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7. SOURCE:	CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	<i>Harry E. Evans</i> HARRY E. EVANS, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:
 (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 14 November 1969, and concerns a report pertaining to the study of Resolution 10/69 ((possibly Resolution 9, adopted by COSVN)). The record also contains notes that reveal that friendly ((NVA)) personnel will not regroup to NVN after the cease fire.

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SUBJ: (C) Lesson Plan on Resolution Number 9, COSVN. 10/69

(C), (44 pages, handwritten; B-3) Record, undated, maintained by Trần Tiên Thọ ((no further information)), pertains to the study of the Resolution 10/69 ((possibly meaning Resolution number 9, adopted by COSVN and studied by the author at a political reorientation session conducted in Oct 69)). The Resolution consisted of five parts. The first part provides details on the present enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) situation. The second part outlines the conspiracies of the Americans for the near future. These included the increase of military attacks, psychological Chiêu Hồi, and intelligence activities; the consolidation of the Puppet ((RVN)) Government and Army; and the de-Americanization of the SVN war from a position of strength. The third part covers the capabilities of the Americans in the days ahead, and reveals the following two probabilities: (1) The Americans may suffer great difficulties in their de-escalation of the war and will be forced to end the war rapidly with a political solution contrary to their aims. (2) The Americans may partially surmount their difficulties and try to prolong the war to pursue their goals. Of the two above probabilities, the first one will take place. The fourth part deals with the immediate missions of friendly forces. It relates that the Mekong Delta would be the primary battlefield at present and in the future. Concurrently, the mountainous areas were of vital strategic importance to friendly forces because they would always be the safe base areas for friendly troops.

The liberated areas in T3 ((possibly Military Region 3)) would be consolidated and expanded, and would be turned into bridgeheads. Currently, in T3, there must be 1,800,000 inhabitants in the liberated areas, 1,200,000 inhabitants in the disputed areas, and 400,000 inhabitants in the enemy ((RVN)) controlled areas. The friendly major tasks were to launch steadier and more widespread attacks on the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)), disrupt the ((RVN)) accelerated pacification program, expand ((VC)) military and political forces, and develop ((VC)) guerrilla warfare. The fifth part deals with the past friendly deficiencies which included the failure to thoroughly understand ((COSVN)) policies and directives, unimprovement in combat procedures, and underdevelopment of Party and Popular ~~((COSVN))~~ ~~forces.~~

The Resolution finally instructs that the flexibility in leadership should be maintained to deal with the changing situation and to take advantage of opportunities that may be presented.

It was revealed that the Resolution was adopted before the second stage of the withdrawal of US troops from SVN and before the intensification of the antiwar movements in the United States in Oct 69.

The record further contains the following notes taken by the author during the political reorientation session:

- The situation may evolve quickly and unpredictable events may occur.
- The ceasefire will be the first step of our ((VC)) decisive victory.
- Friendly personnel will not regroup to NVN ((after the ceasefire)).

----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

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STUDY OF RESOLUTION ((POSSIBLY NO: 9)) IN OCT 69

Good Student: Tran Tien Tho ((No further information))

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Nhon Trach ((possibly District, Bien Hoa Province))

- Study the new decision of TW ((possibly Central Headquarters of the Lao Dong Party)).

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Nhon Trach

13 Oct 69

Study the new resolution of the Central Headquarters ((of the Lao Dong Party)) in Oct 69.

I. PURPOSE AND REQUIREMENT

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Contents ((of the resolution)).

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I. EVALUATION OF OUR FORCES AND THE ENEMY FORCES.

There is no balance of power and expense in the fighting between us and the enemy.

The enemy expends 720 billion dollars a year, and we use only 5 billion "dollars". This shows that the ratio between our expenditures and the enemy's is 1 to 144.

US military forces: America is the first country to possess nuclear power. It has an Army of four million troops. It is also a leading country in the ((free)) world with an international strategy.

Our side: Our country is a small one with an undeveloped economy and agriculture.

The enemy has sent from 250,000 to 540,000 troops to Vietnam, along with a quantity of modern weapons for use in the special ((unconventional)) war with a view of defeating us.

We have attacked the US continuously

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and kept on frustrating all of its major campaigns.

In 1967, the limited war reached its climax in both parts of the country. Also, our General Offensive and Uprising brought failure to the enemy and destroyed his scheme of invading our country and destroying us. Observations of Nixon's advisors: The ((US)) main force is considered defeated because it cannot triumph over the guerrilla force.

Our observations: There is a relationship between the limited war in South Vietnam and the war of destruction in North Vietnam. Attacking the North was the enemy's strategic mission, the purpose of which was the destruction of the "nerve center" ((of our war system)).

Our victory: The US was forced to stop bombing the North and sit at the conference talks. It is now obvious that the enemy is defeated because he is incapable of achieving his political goal in the war.

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It was not his good will that made the enemy put an end to the ((air)) war in the North. It was because they found they had lost over 3,200 aircraft and thousands of pilots in the North.

After our General Offensive, the enemy believed we were strong enough, and therefore he continued to press forward with his schemes of pacifying the rural areas and de-Americanizing the war.

The enemy is finding ways to avoid being defeated ((directly)) by us in Vietnam by de-Americanizing the war in order to let the ((shame)) of defeat fall on the Puppet Government and Army.

However, we have frustrated his plan of de-Americanizing the war in its first stage.

Our General Offensive has made him change his strategy by shifting from the offensive to the defensive.

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In the face of these failures, Nixon planned to tour the different nations, stating he would not get his country involved in any other war as he did in Vietnam.

Thus, the US was defeated in their world strategy.

Our activities: We started fighting with the Americans in 1965, and the fight has increased in intensity since early 1968.

Then, the US voluntarily stopped bombing North Vietnam, joined the peace talks, and withdrew their troops.

Then the Provisional Republican Government was born.

In the ((Saigon)) Capital, we have defeated the enemy in the military, political, and diplomatic fields.

The Paris peace talks are one of our diplomatic victories which provides us with world-wide prestige (an appropriate weapon to attack the enemy).

In the diplomatic field: With regard to the negotiations, we have our viewpoint and we would not agree to make any concessions. (The unique solution to the war should be "violence" on the battlefields).

In the military field: Presently, our fighting capabilities are very high and we have destroyed a large number of enemy personnel.

Our different types of forces have been developed greatly and they have reached a high maturity.

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We are trying to develop all branches of the armed forces (using a small strength to attack a larger number of the enemy's).

Our political victories: Before, we feared fighting with the US, but we gradually realized the correct situation and saw their defeats. (The Puppet Army and Government are in great dissension with each other).

We gained the support of an intermediary force (the People's Alliance for Peace and Democracy).

(Determination to) hold on to the area:

The (enemy's eastern battlefield area to the southeast of Saigon) presented many weak points, because there have never been enough enemy forces there. On the contrary, our forces grew stronger in this area (due to the support we received from the people). We succeeded in holding on to the battlefield, and the intermediary area ((area situated between the front and rear lines)), through the planting of our military and political cadre to direct the movements of the people

We continuously attacked the enemy, thus attaining the prescribed criteria, and the aforementioned activities affected the enemy's spirit and ideologies.

The reasons (for our successes):

1. The leadership provided by the Party Central Committee has been wise. It reflects on our Party's effective techniques used in this matter. (We launched continuous attacks despite the enemy's counterattacks).

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Our General Offensive and General Uprising Campaign marked a turning point in this unconventional and limited war. It became history and also highlighted our struggle.

2. Revolutionary mind of our people. New civilian proselyting methods of our cadre. Confidence of the armed forces in Chairman Ho.

The people wholeheartedly support the Revolution.

3. North Vietnam, socialist countries, peace-loving people of the world, and even the US people have supported our struggle.

Strengths:

1. Our Party, from the highest to the lowest echelons, has made concerted efforts in the field of leadership.

Shortcomings:

Our leadership had weaknesses in the interpretation of guidelines and made mistakes in the adoption of these guidelines.

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The ideological and revolutionary concepts were not correctly implemented.

2. The guidelines for leadership were not thoroughly understood.

3. Party Chapters of various people's organizations were still weak. However, they met the requirements (they did not stay close to the people to conduct their movement).

4. Leadership was weakly exercised by many organizations.

II ENTHUSIASMING SCHEMES OF THE US AND THEIR PUPPETS.

Faced with our great victories and their great failures which had been sustained, the US and the Puppets made efforts to implement the following schemes:

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The Americans have a military and political plan they must follow in order to please the world.

The remains of the enemy's military and economic forces are still considerably large.

However, the enemy still is confronted with dissensions among the social classes.

The enemy continues to implement the following schemes:

- 1. Clear and hold strategy (in bordering areas to stop

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our supply and rear service activities).

De-Americanization of the war in Vietnam.

The replacement of US troops by Puppets troops.

The change of equipment for the troops.

Increase the activities of political factions.

The strengthening of the Puppets Government.

The acceleration of the pacification plan.

The intensification of psychological warfare and the Open-Arms ((Open-Arms)) activities.

The US controls the radio stations.

They control the press.

Increase of spy activities.

Enemy's capabilities:

- 1. The US must end the war with a political settlement.

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2. If our attacks are not strong enough, the enemy will be able to partially surmount the difficulties he meets with and create many difficulties for us.

Presently, our Party is concentrating all their efforts to force the enemy to end the war (de-escalate the war suddenly).

The enemy is becoming more and more demoralized because of his defeats.

The enemy is being confronted with many dissensions that he is unable to overcome.

1. Because of defeats he has sustained, the enemy cannot gain a strong position. His forces are becoming weaker and they have lost their combat initiative.

2. The US plans to slowly withdraw their troops and at the same time strengthen the Puppets troops.

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3. Faced with this unfavorable situation, the Americans must de-escalate the war and withdraw their troops soon in order to avoid casualties. Therefore, the Puppets troops must replace them and pay a high cost for the war.

4. If the US does not rapidly withdraw its troops from Vietnam, the dissension between the US Government and the US people will become more and more critical. But if they pulled their troops out quickly, this would create dissensions with the Puppets Government. In brief, the US displays stubbornness even in a position of defeat.

They want to de-escalate war in a position of strength.

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III. IMMEDIATE MISSIONS:

1. Achieve great and complete victories for the General Offensive and Uprising.

Defeat US aggression.

Fight until the US withdraws its troops ((from SVN)).

Disintegrate the Puppets troops.

Frustrate the "clear-and-hold" strategy, de-Americanization plan, and accelerated pacification program.

Main activities to achieve the decisive victory:

Force a withdrawal of US and satellite troops.

Strengthen our military and political forces to defeat the Puppets Government

Our forces must take control over the vast rural areas,

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district seats, and important strategic areas surrounding the province capitals.

Develop the local forces to corner the enemy in his posts.

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To obtain the decisive victory, we must:

- 1. Concentrate our troops to inflict heavy blows on the US troops and increase their casualties. (These are the main forces for the development of the struggle movement ((antiwar movement)) of the US people).
- 2. Attack the Puppet troops more violently, destroy stubborn and cruel members of the Puppet troops and Government, frustrate the "de-Americanization" plan, and disintegrate and paralyze Puppet troops.
- Deny the enemy the opportunities to carry out the "sweep-and-hold" strategy.
- 3. Build up the military and political forces positioned on strategic lines of communication.
- 4. Break the enemy's administrative control at all levels, especially at village and district levels.

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Consolidate our agencies, especially at villages, and increase the prestige of the SVN Provisional Republican Government. In order to accomplish the above missions, we must destroy the US's attempt of aggression and refuse to end the war in his favor (force him to satisfy our demands).

However, we failed to attack the enemy and conduct uprisings on a regular basis in the past.

Province capitals and towns play a significant role in the strategic phase.

We must consolidate our troops to successfully attack towns, creating favorable conditions in order to occupy them.

2. Outskirts and also intermediate areas are very important ((in strategy)) for both us and the enemy. If the enemy wants to hold the towns, he must disperse his troops outside to attack us and enlarge the security belt surrounding the towns.

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Friendly side:

Firmly hold the area of operation, frustrate the enemy scheme, and establish the local armed and political forces.

Before the political indoctrination was conducted, our men in areas bordering cities failed to follow the proper line of action in the present strategic phase.

Tactical requirement:

Employ small forces to attack the enemy

3. The rural areas are strategically extremely important (especially the Cuu Long Delta) now and in the future.

The National Democratic Revolution is built around the farmers

We must build up the liberated areas and turn them into revolutionary bases.

Area T3 ((possibly Military Region 3)): Liberated area has 1,800,000 people; disputed area has 1,200,000 people; enemy-controlled has 400,000 "

4. The mountainous area, where our forces are bivouacking, is an important strategic position to meet present and future requirements.

IV. MAJOR TASKS

Military

Intensify military activities, consolidate the armed force, improve Party leadership in combat, and provide close leadership in the various phases of activities.

Combat: Wear down and destroy the enemy forces and (Intensify the People's Self-Defense Forces to capture weapons).

Anticonscription

Attack enemy military training centers.

Military requirements:

1. Wear down and destroy the enemy forces.

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- 2. Frustrate the enemy's accelerated pacification program.
- 3. Conduct encirclements ((on enemy posts)).
- 4. Build up troop strength.
- 5. Cut off communication lines.
- 6. Consolidate all three types of forces.

Development:

Rapidly develop the district and village armed forces, improve the skills and increase the number of key personnel to assume key positions. Consolidate the guerrilla, militia, and secret self-defense forces.

Coordinate politics with diplomacy.

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2. Step up civilian and military proselyting activities and political activities in order to keep up with the new situation.

Either of the two probable ((courses of action)) the ((US)) may embark on will lead to a political settlement. ((If this is the case)) (the side which has control over the people will win).

The political section's task is the key task.

We have succeeded in making the people realize that we are winning and the Americans are losing. We must:

- Blunt the enemy's accelerated pacification plan.
- Intensify the people's struggle for social welfare and democracy.
- Struggle to win the noncommitted people over to our side (If we accomplish this, it would be a great success for us in the present stage of the Revolution).
- Develop the guerrilla warfare movement in its new form.
- Motivate the people to make more manpower and material contributions to the Revolution.
- Establish revolutionary agencies.

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Weak points:

We ((VC)) failed to disrupt the ((RVN)) accelerated pacification program.

We failed to make use of the people to persuade enemy ((RVN)) soldiers to rally to our side.

Reasons ((for the above weak points)):

1. We did not fully understand the people's viewpoints.
2. We did not take advantage of our organizations available staying close to the people to indoctrinate them.

Importance of the civilian proselyting task

All members of the Party Chapter and personnel of various branches must realize the importance of the civilian proselyting task. They must provide their subordinate personnel with clear guidance concerning this task. In brief, we must organize the people, do our best to meet their requirements, satisfy their aspirations, and make them know the interrelationship between their privileges and those of the Revolution.

3. Intensification of enemy troop proselyting.

Administrative security, economic, and financial activities.

1) Consolidate and uphold the role of district and village administrative agencies. The agencies are important, because they serve as the instruments of support for the people.

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Strive to frustrate all the enemy's schemes.

2) Step up security activities designed to arrest or kill enemy spies.

Proceed to perform security maintenance tasks.

3) Step up production and protect our crops.

Expand liberated areas.

4) Seek to understand the working class viewpoint more profoundly. Ideologically, improve Party members and perfect the Party organizations.

These are required because some Party members are still unable to understand the viewpoint of the working class. They did not enthusiastically engage in the activities and organization of the Party's agencies.

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Swiftly develop the "Four-Excellences" Party Chapter with due emphasis on the ideological improvement of Party members and in the perfection of organizations.

Encourage the cadre to make more efforts in performing their tasks. Pay attention to the cadre's thoughts and working procedures as they carry out their political missions.

Admit more Party members in all three areas.

Teach Party Chapter members to thoroughly know the point of continuous attack, so as to win the decisive victory in the shortest possible time.

At the same time, make preparations in all fields to help strengthen friendly forces as they fight against the enemy.

Step up the activities designed to protect Party organizations.

5) Ideological tasks

Commanding cadre must adopt the ideologies on the viewpoint of the working class.

They must criticize those who adopt passive rightism, those who

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lack enthusiasm in performing assigned tasks, and those who dare not criticize the others for their faults.

Future missions

Make every effort to successfully complete the political reorientation sessions concerning the study of the new resolution, with a view to ensuring accomplishment of all tasks in the future.

Strengthen our own will to attack the enemy continuously.

Heighten our own determination.

Devote our strength and energy to winning the decisive victory in a relatively short period of time.

Remain ready to cope with any change in the situation.

Promote enthusiasm among cadre and soldiers by telling them that victory will certainly come to our side.

Indoctrinate the masses with the slogan "Nothing is more precious than independence and liberty."

II. COMING MISSIONS OF THE DISTRICT PARTY COMMITTEE.

1. Conduct political reorientation sessions for Party members, the people, and the troops for studying the new resolution.

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2. Proceed to propagandize the people.

The end.

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Questions for discussion:

1. Enemy failures and our victories, especially our victories obtained during the ((1969)) Spring and Summer Campaigns since the General Offensive and Uprising ((conducted in early 1968)).

- The characteristics and importance of our overall victories and their strategic significance, which have reversed the fundamentals of the strategic plan of the US and Puppets Governments, and has helped to frustrate their scheme of de-Americanizing the VN war

- Victories having strategic significance which have brought deep changes to the balance of power and the war situation.

Our weak points; we will discover the causes of our weak points, and find a means to rectify them.

We will discuss the above problem for three hours.

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2. Evaluation of enemy's coming schemes:

Concerning this, we will discuss:

- The enemy strategic deadlock in many areas.
- The stubborn nature of the enemy, his wish to end the war as a strong opponent, the de-Americanization of the VN war, and de-escalation of the war step by step.

- Incisive contradictions and weak points of the enemy.

We will discuss this problem for three hours.

3. Our present missions:

- Realizing the common mission
- Using our capability to achieve our coming missions.
- Availing any opportunity which comes in our favor to gain the decisive victory in the near future.
- Understanding our strategic missions and the three fundamental problems of the leadership task.

We will discuss this problem for three hours.

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4. Military task.

- Role and importance of the coming military task (fully understand the six basic requirements.)
- Role and importance of the people's guerrilla warfare movements.
- Comments on strong and weak points of local military activities, leadership and organization.

(Period for discussion: Two hours)

5. Civilian proselyting tasks:

- Plan and importance of the civilian proselyting task in the future.
- Methods under which the people in each area are motivated.
- Responsibility of armed forces and branches in the task of motivating the people.

(Give applicable examples)

(Period for discussion: Two and
a half hours)

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Role and importance of the troop proselyting task

(Period for discussion: Two and a half hours)

6. Administrative, financial and security tasks.

Role and importance of the administrative task and the functions of the cadre in the execution of their administrative tasks.

- Mission of cadre in the current and coming security tasks.

- Sense of self-sufficiency and self-reliance

- Coming financial tasks.

(Period for discussion: One and a half hours)

7. Organization and ideological indoctrination tasks.

Organization tasks:

- Viewpoint of the working class in the development of the Party.

(Mention the method of organization)

- Role and importance of strengthening the Party Committees and the Party Chapter, especially the latter.

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Ideological indoctrination task. The ideological requirements in the present situation (to ensure the execution of the Resolutions). (Opinions of all persons are required).

(Period for discussion: Two and a half hours).

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Study of the will made by Chairman Ho.

A discussion of the will, made by Chairman Ho, should be conducted.

1 We should strengthen our viewpoint; and not balk at hardships, nor should we get discouraged by the protraction of the war.

We should know that we cannot win victory easily. To reach our revolutionary goal, we must endure many hardships and difficulties over a long period of time.

We should affirm our position.

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2. We should fully comprehend the meaning of solidarity and unity (which is the life of the Party and the people). Solidarity should be carried out in the Party and in the nations of the world.

3. We should meet the requirements set forth by the last Resolution of our Chairman, so that we can gain the decisive victory.

Answer

a. Report on results obtained by the indoctrination:

Annotation:

1) Evaluation of our and enemy's situation:

Military : According to an enemy document, the US spent, for the war in South Vietnam, the following amounts of their total budget:

Infantry forces: Forty-five percent

Airborne and Marines: Sixty-five percent ((sic))

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- Replacement of troops: \$2,500,000 ((US dollars)) for every replacement.

Transportation of US Air Force: 65%

- B-52: 25%

Seventh Fleet: 45%

- Civil affairs: \$4,500,000 ((US dollars))

- Bombs expended: 3,000,000 tons

- Expenditures: 150 billion ((US)) dollars

- Anticipated expenditures for a world war: 300 billion US dollars
- Expenditures in the Korean War: 21 billion US dollars
- The rise in the cost of living in the US: 65%
- Devaluation of the US dollar: 1.90%
- Debt of the US: 377 billion dollars
- Number of persons killed in action recognized by the US:

((Blank in O.T.))

- The US wanted the Puppet Government to increase their troop strength to 850,000, in order to set up

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two more divisions and 137 C ((companies))

- The enemy ((RVNAF)) agreed to increase his troop strength to 850,000, but gave up the attempt to establish two more divisions.

- (The enemy has no capability to de-Americanize the war).

- Thieu promised the Americans that the results of his accelerated pacification program would certainly reach 91% by late 1969.

In the III CTZ ((blank on O.T.))

In the II CTZ (("-))

In the IV CTZ (("-))

In the I CTZ (("-))

- Enemy forces used to defend his ((Saigon)) capital city and suburbs. They consisted of 118 battalions (US, Puppet and satellite troops).

- The greatest force consisted of 420,000 troops, including 200,000 US troops, (as compared with those in other CTZ's) concentrated in the III CTZ.

The II CTZ had 260,000 troops.

The I CTZ had 248,000 troops.

The IV CTZ had 150,000 Puppet troops.

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Assessment of the situation:

Our troops have gained the sympathy of the working class. They have a high determination to fight and the will to fight and win.

US military situation:

The US has four million troops, 4,000 military bases all over the world, and ultra-modern weapons. They have never suffered a defeat and possess the most advanced industries in the world.

Friendly specific successes:

We have developed our offensive position to the utmost and forced the enemy to change his strategic position.

In 1960, the enemy carried out pacification activities in SVN, while we initiated a widespread movement in NVN.

The enemy has made a great effort to strengthen the Puppet Government and Army.

After the enemy failed in his unconventional war, he began to wage his limited war.

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He employed 300 divisions, without counting local forces, to launch attacks. However, these attacks were not launched simultaneously.

The enemy shifted from an offensive to a defensive position.

In a war of aggression the defensive position means defeat.

The unsuccessful escalation of war in NVN jeopardized US prestige in the world

In SVN, the US had to de-Americanize the war and withdraw their troops unconditionally (but they did not dare return all their troops back to the US.)

Because of their failures in VN, the US strategy in the world has been thwarted.

The US was ruined.

The US plans: They staged their limited war in an attempt to gain great victories.

Reasons for friendly successes:

1. We had good leadership from the COSVN and from Chairman HO Chi Minh. This was the main reason for our great successes.

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These successes were adherent to those of the SVN Revolution.

The SVN Revolution was successful due not only to its just cause, but also to other factors:

Purposes of the General Offensive and Uprisings:

The enemy schemes:

Although the enemy increased his strength from six to eleven divisions, he failed to accomplish his plan.

The expense planned for the war was previously 15 billion dollars but it later reached 150 billion dollars.

The enemy estimated that the war would take two years, but he suffered failures beyond his imagination.

The expenditures for the war were so great that his debt amounted to 377 billion dollars.

We were in the last phase of the General Offensive and Uprising.

The Revolution in NVN was aimed at frustrating the enemy's plan of escalating the war and developing the people's warfare.

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The US Air Force has never been so seriously defeated as it was by NVN, in spite of its modern aircraft.

The world could not believe that while sustaining a destructive war, we succeeded in maintaining our economy, developing our culture, stabilizing life, and assuring order and security (even the friendly countries in our socialist bloc could not believe in such success).

We have concentrated all our manpower and material resources for the South.

The Paris Conference:

In the beginning, our friends in the world did not approve of our activities (they feared we would be inclined toward rightism).

According to the opinions of our friends, we would make concessions at the Conference.

Their opinion was that the Paris Conference was a type of strategic war which required great skills.

Assistance from socialist countries:

Though the Soviet Union and ((Red)) China were in dissidence, we still maintained our independence and neutrality.

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We were able to maintain a close relationship with the socialist bloc; therefore, we succeeded in obtaining assistance from socialist countries.

Assistance from Nationalist countries:

Cambodia:

Though Prime Minister Le Non is considered (pro-American), we have succeeded in gaining his sympathy.

Shihanouk:

The Americans tried to gain his support by giving him \$121,000 dollars and later with one billion dollars, hoping he would create difficulties for the South. (Shihanouk said: "If I received one billion dollars I would die immediately ((sic)), but I can still survive if I go with you ((sic)).")

International, democratic, and peaceful movement:

Movement in USA

((Blank))

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In brief, we have gained an extremely great victory due to the skillful and clairvoyant leadership of the Party.

Enemy situation

1. We clearly see the enemy's failures which are greater than ever before.

The enemy's strategy has been frustrated.

Strategic matters:

From an offensive position, the enemy has shifted to a defensive position.

In his offensives, he adopted pincer tactics.

In his defenses, he adopted "clear and hold" tactics.

Since he practiced his "clear and hold" tactics, he suffered more casualties, especially among the Puppet troops.

First the enemy spread his defensive lines far and wide toward our areas. Then, he retreated to the middle defensive lines ((sic)) and finally to the areas surrounding the cities.

This tactic of retreating strategy affected the morale of his troops.

2. Accelerated pacification program:

At the beginning, the enemy widely carried out his plan. Then, this program slackened, and the areas under enemy control attained only 21% (of its criteria).

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Friendly situation:

We have control of over 79% of the land and have a specific plan to gain control of the remaining parts.

De-Americanization of the war:

The US's de-escalation of the war does not mean that he wants to end the war; but only to de-Americanize it. This is a feature of neocolonialism.

The present objective of the enemy is to:

Modernize the Puppet troops and control the political factions.

The US first planned to increase the Puppet troops to 85,000; but they failed. They then hoped to attain 78,000 troops. But, until the end of 1969, the strength of the Puppet troops will only be 55,000.

There were false designations for many battalions.

To attain the figure of 78,000, the enemy will be forced to conscript 41,000 persons, and he admits that he is incapable of doing so.

Recently, while withdrawing their troops, the US was forced to say that the Puppet troops were strong enough to replace them.

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2. ((sic)) The Puppet soldiers who replaced the US troops were incapable of doing so.

The 18th Division ((RVNAF)) was defeated.

The RVN troops filled the gap left by the US (there is confusion among the Puppet ranks). The RVN troops are not as strong as the US troops, and their Air Force, artillery, and logistical facilities are weak (they have no means to insure security).

3. The declining morale of the Puppet troops cannot be stopped.

According to the enemy report, the monthly number of deserters reached 10,000 troops.

The enemy submits erroneous reports.

Conclusion: The US is unable to de-Americanize the Vietnam war, as they planned.

Situation in recent days:

The Americans have not made the decision to withdraw a second contingent.

US soldiers have recently displayed their antiwar attitude.

At present, the enemy does not dare to leave any areas unoccupied for fear that it will heavily affect his strategic defense.

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Our troop deployment must help to immobilize the enemy.

The Puppet's economic problems:

The ((Puppet)) budget showed a deficit of sixty billion ((sic)).

There has been a change in the enemy's ranks since the death of our Uncle ((Ho Chi Minh)).

2. The enemy's obstinacy:

Although the enemy's will of aggression was shaken, he still did not give up his plan of aggression.

We are waging a class warfare against the enemy who has intensified psychological and intelligence activities, and assembled religious sects.

((GVN)) post-war economic plan.

The enemy's weaknesses and vulnerabilities:

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Immediate tasks

The Army, the Party, and the populace must make every effort to frustrate the enemy's scheme.

We must be determined to gain the greatest victory.

Organize as many families and cells as possible and implement five strategic objectives.

The situation may develop quickly and unpredictable events may occur.

Our first resistance had its battlefield in NVN, but now the battlefield is in SVN.

We are not going to regroup our personnel ((to NVN after the ceasefire)) like we did before.

We are much stronger than we were in 1954 at the time of the armistice. We have the support of the masses' revolting

force and must build a firm class policy. We must thoroughly understand the viewpoint and the use of violence.

(The ceasefire will be the first step of our ((VC)) decisive victory.)

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Opportunities and capabilities:

Opportunities: They consist of strategic, and specific opportunities.

We must create opportunities, and take advantage of these opportunities to strengthen our forces, intensify our activities, and motivate a general revolution.

The masses should be motivated to struggle in accordance with their degree of revolutionary awareness.

Capabilities:

We must be determined to drive the enemy into a defensive position and strengthen the revolutionary movement.

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