

II. 8 Oct 69

SOUTH VIETNAM

A/S
FILE SUBJ.
DATE SUB-CAT.
10/09

PRESIDENT THIEU ADDRESSES NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Saigon Domestic Service in Vietnamese 0245 GMT 6 Oct 69 S

[Speech by President Thieu before a joint session of the Republic of Vietnam National Assembly on national situation and policies--one hour 15 minutes, live]

[Text] Mr Chairman of the Senate, Mr Chairman of the Lower House, Messrs senators and deputies, gentlemen, and compatriots, today I am very happy to have again the opportunity to expound a number of national problems to your gentlemen and compatriots.

First, in the past few weeks a number of problems concerning our country attracted special attention in the country as well as abroad: For instance, the withdrawal of allied troops, cease-fire in accordance with one formula or another, breakthrough of the Paris conference. Some of these problems were inspired by correct views, and others by antiwar, defeatist, or faked-peace views. As victims of communist aggression, we Vietnamese people must express our views. We must help public opinion in the world and in allied countries cultivate correct views and understand our position. As for us, with the executive and legislative powers, who are responsible before our country, we must determine a direction and help our people and the world see it clearly. This is the goal of my talk to you and the compatriots today, on this platform.

Gentlemen and compatriots, before speaking of a breakthrough for the Paris conference, peace restoration, cease-fire, armistice, good will for peace of one side, or stubborn attitude of the other side, we must recall, discuss, and analyze a number of events. The Paris conference so far has lasted 17 months, with 36 sessions. We and our allies have advanced from discontinuing the bombings of part of the northern territory to stopping the bombings against the entire northern territory. Now, we have performed a significant reduction of allied troops in Vietnam.

We and the allies have advanced many important solutions and initiatives, such as mine on 25 March 1969, that of the U.S. President on 14 May 1969, and then mine on 1 July 1969 with the goal of calling on the other side to hold serious discussions in order to advance toward ending the war and restoring peace. This is not to mention that every week, at the Paris conference, we have proposed a concrete subject for discussion.

Through these solutions and initiatives, we and the allies have renounced no formulas to step up the conference toward progress, such as holding secret talks with the other side's so-called NLFV without imposing conditions, calling upon it to participate in democratic elections in the spirit of national reconciliation and unity, discussing with the other side the electoral course and procedures, holding talks with the northern administration in order to unify the country, readily discussing with the north the establishment of economic and cultural relations with it, and readily discussing with it everything, including its own proposals and solutions.

Everyone must still remember that we and the allies agreed to stop the bombing of part of the north, so the other side would appropriately de-escalate the war and advance toward serious talks.

The other side did not respond to us. Following this, we and the allies stopped bombing the entire north, and the other side promised to stop shellings and to seriously talk directly with the Republic of Vietnam. Once again, the other side did not respond to us. [as heard]

On the other hand, the other side only put forth its 10 points, compelling us to hold discussions on the basis of these 10 points and refusing to discuss any other formula put forth by anyone. The other side also put forth two preconditions-- unconditional, unilateral U.S. retreat and overthrow of the constitutional Republic of Vietnam Government--and has stubbornly maintained these two preconditions. Except for the communists and the defeatists advocating surrender, I think no one else in the world fails to recognize that it is the communists who have stubbornly prosecuted their aggression, refusing to enter into discussions conducive to the restoration of peace.

Let me make it clear that the communists just stall at the Paris conference table, waiting for us to make concessions and refusing to enter into discussions. It is not true that they have held discussions with our side and, in the course of these discussions, have encountered a stalemate. Therefore, it is erroneous to characterize the talks as stalemated. It must be bluntly stated that the communists have refused to hold talks. It is obvious that the communist side came to Paris mainly to carry out propaganda, save the north from being bombed, and, thereby, consolidate and maintain the rear base of its aggression. It did not come to Paris for peace talks.

We and our allies have pointed out that we are willing to discuss any issues which the other side wants to put forth for discussion. We and our allies have reiterated this 36 times at all the past 36 sessions of the Paris conference. We and our allies have put forth one concrete issue after another--namely, the problems of troop withdrawal and prisoners of war, and so forth--which we have called on the communist side to discuss. But the communists have refused to discuss these issues.

We have advocated entering into discussions with open minds, with a peace-loving spirit, and with a national conciliation and great national solidarity spirit in order to achieve an early end to the war, provided that the communists agree to hold discussions. Today, we reiterate our goodwill and our appeal in the same spirit.

Many people, many groups, and broad segments of public opinion at home and abroad have talked about a ceasefire. We take this opportunity to reiterate that we are ready to discuss any issues, including the ceasefire problem, with the other side, provided that it really wants to end the war by entering into serious discussion. But I also take the opportunity to reiterate that before effecting a ceasefire in order to actually end the war, it is necessary to discuss the procedures for effecting a ceasefire, and not to unconditionally cease fire, then discuss the procedures.

It is our stand to discuss and discuss seriously any issues with a goodwill for ending the war. As far as our goodwill for peace is concerned, after 25 March when I agreed to hold secret talks with the communist organization called the NPLSV, everyone believed that my proposal would break the so-called deadlock of the Paris conference. Everyone recognized that the whole world, including those personalities, neutral nations, and individuals who had doubted our goodwill because of crafty communist propaganda, unanimously welcomed Vietnam's 1 July proposed solution and peace initiative.

Some people even accused me of going too far in demonstrating our goodwill. The U.S. President himself openly recognized that the Republic of Vietnam's peaceful solution represents a most generous solution which is unprecedented in the history of the war. The U.S. President also asserted that we have done everything we could and should in order to proceed toward peace, and that it is the other side's turn to respond, otherwise it must bear full responsibility for the suffering and mourning which the Vietnamese people in both parts of the country have endured so long because of the communist side. Everyone agreed with this statement because it is rational.

Apart from the stubborn attitude displayed by the communists in Paris, we must cite their warlike acts in Vietnam. Since early 1969, the enemy has carried out an average of 1,400 actions or more each month. Half of the number of these actions are shellings directed against civilians, and 10 percent are terrorist or murderous acts. Since early 1969, the communists have unleashed six so-called offensive waves, from spring through autumn. They are expected to unleash ensuing offensive waves during the forthcoming winter.

Since early 1969, 2,998 civilians have been murdered or kidnaped by the communists. This figure excludes the 7,482 other civilians wounded as a result of communist shellings and terrorism in all forms. In 1968, the communists killed 11,697 civilians, kidnaped 927, and wounded 30,002 others. The total number of communist-inflicted civilian casualties over the past 2 years amounted to 62,179.

I have just cited the actions showing the communists' lack of goodwill and their crimes. Let those who still dream of a communist paradise, those--primarily Vietnamese--who still defend the national enemy and demand that the government further demonstrate its goodwill, those who demand that an unconditional ceasefire be effected before discussing peace in order to allegedly break the deadlock, those who still dream of a "status quo" solution and advocate dividing zones of control, turning central Vietnam into a buffer zone, or ceding to the communists a capital and a seaport in order to achieve peace, and those who have praised and venerated people who are guilty before the fatherland and who have massacred Vietnamese and turned Vietnam into a lackey, a slave of the international communist aggressors, listen to my words and ponder over the facts and statistical data which I have just cited. Specifically, the Vietnamese living in the security, freedom, and democracy built upon the bones and blood of the combatants and compatriots in the free south.

Those who have contended that the communists have de-escalated the hostilities because they have reduced the intensity of their activities in the recent past and that the communists have reduced the level of infiltration because they have goodwill for lending their aggression--these facts, I think, only show that the communists have been unable to do otherwise--intended to use these facts to deceive themselves and others and to cover up their cowardly, defeatist thoughts. These people have gone so far as to attribute to the communists a good reputation which they definitely do not have.

I said that the communists could do nothing better in the matter of infiltration from the north because if we had not continued to destroy their infiltration routes running through the borders, or if the north had not become exhausted as a result of its 10-year-long aggression and as a result of serious air raids, the communists would certainly have continued their infiltrations even at a higher level.

I said the communists could do nothing better in the matter of increasing the intensity of their military activity in the south. The very easily understandable reason is that we have increasingly extended our control over almost all the territory and resources, whereas the communists have sustained too serious losses. Therefore, they could in no way maintain forever the same level and intensity of military activity as they had in previous years. The enemy lost 213,705 men in 1968 and 151,870 men since early 1969.

Through these six waves of weak, scattered attacks, the enemy has sustained an average weekly casualty toll of 2,000 to 5,000 men or an average monthly toll of 13,000 to 22,000 men. The average (monthly) number of returnees has increased to 3,800. Eighteen thousand enemy infrastructure cadres were eliminated in 1968. The number of enemy infrastructure cadres eliminated during the first 9 months of this year amounted to 26,000.

As I have just said, the communist-inflicted civilian casualties amounted to 62,000.

Have the communists ever shown their good will, stopped the massacre of people, and deescalated the war to put an end to all suffering for the country since they sat in on the so-called peace negotiations at the Paris conference? Conversely, because of the deterioration of their combat potentialities and with their remnant forces remaining in safety on Laotian and Cambodian territories, they have planned to conserve their strength this year and to create an impression that they have de-escalated the war so that the U.S. Government will be pressured into withdrawing more troops and then in 1970, with the U.S. internal situation confronting many difficulties, they will devote all their forces to intensifying the war to obtain some political concessions at the conference table.

I say that, more than anyone else, the communists are aware that they will be unable to become militarily stronger, but they, however, expect that we and our allies will become spiritually weaker and impatient, thus allowing them to score great political victories at the conference table instead of seeking to achieve some military feats on the battlefield. Expecting some favor from the communists, a number of communist-fearing, safety-seeking defeatists have encouraged them to stubbornly prolong their aggression and massacre. The Vietnamese defeatists must be ranked first among these people.

Gentlemen and compatriots, what I have just expounded is aimed at denouncing once again before public opinion at home and abroad that the very author of the so-called deadlock of the Paris conference is none other than the communists who, due to their stubbornness, have refused to hold serious talks because they expect that with time they will achieve great political successes without sacrificing their blood and bones.

I entirely reject the erroneous remark by anyone and from anywhere according to which the present Republic of Vietnam Government is the main hindrance to peace. Those who have made this remark have willfully or inadvertently lent a hand to the communists, because they have shown a defeatist, submissive spirit and want to lead all South Vietnamese people along the defeatist, submissive path.

I assert that I will never accept a solution of coalition government or the discussion of a solution related to land partition. The communists must not expect that their illogical demand for the replacement of the present constitutional, legal government to end the Vietnam war--a demand which they hold out as a peace bait to entire U.S. and world opinion--will become true. The South Vietnamese people's self-determination right and South Vietnam's territorial integrity are not two things over which to bargain.

I ask everyone to be vigilant against the communist aggressors' plot everywhere to hinder the free world's assistance by chasing the allied troops from the country so that they can freely carry out their aggression, overthrow the people's legal administration and replace it immediately with a communist administration, or set up a coalition administration before moving gradually toward an entirely communist administration.

I also call on the peoples and governments of allied countries not to sacrifice blood and bones in this South Vietnam by tolerating the communists' stubbornness and encouraging them to carry on the so-called war of attrition and their fighting-while-negotiating strategy and to continue the war according to their strategy.

You, gentlemen, and us, we should not allow the communists to remain stubborn, stalling and waiting for pressure to mount and create more difficulties in our internal ranks or between you and us, which might weaken the potentials of not only one nation, but of the free world as a whole. Our Republic of Vietnam is certain not to surrender to the communists. Our Republic of Vietnam makes it unequivocally clear that after repeatedly showing our goodwill for peace, after taking countless concrete, conciliatory actions, faced with the stubbornness displayed by the communist aggressors on the battlefield and at the conference table, and after 17 months of so-called peace talks, we have only one alternative, that of continuing to fight to protect our independence, freedom, and democracy.

I think that if our free world also adopts a clearcut, unanimous attitude and takes concrete actions to compel the communists to adopt a clearcut attitude and take concrete actions, the communists will certainly have to comply. Only then will there be hope for an early end to the hostilities and for the early restoration of peace in this part of the country. What the free world is lacking is not the means, but a resolve in the face of the communist aggressors' stubbornness.

Gentlemen and compatriots, I have just said that we shall not surrender to the communists, nor shall we allow the communists to win in the south. I have also said that to achieve an early, just, and genuine peace, we must continue to fight.

We struggle for peace and for promptly restoring peace. In order to achieve this, we must be the first to endeavor more than anyone else to make sacrifices, endure, and shoulder our own appropriate responsibilities--military, economic, and social responsibilities. In short, we must do everything our Vietnamese people can do, before we ask for foreign aid. When this aid is needed, we must also bear in mind that it is designed to help us gradually strengthen ourselves and to rely on our own force, so that we can proceed toward a reduction in and an end to foreign aid or, at least, toward a minimum foreign aid.

When I said that our Vietnamese people must shoulder our own burden and responsibilities, I meant that we must reduce the burden and responsibilities of our allies, and first of all, we must reduce the burden in blood and bones for the U.S. people and gradually reduce the U.S. financial aid. This has been willingly approved by us, and we must succeed in doing this. I want to reassert to the U.S. people and government that we want this to be so. When speaking of the blood-and-bone burden and responsibilities I want to discuss with you, gentlemen, with the Vietnamese compatriots, and also with the U.S. people, the problem of the Vietnamese armed forces' replacement of the U.S. armed forces.

For over a year now, I have realized that maintaining a tremendously great military strength in a relatively long war for the U.S. people--although the daily losses on our side are insignificant, compared with those of the communists--has influenced a few internal problems right in the United States, due to war expenditures. While Vietnam has been steady politically and the Vietnamese armed forces have developed and become efficient, while we have gradually gained the initiative and the communists have become increasingly weaker, and while we have regained the control of a great part of the rural areas, I have myself advocated gradually replacing the allied armed forces and, first of all, the U.S. armed forces.

In 1969, there have been noteworthy troop replacement waves. Today, I assert that in the coming days I will continue to carry out this policy. Although the President of the United States agreed with me that following the 1969 troop reduction waves, the two governments, in the coming troop waves, would base themselves more on the two following policies--the progress of the Paris conference and the communists' goodwill for de-escalating the war--than that of development of the armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam, I still do not believe that the communists will have goodwill, if we and the United States do not appropriately use our force to compel them to have it.

Conversely, in order to help the U.S. Government in its internal problems and reduce the U.S. people's burden, we are determined to replace the majority of the U.S. combat units in 1970. We can assume this with our capabilities. Our Vietnamese people can accomplish this technically and in time. If the U.S. people and government sincerely provide us with vigorous aid in all fields--such as supplying us with quartermaster items, military equipment, weapons, and ammunition, increasing aid for our national defense budget, helping us develop our economy and society with an accurate plan and an appropriate timetable, the replacement of troops in 1970 and the succeeding years, of which I spoke about, will be materialized. But we must assert that, concerning what we cannot yet accomplish nor have the ability to accomplish, nor have time to accomplish, the Vietnamese people will continue to demand that the U.S. people and Government keep helping us drive back aggression and protect freedom in South Vietnam.

The essential thing is that the free world, primarily our U.S. ally, should not abandon Vietnam to the hands of the communist imperialist aggressors. So long as the communist aggressor troops from the north remain on southern territory, the allied troops cannot leave the Republic of Vietnam's territory. So long as a guaranteed peace has not yet been restored in Vietnam and the threat of renewed communist aggression remains in this part of the world, I think that the free world forces must, in one form or another, remain in this country.

I wish to reiterate that we should not confuse two matters which are completely different in principle and in consequence: the mutual withdrawal of all allied troops and all communists troops and cadres to the north in conformity with a solution which ends the war and guarantees peace, and the gradual replacement of U.S. troops by the Republic of Vietnam's troops according to our capabilities in a situation wherein communist aggression continues.

Troop replacement is an internal problem of the allied nations. We have mutually agreed not to encourage the communists to wait negatively in Paris for the day when the allied troops are totally and unconditionally withdrawn.

I also wish to stress that the U.S. troop cutback in Vietnam must be coupled with the corresponding growth--I repeat, corresponding growth--of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces, so that the cutbacks will not be detrimental to our territorial security, to the fine achievements which we have scored in many years in the pacification and construction field at the cost of the allies' blood and bones, and to the direct security of the allied remaining on the battleground.

Gentlemen and compatriots, from my expose, you may see clearly that we do not have many choices. We have the only path to follow--taking the initiative in a violent and protracted struggle--if we do not want this country and people to fall into the communist yoke.

I am sure that you gentlemen and all southern people do not want to remain idle, watching the communists decide our fate. So, we must strive to create by ourselves a strength capable of resisting the communist aggressors for an indefinite period of time. This strength can really exist only when we advance from shouldering more responsibilities in all respects to achieving self-reliance and self-strengthening through our country's existing capacity or gradually developed capabilities and means, along with the assistance of all friendly countries which sincerely help us on this path.

Along with such a policy of self-reliant economy, we must pay attention to nourishing and developing the nationalist spirit among the masses and training a new generation which will inherit from us the task of defending our country. Therefore, in the future, while continuing to build democracy, consolidate national defense, develop the army and the people's armed forces and the pacification and construction program, and improve the administration from the central level down to the village and hamlet level, the government will focus its efforts on my social reform program by developing economy, social welfare, culture, and education.

In the economic and social fields, my policy consists of building a mass capitalist economy. This accounts for the fact that in the recent past all our efforts have been focused on carrying out two main programs: making the masses owners of their property, and protecting the purchasing power of the people with fixed income in the face of price disturbances.

In the near future, there will be no change in economic policy, which is to continue building a mass capitalist economy. However, all efforts will be directed toward the objective of achieving self-reliance. In my opinion, self-reliance does not mean complete economic independence, because this is only an illusion for our Vietnam which does not have the necessary raw materials, energy, and advanced techniques.

For us, self-reliance means maximum development of our existing productive capacity in order to gradually satisfy our needs, especially in food, and later to export the excess to increase our capital in foreign currencies. With these foreign currencies, we will import part of the staple goods which our industry cannot produce.

Gentlemen, for us, achieving self-reliance means advancing toward a balance of receipt and expenditures without recourse to foreign aid. Nevertheless, for an underdeveloped country at war like ours, the path toward a complete cessation of reliance on foreign aid is strewn with many sacrifices and requires unusual efforts and a pretty long period of time. This is an undertaking which we cannot accomplish in 2 to 3 years, but it will take a score of years to accomplish with continuous efforts. It is not for this reason that we should not start this undertaking.

Therefore, right now, we must thoroughly exploit the country's economic potentials and develop to the utmost the production capabilities of the national industry so that in the beginning we can restrict to the minimum our reliance on foreign aid and gradually in only a certain minimum number of fields, we will exceed the capabilities of our tiny country.

With this aim in mind, the government will give priority to developing agriculture and fishing and will encourage local and foreign investments in order to develop the national industry. We are convinced that if we want to attain the objective of developing to the maximum the country's production capabilities, there is no other appropriate method than the initiatives of private individuals, thereby allowing all people to participate in the common development.

In view of this, the government will continue more strongly the making-people-owners-of-their-property programs which we have already started in the spirit of the mass capitalist policy. The project of making people owners of their property will be carried out correctly through agrarian reform programs which are being strongly undertaken.

The government will distribute all expropriated ricefields, ricefields bought from the French nationals, and ricefields located in land resettlement centers and refugee camps. From 1961 through 1967, the government distributed only 16,800 hectares. But early in 1968, when the agrarian reform program was accelerated, an additional 24,000 hectares were allotted. In 1969, as of now, the government had distributed an additional 42,000 hectares, and will allot about 70,000 hectares for this year. Thus, as of the end of this year, about 350,000 hectares in all will have become the property of peasants nationwide.

With the enormous efforts of the government and with that trend of progress, the prospect of distributing the total number of 150,000 hectares of expropriated land and land bought from the French nationals and some 120,000 hectares of resettlement and refugee camp land in 1970 is a realizable thing, and the government will achieve it.

Now throughout the country there are about 800,000 tenant farmers. The government must turn the majority of them into landowners. The "land of the tillers" policy must be thoroughly and absolutely implemented. The tenant farming regime will be abolished, and when the "land of the tillers" draft law is approved by the National Assembly, there will be 900,000 hectares more to distribute to peasants. The government will endeavor to distribute about 500,000 hectares in the next 2 years.

While distributing land, the government will not forget the services of our combatants who are fighting to defend our country and our functionaries and cadres who are dedicated to fulfilling their duties toward the country. Therefore, in the coming phase, to appropriately reward those who have made sacrifices during this war, the government will work out a plan to distribute land to army men and functionaries and supply them with farming means. In addition to the land to be distributed under the "land to the tillers" program, the government will have to distribute the land which will be reclaimed and provided with irrigation canals.

Along with paying attention to transforming peasants' life, the government will pay special attention to the program of enriching workers, army men, and functionaries. Thus, the government will carry out a program of selling all the shares of the government-owned companies in several phases. In the first phase, which will come soon, the government will sell a quantity of shares of the government-owned companies which are making a profit. The sale, on the installment system, of scooters, cabs, and houses to workers will be carried out by the responsible ministries simultaneously with the sale, on the installment system, of houses to army men and functionaries. Also with the aim of transforming the masses' life in mind, the government will complete the reconstruction of the areas ravaged by the war during the Mau Than Tet by the end of 1970.

Within the framework of the production developing plan, the government will pay special attention to developing agriculture and fishery. The program on development of agriculture and fishery will lay special emphasis on producing more rice and fish in order to supply the masses with more nutritive food. In compliance with this program, IR rice will be produced in sufficient quantity to satisfy domestic consumption and put an end to the importation of foreign rice in 1971.

You gentlemen and compatriots know that in 1967 we had to import 750,000 tons of rice, although over 7 million peasants worked hard to cultivate 2,200,000 hectares. If we continue to use local seeds and traditional farming methods, we will surely have to import a larger quantity of rice in the coming years. In order to increase production output and advance toward self-sufficiency, in 1968 the government carried out the plan on cultivation of IR-8 and IR-5 rice--two categories of rice having an average production level five times higher. Thanks to encouraging results, the acreage under IR rice has been boosted from 40,000 hectares at the outset to 200,000 hectares. Now, over 150,000 peasants throughout the country are engaging in the cultivation of IR rice. Thanks to this success, the volume of imported rice has been reduced by half--from 674,000 tons last year to 330,000 tons this year. With the progress of this program and with 500,000 hectares to be under IR rice next year, we can affirm that importation of rice will be terminated in 1971. The program to improve farming methods, the technical research task, and the cadre training task, and to supply peasants with farming means is being carried out and improved as support for the IR rice-planting program. The government will pay special attention to the means for harvesting and storing rice for the coming harvest so that rice will be regularly distributed throughout the country.

Then comes the program for development of the animal husbandry and fishing branches. The government has paid constant attention to the problem of food and nutritives for the people. To improve nutritives in daily meals, the production of meat, fish, and eggs will be boosted through the animal husbandry and fishing program.

The yearly production value of the animal husbandry branch has increased from 14.5 billion piasters in 1965 to 50.5 billion in 1968. The rearing of pigs, chickens, and other domestic animals is being accelerated in order to increase production by 20 to 30 percent in the next 2 years. The projects for producing medicines for domestic animals and foodstuffs, improving breeds, and training peasants to raise animals are being undertaken.

In the fishing branch, the government advocates improving fishermen's living standards, boosting the production of sea products, and industrializing the fishing branch. The fishing program is being developed. Fishing production increased from 375,000 tons in 1965 to 410,000 tons in 1968.

The number of fishing boats also increased from 58,500 to 76,200 during these 3 years. Enormous resources in fishing areas are going to be exploited on a large scale. They might bring fishermen nationwide remarkable incomes. Our objective for the next 2 years is to boost yearly fishing production. We expect to catch as many as 500,000 tons of fish in 1971.

The projects for equipping fishing boats with engines, perfecting the network of fishing docks, improving fishing techniques, and training fishermen will also be thoroughly implemented. Existing or future fishing cooperatives will be improved, guided, and assisted. Other projects involving the development of agriculture and fishing, the organization of agricultural and fishing credit, the protection and exploitation of lumber, the improvement of peasant organizations, and the setting up of improved agricultural cooperatives will also be carried out in order to contribute toward increasing production and improving the people's living standards.

To develop the national industry along with the development of agriculture and fishing so that these two branches may support each other, the government will make public and correctly implement an industrial investment policy aimed at attracting the hearty response of friendly countries as well as local industrialists. The investment policy to be carried out by the government will be based on two principles: encouraging private investment and protecting the bourgeois business enterprise. The government will participate in economic activities in order to develop industry effectively without wasting our very limited foreign currencies.

To implement this policy, the government will, first of all, submit to the National Assembly a revised and improved investment draft bill outlining tax privileges, guarantees, and other attractive provisions in favor of foreign capitalists. The bill will also simplify to a maximum all investment procedures.

With such a rational investment law, the government hopes to attract investment funds from local and foreign capitalists. Nevertheless, the present situation does not permit us to leave the investment enterprise to private individuals' initiatives. Thus the participation by the government in economic activities will be very necessary to avoid waste of all national resources.

This participation will be carried out in two forms. First, we will guide private individuals in making investments in priority-categorized industrial branches in order to advance toward the most favorable national development while avoiding wasting national resources. In this phase, the industrial branches specializing in processing agricultural products, in supporting the development of agriculture and fishery, and in yielding products for export will be developed on a priority basis, and special investments will be reserved for these spheres.

The second form of participation is that the government will directly allot funds for the establishment of important basic industrial branches which require an advanced technology and very great capital beyond private individual capabilities. These direct investments have not yet been materialized for, first of all, the completion, prior to the end of 1971, of a fertilizer plant, an agricultural-machine plant, and a pulp plant for paper production, and for increasing the production capabilities of the present enterprises in order to meet the masses' increasing requirements in cement, sugar, and so forth. I am convinced that the investment policy, which I just set forth, will correctly meet the wishes of business circles.

By the way, I also wish to use this tribune to sincerely call for the cooperation of private individuals at home and abroad. With a clear-cut policy governed by precise laws, I believe that businessmen's investments will encounter no difficulties and will be soundly guaranteed and favored.

Apart from the goal of satisfying the individual businessmen's capabilities, in materializing these industrial investments, private individuals will also have the opportunity to truly contribute toward building a prosperous industrial foundation for the country. Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that many industrial branches need enormous capital and that various vital industrial branches cannot stagnate. In these branches, if private individuals cannot provide sufficient capital, the government will be obliged to apply every measure to materialize urgent projects by furnishing the total amount of the required capital, or by sharing it with private individuals.

Dear gentlemen, I also wish to assert that the government does not intend to run a number of enterprises in order to be the only recipient of profits, but aims only at streamlining the production ability and the improvement of our industrial branch; and when favorable operational circumstances permit, the enterprises in which the government has invested its capital will be gradually transferred to private holdings exploitation. With this development trend, we can believe in the future of our national industry. In addition to streamlining the present industrial foundation, the government will go ahead with exploiting the kerosene resources in the Vietnam coastal areas; and phosphate mines. The government has started an initial study in order to promptly engage in exploitation. In the face of this fine prospect, many foreign companies have demanded that they be allowed to make investments, providing conditions which are very favorable for our government. This project requires a long period of time. Concerned agencies are endeavoring to materialize this project. Once available, these sources of raw materials not only can meet the demands in the country, but can also be exported in substantial quantities, and will thus bring to our nation an appreciable amount of foreign currency.

In the economic sphere, before prices soar, the present urgent problem is to stabilize the livelihood of various circles, especially armymen and civil servants whose wages are regular. So, all necessary measures will be immediately carried out by the government. A program of unrestricted import of essential commodities will be carried out by the Ministry of Economy, despite the decrease in foreign currency reserves. Meanwhile, along with maintaining absolute security along the main arteries on land and water to insure transportation of goods and foodstuffs day and night, the cancellation of unnecessary checkpoints along the highways and of unnecessary administrative procedures hindering goods transportation will help insure rapid transportation of abundant goods from the countryside to the cities.

Attention must also be paid to storing essential commodities. A network of storage facilities will be set up countrywide to store essential commodities for consumption for at least a 3-month period. Necessary measures to assist army men and civil servants have been executed. The National Assembly itself has not hesitated to approve expenditures amounting to 13 billion piasters per year to increase the salaries of army men, civil servants, and cadres. However, this is but a measure which the government has reluctantly adopted to cope in time with the soaring of prices. In the future, many more practical and effective measures will be carried out. First, the government will promptly complete a network to supply low-cost commodities and will set up a public transportation network to facilitate the people's movements and to reduce fares.

All children of army men and civil servants will be admitted to free public schools if their ability is not mediocre. If they are now attending private schools, the government will seek appropriate measures to help reduce their school fees. The last assistance is the granting of free medical care to all army men and civil servants and their families.

All these immediate measures will help further stabilize the life of army men, civil servants, and cadres.

Gentlemen, these are the main points of the policy for improving the people's livelihood and developing national economy to achieve self-sufficiency and self-reliance.

Economy, culture, and education are always closely related. Economic development will surely lead to cultural and educational development. Conversely, culture and education play an important role in economy and social improvement. Moreover, we must not forget to place culture and education within the framework of the present protracted struggle and our nation's survival.

So, the cultural and educational policy must be placed within the framework of the national salvation and reconstruction policy. I therefore advocate that our national culture must be preserved and developed so as to develop warm patriotism in the Vietnamese heart and to create a strong sense of nationhood in everyone's mind.

To preserve and develop our national culture, we must, on the one hand, restore the essences of our traditional culture and, on the other hand, create and encourage a new elite. In this connection, the government will earmark proper funds for restoring historical ruins, gathering and studying our ancestors' cultural heritage, reviving our classical songs, music, and theatre, and encouraging, supporting, and widely popularizing the constructive masterpieces and research works of every department in the direction of developing our people's character.

With particular regard to the educational field, a field with obvious and strong influence on social and economic activities, I have held that the educational policy of the Republic of Vietnam must be one of popular and practical education. I think that education must belong to and serve everybody without giving privileges to any minority group in society. Every citizen has the duty to actively contribute to the education undertaking and the right to be educated at a basic level. Only by so doing can we achieve educational equity and improve the people's intellectual standard so as to improve society and effectively defend the national cause. This also represents the application of democracy and equality through education. In order to establish popular education, the government must enforce free and compulsory elementary education, liquidate illiteracy, and develop secondary, university, and youth education. These great undertakings call for ample funds to develop schools, equip them with materials, and obtain teachers to meet their demands.

The most important point in the popular education policy is the need to create favorable conditions and surroundings for the people to become conscious of their duty and actively participate in the educational undertaking. These conditions and surroundings are part of the government's policy of localizing education. According to this policy, power will be decentralized to achieve a locally administered educational regime. In the very near future, the government will set up educational zones and provincial services along with local educational councils so that the people, the teachers, and the local authorities may have the opportunity to closely collaborate with one another and actively contribute to the real application of the national educational policy in their localities, so that, on their part, the people will have an opportunity to vigorously participate in the educational undertaking by directly contributing their services or money or indirectly administering it.

Another important point in my policy is that education must be directed toward practical purposes. This means that we must associate, at any cost, these two educational objectives: Development of individual faculties and adaptation to the society. We cannot spend a great sum of money for education without paying attention to forming a class of able people practically useful to economic development and social improvement. To achieve this objective, the application of a new program in general education along the lines of community spirit at elementary level and in the generalized direction at high school level has been underway for some time in a number of pilot schools. With these new programs and methods, pupils will be clearly aware of their localities and the situation of their society, and will acquire practical knowledge about community life so they will be able to serve the country more effectively in the future.

Other than that, our country is in need of a great deal of specialists, technicians, and people with specialized abilities to develop industry and agricultural and fishing activities. Therefore, the government must bring localities under technical and vocational education so as to form enough skilled men to meet the demands of the country in the future.

To carry out the aforementioned policy, I have set forth the following objectives for the educational branch in the forthcoming 2 years: Concerning elementary and secondary education, the government will establish a continuous 12-year education in accordance with the recommendation of the international organization. The government will study and renovate the education program and improve the examination system in accord with the new education system. The general education program will incline greatly toward practical purposes in accordance with the spirit of the community development in elementary education, as I said above.

At present, out of 5,395 elementary schools, 1,300 have been developed into community development schools. The other schools will undergo the same community development process, with the whole plan being completed by 1971.

In the consolidated education system, only 11 secondary schools have been chosen as pilot centers. In the 1970-71 school year, it will be possible to turn about 100 secondary schools into consolidated secondary schools.

To make teachers understand and correctly apply the teaching methods related to this new educational program, the government will continuously organize seminars and refresher courses, and will strive to complete the compulsory education plan in the first 5 years of the 12-year educational system, that is, at the present elementary education level. It is estimated that this plan will be completed in 1972 at an expenditure of 2 billion piasters. The government will appeal for assistance from the local people and fraternal countries.

Particularly in the secondary education sphere, outstanding strides have been made during this school year. In the previous school year, only 40,890 out of 188,800 schoolchildren, or 24 percent, were admitted by competitive examination to the seventh grade class. This year, 70,000 out of 200,000 candidates, or 35 percent, have been admitted to this class. As compared with the previous year, the rate of admission of schoolchildren to the seventh grade class has increased 72 percent. However, to meet increasing needs with every passing year, the government has ordered the opening of more schools so that in the 1971-72 school year, 50 schoolchildren will be admitted to each sixth grade class, that is, the seventh grade class of the present general educational system.

Concerning the education of adults, the government will strive to completely eradicate illiteracy and to seek measures to support adult classes and encourage the adults to further their studies.

As regards the technical and vocational education department, the government will give priority to technical and vocational schools so that in the coming 2 years, they will be able to admit about 10,000 students, that is, double the present number. The Phu Tho Technological Center and the National Agricultural Center will be expanded. Priority will be given to technical students applying for self-supporting overseas study so that the technical branch will not be deadlocked after the secondary education system, as it is now.

Concerning university schools, the government will move a number of university establishments from Saigon to Thu Duc. A university statute will be completed soon to eliminate all present injustices and to improve university life. The government will develop the school-life program, which is considered a practical part of civic education and to which I give special attention. In fact, this program will help our youths and students to accustom themselves to a collective, self-directing life, to acquire a democratic spirit, a sense of responsibility, a spirit of mutual affection and assistance, and a spirit of devoted science, and to cultivate many virtues so as to become worthy citizens. The government will order the building of a number of school-life centers at Thu Duc, Vung Tau, Can Tho, Dalat, Nha Trang, and Hue.

Concerning educational television, the Japanese Government has promised to help us install a television network for educational purposes. Our government has worked out a plan for the execution of this project and will carry out this task urgently so that in the next 2 years we will have an educational television center which will function on an experimental basis in a number of Saigon schools.

All these programs are aimed at developing our national education qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Under present war conditions, to develop our education qualitatively and quantitatively is truly a very great task. However, faced with our national needs and with our desire to transform our society and build our country, we cannot avoid thinking of future generations--the rich sources of manpower, the training of which we are responsible for. Thus, I expect that everyone will make positive contributions to this great task so that our education will achieve good results.

I am going to speak of the problem of insuring security for the masses. Now we control 16,542,000 inhabitants, that is, 95 percent of our total population. Of this number, 15,419,000 are enjoying relatively efficient security, that is, 98 percent of the total population. Given the present pacification and construction speed, by the end of 1969, 93 percent of the population may enjoy relatively efficient security. Thus, compared to the population we controlled by the end of 1968, 87 percent, in the first 9 months of 1969 our results prove that our

pacification and construction plan has progressed strongly and encountered no obstacle. That is what I anticipated and expounded before the National Assembly at its inaugural session, last April. Insuring security for the masses has been the result of efforts to annihilate the enemy military strength along with annihilation of underground cadres through the Phoenix Plan, with the development of civil defense organization, and with the success of the "open arms" operation.

During the first 9 months of the year, our Phoenix Plan resulted in neutralizing some 26,169 enemy basic-level cadres. Thus since the launching of the Phoenix Plan, about 44,165 lower-level cadres have been annihilated by us.

With regard to our "open arms" activities, also during the first 9 months of the year, some 34,295 enemy soldiers, among them 14 high-ranking cadres and 88 intermediary cadres, returned to the national cause, raising the total number of returnees to 127,675. The monthly number of returnees in 1968 was 1,800; in 1969, the monthly number has risen to 3,800, representing an increase of 200 percent.

Our people's self-defense organizations have been developed strongly, far exceeding the prescribed norms and attracting the participation of people in defending their villages and hamlets. In early 1969, some 1.06 million people were self-defense corpsmen equipped with only 106,800 rifles. Now there are 2,199,800 corpsmen with 347,000 rifles.

With regard to the pacification plan, mass security has been guaranteed along with our efforts to develop a village- and hamlet-level administration of the people and for the people, enabling local people to defend and govern themselves and achieve self-sufficiency. As of today, 2,027 villages, that is, 95 percent of the total number of villages nationwide, had organized elections; and 9,564 hamlets, that is, 88 percent of the total number of hamlets nationwide, had organized elections. By the end of 1969, elections will be organized in all our villages and hamlets.

To improve the quality and efficiency of village and hamlet officials, the Vung Tau Training Center has provided for 9,412 trainees out of the 19,000 to undergo training this year. In the provinces in the south, in-service training courses have also been held. To date, 15,800 persons out of the total of 39,000 scheduled for this year have received in-service training.

Regarding rural and urban development, in 1970 the government plans to provide 1.3 billion piasters for the provinces and 2 billion for the villages in order to enable the localities to implement self-help projects aimed at improving the people's living conditions in the community-development spirit. These appropriations shall be allocated on the basis of 1 million for each electoral village and 20 million for each province.

Another purely military effort, which I presented in my early 1969 message, consists of increasing, consolidating, and modernizing the Republic of Vietnam armed forces on a people's basis, that is, emphasis will be laid on expanding and improving the territorial forces in order to insure that the protection of the population's security will become increasingly effective.

This effort is also aimed at implementing our policy of having Vietnamese troops gradually replace the allied combat troops in protecting territorial security. Therefore, the strength of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces has been increased from 717,000 men in 1968 to 953,673 in 1969. This strength is expected to increase to 1,010,000 men by the end of 1970. In 1970, the people's self-defense forces will be vigorously improved on a people's basis, if we receive effective assistance. As a result of this rate of increase, the strength of our territorial forces-- that is, the regional and popular forces--has for the first time amounted to more than half of the total strength of the Republic of Vietnam armed forces. This reflects our effort to insure territorial security and territorial defense, which is regarded as our main national defense trend at present and in the future.

Thus, the tasks which I set forth for 1969--counterattacking and annihilating the enemy, developing the Republic of Vietnam armed forces, developing pacification and construction, improving and perfecting the village and hamlet administrations, and expediting the implementation of the agrarian reform program--have achieved encouraging results. We shall vigorously carry on these programs next year by capitalizing on our victorious elan and the enemy's declining strength. These achievements will arouse all our armed forces' and people's firm confidence in inevitable final victory. On the basis of this confidence, our armed forces and people will jointly advance toward final victory.

Regarding the other programs which fall within various governmental domains, we shall present them to the National Assembly at later dates when we have to elaborate on the proposed budget.

Gentlemen and compatriots, I have just presented to you what we want to do in the next 1 or 2 years, the main tasks involved in fighting and defeating the communists and carrying out economic, social, cultural, and educational development, in conformity with our nation's self-help spirit and determination to fight the communists until genuine peace is achieved.

Generally speaking, I can pledge my determination to achieve by every means the objectives set forth. But whether my good faith and resolve can bring about the expected results depends on the means to be provided for the executive in the budget which has been presented to the National Assembly and on other measures which the National Assembly will permit us to take. Contrary to previous occasions, this time I wish to tell you frankly that the government is in great need of extensive financial means. I also tell you frankly that the draft national budget for fiscal year 1970 which I sent to the Lower House Secretariat a few days ago only reflects part of the overall needs. The costs of many programs were estimated for only the first 6 months of the year, pending the acquisition of additional means.

As I have said, I should frankly present the estimated annual national requirements. In national defense, we need up to 136 billion piasters to fully meet the annual requirements. After repeated discussions and after my personal review of the estimated requirements from the general outlines to details, I approved a budget reflecting the requirements in the first 6 months of the year with provisional appropriations amounting to 112 billion piasters, instead of 120 billion recommended by the National Defense Ministry. Thus, I eliminated all the projected works and estimated expenditures which are not urgent, cutting the Defense Ministry's proposed budget by 8 billion.

Concerning security, the national police strength necessary for the country-wide needs is estimated at 122,000 men. But I have only basically planned for 95,000 men. Concerning the land reform program, the project of providing land to the tillers must be allotted more than 4.5 billion piasters for 1970. But the budget only registered 2.5 billion piasters. Many other programs concerning culture, education, and the processing industry, as well as various projects for the infrastructure development necessary for increasing production in the direction of self-reliance, which have only been planned partially or which have not yet been granted funds, still await additional means. Due to these reasons, there is an important difference between the expenditures amounting to 182 billion piasters recorded in the draft budget presented to the National Assembly and the actual total of needs amounting to 232 billion piasters proposed by the ministries. In the 1970 national draft budget presented to the National Assembly, with planned receipts amounting to 125 billion piasters and planned expenditures amounting to 182 billion piasters, there will be a deficit of 57 billion piasters, compared with the 1969 budget deficit of 49 billion piasters, with total expenditures amounting to 150 billion piasters.

I do not think the level of the budget deficit has increased, nor will it bring about harmful consequences. However, to reach the main objectives I have set forth, the program of action must be steadily and actively carried out and thereby be given more support. As I have just said, the total expenses proposed by the various ministries amount to 232 billion piasters. It is I, myself, who have re-examined the draft expenses on the basis of strict thriftiness, and canceled all expenses of a luxurious and show-off nature which are not urgently needed by the compatriots, and canceled every program of action which has no immediate effect. The management of the various government offices, just as the autonomous state-run enterprises, will be gradually examined along with simplification and thriftiness, on reducing the budget but increasing efficiency. It is in this spirit that I promise to the National Assembly and the compatriots that along with the improvement of the village and hamlet administration, I will complete the reorganization of the government administrative machinery of the central echelon before the end of 1970, which will contribute to further reducing the state budget and will more effectively serve the compatriots.

I wish to reassert that I have always been concerned with defending the Vietnamese piaster. I do not like to see any disturbance which may bring about inflation and shake our monetary system. Thus, in drafting the additional budget to the 1970 budget, the government will do its best to reduce the deficit under the limit anticipated in the original budget--that is, less than 50 billion for the entire 1970 budget. I wish also to assert that the government has never thought of devaluating the piaster. The extreme solution of devaluating the piaster would not help satisfy our needs, but on the contrary, might create many difficulties for the majority of rural people and those with fixed incomes. To avoid a devaluation of the piaster--a solution of which, I am sure, you will approve--the government must apply other measures to whittle the budget deficit. Through debates at the National Assembly, you have certainly realized that there have been many serious cases of tax dodging. I agree with you on this point. That is why I have paid special attention to working out a plan for collecting taxes efficiently and for applying various tax-collecting measures vigorously and correctly.

I wish to advance some figures so that you can realize that the government has exerted great efforts and achieved great results. In 1967, the estimated receipts were 36 billion while the actual receipts were 45 billion. In 1968, these figures were respectively 49 billion and 53 billion. In 1969, the originally estimated receipts were 55 billion, while the actual receipts by the end of August were 50.5 billion. The amended estimated receipts for 1969, 77 billion, will surely be achieved.

The results achieved permit us to pin great hopes on the years to come. I am sure that many circles and most of the beneficiaries of the war have either failed to adequately pay taxes or have paid no taxes at all. To be worthy of the great sacrifices of all our people and combatants and to help the nation achieve self-reliance, these circles will have to make worthier contributions. On the other hand, the poor, namely, army men and civil servants as a whole, will not only be exempted from taxes but will also be appropriately compensated. I will present to the National Assembly a draft law granting salary-tax exemption to army men and civil servant cadres. At the same time, the government will consider every flexible way to insure equitability in collecting taxes. The government will not prohibit those possessing property and incomes from spending them according to their desires. But at least, and primarily, they must adequately fulfill their tax obligations in the spirit of making worthy contributions at a time when the nation has many people who are less privileged than themselves.

Members of the Senate and the Lower House, I have just outlined the government's efforts in restricting expenditures and increasing receipts in order to mend the national budget deficit. However, in the future, special, urgent requirements involved in strengthening our fighting potentials in all fields and in the self-help direction will inevitably arise. These requirements can only be effectively met if the government has adequate means at its disposal. Therefore, various measures capable of providing the nation with enormous resources will be communicated to you for consideration. These measures, which the government will forward to you in the near future, include a number of draft laws revising existing taxes or establishing new taxes. I hope that the compatriots thoroughly understand the nation's difficulties and that all members of the Senate and the Lower House support the executive's efforts and concern themselves with effectively supporting the proposed measures.

Messieurs, representatives of friendly countries, the efforts to obtain more contributions which I have just presented to my Vietnamese compatriots are only aimed at partially mending the deficit of the budget of an underdeveloped nation ravaged by the war of aggression. We would, as I said earlier, implement construction projects and build industries in the self-help direction in order to maintain and protect our country's independence and freedom. These projected works require extensive means and facilities which our Vietnamese compatriots' contributions alone cannot finance. I think, therefore, efforts to fully achieve the objectives set forth cannot be made in a favorable direction without the sincere, positive, and multiformed assistance of friendly nations.

The assistance movement has (not yet) developed vigorously and comprehensively. We have received extensive assistance in every field. I would like to ask the representatives of friendly nations to accept the profound gratitude of the Vietnamese Government, people, and myself.

With special regards to the American nation and people, who have sacrificed their bones and blood and contributed their property to the greatest extent toward the present fight to protect freedom, I would like to reiterate that while we receive great, generous assistance from your nation, and while we hold that this assistance is a just and reasonable thing, we remain fully aware of the significance of the words self-reliance and self-strengthening. Owing to this awareness, while fighting and continuing to receive assistance, we have constantly striven to move closer and closer to our objectives--self-reliance and self-strengthening--and to increasingly reduce the contributions, especially the contributions in human lives, in bones and blood, for which we have to rely upon your nation. I have decided to advance toward self-reliance, as I have boldly assumed increasingly great responsibility in the fight to protect our freedom and that of the world.

Therefore, we have to meet increasing demands with the means, though very poor and scarce, of a small country ravaged by war for a quarter of a century. Naturally, we have achieved many encouraging results. In so short a period as the past 3 months, we have agreed with your country to swiftly and effectively effect the replacement of 60,000 U.S. troops with Vietnamese troops. I firmly believe that we shall attain even quicker and better results if you, in the just and reasonable spirit of international obligations between nations, will really strongly support us economically and socially.

Gentlemen, we always understand that the aid, although being mutual help and unselfish by nature, is nonetheless never without conditions, and we do not hesitate to affirm on this platform that we greatly need foreign aid, either under the form of donations or long-term loans with or without interest from any source, provided that the principles of sovereignty, freedom, and democracy of our country are insured. We shall happily welcome all foreign investments in the Vietnamese economy and we wish to mention that many generous special clauses, especially on taxes and transfer of income, will be granted for these investments.

I always stand for the development of the interdependence and solidarity spirit of free countries in the world within their international obligations. With the aim of proceeding toward developing the international spirit of mutual aid and brotherhood, we need to maintain close relations with one another in the nation-to-nation or people-to-people fields in order to create mutual understanding and aid one another to meet each one's imperative demands. In the forthcoming days, I shall send Vietnamese governmental and private delegations to your countries to directly appeal for your country's economic and social aid. And I hope to receive good-will delegations from your countries to study the realities of the Vietnam war and our sincere aspirations.

Dear chairmen, senators, and representatives, gentlemen, and compatriots, faced with the communists' stubbornness in continuing their aggression, and their unwillingness to talk seriously to put an end to the war and restore peace, I have told you and the compatriots that the only way to defend the country is to fight actively by relying on our own self-reliance, and by appealing for sincere and active aid from all friendly countries. I appeal for the National Assembly's effective support for the drastic measures which the government needs to take to carry out its national salvation programs. I know that leading the nation in wartime and taking (severe) measures to defeat the aggressive enemy certainly draws public disaffection. But against the alternative of losing the country, if being demagogic, I choose public disaffection to save the country.

There is no people who can strengthen themselves and rely on themselves without having to accept great sacrifices and outstanding efforts; we must survive and strengthen ourselves. Therefore, I call on all of you, gentlemen and compatriots, to jointly shoulder the responsibility toward the country and before history. In the forthcoming days, I eagerly hope to have the sincere and practical cooperation between the executive and legislative branches which I have appealed for and set as a standard for the recent cabinet reshuffle, so that the national salvation and construction undertakings of us all may be completely successful.

Thank you. Cordial salutations to the compatriots.

Communist Reaction

Liberation Radio (Clandestine) in Vietnamese to South Vietnam 1400 GMT 7 Oct 69 S

[Commentary: " Thieu's message: An assertion of the Americans' stubborn, aggressive stand and the puppets' countryselling nature"]

[Text] Once again, Thieu has read a message at the so-called Saigon National Assembly. Thieu was more boastful and lengthier than in previous times, but the contents of Thieu's message were only aimed at asserting his clique's extremely dirty, countryselling, lackey nature.

Thieu clearly revealed the traitorous Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique's common state of mind. This clique has been confused and panic-stricken in the face of its U.S. masters' repeated, increasingly greater, and comprehensive setbacks, the great victories of the South Vietnamese armed forces and people, and the ever-mounting anti-war movement in the United States.

Thieu feared that all these factors would constitute a strong pressure that would force the United States to end the war, withdraw all U.S. troops, and let the South Vietnamese people form a coalition government in South Vietnam. Therefore, Thieu has endeavored to seek every possible means to oppose two basic problems for a correct political solution to the South Vietnam problem, which are our people's basic national rights and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination.

Thieu also talked like a hooligan, threatening all those who support such a correct political solution. Concerning the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Vietnam, Thieu was forced to follow Nixon's arguments in an effort to deceive public opinion by saying that his clique was determined to replace all the U.S. combat troops here in 1970. But, on the other hand, Thieu clearly exposed his clique's evil design by saying that it would continue to demand that the U.S. Government maintain its aid, that the main problem was that the free world, especially the U.S. ally, would not abandon Vietnam, and that as long as there were communist aggressor troops, the allied troops could not withdraw from the territory of the Republic of Vietnam.

No acknowledgements can be clearer than these. Reflecting the anxiety of the Saigon traitorous clique, Thieu clearly exposed his U.S. masters' true design of seeking to prolong the presence of the U.S. expeditionary corps and their military occupation in an effort to continue the cruel war of aggression in South Vietnam. Thieu's acknowledgements constitute an assertion of the U.S. acts in South Vietnam since Nixon took office. Nixon has incessantly talked about withdrawing U.S. troops from the south. But, in truth, Nixon has sought every possible means to strengthen and consolidate the puppet armed forces.