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COMMENTS ON NEW YORK TIMES  
ARTICLE OF OCTOBER 16, 1969, ON  
PACIFICATION

Mr. McGEE, Mr. President, the New  
York Times article of October 16 on

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pacification represents an independent assessment of the real progress which has been made in this area in Vietnam over the past year. It confirms what our own officials are reporting about the substantial improvements which have been made in reestablishing security in the rural areas in Vietnam.

This progress in pacification is attributable to three major factors:

First, the offensive tactics used constantly by American and Vietnamese military units in seeking out enemy forces and preventing them from massing in a manner which would enable them to disrupt pacification.

Second, the increase in numbers and improvements in training and armaments of the Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces who provide security to the Vietnamese people at the village and hamlet level.

Third, the increasing effectiveness of the Vietnamese Government in carrying out the pacification program, starting with the special 3 months "accelerated pacification campaign" of November-December 1968 and January 1969. Formerly pretty much an American program, the Vietnamese Government has now taken on this program as its own.

The most striking corroboration of progress in pacification, as the New York Times article indicates, is through the improvement of road security and the return of tens of thousands of refugees to their hamlets of origin. The article speaks of these people as "leaving the Communist-controlled areas and moving into those more or less under Government control." Actually, these people left Communist-controlled areas in most cases 4 or 5 years ago and are now moving back to their own hamlets in areas over which the Government has recently taken control from the Communists.

I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows.

PACIFICATION IN RURAL VIETNAM MAKING BIG BUT FRAGILE GAINS  
(By Terence Smith)

SAIGON, SOUTH VIETNAM, October 15.—The road that runs south from Saigon to Cantho is clogged these days with trucks and cars that rattle along with careless abandon.

Sixteen months ago, in the wake of the Lunar New Year offensive, a drive along the stretch between Mytho and Cantho was a perilous adventure. Vietcong guerrillas regularly planted mines under the pavement and floated explosives under the bridges. In the evening and early morning snipers fired at passing cars from the trees lining the road.

Today as an extensive auto trip has confirmed, the only danger along Route 4 is the traffic, which is dreadful, and the potholes, which can shatter an axle.

The improved security along the road is one of the more visible examples of the progress achieved over the last year by the allied pacification program. While the enemy has concentrated his attacks on military targets, the \$600-million-a-year effort to secure and develop the South Vietnamese countryside has proceeded almost without opposition.

The gains during the period have been striking. Rural security has been greatly increased—although American officials concede that it is still fragile—and the Saigon Government's control now reaches deeper

While most of Terry Mfg. Co.'s sales contacts are with wholesalers rather than the retail outlets, their garments reach the ultimate consumer through most of the major chain stores. The direct sales made to the large retailers have so far been "less than overwhelming", according to Roy Terry. "However, some of them now seem to be expressing genuine interest, especially in our Afro style garments for men and ladies and our ladies' uniforms."

Plans are also now in the process of being implemented which will supply these items to other markets. Individuals and small shops are being recruited to sell the Afro Dashiki garments on and near the nation's black college campuses. Also, the uniforms are being catalogued for mail-order sales through persons in local communities (e.g. nurses, beauticians, etc.) who will take orders on a commission basis.

IV. THE FUTURE

The future for Terry Manufacturing Company looks bright. Plans are already being made to increase employment to about 100 persons so that expected increases in sales can be adequately provided for. There is a solid nucleus of management and production personnel who expect to build a much larger and better organization. Mr. J. A. Terry undeniably deserved the "Black Businessman of the year for 1969" award recently presented to him by the National Association of Market Developers. Further testimony to the contribution to "black capitalism" made by Mr. Terry and his company is the Awards Luncheon for him on October 29, 1969 sponsored by the local all-white Chamber of Commerce. It is believed that this is the first time that a black man has been so honored by a Chamber of Commerce in the rural South.

A high level federal government official will deliver the keynote address. Representatives of education, business, and government on the local, state, and national level are expected to attend. All major news media have been invited. On this same date, open house for the guests and the general public will be observed in order to exhibit the recently expanded plant facility. Local citizens look forward to this day as a history-making event for the community and the nation.

VIETNAM MORATORIUM—ADDRESS BY MAYOR SAM YORTY

Mr. MURPHY, Mr. President, on October 13, 1969, the distinguished mayor of Los Angeles, Sam Yorty, made what I consider to be a most forthright and perceptive speech to the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers at their annual convention.

Mayor Yorty very clearly pointed out what most of us understand "down in our consciousness" about the effect on Hanoi of the October 15 moratorium.

Mr. President, believing that Sam Yorty has articulated the majority view, I ask unanimous consent that the text of his remarks on this matter be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the remarks were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

REMARKS BY LOS ANGELES MAYOR SAM YORTY

And so what's happening? We find again this great crescendo, this great building up of subversives, dupes, and people who don't understand, who think they are just marching against war—we are all against war and they are trying to put the pressure on President Nixon to concede to the Communist demands.

They want the President to just pull out of there or agree to pull out on a certain timetable so that the Communists can know

then that if they just hang on, they have a chance to victory and this is where they are planning to win the war now. They are not going to win it in South Viet Nam any more and they know it. We have paid horribly to get into this situation, more than we needed to, more than our allies needed to, but we have paid it already and they are in sad shape and they know they have to do something to try and force Nixon not to even give them the kind of a threat that would take them out of the war.

I want you to remember what President Eisenhower did, and I asked him in Palm Springs after he retired. I said, "General, I have heard so much about what happened in Korea, I'd like to just hear from you just what did you really do?" He said, "Mayor, it's simple." He said, "I got tired of waiting for them to negotiate and I sent word to them through diplomatic channels 'if you don't want to negotiate, I am going to take the restrictions off of American weapons and where we are to use them.'" And he said, "In ten days I had a note that they wanted to sit down and negotiate and have a cease-fire."

So we are reaching a point now where the Communists know that President Nixon has walked the last mile. He has given them about all the rope he intends to give them. They know there is going to be a decisive change and they want some assurance that the change will be that we will pull out and that the President won't have the backing of the American people to see that we are not going to turntail and be defeated with the consequences to the world, which I hope our people understand.

And so this great moratorium that they are talking about, this march, can only do one thing—it can encourage the Communists to stay in the war and increase American and allied casualties. So believe me, I don't think much of the politicians encouraging this moratorium and I hope that somewhere down in their consciousness, they have some conception of what they are doing with American kids out there on that line risking their lives. And I say again, as far as I am concerned, I have told President Johnson and I have told President Nixon, that I don't think any President has the right to send kids out there to risk their lives under these restrictions because when you send them out there and say "risk your lives" but at home we say "don't escalate", what are you really saying? You are saying "let the kids risk their lives but don't do anything to risk mine because if you escalate, I might get involved and we are afraid of the Russians." Well, I'll tell you I'd rather we'd risk our lives than those kids'. They have their whole lives ahead of them.

We have reached the point that what we need is for the President to hear from the rest of the people of the nation and not just from the loud dissenters and the marchers who are the same kind of people who insisted on the appeasement of Hitler which brought such catastrophe to the world.

North Viet Nam, with just the right kind of ultimatum and if they really think we mean it—will get out of South Viet Nam and get out pretty fast. We have the power to absolutely eradicate that country in a couple of days if we wanted to do it and it is about time we let them know that the great United States of America is not about to be defeated by the kind of Communist tactics, both there and subversion at home and around the world, that they are practicing against us.

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into the countryside than it has for at least two years.

The expanded security in the countryside is a result of a combination of the pacification program and the enemy's decision during the last 10 months to concentrate on military targets.

With an eye toward escalating American casualties, the North Vietnamese and Vietcong have directed their principal efforts this year against Allied military installations rather than civilian targets. As a result, the forces assigned to the pacification program have encountered little opposition as they have pushed deeper into the countryside.

They have been operating in a sort of military vacuum, and the American officials in charge of the program are quick to concede that the progress that has been made would not have been possible had the enemy been determined to frustrate it.

Nonetheless, the officials, capitalizing on the opportunity, have redoubled their efforts during the widespread lull that has descended over the battlefield since the middle of August. They are attempting to make the most of it because they realize that it cannot last indefinitely. They acknowledge that the major test lies ahead, when the enemy turns his attention to the fruits of the program.

The officials well remember the Tet offensive of 1968, which delivered a severe setback to the gains achieved by the pacification program in 1967 and shattered the boundless optimism that characterized the official American attitude at the time.

#### "WE REALIZE ITS LIMITS"

Varied and widespread though it is, American officials readily acknowledge, the security that prevails in much of Vietnam could easily be upset by a determined enemy effort.

"There has been a steady expansion of security and Government control throughout the year," William E. Colby, who directs the pacification effort, said in a recent interview.

"But I realize its limits. We know it is still thin in many areas. It is thin at night and in the rural areas away from the towns."

To test the security, this reporter set off with two others on a five-day, 400 mile drive through the heart of the Mekong Delta. Unarmed and in a Volkswagen sedan, we drove the length of Route 4 from Saigon to Cantho, then up the bank of the Mekong River to Chaudoc, a lovely province capital on the Cambodian border, and back through Sadec and Mytho to Saigon.

#### NO SOUND OF GUNFIRE

We passed through towns, villages and hamlets and through miles of lush, green paddy fields without hearing a shot. Men and women are working the fields without visible concern for their safety, and in the towns the restaurants were busy until the curfew forced them to close.

A handful of mining incidents were reported during the week on some of the roads we used, but we encountered none of them.

The areas toured seemed prosperous as well as secure.

Television antennas poked up from innumerable thatched roofs, and in the towns gleaming new Japanese motorcycles crowded the sidewalks.

As another example of the improved security, Jim Clare, a reporter for Stars and Stripes, the Army newspaper, recently hitchhiked the length of Route 1—the late Bernard Fall's "Street Without Joy"—from the demilitarized zone to Saigon. He made the trip in 13 days without incident, arriving here last week.

In January, 1967, Michele Ray, a French free-lance journalist was kidnapped by the Vietcong when she attempted the same trip. She was released after three weeks in captivity. No else had tried it since.

Gerold Hickey, the anthropologist who first came to Vietnam in 1962, recently compared the present security to the conditions that prevailed in the summer of 1964, before the vast American buildup was under way.

#### STILL MANY RISKY AREAS

"We used to drive up and down the coast and all through the Delta in those days," he said. "Now people are doing it again. You can drive from Danang to Dongha now, a year or 18 months ago it would have been suicide."

None of this is to say that there are not areas that the Vietcong dominate either wholly or in part. There are still many districts in the Delta and in the north where an American driving in anything less substantial than a tank is risking his life.

And there are still many areas that the Vietcong can rely on for sanctuary, support and supplies. Even in many of the regions where the Government presence has recently been established, the Vietcong still conduct their business at night and collect taxes on a regular basis.

But the pendulum has swung in the direction of the Government during the last year, and the shift is reflected in the much-maligned computerized analyses prepared each month by the experts on pacification. In the past their findings have been sharply challenged, by members of Congress among others.

According to official American figures, 89 per cent of the South Vietnamese people were living under "relatively secure" control of the Saigon Government as of Aug. 31—15.3 million of a population of 17.3 million. In the rural areas the figures are lower but still high; 84 per cent of those outside the cities enjoy "relative security."

#### A DEFINITION BY THIEU

In some cases that security is very relative—particularly at night, when the Vietcong are most active. In a recent speech President Nguyen Van Thieu came up with a definition of a relatively secure area that most people agree with. It means, he said, an area that "Government representatives can visit without military escort in the daytime."

Even President Thieu would readily acknowledge that the situation can easily change at night or from one day to another.

The generally improved security is mainly a result of the enlarging and equipping of the regional and popular forces, nicknamed the Ruf Puffs, which along with the regular army, have taken over a large share of the military side of pacification. As a result of relentless American prodding, and in the absence of significant enemy opposition, they have spread out into the countryside and taken up the front-line defense of much of the rural population.

In addition a home-grown militia composed of men too young or old for the draft and of some women and girls has been developed over the last year and a half. There are about 1.5 million members of these people's self-defense force who guard their own villages or hamlets at night. About a million of them have received some rudimentary military training, and they have some 300,000 arms.

Although their contribution to defense may not be great in purely military terms, their presence has provided a major boost to morale.

#### SHIFT FROM VIETCONG AREAS

The relative security, despite its thinness, is attracting people into the newly pacified communities. Increasing numbers of refugees are leaving the Communist-controlled areas and moving into those more or less under Government control. Politics is not usually involved; people are simply in search of an opportunity to live and work in peace—a rare luxury in Vietnam.

Few officials doubt that the tide would be running in the opposition direction if the people believed they had a better prospect in the Vietcong areas.

There has also been a stirring of political life in the villages during the last year, and this too is a by-product of the pacification program. Elections have been held in about 1,900 of the 2,300 villages in South Vietnam, and though some difficulty was experienced in getting enough people who were both qualified and willing to run, the voting is said to have had a generally positive effect.

New village officials have been given substantial budgets to use for local development, and they now have administrative control over the rural development workers sent by the central Government as part of the pacification effort.

As a result the officials are operating with greater autonomy than they have had since President Ngo Dinh Diem suspended village elections 14 years ago. Returned to their traditional role, they have a vested interest in continued Government control.

Government troops and pacification workers recently pushed into an area in Sadec Province, in the Mekong Delta, long held by the Vietcong and known as the Triangle. They secured three villages that had been abandoned for more than a year, and within a month refugees poured back into the area. The fields surrounding the villages have been planted for the first time in several seasons, village elections have been held and the Government presence appears to be firmly established.

"The elections have produced the beginnings of community awareness and responsibility in the villages," Mr. Colby said. "But let's not overdo it—it's just a beginning, and we know it."

"The important thing is whether the structure we have set up is strong enough to resist the shock of an enemy attack," he said. "We have been working for the past year in a relative vacuum, but now we have documents that indicate that the enemy feels he must do something about the situation. So it's up to us to prepare for it."

The pacification program is a massive assistance and advisory effort that employs 14,500 people, including 7,300 Americans. Its goal is to extend the Government's presence in the countryside and rejuvenate economic and political life in the rural areas that have been disrupted by the Vietcong. But its primary task is security, and that is how its success is measured.

Officials of the pacification program have been expecting some enemy response since early this year, and they acknowledge that they have been mystified by the lack of it.

Now, as the result of the capture of a command-level enemy document, they expect it shortly. The document, which American analysts believe to be authentic, calls for a concerted military and political campaign to reverse the gains achieved.

In its ominous way the document is a compliment to the program—the first clear indication that the enemy is sufficiently concerned to attempt to counteract it.

#### DISABLED AMERICAN VETERANS SUPPORT SENATE RESOLUTION 271

Mr. DOLE, Mr. President, on October 13, I introduced, with 30 other Senators, Senate Resolution 271, calling on the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front to take certain steps toward bringing an end to the Vietnam war. I have received considerable response supporting the resolution, a response which is most encouraging from a group whose devotion to this coun-