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15. SUMMARY:
 (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured in June 1969, and concerns a study originated from the BTH ((poss VN abbreviation for Ban Tuyen Huan meaning Propaganda-Training Section)) of X69 ((poss element of Sub-Region 6, COSVN)), providing an assessment of the political and military situation during the 1969 Spring-Summer Campaign.

(C) Following is a full translation of a captured enemy document. This document was captured in June 1969 in South Vietnam (WS940498; III CTZ) by 4/39 Inf, 1/9th US Inf Div. The document was received at CDEC on 8 June 1969, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 22,357 dated 10 June 1969 under CDEC Document Log Number 06-1348-69.

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CERTAIN HINTS FOR THE CONDUCT OF
THE STUDY OF THIS DOCUMENT

1. Considering the importance of the spring-Summer task, the race against time and the complex Saigon situation, it is imperative that the Party Headquarters and the hardcore revolutionary forces be instilled with additional fervor and be made to clearly grasp the circumstance, mission, and policy of the General Offensive-and General Uprising. Consequently, it is essential to overcome all difficulties and to conduct elaborate indoctrination for the local cadres, Party and group members, and [Liberation] association members.

2. The focus of indoctrination consists of making everyone assess the main points of the General Offensive and General Uprising policy, realize the opportunity and mission, give his full measure devotion and fervor, ascertain his revolutionary outlook, and work out realistic action programs.

3. It is necessary to hand out instructional materials for everyone to read in advance. Explanations will be made in proper sequence. Each topic must be related to a specific situation and past performance. Lessons may be repeated to help the students understand. Rectification of erroneous thoughts will be made to build confidence in Party leadership and guidelines.

4. Duration of the classes and methods of conducting them will depend on the specific situation. The most important thing is that adequate preparations be made by the instructors, who must be able to master the subject they teach. Results of the courses will not be satisfactory, unless the instructors are qualified and well prepared.

It is hoped that the courses will be well conducted and that reports submitted to "X.69" so that this headquarters can take appropriate action.

Propaganda and Training Section

"X.69"

Some Figures Illustrating the Victories Gained During the First Ten Days of the 1969 Lunar New Year.

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1. Attacks on 36 cities and province capitals,
2. Attack on 35 American, Puppet, and satellite Command HQ from regiment size and above
3. Attacks on 38 airfields,
4. Attacks on 17 major rear service installations—Long Binh, Nha Be, Cam Ranh, etc...
5. Attacks on over 100 district seats, towns and sub-sector headquarters,
6. Attacks on and disruption of Highways 1,4,13,15,19 and 20, numerous provincial routes and waterways—Long Tau, Dong Nai, Vam Co and Mang Thit rivers,
7. Killing, wounding and/or capture of 45,00 American and Puppet troops (of these 23,00 were Americans and 2,000 satellite troops),
8. Destruction of and / or damage inflicted on two division headquarters, six brigade headquarters, ten American infantry battalions and two artillery battalions, one Royal Thai infantry battalion, 60 companies of American, Puppet and/or satellite country troops. Particularly, the United States 25th Infantry Division aka "Tropic Lightning" and Americal Division were badly battered. The 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division stationed at Dau Tieng was inflicted a serious blow.
9. Four hundred and seventy assorted aircraft were destroyed.
10. Two hundred artillery pieces and heavy mortars were destroyed.
11. One hundred and fifteen river craft were sunk or burned; 35 bridges were blown up.
12. One hundred ammunition dumps and POL depots were destroyed. (Ninety million liters of gasoline were burned at Binh Dinh.)

Comparison: The above results exceeded those gained during the first ten days of the 1968 Lunar Year offensive, surpassed those of the entire year 1965, doubled those of Điện Biên Phủ, equaled nine times those of the Nam Tha [?] battle and twice those of "Thuong Cam Linh" [sic] in Korea.

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----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

"To intensify the activity, to bolster the revolutionary fervor, and to urge the South Vietnamese [Liberation] army and people to move forward for the achievement of decisive victories in the days to come..."

Documents for study by the local cadre party, group and association members.

Through the successive phases of General Offensive, the American and Puppet forces have suffered the most staggering defeats. The army and people of South Vietnam are being confronted with the most favorable circumstances. The Party appeals to the army and people of South Vietnam to exert their stupendous efforts to wage all-out attacks on the enemy during the Spring and Summer of 1969, create a "pre-uprising situation" in urban centers, and make preparation to move forward for gaining decisive victories in the days to come.

The cadre, Party and Group members, who constitute the "pillar of the revolutionary movement," must fully assess the Party policy and guideline to exercise leadership of the masses.

Following are specific matters:

I. What are the main points in the Party policy of General Offensive-General Uprising which need to be mastered?

The policy of General Offensive-General Uprising initiated in 1967 has proven to be correct. It behoves us to fully grasp this policy with particular emphasis laid on the following key points:

First, the General Offensive-General Uprising phase is an extremely fierce stage of the struggle. While we launch our offensive and pursue the enemy, he will retaliate with many military and political capabilities. Consequently--and certainly--the situation will become "complex and difficult." It is imperative that we realize that complexity and difficulty in order to seize the initiative in all eventualities, consolidate our revolutionary and militant stance, guard against vacillation, brave sacrifices and hardships, and carry out to the letter Uncle Ho's dictum "so long as there is the presence of a single aggressor on our territory, we must resolutely wipe him out".

Second, due to the presence of a million American and Puppet troops, the General Offensive and General Uprising cannot be accomplished at one stroke or one stage lasting 3-5 days or a month. Instead, it must be conducted through successive stages concurrently with the buildup of our own forces. Our military and political forces must be able to increase

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our prestigand frower in urban centers—through "sporadic and simultaneous activities". To our agents who are operating within the urban areas all this means that while stepping up our political action, guerrilla warfare, elimination of tyrants, disruption of the coercive governmental apparatus, it is imperative that we should motivate the the population regiment the masses and enlarge party, group, liberation association and guerrilla memberships in order that the more attacks we conduct, the more installations in labor districts we can build up and the stronger our political and armed organizations in place will become. Then we will proceed to initiate a simultaneous armed uprising participated by millions of Saigon residents in conjunction with the General Offensive to gain a decisive victory.

3. Third, our General Offensive- and general Uprising must depend on the combined forces of three areas—the mountainous, rural, and urban areas; on three types of forces--the regular, local, and-guerrilla forces; on three prongs--military, political, and [enemy] troop proselyting; and on three fronts--military, political and diplomatic. Apart from "regular" offensive, there will be climaxing phases in which combined military, political and troop proselyting actions are brought to bear on the enemy simultaneously everywhere, denying him an opportunity to react. Despite our lack of personnel and advanced technology, we have succeeded—thanks to our skill in organization, good observance of discipline and the combined strength of our forces in the winter-summer campaign in dealing death blows to over on million well-equipped American and Puppet troops. If our seccesses victory were still limited in the recent past it was because certain elements and places failed to mobilize this combined strength and, especially, to adopt the "three-prong " tactics. they did not know how to organize and motivate the masses and coordinate guerrilla warfare with eliminating the tyrants , breaking up the oppressive control, conducting political struggle against the enemy, and proselyting [enemy] troops and police.

Fourth, it is our goal in the General Offensive and General Uprising to achieve a decisive success, which would eventually lead to total victory. By total victory are meant the departure from our country of all aggressors, the turning over of all farmland to the peasantry, the return of power to the people, and the reunification of North and South Vietnam.

As immediate task, we must bend all our efforts to gaining a decisive victory, which more specifically means;

1. To deal the most stunning blow to the United States, forcing it to abandon its aggressive attempt and to withdraw all American and "satellite" troops from South Vietnam; to weaken the Puppet government and army in such a way that, after the American pullout, our military and political forces in South Vietnam can be superior to those of the enemy.

2. To try to hold sway over most of the countryside and most of the wards and sub-wards in urban centers.

3. To strive to establish—at all costs—a broad-based national democratic coalition government the core of which is the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN).

Only by achieving such a measure of success can we prevent the U.S. and Puppets from rekindling the war, after peace is restored, and can our Revolution have enough prestige and power to attain its final goal.

On the contrary, if the United States is reluctant to withdraw its troops, if the Puppet forces are in a stronger position after the Americans' withdrawal or if the NFLSVN plays only a minor role in the coalition government, it is definitely certain that we do not win. For if this were the case, the United States would keep pursuing its aggressive purpose and the Puppet government its traitorous schemes. Then, the peace thus gained would not be a stable one and we would not be strong enough to achieve an all-out victory.

Fifth, while concentrating our forces in anticipation of the General Offensive and General Uprising to achieve a decisive victory, we must be prepared to defeat the enemy in the event he is bent on protracting the war in South Vietnam or expanding it across the country / TN: Into North Vietnam /.

The above five points make up our Party's unshakeable stand which all of us must comprehend and abide by.

II. How are the South Vietnam Situation and That of Saigon Like More Than A Year After the General Offensive? What Makes the Party Think We Are Confronted with the Most Propitious Circumstances?

Over a year after the General Offensive, the following salient points are noticed with respect to enemy and friendly situation:

1. Although their aggressive attempts have not been crushed, the American invaders are being "shaken loose." They have been compelled to unconditionally stop the bombing of NVN. They have had to ask the NFLSVN to attend the Paris conference. They have been forced "to shrink" into the defense of urban centers and bases. They are thinking about pulling their troops out of South Vietnam and undertaking the so-called "de-Americanization" of the aggressive war—which means the gradual turning over of the war burden to the Puppets.

2. In face of recent heavy defeats, the Puppet government and army

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find themselves in utter confusion, especially after realizing that their masters--the Americans--are planning to withdraw. The warlike militarist Thieu-Ky-Huong clique is being shaken up and isolated.

The enemy ranks are splintered with serious contradictions. The Puppet administration is weakened and functions in a perfunctory manner. Desertion rates are increasingly high beyond remedy. The financial and economic situation is in a chaos. The society is deteriorating. The population's material and moral lives are "strained." All strata of life are profoundly resentful of the Puppet administration and the "spearhead of resentment" is directed at the obstinate and warlike Thieu-Ky-Huong clique. The United States and the Puppet administration are in a defensive and isolated position at the Paris conference.

3. For our part, despite the many difficulties and rigors encountered, we become stronger and stronger through our General Offensive action. Our three types of forces in the three areas are becoming stronger and stronger. The Front's prestige at home and overseas keeps rising. After the failure of the war of destruction waged by the United States against NVN, our capability to funnel supplies to the frontline has increased. Judging from the developments in South Vietnam's theater of operations on the first days of the Spring 1969 offensive and from our diplomatic offensive at the Paris conference, we cannot help realizing our "position of strength, victory and initiative" and the position of defensive assumed by the United States and the Puppet government. Even in Saigon, hub of enemy defense, he cannot conceal his weaknesses and failures.

The salient characteristic of the Saigon situation in recent days is the unchecked expansion of the [revolutionary] movement and the increasingly vigorous attacks launched against the enemy despite the massing of his huge military force committed to the defense of Saigon, the deployment of his vast police and security network and his strict control measures. The masses' revolutionary awareness and resentment against the U.S. puppet regime constitute the most secure basis of the movement. They rally under the Front's banner with boundless confidence and pride. Beset with the feeling of being "abandoned," they are ready to join in great numbers any "progressist" struggle movement. Conversely, they boycott such reactionary organizations as the "National Salvation Front" or Hoang Quynh's political convention.

Parallel to the political movement, the guerrilla warfare movement within the capital keeps expanding. Unlike in the past when "incidents" took place only once in a while, actions in the forms of assassinations, setting off of explosive charges and harassment, now occur once--sometimes three to four times--daily.

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Our political and armed strength keeps increasing. The enemy has proven unable to cope with the movement. Such policies as assignment of servicemen to the posts of ward chiefs and continuing police operations conducted from one precinct to another give credence to the ineffectiveness of his oppressive control at subward and ward levels. On account of the failure of the large police force to cope with us, the Rangers, Field Police, Thu Duc military school cadets, etc. are committed to police duties to counter our activities. The high desertion rate has caused the enemy to recruit additional MPs. Judging from the above situation, our Party says that "the South Vietnam Revolution is faced with the most favorable circumstances in its efforts to achieve a decisive victory in the days to come".

3. What is the Enemy Attempting to Do? What Are the Party Goals during the 1969 Spring and Summer?

The United States is at present contemplating a way out of the Vietnam conflict but is endeavoring to shore up the puppet army and administration on which it expects to depend for the continuation of its neo-colonialist policy in South Vietnam.

To this end, the United States capitalizes on the clear-and-hold strategy, deploys its troops at military installations and urban centers—especially Saigon—for their defense, and hurriedly furnishes equipment to the Puppet army. [The Puppet administration] forces the population living in the areas under its domination to join the civil self-defense and bends every effort to carrying out the pacification program, hurriedly gaining control over the population and enlarging the "defense belts" of metropolitan centers.

On the political front, the enemy is trying to rally a political force in support of the ruling circles, seed spies into our ranks for sabotage, employ the traitors in their attacks on us, and carry out the "Chieu Hoi" schemes.

In urban centers the enemy is seeking by every possible means to impose his oppressive hold [on the population]. He employs military leaders to buttress the Puppet administration at subward and ward levels, intensifies create conditions for the people's uprising.

4. To step up troop and civilian proselyting tasks in order to dislocate major parts of the Puppet army; to incite the enemy troops and police to stand up and instigate military coups and revolts.

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In a word, every effort should be made to frustrate the United States aggressive scheme and disrupt the Puppet administration and army so that a "pre-uprising" situation can be created in metropolitan centers in anticipation of an armed upheaval to gain control of the subwards and wards in conjunction with a vigorous military offensive for the achievement of a decisive victory.

4. What is Expected of Each Individual operating in Urban Centers to Contribute to the Accomplishment of the immediate victory.

The first and foremost thing, which we must be proud of, is the instigation, at all costs, of an armed uprising in Saigon, redoubt of the Americans and the puppets. It is imperative that each of us does his utmost to achieve the following:

1. To stir up the most "ebullient revolutionary fervor" within the Capital so as to instill in the million Saigon residents a strong revolutionary determination to engage in an armed upheaval; to contribute to the achievement of a decisive victory; to rally hundreds of thousands of inhabitants into overt, semi-overt and secret organizations for the activation of a powerful revolutionary army and the admission into the Party and the Group of outstanding and loyal persons.

2. To step up the political struggle to proceed toward a widespread political offensive for the overthrow of the incumbent government, formation of a peace cabinet, which will enter into serious talks with the NFLSVN for his control measures, cracks down on the local revolutionary force, keeps our troops from conducting attacks from the outside into these metropolitan centers, and prevents our citizens from rising up. In a word, the conspiracies to be perpetrated by the enemy will be diversified in nature and he is likely to cause us a great deal of difficulties in the near future. Therefore, it is imperative that we keep him under close surveillance, guard against "subjective thinkings" and heighten our vigilance. But we can assert that, no matter what they contrive, they cannot help suffering the increasingly crushing defeat on account of their lack of a just cause, their "going-down-hill" position, and their splintered ranks.

With a view to crushing the enemy plots and making the most of the situation during the 1969 Spring and Summer, the entire South Vietnam's army and people must devote their stupendous efforts to accomplishing the following tasks:

1. To destroy or wear down part of the American and Puppet "potential and their rear service installations; to dislocate a certain number of the Puppet military units.

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2. To frustrate the enemy's scheme of urgent pacification; to enlarge the liberated area in the countryside; to encircle and bring heavy pressure on cities, province capitals and district towns.

3. To bolster the political movements in metropolitan centers; to demand the overthrow of Thieu-Ky, and Huong, the formation of a peace cabinet to enter into serious negotiations with the NLF/SVN; to expand and upgrade the people's guerrilla warfare movement in metropolitan centers so as to constantly disturb the enemy rear; to relentlessly destroy the wicked tyrants and put heavy pressure on the sub-ward and ward governmental functions to the restoration of peace, safeguarding of national sovereignty and protection of the people's social welfare and democratic rights.

3. To bolster the people's guerrilla warfare movement; to enlarge the scope of harassment and sabotage; to intensify the attrition operations designed to erode the enemy potential in climaxing phases.

4. To increase proselyting actions targeted at the [puppet] troops, police, and establish contact with those families having their children serving in the army or police force. To discuss a plan for motivation of their relatives with specific requirements and under specific circumstances.

5. To widen the scope of domination over the penetration bases and labor districts within metropolitan centers; to expand the agent network within major firms, schools, markets; to establish a firm foothold for the movement and the different urban forces.

Every effort will be diverted to one direction— the positive preparation for an armed uprising to be participated by hundreds of thousands of Saigon residents for gaining control over the sub-wards and wards. This uprising will be conducted vigorously in conjunction with the General Offensive to compel the United States to withdraw its forces and accept a coalition cabinet whose core is made up of a NLF/SVN representation. The United States and the Puppet administration will thus be forced to end their war of aggression and remain in the posture of the defeated.

In view of the arduous tasks and pressing time, we are ordered by the Party to make the most of the circumstances and undertake the armed uprising at any cost. Whether the decisive victory, will be gained sooner or later, depends primarily on our own efforts.

2. To frustrate the enemy's scheme of urgent pacification; to enlarge the liberated area in the countryside; to encircle and bring heavy pressure on cities, province capitals and district towns.

3. To bolster the political movements in metropolitan centers; to demand the overthrow of Thieu-Ky, and Huong, the formation of a peace cabinet to enter into serious negotiations with the NLF SVN; to expand and upgrade the people's guerrilla warfare movement in metropolitan centers so as to constantly disturb the enemy rear; to relentlessly destroy the wicked tyrants and put heavy pressure on the sub-ward and ward governmental functions to the restoration of peace; safeguarding of national sovereignty and protection of the people's social welfare and democratic rights.

3. To bolster the people's guerrilla warfare movement; to enlarge the scope of harassment and sabotage; to intensify the attrition operations designed to erode the enemy potential in climaxing phases.

4. To increase proselyting actions targeted at the [puppet] troops, police, and establish contact with those families having their children serving in the army or police force. To discuss a plan for motivation of their relatives with specific requirements and under specific circumstances.

5. To widen the scope of domination over the penetration bases and labor districts within metropolitan centers; to expand the agent network within major firms, schools, markets; to establish a firm foothold for the movement and the different urban forces.

Every effort will be diverted to one direction-- the positive preparation for an armed uprising to be participated by hundreds of thousands of Saigon residents for gaining control over the sub-wards and wards. This uprising will be conducted vigorously in conjunction with the General Offensive to compel the United States to withdraw its forces and accept a coalition cabinet whose core is made up of a NLF SVN representation. The United States and the Puppet administration will thus be forced to end their war of aggression and remain in the posture of the defeated.

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In a word, every effort should be made to frustrate the United States aggressive scheme and disrupt the Puppet administration and army so that a "pre-uprising" situation can be created in metropolitan centers in anticipation of an armed upheaval to gain control of the subwards and wards in conjunction with a vigorous military offensive for the achievement of a decisive victory.

4. What is Expected of Each Individual operating in Urban Centers to Contribute to the Accomplishment of the immediate victory.

The first and foremost thing, which we must be proud of, is the instigation, at all costs, of an armed uprising in Saigon, redoubt of the Americans and the puppets. It is imperative that each of us does his utmost to achieve the following:

1. To stir up the most "ebullient revolutionary fervor" within the Capital so as to instill in the million Saigon residents a strong revolutionary determination to engage in an armed upheaval; to contribute to the achievement of a decisive victory; to rally hundreds of thousands of inhabitants into overt, semi-overt and secret organizations for the activation of a powerful revolutionary army and the admission into the Party and the Group of outstanding and loyal persons.

2. To step up the political struggle to proceed toward a widespread political offensive for the overthrow of the incumbent government, formation of a peace cabinet, which will enter into serious talks with the NPLSVN for his control measures, cracks down on the local revolutionary force, keeps our troops from conducting attacks from the outside into these metropolitan centers, and prevents our citizens from rising up. In a word, the conspiracies to be perpetrated by the enemy will be diversified in nature and he is likely to cause us a great deal of difficulties in the near future. Therefore, it is imperative that we keep him under close surveillance, guard against "subjective thinkings" and heighten our vigilance. But we can assert that, no matter what they contrive, they cannot help suffering the increasingly crushing defeat on account of their lack of a just cause, their "going-down-hill" position, and their splintered ranks.

With a view to crushing the enemy plots and making the most of the situation during the 1969 Spring and Summer, the entire South Vietnam's army and people must devote their stupendous efforts to accomplishing the following tasks:

1. To destroy or wear down part of the American and Puppet "potential and their rear service installations; to dislocate a certain number of the Puppet military units.