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7. SOURCE:	CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY:	<i>Alvin W. Lotz</i> ALVIN W. LOTZ, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC		

15. SUMMARY:  
 (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 27 March 1970, and concerns a report, dated 30 October 1969, prepared by the Current Affairs Committee, M40 ((COSVN)), sent to subordinate units and agencies, which provides an assessment of activities conducted during the 1969 Fall Campaign. The document reveals that for a general assessment of the 1969 Fall Campaign, the results obtained failed to meet the prescribed requirements on the grounds that the cadre in charge did not apply suitable plans for coordinating military actions with counterpacification activities. The document further states that in the future, cadre must closely coordinate activities of the three types of forces ((main, local and militia)) with political struggles and proselyting activities.

*Ref to Res 14 - p. 20*

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08 89

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-----FULL TRANSLATION-----

((Page 1 of U.T.))

No. 16/TBNT

Date: 31 Oct 69

((Marginal notes:))

No. S6/Q4  
R ((sic))  
File

Copies to:  
Districts and ((possibly)) Agencies

File

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From: M40 Standards ~~Government Affairs~~ Committee, M40, COSVN

To : All subordinate units and agencies

A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON ACTIVITIES DURING THE 1969 FALL CAMPAIGN.

The 1969 Fall Campaign played an important role. Our policy was to take advantage of our great victories in the political and diplomatic fields gained in the Spring and Summer Campaigns. ~~We have implemented Resolution No. 9 to initiate a stronger Fall Campaign dealing heavier blows to the enemy's <sup>we</sup> ~~endeavor~~ to spoil his plan of "Vietnamization" of the war. At the same time, <sup>we stopped</sup> ~~we prepared~~ for the Winter-Spring Campaign.~~

*along with implementing Resolution 9,*

While we conducted the Fall Campaign and implemented Resolution 9, Chairman H6 ~~(the leader)~~, the great and beloved leader of the Party of the working class and of our people, died. The Party, army, and people have been extremely mournful. They are ~~trying~~ <sup>striving</sup> to transform their mourning into action in order to strengthen solidarity to fight and to successfully implement Chairman H6's will.

*In the*  
I. Military field:

a. Concerning the activities of our main forces, although the enemy had ~~developed~~ <sup>our</sup> ~~plan~~ and deployed his defense forces more carefully, ~~we were successful in assessing~~ <sup>we</sup> the enemy situation, ~~in strengthening~~ <sup>our application</sup> our determination ~~to fight the enemy~~, and ~~in setting up guidelines to use~~ <sup>we</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>of appropriate</sup> ~~appropriate~~ combat methods, ~~due~~ <sup>thanks</sup> to the great efforts made by the units participating in combat, we satisfactorily met the requirements.

~~Page 2 of U.T.~~

*by destroying an important enemy element and its war facilities, especially a number*

*manpower and*

*elts*  
of units, including a number of US and Puppet armored units, ~~displayed~~  
~~defensive attitude~~: We also defeated his tactical defense plan of  
using armored vehicles in coordination with B-52 airstrikes. At the same  
time, by conducting extremely fierce battles, we improved our combat  
efficiency, our organizational skill, leadership, and combat tactics  
and techniques. Our casualties were the lowest ever.

Our forces in the battlefields of Military Region 5 and Tri-  
Thien made efforts to successfully conduct coordinated activities. Forces  
of Military Region 6 fulfilled missions prescribed for each phase of  
activities. Forces of Military Region 10, ~~in their first phase of activities,~~ *initially*  
made efforts to overcome difficulties; ~~but~~ *we have improved* activities in areas of emphasis  
and in the Mekong River Delta ~~were completed~~ in the second phase. In  
addition, the forces in a number of battlefields, such as Military Region  
6 and Military Region 10 succeeded in destroying a number of sub-sectors.  
In Ban Tre and My Tho Provinces, a number of networks to counter the enemy's  
encroachment and pacification plan have been established.

The guerrilla and local units of a number of provinces and  
districts operated correctly and with a higher efficiency than before.  
They also made much progress in conducting attacks and in employing mines  
and explosives. The activities of ~~guerrilla and secret~~ *guerrilla* self-defense forces  
were still maintained in many areas.

*scheme*  
The above victories have contributed to the breakup of the  
enemy's ~~plan~~ *for reducing US casualties, and replacing the US troops*  
with Puppet troops. Their "clear and hold" strategy became ~~disorganized~~  
which placed them in a ~~defensive position.~~ *more passive and confuse.*

~~-(Page 3 of 6.1.)~~

b. However, generally speaking, our military offensive activities  
conducted during the 1969 Fall Campaign were not strong and continuous in  
conforming with the criteria prescribed for the three ~~(territory)~~ *regions and areas*  
and all the battlefields. As a result, we failed to fully take the  
initiative in attacking the enemy. We also failed to heavily defeat his  
strategic position and his forces on all battlefields.

In addition, the coordination of activities between the  
battlefields was weaker than in the past. The concentrated forces could  
not take advantage of the opportunities in their local area to step up  
attacks against the enemy.

*movement*  
~~The~~ The guerrilla and ~~mobile~~ *mobile* elements made slow progress. A  
number of these units operated very well, however, there are only a few of  
these units. Even the available forces in the regions, provinces, and  
districts down to guerrilla units were still not fully ~~trained and deployed~~ *used and*  
*developed.*

Briefly, we did not meet the requirements of destroying the  
enemy on all battlefields. Attacks conducted on the enemy communication  
routes, rear bases, and storage facilities became weaker. At the same time,  
the coordination ~~of~~ attacking the enemy, ~~counterpacification~~ *used* activities,  
~~the~~ winning over ~~of~~ the people, and the ~~initiation of the people's struggle~~ *improvement*

*between* → *countering enemy*

*our* movement in weak areas and ~~surrounding~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> areas was not satisfactory. The leadership of the Party Committee levels and military echelons towards the local armed forces' mission of defeating the enemy's pacification ~~scheme~~ <sup>plan</sup>, ~~the~~ winning over ~~of~~ the people, and the initiation of the people's ~~struggle~~ <sup>improving</sup> movement in weak areas and ~~surrounding~~ <sup>improving</sup> areas was not properly provided. The employment of forces and the application of combat methods were not suitable for ~~satisfying~~ the requirements of the local situation and ~~mission~~ <sup>and mission</sup> and the practical condition of the battlefields.

2. Counterpacification Activities and <sup>Improving</sup> Initiation of the People's Struggle Movement in Weak and <sup>fringe</sup> Surrounding Areas:

((Page 4 of O.T.))

a. Although ~~the enemy must~~ <sup>having to</sup> cope with our attacks ~~phase~~ <sup>phase of</sup> and withdraw a number of American units from the battlefields near Saigon and Bien Hoa ~~Province~~, <sup>the enemy</sup> he strived to carry out his pacification and encroachment activities by using a centralized, sinister plan of attack, ~~attacking in an all~~ <sup>concentrated, most violent and sinister way.</sup> The ~~fighting~~ <sup>struggle</sup> ~~between~~ <sup>of</sup> our people and army against the enemy pacification ~~scheme~~ <sup>scheme</sup> became more complicated and ~~resulted in~~ <sup>resulted in</sup> the following progress <sup>during the 1969 Fall Campaign</sup>.

The people's struggle movement was continuously and broadly conducted <sup>with very</sup> degrees of intensity, and caused instability to the enemy's oppressive control. Recently, the people living in weak areas and ~~surrounding~~ <sup>fringe</sup> areas ~~moved~~ <sup>took</sup> out from ~~areas of concentration~~ <sup>areas</sup> and strategic hamlets, ~~including a number of rural areas around Saigon~~ <sup>to engage in</sup> production work. In some areas such as Giồng Trôm and Châu Thành Districts of Ben Tre Province, tens of thousands of people, who were formerly relocated or temporarily sent to enemy controlled areas returned to their old villages. In some areas the enemy ~~intended to~~ <sup>intended to</sup> reduce the number of people living in their ~~relocated~~ <sup>relocated</sup> areas so as to ease their economic ~~problems~~ <sup>and supply</sup>. When ~~released to their old~~ <sup>released to their old</sup> villages, the people must turn their supplies over to him. He also inserted his agents among the people to watch their activities, ~~who returned to their native~~ <sup>who returned to their native</sup>.

Generally, in spite of increased oppressive control by the enemy, the people living in weak areas, ~~surrounding~~ <sup>fringe</sup> areas, and newly encroached by the enemy ~~areas~~ <sup>areas</sup> showed strong devotion to the Revolution. When ~~cadre or agents from~~ <sup>cadre or agents from</sup> our forces came, the people were ready to welcome and help them. A number of hamlets located deeply in enemy ~~controlled~~ <sup>in</sup> areas seem ~~to be~~ <sup>to be</sup> strongly ~~enemy~~ <sup>enemy</sup> control, but with the infiltration of a few cadre working cleverly in these hamlets,

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<sup>were able to</sup> we ~~can~~ <sup>we</sup> organize the people, step up the people's struggle movement, annihilate the cruel tyrants, break up the oppressive control, and quickly initiate the people's struggle movement ~~in these hamlets~~ <sup>to these hamlets</sup>. ~~Our struggle movement was not only maintained but improved in areas where the people are closely watched and our local administrative personnel and spies are oppressed.~~ <sup>spread</sup>

In areas subject to enemy pacification and encroachment activities, the people's struggle movement ~~strongly expanded~~ <sup>is decisive</sup>. In a number of sensitive areas, such as North Củ Chi, North Trảng Bàng, and Sub-Region 1,

→ [Where our agents manage to cling to the people and to repress the puppet administrative officials and spies, the [struggle] movement not only maintained but improved.]

*force them to*

although the enemy repeatedly conducted ~~repeated~~ <sup>repeatedly</sup> violent attacks against the people and ~~burned~~ <sup>destroyed</sup> all their houses in an attempt to subvert his controlled areas, the ~~local~~ <sup>people</sup> managed to resolutely cling to their lands and lands. Through the counterattacks conducted permanently against enemy ~~attacks~~ <sup>attacks</sup> to encroach the land, and relocate the people, the people's struggle movement in combat villages and hamlets in mountainous and lowland areas was improved and heightened.

This situation showed that our struggle ~~of pacification~~ <sup>of pacification</sup> to gain back the control of the weak areas and bordering areas ~~against the enemy~~ <sup>against the enemy</sup> has a new appearance. ~~The people's struggle movement is bringing forth a great~~ <sup>deal of new capabilities which we must promptly grasp and strongly develop.</sup>

In addition to the development of the people's struggle movement, progress is being made in the performance of tasks, the guidance

*by various echelons* ~~((Page 6 of O.T.))~~

counterpacification activities, and the struggle movement in weak areas and surrounding areas. ~~to being carried out~~ <sup>to being carried out</sup> by all echelons. Our Party Chapters and guerrilla forces in weak areas and bordering areas were highly determined to cling to areas of activity. They had been driven away in ~~many places~~ <sup>many places</sup>, but they are now returning to regain control. The employment of penetration forces to annihilate cruel tyrants, pacification cadre, supporting forces, and People's Self-Defense Force, etc., ~~was~~ <sup>was</sup> intensified. The annihilation of tyrants and the breaking of the enemy's oppressive control were maintained by guerrilla and ~~secret~~ <sup>secret</sup> defense forces.

In a number of regions, such as Ben Tre, My Tho (Region 2), Long My (Region 3), the region Party Committees have effectively led the people in resisting the widening pacification and encroachment activities conducted by the enemy.

Due to the above achievements, plus the victories obtained in the Summer-Spring Campaign, we have blocked the enemy's pacification plan in many areas. The enemy's oppressive control ~~in some areas~~ <sup>in some areas</sup> was loosened and disrupted ~~in some areas~~ <sup>in some areas</sup>. This has given us a new opportunity to intensify the people's struggle movement in weak and surrounding areas.

Obviously, <sup>at</sup> the enemy is trying to carry out his "Vietnamization" plan, ~~to solve~~ <sup>to solve</sup> the problem of winning over the people, gaining back

*standards* ((Page 7 of O.T.))

our control of the rural areas has become very urgent.

However, ~~generally speaking~~ <sup>generally speaking</sup>, although our ~~activities~~ <sup>activities</sup> against the enemy's pacification program and his oppressive control impeded the execution of the pacification program in some areas, ~~never~~ <sup>never</sup> the enemy still attained his requirements such as ~~the~~ <sup>the</sup> consolidation, organization of People's Self-Defense Force, intensification of strike, "new area" and rallying activities, ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> caused difficulties to our forces in staying close to the people, in organizing the movement, securing area of activities, and strengthening the system of leadership from the higher

*or talks to him* *these* *are* *pushed* *to* *our* *side*

echelons to village <sup>and</sup> hamlet echelons.

The following were our <sup>major</sup> ~~recent~~ leadership deficiencies <sup>improvement</sup> in recent period.

Local authorities did not realize the importance of activities against the enemy's pacification program and the ~~blighting~~ <sup>blighting</sup> of the movement from the weak area <sup>in</sup> into the bordering area. In organization and leadership, they did not pay less attention to activities against the enemy pacification program, the ~~blighting~~ <sup>blighting</sup> of the movement ~~from~~ the weak area ~~into~~ the bordering area, ~~and~~ with the task and requirements of the phase. They did not fully realize that in the ~~blighting~~ phase as well as the ~~normal~~ <sup>regular</sup> activities against the enemy pacification program, and ~~the~~ extending of our control over the rural area ~~was~~ a mission, a requirement which has a strategic importance. The study, discussion and execution of directives ~~at~~ <sup>concerning</sup> tasks to be carried out in the weak and bordering areas, and the tasks against the enemy pacification program were not properly carried out.

→ of documents → fringe authorities and even ((Page 8 of O.T.))

Many Province Committees, including a small number of Region Committees and Sub-Region Committees, did not study the documents carefully and did not fully understand the context, especially the plan and ~~measures to be executed~~ <sup>measures to be executed</sup>. They did not adhere to the guidelines. Concerning leadership, the ~~Committee echelons, especially the region and province Committees did not concentrate their efforts against the enemy's pacification program~~ <sup>on countering</sup> ~~nor did they gain control of the situation~~. They also did not pay attention to the mission and the requirement of the phase, to the use of three-pronged attacks or to the use of the three types of forces ((main force, local force, guerrilla forces)). They did not pay attention to proper organization, to providing guidance on secondary and main targets, or to disrupting the enemy's pacification program, etc....((sic)). In many areas though they ~~permitted~~ <sup>talked</sup> to conduct three-pronged attacks, they only controlled a ~~few~~ <sup>number</sup> of concentrated units, ~~which~~ provided little guidance for the people's political struggle, troop proselyting activities, and guerrilla activities, etc., ~~and~~.

3. Troop Proselyting and Political Movements in the Cities.

a. In the face of heavy political and diplomatic failures in the spring and summer, the enemy ~~initiated~~ <sup>initiated</sup> schemes to maintain and create support for the Thieu Government, and to ~~join~~ <sup>join</sup> forces ~~with~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~possibly parties~~ in order to ~~to fulfill his~~ <sup>meet</sup> immediate and future requirements. At the same time, he intensified his demagogic activities to appease the movements of the people in the world and the American people ~~against~~ <sup>against</sup> the aggressive war in Vietnam. However, the enemy failed to carry out his above scheme and his political situation entered a deeper crisis.

→ demanding the U.S government to end ((Page 9 of O.T.))

~~became more tense~~ → The fact that Khiem was designated to replace Huong proved that the Saigon Government was inclined to militarism and was in greater ~~confusion~~. It proved that the Saigon Government was becoming more isolated. ~~As~~ Contradiction among the henchmen's ranks became grave, the

*demanding*  
 movement, ~~for~~ the withdrawal of US troops further developed among the American people, even in political circles and in the Republican Party. The more ~~aggressive~~ *aggressive* Nixon becomes, the more isolated he becomes. The ~~[[struggle]]~~ *[[struggle]]* movement in the US on 15 Oct, ~~greatly affected~~ *strongly influenced* the anti-war attitude of the US soldiers in South Vietnam and caused confusion among the Puppets troops. The economic depression of the enemy in South Vietnam was further developed, greatly affecting his political situation. The ~~enemy tried to take measures to stabilize his Government but the financial and economic policy of relying on the US made it difficult to do so.~~ *enemy is*

*stance*  
 b. In regard to our side, although the enemy intensified his control and oppression, our people's struggle movement and the ~~the~~ *their revolutionary* ~~Revolution~~ were continuously and broadly developed. The important characteristic of the ~~[[struggle]]~~ *[[struggle]]* movement in the city in recent months was the economic struggle movement which spread broadly and continuously among the workers and laborers calling for better living conditions. There was a definite coordination between workers of various branches and trades.

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The struggle movement spread not only among the workers and laborers but among all the people, including bourgeois, public servants and enemy troops. The student struggle movement encountered a number of difficulties but was still maintained. Their ~~reluctance~~ *reluctance* to attending ~~at the~~ *at the* military training schools showed that if we seized the opportunity and ~~made~~ *use* an appropriate slogan, we can ~~shift~~ *shift* their struggle into a movement. The funeral ~~ceremony~~ *ceremony* of Uncle Ho was a great political ~~moment~~ *moment*, having a strong influence on promoting nationalism among the people of all strata in the cities. Workers, students, intellectual bourgeois, and the intermediate class, ~~including~~ *including* elements in the Puppets Government and Army. This ~~expressed~~ *expressed* the will and aspiration of ~~our~~ *our* people for independence and reunification. At the same time, ~~it~~ *it* caused a political attack ~~in~~ *in* public opinion against the aggressive ~~actions~~ *actions* of the US and Puppets Governments. *by the* *at large*

*of*  
 Along ~~in line~~ *in line* with the struggle movement for social welfare and democratic rights, and in the face of growing failures and difficulties of the US and Puppets Governments, ~~we~~ *we* ~~must~~ *must* take advantage ~~of these opportunities.~~ *win popular* At the same time, the enemy used all means to gain control of the people.

*the intermediate force is growing stronger, giving us*  
 (an action) ((Page 11 of O.T.))

The above situation proved that we have the capabilities to ~~shift~~ *turn* the political struggle into ~~front~~ *front* demanding political rights and ((improvement of)) social welfare. However, we did not correct our deficiencies, especially those ~~we~~ *we* made in organizing and providing guidance ~~to our~~ *to our* ~~in~~ *in* workers, and laborers, therefore, the movement was not stable ~~and~~ *and* ~~steady.~~ *steady.* For instance, recently, we had many opportunities in the cities but we did not fully develop them. *arised*

*take advantage of*  
 The guerrilla warfare movement, the breaking of the enemy's oppressive control, and the killing of tyrants in the province capital were still maintained. These movements were developed in a number of province capitals and district seats. Recently, we recruited a number of political ~~agents but they were still weak.~~ *agents* ~~in some areas, guidelines were~~

*base - level*  
*set up*  
 In some areas we succeeded in setting up a number of political penetration bases, but generally speaking, these are still weak. In other areas

*the*

*win popular*

*add not get hold of apply order to directly force*

~~unsuccessfully executed because our agents were widely dispersed.~~

c. Concerning outside forces and enemy troop proselyting.

The ~~Current Affairs~~ <sup>standing</sup> Committee M40 ~~(KOSVN)~~ <sup>of</sup> issued a directive ~~asses~~ <sup>pointing out</sup> on the evaluation of the result of the campaign from Jul to Sep 69 and ~~pointing out~~ <sup>the direction where to step up on activities in the forthcoming</sup> ~~the direction where to step up on activities in the forthcoming~~ <sup>period.</sup>

Due to losses on the battlefield, the influence of the withdrawal of a number of units of US troops, and especially due to the American people's movement struggling for the withdrawal of US troops, the combat spirit and capabilities of the US and Puppet troops were ~~critically~~ <sup>critically</sup> reduced. ~~Many cases of anti war sentiments occurred among US troops~~ <sup>whole</sup> ~~and companies~~ <sup>battalions and companies</sup> fled leaving tanks and ~~weapons~~ <sup>artillery</sup> behind. The movement ~~against~~ <sup>opposing</sup> racial discrimination and ~~etc~~

~~(Page 12 of D.T.)~~

<sup>supporting</sup> ~~support for~~ ~~the American people's~~ <sup>demand for the</sup> demand for the withdrawal of US troops have grown. Concerning the Puppet troops, because of the careless and massive conscription, the Puppet troops are strong in numbers but disorganized. The conscripts were numerous in the Regular, Popular, and Regional Forces. Due to the withdrawal of US troops, the Puppet troops became confused, and lost their confidence. ~~on the other hand, being sent to action~~ <sup>they were to engage in operations</sup> continuously, ~~replacing~~ <sup>the US</sup> ~~troops~~ <sup>troops</sup>, their morale was very poor. ~~The enemy troop proselyting campaign achieved much success; we educated and motivated the people and (enemy) soldiers dependents to participate in troop proselyting activities. We paid attention to coordinating troop proselyting activities with armed forces activities (execute the policy for PW's and conduct propaganda appeals to the enemy soldiers during combat.)~~ <sup>In some areas, an intensified military revolts and anti war movements among the Puppet troops. We achieved success in sending in penetration agents and organizing military revolts among the enemy troops in Region 3. However, we still did not know how to take full advantage of the enemy troops poor morale and the results attained were small because our leadership was not close and there was no substantial change in problems of organization and leadership to meet the requirements of the enemy troop proselyting campaign.</sup>

4. Reorientation and <sup>Implementation</sup> Development of Resolution 9.

~~((Page 13 of D.T.))~~

To date, the ~~political~~ <sup>political</sup> reorientation on Resolution 9 has been completed at the ~~Region, city, and Sub-Regions~~ <sup>Region, city, and Sub-Regions</sup> levels. It has almost been completed at province level and in a large number of districts. ~~The Party Chapters are now carrying it out.~~ <sup>and is</sup> ~~According to the plans of various localities, it will be conducted for the people by November (1969).~~ <sup>being carried out at</sup> ~~Various sections and branches of M40, regions, and main force units have already completed the reorientation.~~ <sup>in various Regions.</sup>

All local areas were conscious of the importance of the indoctrination. This time, the organization and preparation for reorientation made much progress: ~~Special attention to~~ <sup>Special attention to</sup> the leadership of

Outstanding during the phase was the fact that in a number of places, thanks to our leadership, the anti-war movement, military revolts and fifth columnist activities among the puppet troops have ~~intensified~~ <sup>intensified</sup>.



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They ~~have~~ <sup>drove</sup> also ~~driven~~ his "de-Americanization" <sup>scheme</sup> ~~plan~~ a step closer to failure and at the same time they created favorable conditions for us to promote the revolutionary movement in the immediate future.

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In Sum  
However, the Fall Campaign has not met the planned results. Considering our actual advantages, we should have gained greater victories and inflicted heavier losses on the enemy, even though we were confronted with some <sup>objective</sup> difficulties. In reality, our victories were limited, <sup>and</sup> the enemy ~~suffered~~ <sup>though</sup> ~~through~~ <sup>de</sup> ~~certains~~ <sup>a further</sup> failure but he has fulfilled his immediate requirements, particularly those of his rural pacification <sup>program</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~consolidation~~ <sup>drive</sup> ~~of~~ <sup>dis</sup> his forces ~~so as to strengthen the Puppet Army~~. These gains have created more difficulties to the performance of our tasks.

b. Our leadership ~~continues~~ <sup>nevertheless</sup> made many efforts to overcome difficulties so as to perform both a political reorientation and ~~conduct~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> an attack phase. However, ~~leadership has not been~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> ~~coordinated~~ <sup>between</sup> with the indoctrination on the resolution ~~in~~ <sup>with</sup> ~~the~~ <sup>and</sup> ~~operational~~ <sup>our</sup> ~~and~~ <sup>leadership</sup> ~~our~~ <sup>leadership</sup> ~~leaders~~ <sup>did not</sup> fully realize the importance of the ~~(1965)~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> Fall Campaign, therefore, ~~the~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> ~~determination~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> to gain the advantage for attacks ~~against~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> the enemy was not firm.

<sup>He overall</sup> ~~In the direction of the [Fall] campaign, we had not firmly grasped~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> ~~Leadership in operational phases has not met the planned~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> ~~requirements~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> and there ~~have been~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> ~~no~~ <sup>most pressing</sup> appropriate plans for fulfilling these requirements in the local areas. In particular, the coordination between attacks and antipacification

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<sup>designed to improve the</sup> activities, ~~the~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> ~~promotion~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> of the revolutionary movement in ~~border~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> ~~border~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> areas and weak areas, the coordination between military activities, ~~political~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> ~~struggles~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup>, and enemy ~~and~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> ~~stubborn~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> proselyting ~~during~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> ~~operations~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> were still weak. <sup>city-fringe</sup> ~~Various~~ <sup>city-fringe</sup> levels have not paid attention to the activation and strengthening of our armed political forces.

Due to the enemy's savage destruction, the masses' living situation, and the characteristics of battlefields, etc....((sic)), which have been confused and complex, we need good organization and effective leadership, especially, appropriate struggle methods and guidelines, and a successful development in both the military and political fields. However, only <sup>at</sup> ~~some~~ <sup>at</sup> levels such as Regions, Sub-Regions, and a number of provinces have just realized these matters during the political reorientation ~~of~~ <sup>at</sup> on Resolution 9.

c. The main points of the enemy's future plans are like those ~~mentioned~~ <sup>is facing</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>is facing</sup> ~~Resolutions 8 and 9~~ <sup>is facing</sup>. Although he has suffered many defeats, ~~and~~ <sup>is facing</sup> ~~difficulties~~ <sup>is facing</sup> in SVN ~~and~~ <sup>is facing</sup> ~~in~~ <sup>is facing</sup> the US, the enemy is still stubborn. ~~He~~ <sup>is facing</sup> ~~expects~~ <sup>is facing</sup> to intensify his pacification activities, relocation of the people, the organization of People's Self-Defense Force, conscription, and the strengthening of his army in order to de-escalate the war in a superior

<sup>is facing</sup> He entertains the hope that through intensifying his pacification activities, relocating the people, organizing the civilian Self-Defense Force, pressganging, replenishing and reinforcing [the puppet force] he could pursue the policy of de-

our [armed] political forces during the phase and normal period was not good or

~~position. The "de-escalation" of the war does not mean to end the war, but to Vietnamize it.~~

~~((Page 18 of O.T.))~~

To achieve the above plan, the enemy is going to increase the use of the tactics that he has recently applied. Along with the intensification of ~~the enemy's~~ <sup>deceptive</sup> propaganda, the creation of peace illusions including the ~~announcement~~ <sup>announcement</sup> concerning the withdrawal of a number of the US troops <sup>designed to ease public opinion</sup> and to attack us <sup>diplomatically</sup>, the enemy will adjust and improve his battlefield organization and devise attack plans, defense plans for cities and rear bases, etc.... ~~in order to protect the US troops from suffering casualties in accordance with the requirement of the Vietnamization of the war.~~ <sup>meanwhile, he can intercept and cause losses to us.</sup> He can strengthen his forces and consolidate his Puppets Government. He will strongly push the pacification activities and the relocation of the people, especially in areas surrounding Saigon and the delta of the Mekong River. The enemy will try to strengthen the Puppets forces, increase the People's Self-Defense Forces' activities, and increase the quantity of weapons and activities of the Regional Forces so they can replace the main force as a mobile force that will be used to attack us on the outer perimeter. The pacification of rural areas and the withdrawal of the Puppets troops <sup>is</sup> are the main point of the enemy's future activity plan and are considered as fundamental for carrying out his de-escalating ~~policy~~ <sup>policy</sup> in a strong position.

and activities in the field

~~((Page 19 of O.T.))~~

In the face of the enemy's scheme, we must <sup>study</sup> try to thoroughly understand Resolution 9, and study <sup>and learn</sup> the testament of Chairman Ho <sup>to increase our determination.</sup> In addition, we should strengthen our combat solidarity and do our best to accomplish the immediate task as stated in the resolution. And, simultaneously, we should be ready to defeat the US in any circumstance.

d. In providing leadership in the coming days, the following important problems should <sup>receive</sup> ~~be paid~~ particular attention ~~to~~.

We should closely coordinate the three-pronged attack with the three types of forces ~~in~~ <sup>main, local, and militia forces</sup> in the three areas ~~of~~ <sup>mountainous, lowland, and city</sup> and ~~promote~~ <sup>promote</sup> capitals to ~~effectively~~ counter the enemy's pacification activities. ~~The enemy's leadership in~~ countering his pacification plan should be provided and further concentrated to frustrate it in the coming months. We must further understand the importance of the present revolutionary movement concerning the countering of the enemy's pacification program and the development of our <sup>superiority</sup> in the ~~key~~ <sup>key</sup> area and the weak areas and the defeat of the de-Americanization scheme. ~~We must try to make the enemy lose one of his most important goals, de-escalation in a dominant position.~~ Although defeated, the enemy is still very stubborn, therefore he is ~~continuing his withdrawal~~ <sup>of troops</sup> and simultaneously striving to implement his pacification plan. Recently, the enemy <sup>successfully</sup> carried out his pacification plan and obtained some <sup>temporary</sup> success <sup>in</sup> territory encroachment, reinforcement, and conscription of troops <sup>conscripted</sup>.

all-around position

which is related to

→ drop by drop

We must strive to deprive the enemy of the <sup>territory</sup> on which rests his base of de-escalation.