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| 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 5 November 1970 | 13. PREPARED BY: <i>George S. Lapinskes</i> GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC |
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15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a letter with the signature block of Phan Hien for B.19 ((possibly aka Security Section, Dien Ban District Party Committee, VC Quang Da Province)). The letter, dated 30 July 1969 and numbered 6/BC, reveals the enemy ((FVNAP/RVNAP)) and friendly ((VC/AVN)) situations in July 1969. The letter describes in detail various activities of ((GVN)) pacification teams, Phuong Hoang agencies, intelligence agencies of E-51 ((possibly 51st RVNAP Regiment)), and Sub-Sector intelligence agencies. The letter also reveals that there was a critical food shortage and friendly personnel had rallied to the enemy.

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B.19 ((possibly aka Security Section,
Điện Bàn District Party Committee, VC
Quang Đà Province, VC Region 5))

No. 6 B/C

REPORT ON THE SITUATION AND ACHIEVEMENTS IN JUL 69.

ENEMY SITUATION.

Military activities:

In order to exert maximum military pressure on us, the enemy concentrated a large number of US and Puppet forces to conduct long-range and fierce operations against us last month. On 10 Jul ((69)), a US regiment conducted a large-scale and fierce sweep operation against Điện Nam and Điện Ngọc Villages. The enemy tried to carry out his scheme of pacifying such villages as Điện Phương, ((Điện)) Bình, ((Điện)) Đông, and ((Điện)) Hải.

On 14 Jul ((69)), a US regiment conducted a sweep operation against Area B ((sic)) of Điện Bàn District. US, Puppet, and South Korean troops still operated in Area K ((sic)). They have launched fierce attacks against us since 5 May ((69)). They continued ((to use bulldozers)) to level and destroy crops and farm produce, especially corn and manioc. They also made efforts to relocate the people ((in resettlement centers)).

South Korean troops remained inactive while US troops spread out to search and lay ambushes. Enemy helicopters operated extensively, especially in Area C.

The enemy increased his accelerated pacification activities in areas surrounding cities and towns. He built ((strategic)) hamlets and resettlement centers, levelled areas along Route 1, and increased ambushes along lines of communication and near ferry landings.

The most noticeable change during the month ((Jul 69)) was that the enemy reinforced his main posts with a ((GVN)) Special Forces company armed with sniper rifles.

Generally, in the military field, the enemy applied the following schemes:

Concentrated US and Puppet troops to fiercely attack forward areas.

Stepped up pacification activities by building ((strategic)) hamlets and relocating the people in the rear areas.

Activities of enemy pacification groups. At the beginning of 1969, the enemy withdrew his pacification groups to Hội An for training.

On 8 Jul ((69)), these pacification groups were organized to perform their activities regularly. The 13 pacification groups of Điện Bàn District were divided as follows:

| | | |
|---------------------------------|---|--------|
| -Điện Vinh ((possibly Village)) | 2 | groups |
| Điện Thanh | 2 | " |
| Điện Trung | 1 | " |
| Bo Bo Area | 4 | " |
| Thanh Quit Area | 4 | " |

(The pacification force in Vinh Điện ((possibly Village)) was not reported.)

These pacification groups were assigned to the above areas on 10 Jul ((69)). The pacification group in Điện Vinh forced the people to clear and level Bình Ba ((Area)) to build a resettlement center. Other groups were inactive at this time.

Activities of ((GVN)) administrative personnel:

During the month, Puppet personnel of the district increased their activities in villages. They held meetings regularly. Assistant District Chief Trần Quang called for repeated airstrikes against Điện Vinh and Thanh Quit. He and his village council members made plans for pacifying the Bồ Đề and Cồn Khê Areas. Supported by the pacification forces, ((GVN)) village administrative personnel came to these areas every day to force the people to have ID cards and family records made in an attempt to control them. In Vinh Điện Area, ((GVN)) administrative personnel used megaphones to appeal to the people to flee from our ((VC)) controlled areas. In addition, they motivated the people to take the necessary procedural steps to demand compensation for war damages. They also forced relatives of revolutionary soldiers to write letters severing relations with them.

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((GVN)) administrative personnel in Kỳ Ngọc and Vinh Hoà ((Areas)) forced the people to leave their villages for areas from No. 3 ((sic)) to Bến Đá.

They also oppressed, arrested, and tortured the people. ((GVN)) administrative personnel in Thanh Sơn ((Village)) forcefully relocated the people into the Bồ Bồ Area. They increased conscription, and strengthened the People's Self-Defense Force by forcing youths 16 years old and older in districts and areas surrounding cities and towns to join this force.

They used megaphones and letters to order male and female youths 14 years old and older to come to their offices in the district. Upon arrival at the district, a great number of them were obliged to write personal history statements to determine their draft status.

On Jul ((69)), ((GVN)) administrative personnel held an indoctrination session at Lam Sơn Square with 50 participants of all ages. The

participants were indoctrinated on the enemy's future political solution and instructed to kill five friendly ((VC)) cadre each. The election and consolidation of ((GVN)) village councils were completed to strengthen their organizations. In the district, the enemy also finished his reorganization.

In short, during the month, ((GVN)) administrative personnel increased their activities in villages to execute the pacification plan, built ((strategic)) hamlets and resettlement centers, and oppressed the people.

However, these personnel were very confused because they feared sacrifice and hardship and did not believe in the success of the pacification program.

Espionage activities:

US intelligence organization: On 25 Jun ((69)), 60 enemy security agents were sent from Quang Tri Province to Quang Nam and Đa Nẵng Provinces. Ten of them, led by Trịnh Văn Ba, were assigned to Điện Bàn District. These agents operated in coordination with the district security section to investigate and report information on the situation to FERRET ((sic)), a US intelligence agency in the Non Nước Area. They operated disguised as defectors, farmers, or workers in areas surrounding cities and towns.

Phưởng Hoàng Intelligence Organization:

This intelligence agency had been disorganized by our forces. However, a branch office with five agents, led by Hầu, was reported to have established the Thiên Nga ((Swan)) Intelligence Organization, aimed at organizing teenagers from 10 to 15 years old to keep track of our activities in areas surrounding cities and towns and along Route 1. These teenagers were organized into separate groups and operated in small areas. Each teenager was assigned the task of watching the activities of a family in his neighborhood.

At present, Phưởng Hoàng agents are conducting a 15-day training course on the purpose and implementation of intelligence tasks for teenagers in Quang Nam Province. After the training, the teenagers will be organized into small groups of five to seven ((each)), led by a Phưởng Hoàng intelligence agent, to detect our locations in areas surrounding cities and towns.

Intelligence agencies of E51 ((possibly 51st RVNAF Regiment)).

These agents operated under various disguises. They usually pretended to earn their living as farmers, drivers, or cashiers in areas surrounding cities and towns. They took advantage of women to recruit female agents or captured the people during sweep operations to exploit information. They also mingled

with the people to bribe teenagers and to get information about our situation and our recruitment of agents.

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Sub-sector intelligence agencies:

Intelligence agents in Quang Nam Sector recruited some traders and wives of friendly KIA guerrillas as agents. Intelligence agents in Diên Bân District investigated the situation in areas along lines of communication.

At night, they entered the people's houses disguised as liberation troops to exploit information by pretending to tell the people of our ((VC)) victories.

Security agents and administrative personnel:

These agents, through the assistance of their ((village and hamlet)) administrations, sent personnel into our liberated areas and recontacted the bad elements who formerly served their administrative personnel and spies and inter-family chiefs.

In cities and in areas surrounding cities and towns, they attempted to check all the papers of the people, especially family records and letters of introduction ((sic)). Those without these papers were considered VC. Therefore, the people had to have papers made. The enemy's public security agents and administrative personnel took advantage of this opportunity to force the people to give weekly reports on our situation to them.

In general, the enemy spies increased their activities in areas surrounding cities and towns and liberated areas. The enemy pacification groups in local areas fanned out to attack us fiercely, and we suffered the following losses:

Nine ((underground)) trenches were uncovered, including five which were not well camouflaged, resulting in one friendly ((VC)) personnel killed, two wounded, and three weapons captured. One trench was destroyed by the enemy through information given by a rallier. However, we suffered no losses. Three other trenches were detected and destroyed by enemy spies, resulting in three friendly ((VC)) personnel killed, five arrested, and five weapons captured.

Psywar and "Open-Arms" activities:

The most important factor during the month was that the enemy took advantage of death, hardships, and the fierceness of war caused by his attacks and long-range sweep operations to increase his psywar and "Open-Arms" activities. He spread groundless rumors and threatened our troops. During his sweep operations, the enemy often used aircraft to conduct loudspeaker propaganda, and to drop leaflets in cities and areas surrounding cities and towns. Groups of enemy psywar personnel also conducted propaganda activities to call for the surrender of our cadre and guerrillas and cause confusion among the people. In addition, village and hamlet ((GWN)) administrative personnel used letters to appeal to our cadre and guerrillas to return. These enemy activities have strongly influenced the morale of our troops and people.

A great number of people became confused in the face of the enemy propaganda and threats.

Some cadre and guerrillas in almost all the villages of the district became confused and passive. They had the tendency to respond to the enemy "Open-Arms" program. Especially, in Area K ((sic)), a number of our personnel

were demoralized. Some of them defected to the enemy because they feared hardships and fierceness of enemy attacks.

Following are the results of enemy Open-Arms activities during the month:

In Diên Hoa ((Village)): On 2 Jul ((70)), the enemy destroyed some of our fortifications. Đa, a former province Farmers' Association cadre, defected to the enemy and helped him attack us, resulting in the capture of a number of our agents.

In Diên Phong ((Village)), three young farmers responded to the enemy pacification program.

In Diên Quang ((Village)), a guerrilla defected to the enemy and helped him attack us, causing us a number of losses.

In Diên Thắng ((Village)): Nguyễn Chính, a former guerrilla, had previously defected to the enemy and then returned to our side and was indoctrinated in the district. He was then sent to an engineer training course in a village. Afterward, he again defected to the enemy along with a farmer and took two weapons. He also helped the enemy destroy one fortification.

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In Diên An ((Village)): Lê Kha, a Party member, transferred by the district ((Party Committee)) to the production section, defected to the enemy on 15 Jul ((70)), and took two hand grenades.

In Diên Thọ ((Village)): A Party Committee was captured by the enemy.

At present, a number of our personnel in the district are attempting to rally to the enemy in response to the appeal of his "Open-Arms" program. Therefore, countermeasures are being taken.

These facts created an unfavorable impression among the people and had a bad influence on monetary contributions ((to the Revolution)) by the people.

Activities of religious sects:

In cities and areas surrounding cities and towns, Buddhists and Catholics were conducting their normal religious activities. Concerning Cao Đàiism, a pagoda headed by Monk Nguyễn Xuân Hào was being built in the northern part of Diên Hoà Village. This monk is a missionary. He is also a tyrant.

In the political field, a majority of Buddhists had a high degree of political awareness and contributed a great deal ((to the Revolution)). Conversely, a great number of Catholic and Cao Đài leaders were against us, and a majority of their followers had a low degree of political awareness.

Activities of factions:

Vietnamese Nationalist Party: This Party had many members and operated strongly. It had village chapters and group chapters led by a secretary who was also a chairman of ED ((sic)). The Party members operated secretly and concentrated upon their Party development tasks in cities and areas surrounding cities and towns.

The Party was suspected of conducting its activities in liberated areas, because the person who threw a grenade at our personnel and fled when detected at Diên Hòa Village might be a Vietnamese Nationalist Party member. Other factions remained inactive.

FRIENDLY SITUATION

Maintenance of security: The enemy has conducted repeated and fierce attacks and leveled our villages, thus causing us a number of difficulties.

Our cadre in areas which were fiercely attacked by the enemy moved to populous areas. In these areas, the enemy easily detected and attacked them with airstrikes and artillery fire, because it was difficult for them to keep their activities secret among the complex activities of the people. This has caused many difficulties to the farm production and movement of the people.

((GVN)) administrative personnel and pacification agents came ((to villages and hamlets)) to threaten and oppress the people. They operated in areas surrounding cities and towns and some liberated areas.

In thinly populated areas, our personnel could not mingle with the people, and therefore had to concentrate in small areas. They were often negligent in keeping their messing and billeting activities secret. Therefore, they were often detected and attacked by the enemy.

The most noticeable fact was that the theft of public property and famine still occurred in local areas. Especially, in Area K, corruption still was prevalent and public property was also stolen. Some of our personnel took advantage of the confusion caused by enemy attacks to steal rice and corn from the people.

In populous areas, petty thefts occurred continuously, such as stealing money, radios, pumpkins, and chickens. In addition, noisy quarrels were commonplace in villages and hamlets.

These facts made the situation last month very complicated and caused us some losses.

The people's situation:

The enemy's fierce attacks and long-range sweep operations caused us some losses. He also ((used bulldozers)) to level villages, and to build ((strategic)) hamlets and resettlement centers to carry out his pacification program. The people were very confused. As a result of the enemy's "Open-Arms" activities, a number of people hated our cadre and guerrillas and did not believe in the revolutionary cause.

A majority of the people in liberated areas (Area K) were especially concerned about famine because the enemy destroyed almost all their farm production, causing some persons to starve.

In this situation, some people last month became very confused. They feared relocation into resettlement centers, hardships, and famine. They also lost faith in the final victory of the Revolution.

However, a majority of the people still remained in their villages to increase farm production, struggle against the enemy, and participate in all revolutionary tasks without fear of enemy attack.

Friendly situation:

After the political reorientation course, the ideology of our cadre was considerably improved. Therefore, they have participated in all tasks. However, fear of sacrifices and the fierceness of a protracted war, passive attitudes, waste, and corruption still existed. A number of our personnel showed a tendency to respond to the enemy pacification program (especially in Area K). They were not eager to do their tasks, attend meetings regularly, or participate in Party activities. They also spoke at random, lacked a sense of responsibility and organization, did not strictly execute orders, had little will to fight, and feared hardship.

Review of friendly ((VC)) activities:

To gain achievements in remembrance of the 20th of July ((signing of the Geneva Agreement)), the district initiated a short-range emulation phase lasting from 20 Jun ((69)) to 20 Jul ((69)). This phase was aimed at stepping up the task of killing tyrants and traitors, countering the enemy's pacification plan, and executing some immediate tasks.

Motivation of the people: A study of the situation was made. Our personnel are motivating the people in Diên Tiên and Diên Ngoc Villages. The motivation of the people in Diên Thọ Village is about to begin.

Investigation tasks: Diên Ngoc and almost all populous villages finished their investigation tasks.

The task of killing tyrants and traitors: This task was stepped up during the month in accordance with specific plans.

Concerning equipment, our villages need time fuses. Two suicide cells were assigned by Diên Tiên Village to forward areas to carefully attack selected objectives. Plans for their activities were well prepared.

Almost all suicide reconnaissance cells were well indoctrinated on ideology. Therefore, they had a high determination to fight and took part in the emulation phases initiated in all villages. During the emulation phase, Le, aka Sang, the cruelest tyrant, was killed. Dien Vinh Village launched continuous attacks against the enemy pacification personnel, driving them out of the village.

As a result, this phase of killing tyrants had a very favorable influence on our people, making them put full confidence in the Revolution.

Nine missions were conducted, resulting in 35 enemy soldiers KIA (including 20 pacification cadre, three intelligence agents, four Popular Force troops, two soldiers of E51 ((possibly 51st RVNAF Regiment)), and six administrative personnel including one assistant district chief, one administrative service chief, and one ((village council)) chairman), and 11 wounded (including seven soldiers of E51 ((Regiment)), two pacification cadre, one intelligence agent, and one administrative personnel). In addition, one typewriter and one Honda were damaged; and two ((A)) R-15 ((M-16)) rifles, one .45 caliber pistol, and another Honda were captured.

In general, during the past month the task of killing tyrants was successful. The destruction of the tyrant cited above has badly influenced the morale of all others, making them very confused. Furthermore, attacks were launched against the enemy while he was in his base or was perpetrating crimes.

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However, the task of killing tyrants was not continuously carried out, thus failing to achieve the expected results.

Political attacks:

To parallel the killing of tyrants, political attacks were also launched against the enemy. After an enemy soldier was killed, a note of warning was immediately sent to enemy troops. This made them very fearful. Some of them deserted their ranks.

However, our political attacks launched during the month were not as successful as those in previous months because they were not continuously and widely conducted. As a result, we could not force the enemy to make concessions.

Suppressive activities:

While pacification cadre were increasing their pacification activities, ((GVN)) administrative personnel operated strongly. To cope with this situation, the district worked out specific plans for villages in order to maintain and develop our movement. In accordance with the Party's leadership, the Current Affairs Committee held two court sessions to judge two enemy personnel, a spy, and an administrative person who was also a member of the Vietnamese Nationalist Party. We killed two Vietnamese Nationalist Party members including one Vietnamese Nationalist Party member in charge of financial and economic affairs on the spot.

Two other enemy spies were secretly killed.

An indoctrination session was organized for four ((GVN)) administrative personnel.

An enemy spy was released after attending a short-term indoctrination session.

The result of our suppressive activities has made the people very enthusiastic and demoralized a number of local ((GVN)) administrative personnel.

Situation of the prison:

The prison was completely destroyed by B-52 bombers. All houses, trenches, property, and food ((for prisoners)) were destroyed.

Prisoners were hungry, because there was no rice. Therefore, almost all of them were ill with beriberi.

At present, the most difficult problems facing us are that we have no safe site for the prison and that famine is prevalent.

Enemy sweep operations caused us many difficulties in following and capturing enemy personnel. The number of enemy personnel captured decreased, though there are very numerous enemy personnel who must be arrested by our agents. Furthermore, we are faced with many difficulties in leading them to our bases. Therefore, last month, we could carry out this task in forward areas only.

30 Jul 69
For B.19

/S/ Phan Nién

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----