

LED

Unit 491
101/1340

DIRECTIVE

A FILE SUBJ.
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pertaining to ideological tasks for the last

quarter of 1969

SECRET

10/69

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I/- Situation.

Through activities conducted since the beginning of 1969, our Nong Truong [poss. NVA Division or Regiment] has recorded a number of definite achievements which proved that we have matured in all fields, firstly in the political and ideological fields.

1/- Since the beginning of this year up to the present: the requirements of our mission have been more demanding the continuous fighting has become more and more urgent and fierce; the situation at home and over the world has undergone major and complex developments. But, generally speaking, the ideological [stand] of our troops has been stable and essentially good: the cadres and combatants are always one-minded in trusting the policies, lines and strategic determination of the Party, they are always loyal to the Party and the cause of the Revolution; they have raised high their brave and resolute fighting spirit, courageously endured hardships and overcome all difficulties with a determination to fulfill all combat missions and tasks.

2/. However, in comparison with our requirements and missions, the political and ideological situation has, during the past period, developed rather slowly and displayed many serious deficiencies:

- Rightist, pessimistic and individualistic thinking still widely prevails in varying degrees among various echelons or individuals; sometimes, some units are undergoing serious and complex developments which are manifested in a number of major issues: Lack of an absolute and firm fighting stand; fear of difficulties and hardships, fear of [war] fierceness and sacrifices; fear of prolonged [war]; illusions for a quick and easy victory; peace illusions; pessimism and lack of confidence in [our] capability to win a decisive victory within a relatively short period of time as in the case of the people who see that their subjective expectations did not materialize (this is presently the main trend); overestimation of the enemy [strength] and under-estimation of our own [strength]; seeing the stubbornness of the enemy but failing to see that the enemy is stubborn in a position of defeat and that we have the capability to force him to abandon his stubbornness no matter how stubborn he is; (at times, these people entertain illusions about the nature of the enemy, and expectations about the objective changes in the internal situation of the enemy and in the U.S.A.; worse still, they fail to see the enemy's stubborn nature in his deceitfully coaxing schemes). As for us, we have been much obsessed by concrete difficulties in our progress toward final victory. Because of this, sometimes, we have been sceptical and lacked confidence and determination in the implementation of the Party's policies and lines.

- In the field of ideological awareness: individualism is still prevailing rather widely, the most important aspect of which is the calculation about prospects of death and survival before the day of victory, and the most common aspect of which is the lack of aggressiveness in combat, lack of enthusiasm in the fulfillment of missions, lack of initiative and willingness to make the highest efforts to outstandingly carry out all missions. Missions are carried out in a perfunctory manner and with a passive spirit. In the face of difficulties, the tendency is to ask for less work assignments, rare are those who asked for additional missions or look for assignments if they are not given any. The percentage of courageous and vanguard elements is still low (around 50%). Because of that, the quality of performances realized was, as a whole, on an average level. Worse still, many units had not fulfilled their missions and more seriously, they ran away from the fighting. (the present trend tends to develop seriously). Other regressive manifestations such as surrendering [to the enemy], giving information [after being captured] defection, have diminished quantitatively but qualitatively, they were of a more serious character (surrender [to the enemy] with weapons, more information was given to the enemy by those captured, increase in the number of mass desertion).

"Freedomism", tendency to act according to one's convenience, lack of organized discipline, lack of vigilance are still widespread. Manifestations such as competition for positions, corrupt practices,

licentious behavior, bureaucratism, militarism... are developing.

As a whole, the present ideological trend in our Nong Truong tends to be "stagnant"; some components [of our Nong Truong] are declining seriously, especially as concerned their fighting spirit.

The above-mentioned situation clearly indicates that the cadres and combatants are basically very good elements and have many good points. However, compared with the development of the situation and missions of the revolution in this present and new period, they [cadres and combatants] are still unable to keep pace with the situation, their class awareness struggle objectives and ideal, their revolutionary ethics and virtues are still at a low level.

3/. Causes of the above-mentioned deficiencies:

From an objective point of view, the complex and fierce external situation of the class struggle has affected the thinking of the cadres and combatants. But, the main cause [of the deficiencies] lies in the leadership of Party committees at various levels and Party chapters. Owing to great efforts devoted to keeping pace with the new situation and missions of the Revolution during this new period and the missions of the units in every phase, improving education on the situation and missions, the policies and lines of the Party, the Revolution's ethics and virtues, stepping up internal activities aimed at improving ideology, there has been some initial progress regarding the thorough understanding of the party policy line toward the masses in the field of political education and ideological leadership.

But, generally speaking, there are still many deficiencies in the leadership of [Party] authorities at various levels:

They are not politically sharp and sensitive; they do not realize with profundity the nature of the class struggle which is becoming more and more fierce and complex in this new period and which is creating within our internal organization a decisive, complex and painstaking ideological struggle. Meanwhile, assessment of the unit's ideological situation was done in a very simplistic and subjective way, and, because of that, the leadership has no initiative, does not anticipate future development of the situation and has not really grasped [the fact] that ideological leadership and political education are basic [missions] in all times and at all places. Worse still, sometimes, in some places this leadership has been loosely exercised. In their leadership, authorities of various levels have displayed a rightist and negative character, they have not completely grasped the Party's basic viewpoints such as: absolute revolution, [revolutionary] violence, class and class struggle, creative self-mastery, practical viewpoint and mass viewpoint.

- Bureaucratic behavior, lack of close relationship with the grass-roots people, are still prevailing and the leadership at the infrastructure is even weaker and more deficient.

- Lack of coordination for strongly developing organizational activities such as strengthening of the organization; strengthening of the

Party, the cadres ... (sic) which had been overlooked by many units. Because of that, in [the carrying out of] organizational activities, the people concerned did not grasp the problems regarding the strengthening of political and ideological [activities] which should be given top priority.

- Regarding educational matters inadequate attention had been paid to educating the cadres, Party members and the mass of combatants on the revolution's ideal, objectives, ethics and virtues. Political cadres and personnel in charge of political activities were not truly vanguard [elements] as expected .

II. Direction of our missions:

The missions of Nong Truong from now till the beginning of 1970 will be extremely hard: to simultaneously carry on combat and building activities which are closely tied together. To combat in order to annihilate part of the enemy forces, to keep up our continuous offensive position on the battlefield and make preparations and set the stage for forth-coming activities. In the field of building, to perfect the skills of the troops, ensuring that they have a high combat efficiency in order to meet the requirements of large scale battles designed to wipe out entire enemy units and to secure greater success in the 1970 Spring period.

The above-mentioned missions require that the cadres and combatants progress by leaps and bounds in the ideological field. But in comparison to our requirements, our troops are still beset with weaknesses as mentioned above and are unable to meet the requirementsⁱⁿ/a]l] other aspects. On the other hand, we are carrying out our missions under the circumstances where

our entire Party, people and army are greatly grieved at the passing away of President Ho [Chi Minh], the genial leader and great teacher of our people and Party, the father of our army; where our "D" (campaign) ended up with a not too good success; and where we are beset with many difficulties in getting food and material supplies and in preserving our health. Meanwhile despite his ever growing failure, the enemy is striving to intensify his cunning plots and maneuvers, especially his psychological warfare activities. Such a situation will strongly affect the personal thinking of the cadres and combatants, and give birth to more complex and delicate developments; the ideological struggle will be more complex and decisive; if authorities at various levels do not appropriately concentrate their leadership, they will be unable to solve [their] problems and fulfill [their] missions because of serious developments of the situation.

In view of the above-mentioned situation of our mission, our tasks in the field of political and ideological indoctrination for the coming period are:

A. Effort must be concentrated [in order] to satisfactorily meet the 6 following requirements:

1/- To heighten the absolute confidence in and high-degree unity of mind vis-a-vis the policy and line of the Party and the leadership of the Party Central Executive Committee; to firmly hold the stand of absolute revolution, revolution to the end; "to perseveringly and vigorously pursue the resistance [war] with a determined-to-fight-and-to-win spirit, to fight

until the U.S. [troops] completely withdraw, the puppet army and administration collapse, to liberate the south, to defend the north, to progress toward peace and reunification of the country."

To combat all manifestations [such as]: rightist and negative thinking; fear of prolonged war; fear of sacrifices and hardships; tiredness; perfunctoriness, [peace] illusion, expectation success; doubt; and lack of confidence.

2/. To heighten revolutionary ethics; to develop to the highest degree revolutionary heroism, the nature and traditions of the army which are "loyalty to the Party, piety toward the People"; to be ready to make sacrifice for the revolutionary undertaking of the Party, for the interests of the Fatherland and the people; to continually heighten the revolutionary offensive and brave spirit; to fight heroically and perseveringly; to actively look for the enemy to fight him; to fight the enemy any time, under any circumstance, even when only one man with one rifle is available; [in combat], to take the initiative by opening fire, assaulting the enemy and completely annihilate him. While carrying out missions, to continually heighten the spirit of political responsibility vis-a-vis the Party, to actively devote all efforts toward obtaining the highest efficiency.

To combat all manifestations of individualism, especially, calculations of individualistic character, safety-seeking, shrinking from duty for fear of making sacrifices before [enjoying] the final victory, lack of spirit of actively attacking the enemy in order to annihilate him, fighting for the

form's sake, daring not assault the enemy in order to annihilate him. Particularly, we must absolutely eliminate the phenomenon of dodging combat actions.

To combat all manifestations [particularly among the cadres] of lack of political responsibility vis-a-vis the Party, the unit and the mass of combatants.

3/. To heighten the sense of organized discipline, to correctly execute all directives, orders, regulations on reporting and asking for instructions, and other main policies of the Party concerning the army.

To combat "freedomism" and tendency to act according to one's convenience, lack of discipline and violations of policies and lines.

4/. To heighten the spirit of revolutionary vigilance; to strictly execute all regulations on maintenance of secrecy, protection of the Party, protection of the army; to resolutely counter all arguments of the enemy psychological warfare; to strictly combat manifestations such as slackened vigilance, confusion and inability to distinguish friends from foes. To put an end to cases of surrender, self-wounding, suicide. To reduce to the minimum level cases of desertion.

5/. To heighten the sense of thriftiness and self-help in consolidation and combat activities; to combat corruption, waste and lack of responsibility in the maintenance of public property.

6/. To improve internal [Party] solidarity and unity of mind, army-people solidarity; to practice and broaden the 3 major democratic policies; to heighten the sense of discipline, the cadres' love for combatants, the

combatants' respect for and assistance to cadres.

To combat bureaucratic, militarist, authoritarian, dictatorial behavior, lack of internal solidarity, lack of army-people solidarity.

B/. Contents of education:

1. To proceed with a major phase of political reorientation, to study the testament of President Ho, the appeal of the Party Central Executive Committee, the funeral oration of the Party Central Committee delivered during the memorial ceremony for President Ho and to study the virtues and conduct of President Ho (in combination with the lesson on heightening revolutionary ethics and eliminating individualism).

2/. To study resolutions of higher echelons and of the Party Committee of Nong Truong.

To study typical flags [symbolizing typical achievements] of Nong Truong and of every unit, in combination with making efforts to develop the traditions of scoring achievements.

3/. To stir up hatred by evoking "poverty and hardship [of the people]", and the contrast between the 2 ways of life, the 2 regimes, and by clearly pointing out the savage crimes perpetrated by the U.S. and their henchmen and against our people.

As far as Party members are particularly concerned, they must study the communist ideology, missions and ethics of the [Communist] Party members. As for the Youths, they must study the lesson titled "the mission and role of the Youth in the present anti-U.S. struggle for national salvation."

C/ Some major measures:

1/.- To tighten leadership and satisfactorily conduct the forthcoming centralized re-orientation phase and, at the same time, to channel political education and ideological indoctrination activities into established patterns, from the higher to the lower echelon and vice versa and, particularly, to strengthen and improve education and leadership within the organization, firmly grasp and satisfactorily deal with the main objectives, i.e., the cadres and Party members with adequate attention paid to other objectives which are the combatants, [Youth] Group members. (principally the newly-recruited combatants).

To firmly grasp the basic method which is to motivate the masses, to promote freedom of thought, self-pride and self-respect to motivate the spirit of self-criticism and to make criticism in a frank, sincere, open-minded and strict manner, based on mutual love between people of the same class.

2/. In close coordination with organizational activities, to step up campaigns for the building of "4-good" Party chapters, to strengthen the basic units, to train "4-good" cadres, vanguard group chapters so as to consolidate [our] organizations, ensure the satisfactory implementation of political and ideological tasks and, at the same time, through the [above-mentioned] campaigns, to improve the revolutionary virtues and ethics of the cadres, combatants, Party members, Group members.

To maintain the quality of regular and periodical political and ideological activities within various Party organizations, leadership organizations and mass organizations; to fully develop the spirit of self-criticism and to make criticism in a self-imposed, serious and strict manner with attention paid to starting the criticism move from the lowest echelons: the masses criticize Party members; combatants criticize the cadres. In the immediate future, to satisfactorily organize conventions of Party members at various levels.

3/. To step up the emulation drive within the unit with concrete struggle targets set for every period and every mission. As an immediate task, to step up the emulation drive to train the troops in order to achieve merits in the Winter-Spring period.

Party committees, Party chapters of various units must carefully study and thoroughly understand this directive and seriously and strictly implement it, according to the practical situation of each unit.

1 October 1969

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The Commander of Unit 491,

/s/ Nguyen Ngoc Tien
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