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DANGERS OF INVOLVEMENT IN  
ASIA

**HON. LEE METCALF**

OF MONTANA

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, October 23, 1969

Mr. METCALF. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD), the majority leader, has warned us repeatedly of the dangers that could flow from our deepening involvement in Laos. Senator MANSFIELD is once again speaking out directly, telling it, as the young people say, like it is. I profoundly hope that our Government will take heed this time.

For years my distinguished colleague from Montana has warned while others have soothed. No alarmist, rather a realist and a man of peace, Senator MANSFIELD has tried to show us how badly our Vietnam policy has served our own interests, even if we could ignore its cost in men and resources.

In an article published recently in the Great Falls Tribune, William D. James, the executive editor, described Senator MANSFIELD's position and cited his many warnings about Vietnam. Mr. James has also drawn a parallel with our situation in Laos. In the hope that it will reinforce his warnings of additional tragedies there and so that all Senators may have the advantage of this recapitulation of MIKE MANSFIELD for the right statements, I ask unanimous consent that the article be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the Great Falls Tribune, Sept. 28, 1969]

MAJORITY LEADER MANSFIELD WARNS UNITED STATES ABOUT FURTHER INVOLVEMENT IN ASIA

(By William D. James)

A warning Sen. Mike Mansfield made last week that a deeper U.S. involvement in Laos could develop into a Vietnam-style military entanglement is drawing national and international attention because of the accuracy of his grim predictions about the course of the Vietnam war.

The Senate Majority Leader based his warning about Laos on a trip he made to Southeast Asia in August at the request of President Nixon.

The trip was his sixth fact-finding trip to Southeast Asia in the last 16 years. He made such trips in 1953, 1954, 1955, 1962, 1965 and 1969.

Mansfield, who has investigated conditions in Asia at the request of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, has been consistent in warnings that the U.S. should avoid getting lured into the quicksand of Asiatic wars.

The Montana senator has been lauded frequently by national correspondents for analyzing Vietnam events accurately. Clayton Fritchey, nationally-syndicated columnist, complimented Mansfield last year for being "the one man, who from the beginning, has been uncannily right about U.S. involvement in Vietnam."

After investigating conditions in Indochina in 1953, when the French were still fighting, Mansfield recommended that the U.S. should improve its Vietnam programs. Noting that we then were spending about \$25 million a year there, he stressed that the aim of our programs should be to build up the self-reliance of the people.

Mansfield has maintained consistently since 1953 that it would be better to have the Southeast Asians solve their own problems than to have U.S. military forces involved.

"The situation in Vietnam and in a larger sense in Indochina, is grim and discouraging," he reported after his 1954 visit. (On that trip, he also attended the conference of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the Philippines at the request of President Eisenhower.)

"It would be misleading and futile," he said in his 1954 report, to tell the Senate or the people of the U.S. that conditions were other than grim and discouraging.

The need, he explained, "is not to hurry the realities of this situation but to face them, however grim and discouraging they may be. If we do so, it is possible that the reversal which has been sustained in Indochina may yield experience which has application elsewhere in Asia."

"This experience could be useful in avoiding still other setbacks and damaging waste of untold millions of dollars of the resources of the citizens of the U.S.," he said.

Mansfield pointed out in 1954, when discussing the French defeat in Vietnam, that there had been a general tendency to "make the wish father to the thought and consistently and seriously underestimate the strength" of the forces fighting the French.

"If there was one overriding cause of the failure, however," he said, "it is to be found in the distorted emphasis given to the capacity of military measures alone to bring about an end to the Communist advance in Indochina."

He said it would be difficult to see what more the U.S. could have done to avert a Communist victory over the French, "short of some foolhardy commitment of American troops on the Asian mainland."

After a visit to Vietnam in 1955, Mansfield again accented the need to encourage the Vietnamese to take care of their own affairs.

"What is at stake is the active loyalty of the preponderance of the population of South Vietnam. That can be won and held only by a Vietnamese government which alone can understand and respond to the needs of the people."

Mansfield urged the U.S. to concentrate on helping with economic recovery and development programs. He said that ought to be done with a view to creating over a set period of time a self-sustaining Vietnam free from further direct reliance on U.S. assistance.

After visiting Vietnam in 1962, Mansfield expressed serious doubts about U.S. policies there. He said there were about 12,000 Americans there and that U.S. spending totaled hundreds of millions annually there.

"It would be a disservice to my country not to voice a deep concern over the trend of events, since my last visit," he said in his 1962 report.

It was seven years and \$2 billion of U.S. aid later but yet, substantially, the same difficulties remained if, indeed, they have not been compounded, he reported.

He expressed fears about having the U.S. intensify support of the Vietnamese armed forces.

"This intensification, however, inevitably has carried us to the start of the road which leads to the point at which conflict in Vietnam could become of greater concern and greater responsibility to the U.S. than it is to the government and people of South Vietnam," he said.

"In present circumstances," he cautioned, "pursuit of that course could involve an expenditure of American lives and resources on a scale which would bear little relationship to the interests of the U.S., or, indeed, to the interests of the people of Vietnam."

To avoid that course, he asserted, it should be clear to ourselves as well as to the Vietnamese where the primary responsibility was in this situation:

"It must rest, as it has rested, with the Vietnamese government and people."

Concerned with the possibility that the war would be converted into an American one, fought primarily with American lives, he said:

"It should be noted in all frankness that our own bureaucratic tendencies to act in uniform and enlarging patterns have resulted in an expansion of the U.S. commitment in some places to an extent which would appear to bear only the remotest relationship to what is essential or even desirable in terms of U.S. interests."

Mansfield and congressional colleagues who accompanied him on the 1962 trip agreed that the U.S. should make a thorough re-assessment of its security requirements.

Such security requirements could be met, they indicated, without any further extension of the U.S. commitment in Southeast Asia.

Pointing out the perils of having the U.S. assume too strong a role in Southeast Asiatic policies, Mansfield said in his 1962 report:

"It is doubtful that it is the best way in any Southeast Asian nation, if the responsibility for its independent survival were to come to rest more heavily with the U.S. than with indigenous leadership because of the failure or inadequacies of that leadership in meeting its own responsibilities to its people."

The Montana senator's warning of the "open-end danger of an expanding war" received worldwide attention following his 1965 trip to Southeast Asia.

Mansfield was pessimistic about chances for an early end of the war—in sharp contrast to optimistic views of top U.S. military and civilian officials.

"A rapid solution to the conflict in Vietnam is not in immediate prospect," he cautioned.

Mansfield contended that despite the great increase in American military commitment, it was doubtful, in view of the acceleration of Viet Cong efforts, that the Saigon government's position could be held without more U.S. forces.

He said there was no assurance as to what ultimate increase in U.S. military forces would be required.

The question, he said, was not one of applying increased U.S. pressure to a defined military situation, but rather of "pressing against a military situation which is, in effect, open-ended.

"How open is dependent on the extent to which North Vietnam and its supporters are willing and able to meet increased force by increased force," he said.

The senator's "open-ended" warning was discussed frequently in the next three years as the U.S. saw its military forces in Vietnam grow to 560,000 and fatalities go over the 30,000 mark.

At the conclusion of his trip in August, Mansfield recommended to President Nixon that the U.S. place an immediate ban on increases in U.S. personnel in Southeast Asia.

In a report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, of which he is one of the ranking members, Mansfield noted that our involvement in Laos already has cost hundreds

of millions of dollars and hundreds of lives.

The involvement in Laos carries the threat of even a deeper commitment by the U.S., he said.

Congressional colleagues of Mansfield, who regard him as their leading authority on Southeast Asia, have been impressed by the accuracy of his scholarly reports after each of his fact-finding trips. Many of his Senate friends say it is tragic that his advice and warnings were ignored.

The record shows clearly that Mansfield was correct in his grim warnings about the dangers of a growing U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

The senator now is warning the nation of what might develop if the U.S. makes the same mistakes in Laos it did in Vietnam.

#### OVERLY OPTIMISTIC VIETNAM QUOTATIONS

(EDITOR'S NOTE.—There have been so many optimistic statements about the Vietnam war that Phillip Geyelin, editorial page editor of the Washington Post, made a collection of them. Geyelin published his list in the summer after Defense Secretary Laird declared, "We have certainly turned the corner in the war."

(Since then, he probably has added a comment by President Nixon. The President described the war as possibly "one of America's finest hours, because we took a difficult task and we succeeded.")

(We are reprinting the article to show the difference in views between the men quoted by Geyelin and those of Sen. Mike Mansfield appearing on this page.)

"We have never been in a better relative position."—General Westmoreland, April 10, 1968.

"We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view. . . . The enemy has many problems: He is losing control of the scattered population under his influence. . . . He sees the strength of his forces steadily declining. . . . His monsoon offensives have been failures. He was dealt a mortal blow by the installation of a freely elected representative government. . . . the enemy's hopes are bankrupt."—General Westmoreland, Nov. 21, 1967.

"We are generally pleased. . . . we are very sure we are on the right track"—President Johnson, July 13, 1967.

"Progress has been made. . . . We have pushed the enemy farther and farther into the jungles. . . . We have succeeded in attaining our objectives."—General Westmoreland, July 13, 1967.

"I expect the. . . war to achieve very sensational results in 1967."—Ambassador Lodge, Jan. 9, 1967.

"We are beginning to see some signs of success. . . . There is an erosion of (enemy) morale."—Secretary of State Rusk, Aug. 25, 1966.

"We have stopped losing the war."—Secretary of Defense McNamara, October, 1965.

"We are not about to send American boys nine or ten thousand miles from home to do what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves."—President Johnson, Oct. 21, 1964.

"The war in Vietnam is on the right track."—Ambassador Lodge, June 30, 1964.

"I think the number (of U.S. personnel) in Vietnam is not likely to increase substantially."—Secretary of Defense McNamara, May 14, 1964.

"The Vietnamese. . . themselves can handle this problem with their own effort."—Secretary of State Rusk, Feb. 24, 1964.

"The United States still hopes to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam by the end of 1965."—Secretary of Defense McNamara, Feb. 19, 1964.

"I am hopeful we can bring back additional. . . men. . . because I personally believe this is a war the Vietnamese must fight. "I don't believe we can take on that combat task for them."—Secretary of Defense McNamara, Feb. 8, 1964.

"Victory. . . is just months away, and the

reduction of American advisors can begin any time now . . . I can safely say the end of the war is in sight."—Gen. Paul D. Markins, commander of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon, Oct. 31, 1963.

"Secretary McNamara and Gen. (Maxwell) Taylor reported their judgment that the major part of the U.S. military task can be completed by the end of 1965 . . ."—White House statement, Oct. 2, 1963.

"I feel we shall achieve victory in 1964."—Tram Van Dong, South Vietnamese general, Oct. 1, 1963.

"South Vietnam is on its way to victory . . ."—Frederick E. Nolting, U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, June 12, 1963.

"The South Vietnamese themselves are fighting their own battle, fighting well."—Secretary of State Rusk, April, 1963.

"(The struggle) is turning an important corner."—Secretary of State Rusk, March 8, 1963.

"The corner has definitely been turned toward victory in South Vietnam."—Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense, March 8, 1963.

"There are definitely encouraging elements . . . the ratio of casualties . . . indicates some turning in the situation."—Secretary of State Rusk, Feb. 1, 1963.

"The war in Vietnam is going well and will succeed."—Secretary McNamara, Jan. 31, 1963.

"The South Vietnamese should achieve victory in three years . . . I am confident the Vietnamese are going to win the war. (The Viet Cong) face inevitable defeat."—Adm. Harry D. Felt, U.S. Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Forces, Jan. 12, 1963.

"Every quantitative measurement shows we're winning the war . . . U.S. aid to Vietnam has reached a peak and will start to level off."—Secretary of Defense McNamara, 1962.

"The Communists now realize they can never conquer free Vietnam."—Gen. J. W. Daniel, official military aide to Vietnam, Jan. 8, 1961.

"The American aid program in Vietnam has proved an enormous success, one of the major victories of American policy . . ."—Gen. J. W. Daniel, official military aide to Vietnam, Sept. 7, 1959.

#### CHILDREN'S PRAYERS

### HON. RICHARD L. ROUDEBUSH

OF INDIANA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, October 22, 1969

Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. Speaker, one of the most incredible decisions ever rendered by the Supreme Court outlawed voluntary prayer in the public schools of America.

Defenders of this outrage like to split hairs and advance the argument that only "prescribed" prayers were outlawed.

This is fiction, of course, because, as all of our educators are well aware, the interpretation of the decision has had the devastating effect of banishing all word of God, prayer, and the Bible from our public schools.

Some people see great danger in allowing a group of schoolchildren to start their day with a simple, child's prayer.

But the same people applaud Supreme Court decisions which have given every pornographer in the Nation the green light to flood our mailboxes and magazine stands with filthy books and magazines.

For the past several weeks we have

been inserting five children's prayers weekly into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD which may be used by our public schools if they so choose.

The Supreme Court would ban all religious aspects from American public life, but I do not believe the American people desire this, nor will they allow such action.

This week's children's prayers include the following:

I

We thank you, God,  
For meat and drink;  
We thank You for  
Each happy day;  
We thank You for  
Long hours of play;  
We thank You for  
Bright butterflies;  
We thank you for  
Our own two eyes;  
We thank You for  
The birds that sing;  
We thank You for  
Just everything.

II

O send out Thy  
Light and Thy truth:  
Let them lead me  
Let them bring me  
Unto Thy holy hill.  
(Forty-third Psalm.)

III

Jesus, from Thy throne on high,  
Far above that bright blue sky,  
Look on me with loving eye;  
Hear me, Holy Jesus.

IV

Be Thou with me every day,  
In my work and in my play,  
When I learn and when I pray;  
Hear me, Holy Jesus.

V

I will praise Thee, O Lord,  
With my whole heart;  
I will show forth all  
Thy marvelous works.  
I will be glad and rejoice  
In Thee: I will sing  
Praise to Thy name  
O Thou most high.  
(Ninth Psalm.)

FORMER POSTMASTER GENERAL  
DAY OPPOSES POSTAL CORPO-  
RATION AND SHOWS THAT NO  
CASE HAS BEEN PROVEN FOR  
DESTRUCTION OF THE POST OF-  
FICE DEPARTMENT

### HON. RALPH YARBOROUGH

OF TEXAS

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Thursday, October 23, 1969

Mr. YARBOROUGH. Mr. President, last Thursday morning, October 16, Mr. J. Edward Day appeared before the Senate Committee on Post Office and Civil Service to give his views on the administration's Postal Corporation proposal, H.R. 11750.

Mr. Day is particularly well qualified to speak on this subject not only because he served as President John F. Kennedy's Postmaster General from January 21, 1961, until September 9, 1963, but also because it is widely agreed by former Post Office associates and Washingtonians generally that he was one of the

best administrators to ever serve in that vital Cabinet position.

Examples of his progressive and innovative services are legion. He conceived and inaugurated Zip Code service, he began A. B. C. D. business service—a service recently abandoned for so-called economy reasons—and he was the first Postmaster General to come before Congress himself and recommend a salary increase for the postal employees.

Aside from Mr. Day's direct experience as Postmaster General, his illustrious background in both business and public service lend even greater weight to his views regarding this corporation proposal. Admitted to the Illinois bar in 1938, he served as legislative assistant to Gov. Adlai Stevenson in 1949 and was Illinois Commissioner of Insurance from 1950 to 1953.

His business career with the Prudential Insurance Co. of America began when he was made associate general solicitor of that firm in 1953. He was later to serve as associate general counsel and then as vice president in charge of western operations—Los Angeles 1957-60—before President Kennedy virtually drafted this highly capable citizen for duty as our Nation's Postmaster General.

The administration's corporation proposal is quite complicated and Mr. Day's statement before the Post Office Committee was therefore of some length—but it was direct and to the point and it brought with it the depth of experience and good judgment that J. Edward Day has always been known for.

In his statement, he covered every facet of the corporate proposal. Highlighting his remarks, Day pointed out that H.R. 11750 recommends, among other things, that a postal corporation, entirely owned by the Federal Government, be chartered by the Congress to operate the postal service on a self-supporting basis. Yet there is no clear and convincing argument why reform cannot be accomplished within the framework of the present structure.

Day went on to conclude that a departure from congressional control of Federal activities should be made only where it is clearly demonstrated the activities can be more efficiently and economically operated through the corporate structure, and a net advance to the Government will result. There is no evidence to that effect in the case of the postal service.

The basic contention of critics is that the Post Office is "on the verge of collapse." Nothing could be further from the truth. The so-called deficit in "real" dollars is less per capita today than in 1950. We have fewer employees in proportion to mail volume than does Great Britain, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, West Germany, Italy, and Japan. In truth, we operate the most efficient postal service in the world.

The unusual Chicago tie-up of October 1966 is also cited as a symptom of impending disaster—yet critics fail to mention there has been no recurrence in the 3 years since.

The postal service is compared unfavorably to TVA, yet such a comparison is really not valid. TVA is geographically

reduction of American advisors can begin any time now . . . I can safely say the end of the war is in sight."—Gen. Paul D. Harkins, commander of the Military Assistance Command in Saigon, Oct. 31, 1963.

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