

9 Dec 69
XS085655,
Kiên Tường
Province
III & IV CTZ
RVNAF IV CTZ
Batch No.
74/KTTL/70 &
045/VLCI/P2
Opn Quyét
Thang/KT/198/
69
Received CDEC
21 Mar 70
Category: C

18.18.02

(C) (9 pages, typewritten; B-3) Directive. number 20/CT9, classified ((VC)) Absolute Secret, precedence Flash, dated 18 Oct 69, signed by Nguyễn Thế Hữu, KAI ((possibly Kiên Phong Province Party Committee, Region 2)), addressed to PA2, UR, KA, and KA2, provides an assessment of the situation during the two climaxing phases of the ((1969)) Fall Campaign, and outlines missions for the coming D ((possibly Winter)) Campaign.

Document states that to reduce losses, the US de-escalated the VN war. However, in an attempt to maintain a strong position in negotiations, the US adopted the so called Vietnamization program. To meet the requirements of this program, the Puppet ((RVNAF)) had to boost conscription in order to ensure sufficient troops to replace the US troops. This conscription scheme could not help the Puppet strengthen his forces, because the desertion rate increased considerably. The replacement of Huong's cabinet by Khiem's cabinet also could not calm, the hostility in the Puppet Government. In addition to the cited difficulties, the Puppet was experiencing a very heavy financial burden caused by the lack of 60 billion piasters ((SVN)) ((118\$ SVN = \$ 1.00 US)) in his budget, and was suffering serious failures in his accelerated pacification program. The People's Self-Defense Forces were disorganized; many posts were encircled continuously and his oppressive control of the rural areas was broken.

Regarding the friendly ((VC)) situation, document states that although the ((VC)) forces have caused great difficulties to the enemy ((FWMAF/RVNAF)) in the military, political, and economic fields, those forces still did not meet the requirements. They failed to closely coordinate military, political, and troop proselyting attacks; to cling to the enemy controlled areas; to increase counterpacification activities in the rural areas; and to motivate the population in cities and towns to conduct political struggles demanding an overthrow of the Thieu - Ky Government. In addition, local guerrilla warfare was not expanded in a satisfactory manner.

Regarding missions to be carried out in the D Campaign, document directs that efforts should be made to: (1) Cause serious personnel and materiel losses to the enemy; (2) attack enemy pacification and combat support units; (3) sabotage enemy communication lines; (4) destroy his depots and important installations; (5) expand local guerrilla warfare; (6) construct combat hamlets and villages; (7) instigate military revolts and antiwar movements; (8) promote the people's political struggles in order to break the enemy's oppressive control and establish a revolutionary administration; (9) and increase farm production. It was also mandatory that addressees indoctrinate cadre and troops on Resolution 9 and submit reports on their strengths and weaknesses during the two climaxing phases of the ((1969)) Fall Campaign to KAI no later than 30 Oct ((69)).

13.18.02