thousands of tons of bombs over areas suspected of being frequented by the liberation troops. The Americans each month dropped an average of 130 thousand tons of bombs and sprayed tens of thousands of tons of noxious chemicals. But all defense-in-depth operations in the outer belts, police operations in the inner belts, clearing operations around cities and bases, and accelerated pacification campaigns of the Americans and puppets in various strategic operational theaters have been doomed. The sweeps involving tens of thousands of troops in the Kokava, A Shau, A Bia and Dakto mountain areas not only failed to deter the liberation troops attacks, but also became bloody operations because enemy troops fell into the PLAF-prepared battleground.

Reporting on the Americans' operation in A Shau, AFP on 27 March said: "Every eight guerrilla casualties cost 119 U.S. casualties." The Americans' operation in A Bia turned A Bia into "Manburger Hill" because U.S. troops sustained serious casualties. U.S. public opinion was stirred by this stupid "maximum pressure" operation advocated by the Nixon clique. Many U.S. senators called Nixon's military policy "stupid," "irresponsible," or "suicidal."

Obviously, the Americans' strategic "sweeping" measure has only "scooped" maximum U.S. casualties and stirred vehement U.S. public protests.

C--The more the U.S. aggressors persist in clinging to their clear-and-hold strategy the higher casualty toll U.S. troops will sustain. In the recent past, the U.S. aggressors have striven to achieve the top-priority objective of keeping U.S. military forces from sustaining extensive losses. But merciless battlefield realities have shattered the Americans' dream. The casualties sustained by U.S. troops during the past 6 months were unprecedentedly high. During the first 6 months of 1968, U.S. and satellite troops sustained 130,000 casualties. During the first 6 months of this year 145,000 U.S. and satellite troops were killed, wounded, or captured.

While U.S. Defense Secretary Laird, attempting to appease U.S. public opinion, claimed that U.S. casualties had decreased to the lowest level, the U.S. casualty toll, in fact, reached an all-time high. Many crack U.S. divisions, namely, the 25th, the Americal, the 1st Air Cavalry, and the 101st Airborne Divisions, sustained serious losses.

Following the southern armed forces' and people's early spring 1969 offensive wave, the Americans admitted that the total number of U.S. troops killed in the war of aggression in Vietnam had exceeded that sustained in the U.S. war of aggression in Korea. Following the southern armed forces' and people's second offensive wave, which was unleashed on the night of 11 May 1969, the Americans again had to admit that U.S. casualties in Vietnam had exceeded those sustained in World War I. U.S. President Nixon himself also had to admit: "I have noted that our casualty toll extensively increased in the 1969 spring offensive," according to VOA on 19 April.

The fact that U.S. casualties have drastically increased during the past 6 months constitutes not only a serious military defeat, but also a serious political setback for the Nixon clique. Since Nixon is a new holder of power, he wants to exert his influence on the American people. While ballyhooing that he will successfully settle the erroneous, defeated war left over by Johnson, Nixon has sustained even more serious setbacks. The U.S. aggressive war situation has worsened and has become more seriously stalemated, entailing soaring U.S. casualties.

2--The pacification program has gone bankrupt

During the past 6 months, to carry out their plot to concentrate people into camps and encroach upon land, the U.S.-puppet forces have actively implemented their accelerated pacification program for 1969 with very ruthless and wicked tricks. However, faced with the violent offensive and uprising wave of the southern troops and people, the U.S.-puppets have been unable to carry out their minimum program.

In the most important strategic areas, the enemy's pacification plan has gone bankrupt most heavily. In the areas around Da Nang and in the coastal areas in central Trung Bo, in only a month, from 23 February to 23 March, as many as 216 concentration camps and strategic hamlets were destroyed and many U.S.-puppet bases were wiped away. More than 400,000 compatriots were freed from the enemy's yoke. In the Saigon suburbs, Tay Ninh, and Long An, many hamlets which the enemy regarded as pacified or safe were the areas where, at night, the "Viet Cong are free to do what they want," the U.S. aggressors admitted.

In central Nam Bo, during the first 3 months of 1969, hundreds of thousands of people in some 200 villages under U.S.-puppet control arose, encircled and attacked more than 300 posts, punished or dispersed more than 3,200 civil defense men and pacification cadres. The highly organized guerrilla warfare sowed confusion in the U.S.-puppet nerve centers. In Saigon, the revolutionary self-defense armed forces strongly developed their activities in all precincts. Almost all U.S.-puppet pacification operations were defeated.

During the first half of this year, 87 pacification teams were annihilated. In large liberated areas, including those near cities, people increasingly enlarged and consolidated their activities. Commenting on the U.S.-puppet pacification plot, the British paper GUARDIAN on 10 March ironically stated: "This is only a childish game." The U.S. press repeatedly admitted the failure of the U.S.-puppet pacification program. This failure deprived the Americans and their lackeys of human and material resources for prolonging their war of aggression. The puppet Saigon administration declined day by day and lost its foothold even in the most strategic areas.

3--Failure of all de-Americanization experiments

De-Americanizing the war of aggression is Nixon's new scheme. To carry out this scheme, during the past 6 months, the Americans have ordered the puppet Saigon administration to actively and forcibly recruit youths into the army. They have re-equipped the puppet army with weapons and war material and sent a number of puppet units to the battlefield for experimentation. Abrams has boastfully stated: The Saigon army has proved effective and is taking over heavy tasks from U.S. troops.

However, while the U.S. aggressors set many hopes on the puppet army, the latter has been dealt relentless, bitter blows. Over the past 6 months, many puppet divisions and regiments were badly mauled by the PLAF. They were the 18th and 25th divisions in eastern Nam Bo, the 7th Division in the Mekong River delta, the 2d Division in the Tri-Thien area, and the 42d and 47th regiments and the 3rd Armored Regiment in the highlands. The most tragic U.S.-puppet setback was in Long Khanh where the puppet 18th Division was utterly beaten. In northern Kontum where the Americans sent some 12 puppet battalions to join in a sweep, seven were destroyed or suffered heavy losses.

Defeated, the puppet army has become a shambles organizationally. Its combat moral is sagging. The Saigon puppet administration recently admitted that the puppet army's desertion rate has quadrupled, compared with that recorded in 1968. The desertion rate in the 18th and 21st puppet divisions has amounted to 50 percent of their strength.

While the war was being highly Americanized, the Americans began to experiment with the "de-Americanize the war" trick. This unrealistic experiment has brought about no success for the Americans and, consequently, their Vietnamize-the-war policy has become sheer illusion.

4--Nixon's setbacks have shaken the United States

The serious defeats suffered by the Americans over the past 6 months in the South Vietnam war theater have vigorously affected the situation in the United States. When he entered the White House, Nixon thought that through insidious cunning tricks he could deceive or appease the U.S. public which was demanding that the defeated war of aggression in Vietnam be rapidly ended.

But all of Nixon's tricks have successively gone bankrupt. Contrary to Nixon's boastful statement that the battlefield situation developed in favor of the Americans and puppets, some 330,000 U.S., puppet, and satellite troops were killed, wounded, or captured during the first 6 months of this year. While Nixon was giving noisy publicity to his eight-point peace plan, it was criticized by Americans as "offering nothing new and indeed it lead to his decision on the replacement of 25,000 U.S. troops. But this swindle has failed to draw any public attention. The American people have waged a vigorous, widespread struggle, demanding that Nixon immediately end the war of aggression and bring U.S. troops home. American papers have continuously exposed Nixon's setbacks, condemning his erroneous policy. Many U.S. (?politicians) and the former delegate to the Paris conference on Vietnam, Harriman, have also criticized Nixon.

Nixon has been defeated not only in the Vietnam war theater, but also in the United States where U.S. public indignation is lashing at his head. The development of the war situation in South Vietnam over the past 6 months represents an extremely severe verdict pronounced against the Nixon clique.

Because of his stubborn, aggressive stand, Nixon has been plagued by contradictions and has become bogged down in a serious stalemate. Nixon wanted to seek ways to rapidly settle the war while successfully maintaining the U.S. colonialist policy in South Vietnam, but the puppet army and administration are too weak. The more Nixon prolongs the war in order to consolidate the puppet army and administration, the higher U.S. losses soar, the greater difficulties the Americans encounter, and the weaker become the puppet army and administration.

The strenuous efforts which Nixon made to acquire a position of strength have, in the end, only brought him a weak, defeated, and stalemated position. Refusing to draw appropriate lessons from U.S. defeats and stubbornly continuing the war of aggression, the Nixon clique will certainly suffer even more serious defeats and will inevitably suffer complete defeat.

COMMENTARY ON GENEVA AGREEMENTS MEMORANDUM

Hanoi in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 0330 GMT 13 Jul 69 S

[Commentary: "Our People Are Determined To Protect Their Basic National Rights Affirmed by the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam"]

[Text] The 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam will be 15 years old on 20 July 1969. On this occasion, the DRV Foreign Ministry has issued a comprehensive memorandum containing firm theories, which is a sharp weapon in the diplomatic struggle front, helping public opinion further understand that our people's struggle not only has a just cause, but also a firm legal basis specified in the Geneva agreements.

First, the memorandum outlines the 1954 Geneva agreements' basic principles that affirm the Vietnamese people's basic national rights--independence, sovereignty, national unification, and the territorial integrity of Vietnam--setting forth principles for preventing renewed foreign aggression against the Vietnamese people, therefore, insuring lasting peace in Vietnam, Indochina, and Southeast Asia.

The memorandum says: Over the past 15 years, a resolute struggle has been going on between the U.S. imperialists, who have brazenly sabotaged the 1954 Geneva agreements on Vietnam, and the Vietnamese people who, singlemindedly united, have resolutely exercised their legitimate right to self-defense in order to protect basic national rights affirmed by the 1954 Geneva agreements.

In their sacred struggle, our people have defeated the U.S. war of destruction in the north, have defeated the special war, and are defeating the U.S. limited war in the south. The defeats in the war of aggression in Vietnam have driven the United States into a comprehensively difficult situation, militarily, politically, economically, financially, and socially. The Vietnam war has become the most urgent problem for the United States.

Regarding the solution to the Vietnam problem, the DRV Foreign Ministry memorandum pointed out: Any correct political solution to the Vietnam problem must guarantee the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights--the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of Vietnam.

Comparing the NFLSV's 10-point overall solution with U.S. President Nixon's eight-point program, the memorandum pointed out: The two positions contrast with each other. Nixon also speaks of the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people. But taking up concrete problems, especially in the two crucial issues--the withdrawal of troops and insuring the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination--it is clear that the United States is opposed to the fundamental national rights of the Vietnamese people.