

04-2064-70

A FILE / SUBJ.
DATE / SUB-CAT.

8109

SUBJ: (C) Message from COSVN Current Affairs Committee on 1969 Fall Campaign.

Date: Unknown
YS219003 ((sic))
Province: Unknown
III CTZ
1st Inf Bde,
RTAVF.
Batch No. 322-13
Received CDEC:
13 Apr 70
Category: C

(C) (5 pages, handwritten; B-3) Message, dated 18 Aug 69 with the signature block of Hai Van ((previously identified as ranking cadre)) for the Current Affairs Committee of M40 ((possibly aka COSVN)), complains about the failure of the sub-region and provinces in attacks during the first part of the 1969 Fall Campaign. Document states that, except for some local areas, such as My Tho Province, many attacks were conducted by friendly ((VC/NVA)) forces throughout Military Regions 5, 6, and 10 and Tri Thien Military Region during the first five days of the ((1969)) Fall Campaign. The enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) forces suffered heavy losses in the Binh Long and Tay Ninh battlefields, with 5,000 troops killed or wounded, 71 aircraft downed, and 551 military vehicles and 51 artillery pieces destroyed. American troops had withdrawn from the Mekong River Delta and the morale of the US and Puppet ((RVNAF)) troops was deteriorating. Enemy military activities reportedly decreased from 50% to 60% in some areas. The situation was said to be developing in the friendly favor, but friendly forces failed to realize the importance of the Fall Campaign and conducted attacks without coordination. Since the beginning of the Fall Campaign, M40 had received no reports from its subordinate military regions and sub-regions. This was a serious shortcoming of local military commanders. "It was possible that a number of ((VC)) main force units in the Mekong River Delta could not develop their combat effectiveness, but why have the local forces of many sub-regions, provinces and districts also displayed poor coordination? Was it because of poor leadership on the part of a number of sub-region, province or district Party Committees, or was it because these agencies had been busy studying Resolution 9, and had failed to prepare specific combat plans?" For the second phase of the ((1969)) Fall Campaign, subordinate sub-regions were instructed by M40 to draw out part of their main force elements now fighting in "main directions" and to initiate attacks on the fringe areas ((of Saigon)). Part of the main force units from Military Regions 2 and 3 were instructed to provide support for local guerrilla activities. M40's subordinate units were advised to adopt deep penetration tactics and to use small units during their upcoming sapper and engineer attacks on enemy communication axes. In addition, local guerrilla movement, counterpacification, and military proselyting activities should be the main areas stressed during the second phase of the ((1969)) Fall Campaign.

61.80