

A  
\_\_\_\_\_

August, 1970

A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON  
ACTIVITIES DURING THE 1969 AUTUMN CAMPAIGN

Background

COSVN Resolution 14, published in this series as Viet-Nam Documents and Research Notes No. 81, evolved out of an analysis by COSVN of the 1969 Autumn Campaign. The report reprinted here presents a portion of that analysis. The document is also an instruction to all subordinate political and military Communist-led units in South Viet-Nam to study and apply Resolution 14.

This text is a complete translation of a captured copy of the report. The Vietnamese original is a twenty one page document which four clerks hand copied. Their names appear in the margins of some of the pages. One of them, at least, made an error in his transcription, which is explained on page 16 of the text.

The document was signed by an unidentified official on October 30, 1969 for the Standing Committee of COSVN, the same date on which Resolution 14 was issued. Copies were made immediately, and the one translated here was ready for circulation the next day.

As is customarily true of Vietnamese Communist reports, this one alternates between self-commendation and self-criticism. COSVN's own "assessment of the enemy situation" is characterized as being "correct" and the accomplishments of a number of commands are singled out for praise. But "generally speaking, our military offensive activities conducted during the 1969 Autumn Campaign were not strong and continuous in conforming with the criteria prescribed for the three areas and on all battlefields."

Furthermore "the coordination of activities between the battlefields was weaker than in the past ... The guerrilla movement and local troops made slow progress ... The leadership of the Party Committee levels and military echelons towards the local armed forces' mission of defeating the enemy's pacification scheme, winning over the people, improving the [struggle] movement in weak areas and city-fringe areas was not properly provided." Increasing the size and effectiveness of the guerrilla

movement and remedying the deficiencies in Party Committee and military leadership of local armed forces are the principal concerns of Resolution 14 itself. This report provides some details of specific situations which COSVN thinks need remedying as well as citations of districts in which "Party Committees have effectively led the people in resisting the widening pacification and encroachment activities conducted by the enemy."

COSVN's disappointment with the campaign is clearly stated. The report declares "even a small number of Region Committees and Sub-Region Committees" as well as "many province Committee authorities" failed to "study the documents carefully and did not fully understand the context, especially the plan and methods of implementation. They did not adhere to the guidelines... did not concentrate their efforts on countering the enemy's pacification program and winning mastership of the rural area."

An optimistic note is sounded in COSVN's assessment of political and economic developments in the United States and in the Republic of Viet-Nam, and sustained by the claim that "the important characteristic of the [struggle] movement in the city [Saigon] in recent months was the economic struggle movement which spread broadly and continuously among the workers and laborers calling for better living conditions. There was a definite coordination between workers of various branches and trades," (an assertion for which no supporting evidence is advanced). However "we did not fully take advantage of" the opportunities which "arose." Another area in which Communist performance in 1969 did not meet the opportunities, according to COSVN, was that of "enemy troop proselyting."

The continuing importance of COSVN Resolution 9 of July, 1969, is underscored by the report. It has been studied at all high levels of the Party and in "main force units," the report says, and by November 1969 will be under discussion in the "various localities."

As the introduction to COSVN 9 itself states, it was designed "to carry out the Resolution of C," i. e. the Central Committee of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party. The report reprinted here asserts that "the Resolution of C" as well as COSVN 9 was discussed at some levels of the Communist political-military infrastructure in South Viet-Nam. "Reports

show that various levels were in full agreement with the spirit and contents of the C Resolution and Resolution 9." It is not implied that "the C Resolution" was being sent down to the "localities" for the November 1969 discussions. Higher echelons are reminded that it is their responsibility to insure the actual implementation of the Resolutions at local levels. No reference is made to a "C Resolution" in conjunction with COSVN 14.

Reverting to the analysis of the Autumn Campaign, the report states: "In sum, the Autumn Campaign has not met the planned results.... In reality, our victories were limited, and the enemy, though defeated a further step, has nevertheless fulfilled his most pressing requirements, particularly those of his rural pacification program, and his press-ganging drive designed to replenish and build up the Puppet army. These gains have created more difficulties to the performance of our tasks."

The "leadership" tried to achieve both a "political reorientation and an attack phase" says the report, but even it "did not fully realize the importance of the Autumn Campaign, therefore the determination to gain the advantage for attacking the enemy was not firm." The leaders are, however, beginning to understand the problems better in the course of "the political reorientation on Resolution 9." The enemy, says the report, will continue to emphasize Vietnamization and pacification, developing the People's Self-Defense Forces and the GVN's Regional Forces. "We" must continue to study Resolution 9 and the testament of Chairman Ho, and understand that: "Although the enemy is trying to carry out the above activities... his capabilities are more limited than before" and "therefore we have the capabilities and conditions for defeating the pacification scheme," ... if "we provide proper and positive leadership for our forces to break the enemy's oppressive control."

This is the context in which the report directs "particular attention to strengthening the guerrilla warfare movement in various areas (by carrying out Resolution 14... concerning the intensification of guerrilla warfare during the General Offensive and Uprising Campaign.)"

The report concludes by calling for more attention to "the political movement in various cities. The financial and economic crisis of the enemy in the South caused an adverse impact on his political situation... This is an opportunity we should use to strengthen the movement demanding economic and social welfare

among workers and various social classes including bourgeois, officials, and enemy soldiers... We should clearly see the favorable time of opportunity and use all forms of struggle to put forth the slogans demanding an urgent solution to the people's livelihood problems and demanding democracy and peace."

To accomplish this ambitious correlation of guerrilla warfare in the countryside with political agitation in the cities "we should ensure that the political reorientation in the Party Chapters and the motivation of the people in various areas are successfully carried out. This is the last and decisive link that will turn Resolution 9 into a strong force."

260

A  
FILE SUBJ  
DATE SUB-CAT  
1069

NT [COSVN]

31/10/69

M40 [possibly Standing Committee, COSVN] to:  
All [subordinate units and agencies]

A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON ACTIVITIES DURING  
THE 1969 AUTUMN CAMPAIGN

The 1969 Autumn Campaign played an important role. Our policy was to take advantage of our great victories in the political and diplomatic fields gained in the Spring and Summer Campaign to initiate, along with implementing Resolution 9, a stronger Autumn Campaign dealing heavier blows to the enemy's scheme of "Vietnamization" of the war. At the same time, we stepped up preparations for the Winter-Spring Campaign.

While we conducted the Autumn Campaign and implemented Resolution 9, Chairman Ho, the great and beloved leader of the Party, of the [working] class and of our people, died. The entire Party, army, and people have been extremely mournful. They are striving to transform their mourning into action in order to strengthen solidarity, to fight and to successfully implement Chairman Ho's will.

I. - In the Military field:

a. Concerning the activities of our main forces, although the enemy had planned and deployed his defense forces more carefully, thanks to our correct assessment of the enemy situation, our determination [to fight the enemy], our application of appropriate guidelines and combat methods, and thanks to the great efforts made by the units participating in combat, we satisfactorily met the requirements by destroying an important portion of the enemy manpower and war facilities especially a number of elite units, including a number of U.S. and Puppet armored units, We also defeated his tactical defense plan of using armored vehicles in coordination with B-52 airstrikes. At the same time, by conducting extremely fierce battles, we improved our combat efficiency, our organizational skill, leadership, and combat tactics and techniques. Our casualties were the lowest ever.

Our forces in the battlefields of Military Region 5 and Tri-Thien made efforts to successfully conduct coordinated activities. Forces of Military Region 6 fulfilled missions prescribed for each phase of activities. Forces of Military Region 10 have initially made efforts to overcome difficulties; our activities in the main war theater and in the Mekong River Delta have improved in the second phase. In addition, the forces in a number of battlefields, such as Military Region 6 and Military Region 10 succeeded in destroying a number of sub-sectors. In Ben Tre and My Tho provinces, a number of networks to counter the enemy's encroachment and pacification plan have been established.

The guerrilla and local units of a number of provinces and districts operated correctly and with a higher efficiency than before. They also made much progress in conducting attacks and in employing mines and explosives. The activities of secret guerrilla and self-defense forces were still maintained in many areas.

The above victories have contributed to the breakup of the enemy's scheme for reducing U.S. casualties and replacing the U.S. troops with Puppet troops. Their "clear and hold" strategy became more passive and confused.

b. However, generally speaking, our military offensive activities conducted during the 1969 Autumn Campaign were not strong and continuous in conforming with the criteria prescribed for the three areas and all the battlefields. As a result, we failed to fully take the initiative in attacking the enemy. We also failed to heavily defeat his strategic position and his forces on all battlefields.

In addition, the coordination of activities between the battlefields was weaker than in the past. The concentrated forces could not take advantage of the opportunities in their local area to step up attacks against the enemy.

The guerrilla movement and local troops made slow progress. A number of these units operated very well, however, there are only a few of these units. Even the available forces in the regions, provinces, and districts down to guerrilla units were still not fully used and developed.

Briefly, we did not meet the requirements of destroying the enemy on all battlefields. Attacks conducted on the enemy communication routes, rear bases, and storage facilities became weaker. At the same time, the coordination between attacking the enemy, countering enemy pacification activities, winning over the people, and improving our movement in weak areas and city-fringe areas was not satisfactory. The leadership of the Party Committee levels and military echelons towards the local armed forces' mission of defeating the enemy's pacification scheme, winning over the people, improving the [struggle] movement in weak areas and city-fringe areas was not properly provided. The employment of forces and the application of combat methods were not suitable for the requirements and missions of the local areas and the practical condition of the battlefield.

2. - Countering Pacification Activities and Improving the [People's Struggle] Movement in Weak and Fringe Areas:

a. Although having to cope with our phase of attacks and withdraw a number of American units from the battlefields near Saigon and Bien Hoa the enemy still strived to carry out his pacification and encroachment activities, attacking in an all-sided, concentrated, most violent and sinister way.

The struggle of our people and army against the enemy pacification scheme became more complicated, and during the 1969 Autumn Campaign, recorded the following progress.

The people's struggle movement was continuously and broadly conducted with varying degrees of intensity, and caused instability to the enemy's oppressive control. Recently, the people living in weak areas and fringe areas including a number of rural areas around Saigon broke out from concentration sites and strategic hamlets to engage in production work. In some areas such as Giong Trom and Chau Thanh districts of Ben Tre province, tens of thousands of people, who were formerly relocated or temporarily sent to enemy controlled areas returned to their old villages. In some areas the enemy reduced the number of people living in his resettlement areas so as to ease his economic and supply problems. He also inserted agents among the people who returned to their native places.

Generally, in spite of increased oppressive control by the enemy the people living in weak areas, fringe areas, and areas newly encroached upon by the enemy showed strong devotion to the Revolution. When base-level cadre or our forces came, the people were ready to welcome and help them. A number of hamlets located deeply in enemy areas seemed to be under strong enemy control, but with the infiltration of a few cadre working cleverly in these hamlets we were able to organize the people, step up the people's struggle movement, annihilate the cruel tyrants, break up the oppressive control, and quickly spread the people's struggle movement to other hamlets. Where our agents manage to cling to the people and to repress the puppet administrative officials and spies the [struggle] movement not only survives but also improves qualitatively.

In areas subject to enemy pacification and encroachment activities, the people's struggle movement is decisive. In a number of sensitive areas, such as North Cu Chi, North Trang Bang, and Sub-Region 1, although the enemy repeatedly conducted savage attacks against the people and destroyed all their houses in an attempt to force them to flee to his controlled areas, the people sought all means to resolutely cling to their farms and lands. Through the counteractions conducted permanently against enemy attacks and attempts to encroach the land and relocate the people, the people's struggle movement in combat villages and hamlets in mountainous and lowland areas was improved and heightened.

This situation showed that our people's struggle against the enemy pacification scheme, the struggle to gain back the control of the weak areas and fringe areas has a new appearance which offers a great deal of new capabilities which we must promptly grasp and strongly develop.

In addition to the development of the people's struggle movement, progress is being made by various echelons in the performance of tasks and the guidance given to counter-pacification activities, and the struggle movement in weak areas and fringe areas. Our Party Chapters and guerrilla forces in weak areas and fringe areas were highly determined to cling to their areas of activity. Previously they had been driven away in many places, but they are now returning to regain control. The employment of penetration forces to annihilate cruel tyrants, pacification cadre, supporting forces, and civilian Self-Defense Force, etc... was

intensified. The annihilation of tyrants and the breaking of the enemy's oppressive control were maintained by secret guerrilla and self-defense forces.

In a number of regions, such as Ben Tre, My Tho (Region 2), Long My (Region 3), the Region Party Committees have effectively led the people in resisting the widening pacification and encroachment activities conducted by the enemy.

Due to the above achievements, plus the victories obtained in the Spring-Summer [1969] Campaign, we have blocked the enemy's pacification plan in many areas. The enemy's oppressive control was loosened and disrupted on a large-scale. This has given us a new opportunity to improve the people's struggle movement in weak and fringe areas.

b. Obviously, as the enemy is trying to carry out his "Vietnamization" plan the problem of staying alive, winning over the people, gaining back our control of the rural areas has become very urgent.

However, generally speaking, although our activities against the enemy's pacification program and his oppressive control impeded the execution of his pacification program in some areas, the enemy still attained his most pressing requirements which are: conscription, organization of People's Self-Defense Force, intensification of spying activities and activities to induce our personnel to surrender or rally to him. These activities caused difficulties to our forces in staying close to the people, in organizing the movement, securing area of activities, and strengthening the system of leadership from the higher echelons to village and hamlet echelons.

The following were our major leadership deficiencies in recent period:

Local authorities did not realize the importance of activities against the enemy's pacification program and the improvement of the movement in the weak area and fringe area. In organization and leadership, they did not closely associate the activities against the enemy pacification program, the improving of the movement in the weak area and fringe area with the task and requirements of the phase. They did not fully realize that in the high points as well as in our regular activities, countering the enemy pacification program, and extending our control over the rural area are a mission, a requirement which has a strategic importance.

The study, discussion of documents and execution of directives concerning tasks to be carried out in the weak and fringe areas, and the tasks against the enemy pacification program were not properly carried out.

Many Province Committee authorities and even a small number of Region Committee and Sub-Region Committee authorities did not study the documents carefully and did not fully understand the context, especially the plan and methods of implementation. They did not adhere to the guidelines.

Concerning leadership, the important Party Committee authorities, especially at Region and Province levels, did not concentrate their efforts on countering the enemy's pacification program and winning mastership of the rural area. They also did not pay attention to the mission and the requirement of the phase, to the use of three-pronged attacks or to the use of the three types of forces [main force, local force, guerrilla force]. They did not pay attention to proper organization, to providing guidance on main and secondary targets, or to disrupting the enemy's pacification program, etc... [sic]. In many areas though they talked of conducting three-pronged attacks, they only controlled a number of concentrated units and provided little guidance for the people's political struggle, troop proselyting activities, and guerrilla activities, etc...

### 3. - Troop Proselyting and Political Movements in the Cities.

a. In the face of heavy political and diplomatic failure in the spring and summer, the enemy schemed to maintain and create support for the Thieu puppet government, and to gather forces in order to meet his immediate and future requirements. At the same time, he intensified his demagogic activities to appease the movements of the people in the world and the American people demanding the U.S. government to end the aggressive war in Viet-Nam. However, the enemy failed to carry out his above scheme and his political situation entered a deeper crisis. The fact that Khiem was designated to replace Huong proved that the Saigon Government was inclined to militarism and was in greater confusion. It proved that the Saigon Government was becoming more isolated. Contradictions within the henchmen's ranks became grave. The movement demanding the withdrawal of U.S. troops further developed among the American people, even in political circles and in the Republican Party.

The more obdurate Nixon is the more isolated he becomes. The [peace] movement in the U.S. on 15 October strongly influenced the anti-war attitude of the U.S. soldiers in South Viet-Nam and caused confusion among the Puppet troops. The economic depression of the enemy in South Viet-Nam was further developed, greatly affecting his political situation. The enemy is trying to improve his situation with patchwork solutions but his economic-financial system being based on the dark war schemes of the U.S., it is difficult for him to save the situation.

b. In regard to our side, although the enemy intensified his control and oppression, our people's struggle movement and their revolutionary stance were continuously and broadly developed. The important characteristic of the [struggle] movement in the city in recent months was the economic struggle movement which spread broadly and continuously among the workers and laborers calling for better living conditions. There was a definite coordination between workers of various branches and trades. The struggle movement spread not only among the workers and laborers but among all the people, including bourgeois, public servants and enemy troops. The student struggle movement encountered a number of difficulties but was still maintained. Their opposition to attending the military training schools showed that if we seize the opportunity and use appropriate slogans we can turn their struggle into a strong movement.

The funeral of Uncle Ho was a great political event having a strong influence on promoting nationalism among the people of all strata in the cities; workers, students, intellectuals, bourgeois, the intermediate class, and even elements in the Puppet Government and Army. This is the expression of the will and aspiration of our people for independence and reunification. At the same time, this is also a political attack by public opinion at large against the aggressive face of the U.S. and Puppets.

Along with the people's struggle movement for social welfare and democratic rights, and in the face of growing failures and difficulties of the U.S. and Puppets, the intermediate force is growing stronger, giving us many possibilities to win popular support. At the same time, the enemy used all means to gain control of the people.

The above situation proves that we have the capabilities to turn the political struggle into an action front demanding political rights and [improvement of] social welfare. However, we did not correct our deficiencies, especially those concerning organizing and providing guidance to our personnel, workers, and laborers, therefore, the movement was not stable and we did not get hold of the situation in order to timely develop the movement. Recently, many opportunities arose in the cities but we did not fully take advantage of them.

The guerrilla warfare movement, the breaking of the enemy's oppressive control, and the killing of tyrants in the capital were still maintained. These movements were developed in a number of province capitals and district seats. In some areas we succeeded in setting up a number of political penetration bases, but generally speaking, these are still weak. In other areas, the movement's strength was diminished as compared to the previous phases. Recently in a number of areas, due to failure to comply with action principle and guidance, our [political] bases had been smashed up with obvious repercussion on other aspects of our activities.

c. - Concerning Outside Forces and Enemy Troop Proselyting

The Standing Committee of M40 [COSVN] issued a directive assessing the result of the campaign from July to September 1969 and pointing out the direction where we should step up our activities in the forthcoming period.

Due to losses on the battlefield, the influence of the withdrawal of a number of units of U.S. troops, and especially due to the American people's movement struggling for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the combat spirit and capabilities of the U.S. and Puppet troops were critically reduced. The deterioration is without precedent among the U.S. troops: whole units opposed the war, whole battalions and companies fled leaving tanks and artillery behind. The movement opposing racial discrimination and supporting the American people's demand for the withdrawal of U.S. troops have grown. Concerning the Puppet troops, because of the careless and massive conscription, the Puppet troops are strong in numbers but disorganized. The conscripts were numerous in the Regular, Popular, and Regional Forces. Due to the withdrawal of U.S. troops, the Puppet troops became confused, and lost their confidence.

On the other hand, being sent to actions continuously in the place of the U.S. troops, they are tense and weary despite their noisy appearance. The enemy troop proselyting campaign achieved much success; we educated and motivated the people and [enemy] soldiers' dependents to participate in troop proselyting activities. We paid attention to coordinating troop proselyting activities with armed forces activities (execute the policy for PW's and surrenderers, and make propaganda appeals to enemy soldiers during combat.) Outstanding during the phase was the fact that in a number of places, thanks to our leadership, the anti-war movement, military revolts and fifth columnist activities among the Puppet troops have intensified. Some typically good cases of military revolts and fifth columnist actions have been recorded in Region 3. However, considering the morale of the enemy troops, our achievements were still low because our leadership did not get a firm hold of the situation and failed to bring a vigorous improvement to the problem of organization and implementation [of policy] which is the key link ensuring that requirements for the enemy troop proselyting campaign are met.

#### 4. - Reorientation and Implementation of Resolution 9.

To date, the reindoctrination on Resolution 9 has been completed at the Region, City, and Sub-Region levels. It has almost been completed at province level and in a large number of districts, and is being carried out at Party Chapter level. According to the plans of various localities, it will be conducted for the people by November (1969). Various sections and branches of M40, and main force units in various Regions have already completed the orientation.

All local areas were conscious of the importance of the indoctrination. This time, the organization and preparation for reorientation made much progress: the leadership of the local forces and concentrated forces have developed collective democracy by listening to opinions from the lower echelons.

Reports show that various levels were in full agreement with the spirit and contents of the C Resolution and Resolution 9, particularly, the assessment of the situation, the causes of strong and weak points and the key problems to solve in order to change the forthcoming situation. There was improvement in their receptiveness and comprehension of the Party policies, the immediate missions, the phase character and the development steps of the General Offensive and Uprising. The most notable point is that this time they

unanimously expressed the view that the Resolution not only outlined the upcoming missions but also correctly responded to the requirements of the complex and decisive struggle in each locality. In short, after this indoctrination, the political awareness of various echelons was strengthened.

Due to a full understanding of the contents of the Resolution and a proper understanding of the local situations a number of localities have satisfactorily settled important problems of the revolutionary movement and leadership such as the assessment of friendly and enemy forces, their strengths and weaknesses, etc... [sic].

The leadership of several localities have begun to settle the problems of implementation of policies, the improvement of their working methods, etc... [sic]. This is a point to which the Party Committees of Regions, Cities, Sub-Regions, and provinces must pay attention. Party Committees that have not yet succeeded in the above matter should correct their methods and provide guidance for the reorientation on, and implementation of, the Resolution to various lower echelons. Only when we succeed in this matter can we turn the Resolution into actuality and change the future situation to our advantage.

5. - Evaluation of the Autumn Campaign and Plans for Upcoming Activities

a. We initiated the [1969] Autumn Campaign on the basis of great victories gained in the Spring and Summer campaign. Generally, the situation brought many advantages to us and disadvantages to the enemy. However, we still had many weak points and shortcomings. Meantime, the enemy, though defeated, was still stubborn and still trying all means to materialize his intention of de-escalating the war while holding a strong position.

After a few months of the intense offensive attacks along with the initial implementation of Resolution 9, we gained much success. In some aspects, our performances were relatively good, such as the activities of our main force. At times and in some places there was some progress made. These achievements were not numerous, but as the enemy was weakening, they drove him into a more embarrassed and difficult position. They also drove his "de-Americanization" scheme a step closer to failure and at

the same time they created favorable conditions for us to promote the revolutionary movement in the immediate future. In sum, the Autumn Campaign has not met the planned results. Considering our actual advantages, we should have gained greater victories and inflicted heavier losses on the enemy, even though we were confronted with some objective difficulties. In reality, our victories were limited, and the enemy, though defeated a further step, has nevertheless fulfilled his most pressing requirements, particularly those of his rural pacification program, and his press-ganging drive designed to replenish and build up the Puppet army. These gains have created more difficulties to the performance of our tasks.

b. Our leadership made many efforts to overcome difficulties so as to perform both a political reorientation and an attack phase. However, coordination between the indoctrination on the Resolution and our [military] activities during the phase and normal period was not good enough. Our leaders did not fully realize the importance of the Autumn Campaign, therefore, the determination to gain the advantage for attacking the enemy was not firm.

In the direction of the Campaign, we had not firmly grasped the overall requirements and had no appropriate plans for fulfilling these requirements in the local areas. In particular, the coordination between attacks and anti-pacification activities designed to improve the revolutionary movement in city-fringe areas and weak areas, the coordination between military activities, political struggle, and enemy proselyting activities were still weak. Authorities at various levels have not paid attention to the activation and strengthening of our armed and political forces.

Due to the enemy's savage destruction, the masses' living situation, and the characteristics of battlefields, etc... [sic], which have been confused and complex, we need good organization and effective leadership, especially, appropriate struggle methods and guidelines, and a successful development in both the military and political fields. However, only authorities at some levels such as Regions, Sub-Regions, and authorities of a number of provinces have just realized these matters during the political reorientation on Resolution 9.

Enemy future schemes are basically those pointed out by the C Resolution and Resolution 9. Although he has suffered many defeats and is facing many difficulties in SVN as well as in the U.S.,

the enemy is still stubborn. He entertains the hope that through intensifying his pacification activities, relocating the people, organizing the civilian Self-Defense Force, press-ganging, replenishing and reinforcing [the Puppet force], he could pursue the policy of de-escalating the war on a strong position, de-escalating for the purpose of Vietnamizing but not ending the war.

To achieve the above plan, the enemy is going to increase the use of the tactics that he has recently applied. Along with the intensification of deceptive propaganda, the creation of peace illusions including the announcement of withdrawal of a number of the U.S. troops designed to soothe public opinion and to attack us diplomatically, the enemy will adjust and improve his battlefield organization and devise attack plans, defense plans for cities and rear bases, etc... [sic] in order to meet the requirement of the "Vietnamization" plan which is to avoid casualties to the U.S. troops while still maintaining the capability to inflict losses on our forces and reinforce the Puppet army and administration. He will strongly push the pacification activities and the relocation of the people, especially in areas surrounding Saigon and the delta of the Mekong River. The enemy will try to strengthen the Puppet forces, increase the people's Self-Defense Forces' activities, and increase the quantity of weapons and activities of the Regional Forces so they can replace the main force as a mobile force that will be used to attack us on the outer perimeter. The pacification of rural areas and the withdrawal of the Puppet (\*) troops [sic] are the main point of the enemy's future activities plan and are considered as fundamental for carrying out his policy of de-escalating the war in a strong position.

In the face of the enemy's scheme, we must strive to thoroughly understand Resolution 9, along with studying and implementing the testament of Chairman Ho in order to strengthen our determination. In addition, we should strengthen our combat solidarity and do our best to accomplish the immediate task as stated in the Resolution. And, simultaneously, we should be ready to defeat the U.S. in any circumstance.

---

\* This is probably an error in transcription and should read "The pacification of rural areas and the withdrawal of the U.S. troops ..."

d. In providing leadership in the coming days, the following important problems should receive particular attention.

We should closely coordinate the three-pronged attack with the three types of forces [main, local, and militia forces] in the three areas [mountainous, lowland, and city] and the capital to counter the enemy's pacification activities more effectively. Leadership in countering his pacification plan should be all-encompassing, more positive and concentrated in order to frustrate it in the coming months. We must further understand the importance of the present revolutionary movement concerning the countering of the enemy's pacification program and the development of our mastery in the city-fringe areas and the weak areas which is related to the defeat of the de-Americanization scheme. We must strive to deprive the enemy of one of his foundations on which rests his hope of de-escalating the war in a strong position. Although defeated, the enemy is still very stubborn, therefore he is withdrawing his troops drop by drop and simultaneously striving to implement his pacification plan. Recently, the enemy noisily carried out his pacification plan and obtained some temporary success in territory encroachment, and troop conscription.

Although the enemy is trying to carry out the above activities, it is necessary to realize that his capabilities are more limited than before. Therefore, we have the capabilities and conditions for defeating his pacification scheme.

We should provide proper and positive leadership for our forces to break the enemy's oppressive control and positively develop our strength and the three-pronged attack movement in local areas, weak areas, and cities in order to break the enemy control grip and turn weak positions into strong positions. We should thoroughly understand the guidelines and apply organizational and struggle methods so that our real force and movement will be strongly and increasingly developed.

In providing leadership to our tasks, we should pay attention to combining combat leadership with the acceleration of the troop proselyting campaign, the strengthening of the political movement, the increase of attacks against the enemy and the building of our strength in every aspect in various areas. We should pay particular attention to strengthening the guerrilla warfare movement in various

areas (by carrying out Resolution 14 issued on 30 Oct. by the Standing Committee of M40 concerning the intensification of guerrilla warfare during the General Offensive and Uprising Campaign).

We should promote the political movement in various cities. The financial and economic crisis of the enemy in the South caused an adverse impact on his political situation. The policy of tax increases and conscription stirred up an unprecedented reaction among all strata in various cities. This is an opportunity that we should use to strengthen the movement demanding economic and social welfare among workers and various social classes, including bourgeois, officials, and enemy soldiers. If we know how to seize this opportunity and use appropriate slogans, we will be able to establish a strong and continuous struggle front using slogans that reflect the pressing demand of the people concerning their livelihood and step up the struggle movement demanding the U.S. to withdraw troops swiftly from SVN and forcing the overthrow of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem Administration and the formation of a peace cabinet.

We should clearly see the favorable time of opportunity and use all forms of struggle to put forth the slogans demanding an urgent solution to the people's livelihood problems, and demanding democracy and peace.

We should ensure that the political reorientation in the Party Chapters and the motivation of the people in various areas are successfully carried out. This is the last and decisive link that will turn Resolution 9 into a strong force. We should closely coordinate the studying of Chairman Ho's testament with the conduct of the political reorientation drive and the motivation of the people.

30 Oct [69]

Thống Vụ [Standing Committee] M40