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CED

REMAINING ERRONEOUS THOUGHTS

FILE

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I. ESTIMATION OF OUR VICTORIES AND THE ENEMY'S DEFEATS.

1. We Have Not Yet Fully Realized the Significance of Our Victories:

Even though we have fought the enemy with more vigor, we have not been highly determined to wipe him out and expand our areas.

We are incapable of attacking ((RVN)) city areas.

Our guerrilla warfare activities have become weaker and weaker.

We have been unsuccessful in political and military proselyting.

The 10-point solution presented by the NFLSVN has not been accepted favorably ((throughout the world)).

The Provisional Revolutionary Government was established for propaganda. It is a new form ((of government)), but its members remain the same ((as before)).

The fact that we controlled from three-fourths to four-fifths of the population is not accurate.

2. Enemy Situation:

The enemy has been defeated, but his defeats are not as serious as the higher echelons estimated.

He still has replacement strength and has the capability to consolidate his position. His failures are due to the political situation in the United States, and not to our strong attacks.

The Party has underestimated the enemy:

The enemy is extremely intransigent.

He still continues to attack us in our base areas in the three areas. Because we have seen that the enemy is still strong and that our capability to win a final victory in a short period of time no longer exists, we have become half-hearted at the thought of a protracted struggle. Those who operate in areas bordering cities display a wait-and-see attitude and hope their units will be replaced by others.

3. Friendly Erroneous Thoughts. The enemy's capabilities are underestimated by higher echelons.

The do not fully realize our difficulties.

They presume that the favorable situation created by the ((1968)) General Offensive and Uprising no longer exists. They are waiting for a new change in the situation and are using combat forces in a moderate manner. They have to continue to carry out the General Offensive and Uprising because they are on the tiger's back and are unable to get off.

In brief: We do not fully realize our successes.

The enemy continues to lose, but has not yet been totally defeated.

The above facts have gradually driven us to anxieties. We thought that we would win the final victory in a short period of time, but on the contrary, we are facing a war which extends indefinitely.

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4. Remarks on the Change in the Policy Concerning the General Offensive and Uprising.

We all realize our achievements in the General Offensive and Uprising in 1968.

We all agreed that during the first six months of 1969, we gained overall achievements.

In T.10 ((possibly Region 10)) battlefield, in particular, we still met difficulties. We fought and won under critical conditions.

In the spring and summer ((1969)), we were successful in our military, political, and diplomatic attacks. In the military field, our troops proved to be resistant.

The enemy was seriously defeated. We forced him to de-escalate the war. He was driven into confusion throughout the battlefield. We turned the situation in our favor and placed ourselves on the offensive.

5. The US and Puppets' Schemes.

The enemy has been defeated both in his plan of escalation and plan of de-escalation of the war. However, in T2 ((possibly Region 2)), the battle has become more fierce.

((TN: The following sentences have been translated literally;))

((*)) Four contradictions as stated above.

Two possibilities:

Envision Possibility 1

However, if Possibility 1 is to be replaced by Possibility 2, it will not be feasible. ((*))

A thorough understanding of the characteristics of each phase of activity:

We should clearly see our victories and the enemy's defeats and fully realize that the General Offensive and Uprising is a critical phase which requires a great deal of effort and a drastic fight. We should criticize and overcome thoughts of attaining the final goal in a short period of time.

6. We should be united in action and launch continuous attack against the enemy. We should make positive efforts to overcome all the difficulties and fierceness of war, in order to achieve a decisive victory.

Unit Critiques

Units should hold critique sessions to:

Place confidence in victory and in the leadership of the Central Headquarters. Strengthen our ideological concept in order to face all difficult circumstances, and accomplish our missions with high determination. Some of our units had to eat rice gruel for months. However, they were not discouraged when they faced difficulties and violence. What they lacked was ammunition and rice.

In brief ((we should correct all the following remaining erroneous thoughts, such as:))

Fear of a protracted war.

Reliance on prompt action from the Central Headquarters to end the war rapidly.

The General Offensive and Uprising has lasted for two years without attaining the decisive goal.

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Doubt concerning the success of the General Offensive and Uprising and ((possibly)) miscalculation by higher echelons.

Confusion, wait-and-see attitudes, fear of continuous attacks, and the desire to rest displayed by aged cadre.

Reliance on the support of other units and on the Paris peace talks.

Fear of sacrifice and violence.

Hesitation to execute deep thrusts far into the enemy's areas, because of a fear of the Biệt Kích ((Special Forces)).

Fear of B-52 bombers and the desire to stay in fortifications, especially in areas heavily attacked by B-52's.

Fear of not being supplied with adequate food; fear of privation and extended hardships.

Hesitation in fighting the enemy when opportunities are good; failure to complete missions; and lack of mutual support.

Lack of sense of responsibility; lack of a spirit to build up our forces and to improve solidarity.

Sense of Organization Discipline:

The Party Committees' and the Party Chapters' resolutions and the procedures concerning reports and requests for instructions have not been strictly observed.

Individualism:

Some cadre do not like to serve in agencies of e or f ((possibly regiment or division)) levels, because they have to make many trips to ((lower echelon)) units. They dare not encounter difficulties, and as a result, successes in accomplishing missions are limited. On the other hand, they are self-complacent, arrogant, vain-glorious, selfish, partial, and doubtful. These attitudes have affected the solidarity of the units.

In brief, the ideological tendencies ((of our cadre)) are as follows:

They are not confident in our success if Possibility 1 takes place, and are afraid of the protracted struggle in Possibility 2.

((Possibly: They are not confident in their success in)) political and military proselyting. They are doubtful of the fact that between three-fourths and four-fifths of the population are controlled ((by the VC)). They do not rely on the support of the local areas. They display pacifistic attitudes and fear of violence and protracted struggles and have illusions of ((peace)) negotiations. They have lost enthusiasm and thus have not sacrificed themselves for the revolutionary cause. They only seek fame ((for themselves)).

They lose self-control, act in haste, neglect the improvement of the unit, and cause unit solidarity to suffer ((by their actions)).
