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| 5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACO: CB; 12 May 1970                                                        | 12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)                                                                   |
| 6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>B</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>                                              | 13. PREPARED BY: <i>George J. Fisher</i><br>GEORGE J. FISHER, MAJ, MI<br>OPNS OFF, US ELM, CDEC    |
| 7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT                                                               | 14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Alvin W. Lotz</i><br>ALVIN W. LOTZ, LTC, USA<br>DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC |

04-303-70

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 12 May 1970, and concerns a directive, in Cambodian, dated 25 October 1969, originated by Group 170-YU ((possibly an agency of the Front for National Reunification of Cambodia)), which provides guidance for frustrating the enemy ((CNAF = Cambodian National Armed Forces)) during the dry season, from November 1969 to June 1970. Activities to be implemented included the construction of defensive positions, the elimination of spies, the relocation of civilians, and the development of Party and Youth Groups in military units. The document adds that the combat mission was to be widespread and consist of guerrilla type tactics.

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((Page 1 of Item 3 of O.T.))

DIRECTIVE ON THE INCREASE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN  
ORDER TO FRUSTRATE THE OFFENSIVE PLAN OF THE ENEMY  
((CNAP=CAMBODIAN NATIONAL ARMED FORCES)) DURING THE  
DRY SEASON, AND ON THE CONSOLIDATION OF ((COMMUNIST))  
PARTY AND YOUTH GROUP IN MILITARY UNITS.

I. FRIENDLY ((CAMBODIAN COMMUNIST)) SITUATION:

1. After having been defeated during an operation designed to clear the roads in Pakop, from May to Aug ((69)), during which 800 enemy troops were killed or wounded, and due to the losses caused by friendly raids in Sep ((69)) which consisted of approximately 400 enemy troops killed or wounded, the obstinate enemy is now preparing a large scale attack plan to be launched against friendly bases from Nov 69 to May-Jun 70.

The Party's point of view on the enemy plan of attack is as follows:

From Nov to Dec 69, the enemy may conduct military operations in the areas around their posts, aimed at destroying friendly economic resources, by spraying defoliation chemicals, using incendiary grenades to burn friendly rice and the people's rice, preventing the people from harvesting their crops, etc..., as well as gaining control of the population.

From Jan to May-Jun 70, the enemy may conduct another attack phase in an effort to reopen roads and to establish additional posts in the Voemé Sai, Lomphat and Bo Keo areas ((Ratanakiri Province, Cambodia)). This phase would be greater than the former one.

((Page 2 of Item 3 of O.T.))

2. With regard to friendly activity, a movement has been initiated to protect friendly forces from suffering casualties, and at the same time to successfully wear down the enemy forces. 1,200 enemy troops were killed or wounded during the recent period from May to Sep 69. The people and guerrillas made millions of spikes. In addition, many roads and bridges were sabotaged which interrupted the enemy traffic for months.

3. At present, efforts are being made by the enemy at home and abroad to create conditions to launch attacks on friendly bases again. To cope with this situation, an activity phase should be initiated to launch military attacks to thwart this offensive plan of the enemy, and at the same to protect friendly forces, civilians ((living under Cambodian Communist control)) and their economy. Friendly troops should display the courage of revolutionary combatants in order to crush the enemy and to achieve a new glorious victory.

((Page 3 of Item 3 of O.T.))

**II. SPECIFIC MISSIONS:**

In order to cope with enemy attacks in the coming dry season, the following missions should be carried out by all Y's:

**1. Defense Works:**

The policy of the Party is to use primitive weapons, such as spikes, stakes, and spike-pits, to deal with the enemy. Therefore, each Y should be able to produce from four to six million spikes and from four to six thousand spike-pits. In short, the number of primitive weapons should be produced in proper proportion to the population and terrain features of each locality.

Efforts should also be made to completely destroy all the roads which are to be reopened by the enemy, such as the roads in Ta Veng, Bo Kao, Peam Chi Mea, Bo Nhok, Road 19, Andong Meas, etc....((sic)). From 100 to 200 medium-size spike-pits should be constructed.

All paths leading into friendly bases should be destroyed and replaced by new ones.

**2. Elimination of Spies and Traitors:**

Efforts should be made to eliminate all spies and traitors living in friendly bases prior to the enemy attack. Anti-espionage measures should be taken decidedly and without any hesitation.

**3. Relocation of Civilians:**

In Nov 69, the relocation of civilians living in areas near

((Page 4 of Item 3 of O.T.))

enemy positions should be completed. Each hamlet should select its own relocation area. (This is just a reminder. Party agencies of all levels are already aware of this matter.)

**4. Combat Missions:**

The struggle movement against the enemy should be initiated everywhere, and in every form. Each squad should be able to launch an average of three attacks a month.

**Attack Tactics :**

The fundamental tactics should be guerrilla attacks to be launched on enemy elements during their movements, such as ambush of truck convoys, countersweep operations, destroying means of communication, conducting shelling and harassing fire, creating dummy targets to divert the enemy from his main objective, etc....

Only small-scale attacks should be launched. Booby trap grenades should be planted along roads of communications, etc....

Efforts should be concentrated to launch attacks on a specific number of posts.

Special attacks by strong combined forces should also be conducted in order to seize weapons from the enemy.

5. Weapons:

The tendency to look down upon primitive weapons and to prefer only modern ones has prevailed in friendly units, even though these primitive weapons were used with remarkable success in some places in the past.

((Page 5 of Item 3 of O.T.))

All Y's should focus their attention on eliminating this erroneous concept from unit members, who should be informed that the war of revolution is the war of the proletariat. We cannot provide modern weapons which can only be obtained in small numbers with much difficulty, due to our poverty. Therefore, we have to rely on the supply of weapons which our people can make. These primitive weapons, when being used in addition to a small number of modern weapons, will create a powerful force able to drive the enemy away from our bases. On the contrary, if we give up all the primitive weapons and rely on a couple of modern rifles or grenades, we shall lose a great deal of our available strength. Each arrow can kill one enemy. With many bows and cross-bows, we can kill many enemy troops during each attack. In fact, we cannot destroy the entire enemy force with these primitive weapons, but we are sure to succeed in our mission of wearing them down.

((Page 6 of Item 3 of O.T.))

All Y's should make efforts to implement this plan at all costs and provide guidance to all units to produce hundreds of cross-bows and lances during a period of from two to three months. Materials such as metal tubes and explosives will be provided by higher headquarters.

6. Seizure of Weapons from the Enemy:

In the past, many enemy units were completely destroyed, but no weapons were captured, because (1) friendly units lacked exact information on the enemy strength; (2) lacked a plan to seize the enemy weapons; (3) and lacked the spirit of making sacrifices in the battle so as to seize weapons from the enemy.

Therefore, a movement should be initiated to encourage troops to boldly seize weapons from the enemy. It is necessary that a plan should be made in advance to organize a team in charge of seizing weapons from the enemy with troops ready to support it. Friendly troops should try their best to capture a number of weapons from the enemy during the coming dry season.

7. Development of Party and Youth Group Organization in Military Units:

In addition to the mission of launching attacks to wear down the enemy strength, Party Chapters of each Y should also concentrate attention on the development of the Party and Youth Group in its own unit.

This is a task of decisive importance, for it creates leadership strength in the armed forces.

Each unit leader should train himself to become a Party and Youth Group member.

Each Party Chapter should make a plan to develop the Party and Youth Group organization continuously.

Following are conditions of eligibility for admission to the Party and Youth Group:

1. High spirit of Revolution, bold in making sacrifices for the Party, the Revolution, and the people.
2. Of suitable class (poor or middle class farmer).
3. Of proper past activity, and having the faith of ((Communist)) combatants.
4. Endowed with revolutionary ethics.

Each of the four conditions has its peculiar essential, but the main points to be considered are social class and courage. To admit a member to the Youth

((Page 8 of Item 3 of O.T.))

Group, a certain part of these four conditions can be overlooked.

8. Leadership Mission:

In order to be successful in countering the enemy, all Y's should be well aware of their role of leadership, and realize the advantage and disadvantage of the enemy situation. No matter how bad the situation is, the role of leadership should never be neglected or abandoned. On the contrary, it should be emphasized and strengthened at all costs, for steadfast leadership is the main factor in the friendly victory over the enemy, who is also stronger than last year.

9. Collection of Information:

Each Y should submit reports on the enemy situation, on the situation of friendly troops, and on the development of Party and Youth Group organizations on time to YU so as to enable YU to make an activity plan in accordance with the space and time available. In addition, Y's should also submit reports to their own Party higher echelon.

III. IMPLEMENTATION:

This directive should be studied by all staff sections which are

((Page 9 of Item 3 of O.T.))

in charge of making particular plans for each unit. All units should also study all points of this directive, except points 7,8 and 9. It should be studied at the same time as ((the document entitled)) Spirit of Military Coordination of YU.

25 Oct 69

Group 170-YU

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