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17. SUMMARY: (U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns a self-critique statement prepared by the Command Committee, VC Long Dat District Unit. The statement, dated 17 October 1969, reviews the strengths and weaknesses displayed by the district unit in military, political and military proselyting activities conducted during the past nine months. These activities were conducted after the unit studied Resolutions 8 and 9 and the directives issued by the Party concerning the development of local force units.			

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----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

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CRITIQUE AND SELF-CRITIQUE  
OF LONG DAT DISTRICT UNIT  
COMMAND COMMITTEE

In the review of activities concerning the implementation of Resolutions 8 and 9 and the directives of the Party during the past nine months under the Command Committee of Long Dat District Unit, the following strengths and weaknesses ((of the district unit)) were noted:

1. Strengths:

Resolution 8, Directives 41, 71, and 88, Resolutions 3 of BCS ((Party Civil Affairs Committee)) and 103/CT - NT were promptly disseminated to guerrillas and secret guerrillas. The slogan "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom" was also widely disseminated. We succeeded in raising cadre's and soldiers' morale, and making them understand the policies and guidelines, and the strategic determination of COSVN. They learned the importance of the General Offensive and Uprising phases, and grasped the concept of the working class. They saw opportunities in local areas and made many efforts to attack the enemy. During the Spring, Summer, and Fall Campaigns, the ((Uprisings)) were initiated simultaneously in coordination with the attacks on the overall front.

The Command Committee properly assessed the enemy and friendly situations and understood enemy schemes. It realized the stubborn, cunning, and cruel nature of the enemy and the important position of Long Dat District. Therefore, the Command Committee was not surprised when the enemy launched attacks in the area. It took the initiative and made efforts to frustrate the enemy pacification plan in ((Long-Dat)) District.

The Command Committee also learned lessons from attacks against the strategic hamlets. This will lead to the frustration of the enemy pacification plan. Depending upon the situation in local areas, the Command Committee concentrated all efforts on attacking and destroying the People's Self-Defense Force.

As a result, 80% of the People's Self-Defense Force was disrupted and the accelerated enemy pacification plan was frustrated from its inception (in the Dat Do ((Red Dirt)) area):

Having failed in the pacification plan during the Summer Campaign, the enemy launched overall attacks

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aimed at repacifying the Long-Dat ((District)). At that time, fighting throughout SVN was fierce. But, with subjective efforts and high determination, our cadre and soldiers in the district conducted incessant attacks against the enemy and attained glorious victories. In particular,

((the district unit)) succeeded in employing its forces and adopted the guidelines of guerrillas to conduct activities against the enemy, using weapons and mines (E3). Along with the development of the guerrilla warfare movement, countersweep operations were conducted in which an important element of Puppet and Australian forces, and their war facilities were destroyed. More than 1,600 enemy soldiers were put out of action, more than 30 vehicles were destroyed, five aircraft were shot down, and 51 guns were seized. Not only did we conduct continuous attacks outside enemy controlled areas, but we also executed deep thrusts into strategic hamlets, district seats, and along communication lines. We destroyed a large number of enemy potentials ((sic)) and the pacification support team. We concentrated all efforts on frustrating the pacification plan and we destroyed a larger number of enemy potentials ((sic)) than ever before. Since that time we have maintained the movement and held the objective area. We mingled with the masses and brought the movement to a high level.

We closely coordinated the three-front attacks. The people's struggle movement was brought to a high point through the struggle movement and the proselyting of the enemy soldiers. We took advantage of the favorable opportunities to attain great overall victories.

Along with attacks against the enemy, the Command Committee paid attention to strengthening our forces in all fields of activity. ((Marginal note)): (Especially the development of the movement of guerrilla warfare in the local area.) Although we did not meet the requirements for the situation, we made some progress in ideological leadership and increased the number of cadre and soldiers and improved their combat skills. The leadership and technical and tactical skills of the district armed forces were greatly improved. We used a smaller force to attack large enemy forces and used rudimentary weapons to defeat modern weapons.

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Combat effectiveness and our ability to kill the enemy were increased. Our casualties were minimized and the fear of war was eliminated.

Under our leadership, agencies and subordinate elements overcame many difficulties. They contributed effectively to the betterment of the the leadership of the guerrilla warfare movements.

#### Reasons for these achievements:

Due to the careful study of Resolution 8, the direct leadership of the province unit Command Committee, the efforts and determination of the ((district unit)) Command Committee, and our determination to hold the area of operation, we continuously increased our attacks in every field.

After an indoctrination course on Resolution 8 and the Party directives, cadre and troops were aware of the opportunity, the situation, guidelines, and the strategic determination of the "Lao Đông" Party Central Headquarters. They took advantage of victories to move forward, used opportunities, increased their activities, coordinated with friendly forces during the climax phase and the ordinary phase, and gained victories.

We maintained a unity of mind and solidarity in the ((District unit)) Command Committee, mastering the plan, properly assessing the situation, and taking the initiative to attack the enemy.

We strengthened the determination of the army and people and took advantage of the opportunity to fulfill Uncle Hô's testament and attack continuously.

The army and people in Long Dát District displayed the Revolutionary tradition and were courageous. They did not fear death or difficulties. On the contrary, they were determined to overcome them, heighten the General Offensive and Uprising, and display self-sufficiency.

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## 2. Weaknesses:

Despite these strengths, the following weaknesses remained:

We failed to launch continuous attacks against the enemy. Some district guerrilla units were unable to engage in combat. Therefore, they could not be used to split the enemy forces over a large area of operations. They limited their own capability to wear down and destroy the enemy's strength. The leadership, organization, training, and the use of secret guerrillas was not good. The guerrilla warfare movement was not effectively developed. Specific plans were not made to provide leadership for local areas to intensify military activities. Therefore, we failed to launch attacks continuously against district seats, sensitive areas, and strategic hamlets. We also failed to kill enemy personnel (pacification cadre, public security agents, spies, and tyrants) who oppressed the people. We have not destroyed ((the enemy)) strategic hamlets and communication lines. We were not determined to break the oppressive enemy control, sow dissension among the enemy in the rear, and frustrate the accelerated enemy pacification plan. We did not strive to support the people to revolt, kill tyrants, and break the oppressive control. The people did not regularly and enthusiastically participate in uprising. Political struggles and military proselyting activities were not strong and not in accordance with the requirements for military activities. We did not conduct surprise attacks to upset the enemy pacification plan. We failed to disorganize enemy units when they were confused. We did not create a favorable situation for enemy troops to revolt. The leadership for military, political, and military proselyting activities was uncoordinated.

The strengthening and development of forces was too slow and weak, especially the development of guerrilla and secret guerrilla forces in villages and hamlets.

In some areas, guerrilla forces have not been strengthened. In other areas, guerrillas have increased in number but not in quality. Training was not conducted to improve their skills and intensify their activities. A number of our units left their areas of operations and stayed away from the people.

The leadership of various agencies and support elements subordinate to the Command Committee was not effective. These units, therefore, did not give full support to the Command Committee in providing guidance for the guerrilla warfare movement and in the implementation of the Party policies. Specifically, the Ordnance ((Section)) failed to overcome its difficulties. The production of weapons was too slow and did not meet the requirements for guerrilla units. The Medical ((Section)) failed to prepare medicine, take care of sick and wounded soldiers, or implement the policies for wounded and dead soldiers. These shortcomings have greatly affected the morale of cadre and soldiers in combat areas. The Army Post Office ((Section)) did not deliver letters promptly or maintain the continuity of communication. The Military Intelligence ((Section)) did not provide timely information on the enemy situation. Sometimes the assessment of the enemy situation was not properly made. The liaison between higher echelons and lower levels was not closely maintained. Thus, leadership was not provided promptly. The political and ideological attitudes of the personnel in the unit were poor and were not improved.

The working procedures between the Command Committee and various agencies, subordinate elements, and villages were inadequate. The sense of organization and discipline was poor. The principle of requesting instruction from and submitting reports to higher headquarters was not followed. Therefore, the policies and resolutions set forth by the Party were not properly carried out.

Ideological leadership was not regularly provided and political indoctrination was not (repeatedly) conducted. Some areas, especially villages, did not maintain internal solidarity among organizations. Defections occurred in some areas.

Erroneous thoughts, such as shirking and rightist attitudes and lack of confidence in the people, still existed. Ideological attitudes were poor. Therefore, favorable opportunities were missed and greater successes were not obtained.

The preparation and maintenance of material facilities for future use were poor. This affected our activities.

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#### Reasons for Weaknesses.

1. We did not fully understand Resolution 8 and the directives of TU ((province Party Committee)), T7, and XA 12 ((sic)). For this reason, we did not control the situation and did not understand the policies, guidelines, and the strategic determination of the Central Headquarters of the ((Lao Dong)) Party. We did not understand all our advantages and disadvantages. We failed to attack the enemy constantly and strengthen our forces.

2. We did not properly estimate the enemy and friendly situations. We failed to make our lower echelons recognize our difficulties and advantages, and the enemy weaknesses and strengths in order to make more efforts and heighten our determination to attack the enemy. We shrank from duty and had a rightist attitude. We were still fearful of the

fierceness of war and sacrifices. We did not believe in the people's revolutionary capabilities, and had a weak ideological attitude.

3. The leadership was not close and effective. In the implementation of the plan, there was no close coordination between subordinate agencies and guerrilla units. Ideological control and corrections were not made. Internal solidarity of the unit was not strengthened. For these reasons, our capabilities to attack the enemy were limited.

4. We did not understand the policy toward the working class. The attacks against the enemy were not continuously conducted and our forces were not strengthened.

5. We did not believe in the people, rely on, or stay close to them. In the face of difficulties, we did not hold on to our areas of operation. We left the people. We failed to provide leadership for the people to attack the enemy continuously.

17 Oct 69

For the Long ~~hat~~ District Unit  
Command Committee.

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