

some of the reports on the operations of the South Vietnamese forces in the last few weeks, they referred to search and destroy missions that they had been on. It is a term used by military commanders to indicate that they had been out trying to locate areas where there have been indications of enemy concentration, and they have tried to destroy the enemy in the locations indicated by their intelligence reports.

Senator MANSFIELD. I understand that. I am not asking about the South Vietnamese. What about our own people? Are we still conducting search-and-destroy missions?

Secretary LAIRD. Our own people carry on missions in order to protect the security of our forces. I am not trying to hedge on the question, but I like to refer to what we are doing as protective reaction. If we believe that a mission is necessary in order to minimize U.S. casualties or to protect U.S. forces, those missions are undertaken by our commands.

Senator MANSFIELD. In anticipation.

Secretary LAIRD. In anticipation of an attack or on evidence that an attack is about to take place.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is fine. Now, you have said that we have done away with maximum pressure, the tactic of maximum pressure which I think you indicated was the basis of the order issued by President Johnson to General Abrams some months ago.

MAXIMUM PRESSURE

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Mansfield, I want to make it clear so that there can be no misunderstanding about this, that in the orders that were in existence for the last 3½ years, the term "maximum pressure" was never used.

Senator MANSFIELD. You brought it up, though, just before I asked the question.

Secretary LAIRD. The term "maximum pressure" which we discussed with Senator Cooper, was used in a letter which President Johnson communicated to MAC/V, and he used that term as a description of the orders that had been in existence for the last 3½ years.

Senator MANSFIELD. Which were maximum pressure.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes. My problem is that I want to be sure everyone understands that that exact term was not in the orders to our military commanders.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, who is the head of MAC/V in Saigon? General Abrams?

Secretary LAIRD. Abrams received that.

Senator MANSFIELD. Or General Westmoreland?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

Senator MANSFIELD. And they received a letter from the President of the United States, but it was not in their orders.

Secretary LAIRD. It was not—the President of the United States used that term as his term to describe the orders that had been issued to our commanders.

Senator MANSFIELD. Well, I think we are quibbling over words. We are getting semantically confused. I think the meaning is quite clear.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Mansfield, the only problem I want to clear up is that some of our newspaper friends went out to Saigon and

started interviewing some of the commanders, and they said, "Is the term 'maximum pressure' in your old orders?" And they said, "The term 'maximum pressure' was never in our orders." And that leads to some stories that say, "Well, you haven't changed the orders." I just want to make sure that everyone understands we have changed the orders. Just because the term "maximum pressure" was not in those military orders, I do not want to mislead anybody here. We have changed those orders and made a very definite change from orders that made clear that the primary responsibility was a military victory to orders that made clear the primary responsibility was to Vietnamize the war.

PROTECTIVE POLICY

Senator MANSFIELD. That is not what I am thinking. In other words, the search and destroy is tactically no longer being used. The maximum pressure is not being used. What is being used now is a protective policy.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes. I do not think our troops ever used maximum pressure to the extent that I would envision maximum pressure. Maximum pressure would mean you had battalion operations going all the time. I want to make it clear I am not trying to hedge on this question one bit, but I would doubt if you could characterize the activities that we had as complete "maximum pressure," because there could have been greater pressure put on the enemy by having our troops operating on a more continuous basis than they were. My concern is that I have seen these stories that resulted from some commander being asked if the term maximum pressure was ever in his orders before, and he would have to say no. But the important difference is that those orders were issued on the basis that a military victory was to be achieved by U.S. forces in Vietnam and those orders were very clear in that regard.

PRESIDENT NIXON'S CHANGE OF ORDERS TO GENERAL ABRAMS

Senator MANSFIELD. Well now, to your knowledge, Mr. Secretary, did the President of the United States, when he was in Vietnam last July, issue to General Abrams any change in the orders then in existence.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. He did.

Senator MANSFIELD. And what was that order which he gave to General Abrams which signified a decided change?

Secretary LAIRD. The order which he gave to General Abrams verbally at that time was to minimize U.S. casualties to the greatest extent possible, protect the security of the U.S. forces, and move forward as rapidly as possible with a program to Vietnamize the war.

Senator MANSFIELD. Was that a protective reaction policy?

Secretary LAIRD. The President did not use that term. I used that term in March, Senator Mansfield.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am trying to get it at a given point. Would you describe that as—

Secretary LAIRD. I would describe that as a protective reaction policy. These orders of the President were then formalized in regular military standing orders.

Senator MANSFIELD. Orders by the President to General Abrams and through him to his subordinates.

Secretary LAIRD. Military orders are issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but they follow the directions of the Commander in Chief, the President of the United States.

Senator MANSFIELD. What I understand the President did was to put into effect what you advocated the previous March.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct.

FIRST USE OF TERM "PROTECTIVE REACTION" POLICY

Senator MANSFIELD. I was under the impression that the order itself was initially issued by the President last July, that a month or so ago at a press conference which you held at the Pentagon you brought out the use of the term "protective reaction" for the first time that I ever heard it. I think you had a General Barnes on a standby basis to make some explanations about the Vietnamization or pacification of the area which he held. And then the following Sunday, when I was in Salt Lake City, I saw Secretary Rogers on television. He emphasized the tactic of protective reaction which to me seems to be a decided shift away from any kind of maximum pressure on search and destroy, which means in effect that what we can have sweeps to anticipate and protect anything which might be coming up. I know that you will not agree with this, but it seems to me that that is a pretty decided step, if not a long step, toward a cease-fire and standfast.

Secretary LAIRD. It would be depending upon what the enemy does.

Senator MANSFIELD. That is right. You are not going to stand there defenseless. You are not going to let them build up and come in on you, but at the same time you are not going to go out on search and destroy missions or apply maximum pressure. So there has been a decided change in tactics and policies on the battlefield.

Secretary LAIRD. There has been a change, and the date of the official orders, I will be glad to supply that.

Senator MANSFIELD. No, I just want to know if there has been a change and if we can say now with assurance that orders to establish a protective reaction policy have been issued and have been reinforced, not only issued by the President but reinforced by you and Secretary Rogers and all the others.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. And the President outlined this first to General Abrams last summer, and it was formalized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in official battlefield orders later in the summer.

Senator MANSFIELD. I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Senator.

TIMETABLE OF EQUIPPING AND ARMING VIETNAMESE

Senator COOPER. Let me say that Senator Mansfield explored what I was driving toward. My purpose was to establish, if it is correct, that there had been a change in military orders and military operations, and, second, as Senator Mansfield has brought out, that it is possible it might lead, as it already has led, to reduction in the level of fighting and perhaps a cease-fire if it was reciprocated on the other side.

With my limited knowledge of military tactics, only 4 years in the army, I understand even if you are in a protective situation, you do

have patrols and you do have to take some what might be called offensive operations to protect your troops, and transportation of supplies. I would like to go to this question of timetable because that is the one which has been brought up again and again. This is a question I addressed to Secretary Rogers and now to you.

Ideally it seemed to me that if the program of the President should be successful, that is, if the Vietnamese were so equipped and armed and had the will to take up the burden of the battle themselves, that the timetable could be self-executing. When that occurred, that we would move out, first with a disengagement of combat forces, and finally withdrawal of all forces. But that procedure depends not only on what we do but upon what the Vietnamese do. So my question is directed first to what are we doing, and you do not have to go into great lengths unless you want to, unless you want to supply it by written answer, what we are doing militarily to strengthen the Vietnamese. You have gone over that to some extent today, have you not?

Secretary LAIRD. Some. I would be glad to go over it again.

Senator COOPER. Well, as I understand it, you said we are proceeding more quickly with the supply of arms and equipment to prepare them to defend themselves. Is there any timetable you can establish in which that process of arming and equipping the Vietnamese will be completed?

Secretary LAIRD. Part of this program has already been completed, Senator Cooper. I referred this morning to the fact that within the last 6 months we have moved to a position where we have 100 percent of the M-16 rifles necessary to support the Regional forces, the Popular forces, and the Regular forces in country. Ninety-seven percent of all these forces have these rifles in hand and have been trained to use them. Only 3 percent of the forces do not have this rifle and have not had the proper training to use it. But the rifles all are in-country and are available to them.

This is quite a change over 12 months ago.

The equipment requirements are being met on schedule. We are ahead of schedule as far as aircraft and helicopters are concerned. Our only slowdown in this area is the fact that aircraft and helicopter training takes some longer period of time. But we have established the goals to expand these forces and to equip these forces and at the present time we are ahead of the goals that have been established in this Vietnamization program.

EXTENT OF U.S. TRAINING OPERATIONS

Senator COOPER. You mentioned the second element, training. How extensive are the training operations that the United States is now engaged in as related to the total armed forces of Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. They are very extensive, Senator Cooper. Let me use as an example, and I would like to enlarge upon this, if I could, the training activities that are currently going on with the [deleted]. We have put American training missions and have American units operating in cooperation with them at the present time in their training program, and these particular divisions are now engaged in combat operations for the first time in about 4 years, but I would like to just check that number of months. They were not previously

engaged in real combat activities but were more or less stationed around [deleted].

They are making progress not only because of the U.S. training mission and because of our commitment to this program, but more importantly because the Vietnamese understand that these are goals and these are training progress dates which are firm—we really mean what we are talking about in this particular program.

LEADERSHIP IN VIETNAM FORCES

Senator COOPER. The third element you mentioned is the question of leadership. In the past we have had witnesses before the committee who gave testimony that the appointment and promotion of officers is based upon family relationships, upon political relationships, and the many failures of the Vietnamese forces were caused by the inadequate and undertrained, poor leadership.

Now, that is an essential element. You said something about it this morning. But is the United States doing anything to cause the South Vietnamese forces to know that they have to have adequate military leadership? Has it any influence in that direction? And is the South Vietnamese Government, the military leadership, actually giving their troops adequate leadership relative to their own abilities?

Secretary LAIRD. [Deleted]. Off the record if I could.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator COOPER. I would say even accepting it for the sake of argument, the program of Vietnamization is bound to fail if the military forces do not have capable leadership. I would think this is one field that the United States would have the right, because the safety and lives of our own troops are at stake and also this policy is at stake, to insist that this effective leadership be provided. I think we have to do that.

Secretary LAIRD. We have to emphasize improvement in leadership, and they are making great strides I think in this area. I am not trying to give you an overly optimistic report on this, but this is at the heart of the problem. As I said this morning, this question of desertion and this question of leadership, which I discussed at some length, and some of the things that are being done about them right now, are very important. I think it is understood that we are very serious about this program to Vietnamize the war.

LAND REFORM IN VIETNAM

Senator COOPER. Now, to look at the other side for a moment, the Vietnamese. Assuming that the United States could within a reasonable time, perhaps quite rapidly, arm, equip these troops of South Vietnam, train them, insist that they have capable leadership, the question would still be before us whether the South Vietnamese people would accept this program, would have confidence in it, whether it would support the government.

I would presume their security is an important factor, that they feel some reasonable safety. But is the South Vietnam Government doing anything in other fields? I set aside the pacification program. Are they doing enough things in other fields in the economic field,

for example, in the field of land reform, to give the people of South Vietnam a stake in this program.

I ask this because I have talked to a few American soldiers who have come back from Vietnam, and they were in combat and they had no complaint about their going to Vietnam, whether they were drafted or volunteered, and they are not protesting against the United States or American policy, but they did state that one of the disheartening factors that they saw there is when they would engage in an offensive operation, engage in combat, and recover areas in South Vietnam, and try to secure them, that they were followed by the landlords and taxgatherers who came back to again impose their burdens on these people.

I talked to Cabot Lodge in Paris. He told me that he thought an effective plan for land reform is going on, at least as much as can be done at this time.

As I recall, though, that was one of the effective methods of the Communist Chinese to gain support of the people. When they took over China, they did provide land reform, and it was such a contrast to the system they had under Nationalist China they got the support of the people.

Now, did anything like that happen in South Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. The land reform program is a high priority program as far as the Government is concerned. As you know, it is tied up in the debate within the Senate and the House in Saigon at the present time. Not as much progress has been made as we had hoped in this legislative session. There is a dispute about the method by which payment is made for the land. We are hopeful that the legislation will pass because the land reform program is very important.

The Government has faced up to some of its problems with inflation and some of its problems as far as control of its monetary program in the last few weeks. This is now being challenged in the courts in Vietnam because the President put the program in by fiat under emergency terms that were granted under the Constitution, and the legislature has raised some questions about this.

But the actions that he took in this field, although they may not be too popular right now, we believe were necessary as far as the economy of the country was concerned.

I would like to give you a more complete report on the land reform. This is one of the things that I consider very important, the economic actions that can be taken in the whole area of Vietnamization. Land reform and economic reform are most important.

HOPE OF POLITICAL CHANGES

Senator COOPER. Now, one other question in this area. I raised the question of land reform to see if there was any economic hope being given these people. Is there any political hope being given to them? We talk about self-determination, but a great many people believe that the election of this government and the adoption of the Constitution was not a true self-determination. I do not know whether we will ever be able to have any kind of self-determination and free elections as we consider it. But I do not think there are many countries in the world that look at it the way we do. Very few. But does this Gov-

ernment in South Vietnam hold out any, not hope, but does it have any program that at some point free elections will be held either according to our standards or according to better standards of their Government than have been the case before? Will their Constitution be revised which would give greater evidence of an intention to create a better, more responsive government?

Secretary LAIRD. They have indicated that they would be willing to go along with the new election process and would be willing to consider changes as far as their Constitution is concerned, in order to permit an election at an earlier date in Vietnam.

They have outlined on several occasions their willingness to go along with proposals that have been outlined by President Nixon to have an open, free election supervised either by an international commission or by a joint commission, mixed election commission. Thus far there has not been much progress as far as negotiations are concerned, to set up such an election, but I think that they have been forthright in indicating that they are willing to negotiate for such an election.

PERIODIC REVIEW OF VIETNAMIZATION POLICY

Senator COOPER. Senator Case and others talked about the timetable in these terms. Senator Case said he thought that it would be better to set an outside limit because it would bring influence on the South Vietnamese Government to take the necessary steps. You gave him a reason for not doing it. Would there be any help or point in stating dates when our policy would be reviewed? That might let the South Vietnamese know that at a certain fixed time we are going to review our policy, and if they have not taken the necessary steps, there is a possibility we would move out.

I do not know whether you can answer that or not, but I suggest it as a possibility.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, as I said this morning, I have been one of those in the administration who perhaps has been overly concerned about this, but I have had the experience of hearing these various predictions as to when all Americans will be out of Vietnam and when this will be done and when that will be done. I have urged the President not to make announcements more than 4 to 6 months at a time, because I think that we should have a continuing review of the progress of the plan. Continuing review is going on now in behalf of the President and the administration, on this plan—not only to remove combat troops but also to remove the so-called transitional force. It is better to have regular reviews and have public announcements after those reviews.

Senator COOPER. I thought it might be possible to state at some point in the future that we would review our policy in the light of the progress of the Vietnamization program. It might have influence upon the South Vietnamese Government.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, we are trying to communicate as best we can. I planned to go to Vietnam again this November to have a series of meetings not only with the representatives of the Joint General Staff, but also with the President and others to discuss again our goals and the entire program. Because of the appropriation process and other activities going on here on the Hill, the Deputy Secretary of Defense

David Packard, went instead, and he is there this week carrying on these meetings with the South Vietnamese and with the South Vietnamese military general staff. And I can assure you that these training goals, these organization goals of this program, are under constant review. We feel that we are ahead of the projected program which has been set up and was started on the 1st of July.

CONTINGENCY IF PROGRAM SHOULD NOT SUCCEED

Senator COOPER. Well, if it raises the question of contingency, and I raise that question, if this program should not succeed, if you could not secure Vietnamization, if their will could not be strengthened, if the Vietnamese Government should begin to disintegrate as we withdraw forces, if they just did not have the will to fight, then at some point in the future we would be faced with either continuing an operation which would be essentially an American military operation or getting out. Has that possibility been considered?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I would not be in favor of carrying on the program, Senator, if that should ever happen. If we reached the point where the people of South Vietnam and the military forces of South Vietnam or the Government of South Vietnam as such do not support this program and do not support our assistance and our help in this program, I would certainly feel that that was the time to abandon the Vietnamization program. But I do not have that feeling at all at the present time. I think this program will work.

Senator COOPER. I am not only saying whether we abandon the Vietnamization, but that we get out of Vietnam.

The CHAIRMAN. What would be the alternative?

Senator COOPER. I believe that we have been in there for 20 years. You said that early this morning. We have been in Vietnam since 1950, supplied funds, supplies, fighting, and we have given already too many lives and treasure and wounded men. It would seem to me that at a time—some people think now is the time—the administration has decided to try another course of action. I want to support that new policy because I think it is a better alternative than getting out now. But if in a reasonable amount of time, if this program does not work, I really do not see how we can continue another 5 or 10 years of involvement which in 20 years has not led the South Vietnamese people to defend themselves.

If the will had been there, I think it would have been shown long ago. I hope it will be shown now.

I would say if there comes a point when this program fails—if it does fail, I hope it will not—that I think we have done enough.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Cooper, I think under previous policy that war was Americanized and, as I said this morning, I would rather not get into the question of "Why Vietnam?" I would rather discuss the question "Why Vietnamization?" and in my testimony this morning, I tried to outline why we were going forward with the Vietnamization program.

Senator COOPER. There might come at last a debacle which we fear today similar to Dunkirk—

Secretary LAIRD. If that happens, then the Nixon doctrine as far as Asia is concerned, which he outlined in Guam, would not be a

possibility in the future. This is the first step, though, as far as Asia is concerned—to turn over the responsibility to the Asians themselves for this kind of activity in the future. I think it is most important that this Vietnamization program work as a first step toward implementing this doctrine which the President outlined at Guam.

CONTINUED EFFORTS FOR NEGOTIATION URGED

Senator COOPER. This is the last issue, and then I will turn it over to someone else.

The President stated in his speech two alternatives. One was withdrawal, immediate withdrawal. The other was the program which you have outlined more comprehensively than has been outlined, but I would assume you would continue to search for other possibilities and examine the other alternatives that exist.

I know Senator Symington is going to raise another possibility, so I will not invade on his thinking. I have always believed it is possible that a conclusion of the war by negotiations would be the best way to stop the fighting, to stop the killing, to stop the wounding.

I hope continued efforts will be made toward negotiations including urging the Soviets to join in initiatives and to renew the Geneva Conference. We should consider seriously—and consider now—alternatives which do not focus altogether upon one, immediate withdrawal, and, two, Vietnamization that might fail, could fail, and the continued fighting would go on.

I read your statement. You said our efforts had had no support either from Vietnam or others, and I assume you mean the Soviet Union, and that is what I think myself, that they have given us no help thus far. But I think it worthwhile in view of the fact we are beginning to talk of a change in policy, in view of the fact they are having difficulties with China and they are beginning to talk with us on other questions. It is an area which might and should be searched out.

That is more on the State Department side, but you know all these factors, too, as well as the State Department.

Secretary LAIRD. I agree with you, Senator Cooper, and I hope that my strong support of Vietnamization does not lead anyone to believe that negotiation should not be kept in the forefront, because negotiations and success through negotiations, of course, is the best route, and certainly a negotiated settlement would be something that I would support.

But the reason we are going with the Vietnamization program is that we had to have another position to fall back on in case negotiations fail. And this was the only solution that I felt was a viable solution from the standpoint of the Department of Defense. That is why I recommended it to the President.

Senator COOPER. As Abraham Lincoln said in his inaugural address, "I am loath to close, I am loath to close, but I will." We are loath to close. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

SELF-DETERMINATION AS JUSTIFICATION FOR U.S. INVOLVEMENT

Senator CHURCH. I could not help but reflect on the fact, when Senator Cooper put his questions to you, Mr. Secretary, concerning the necessity for land reform and political reform in South Vietnam, that I introduced a resolution in the Senate way back in 1963, calling upon the Saigon government to adopt urgent measures of land reform and political reform, as the basis for justifying continued American support. Our policy over there has been based for so many years upon delusions of one kind or another. Back in those days, we were told that we were fighting the war to hold back the tide of Communist aggression, to keep the Communist world within its present periphery, and for other reasons such as the sanctity of an American commitment, and our legal obligation under SEATO. So many different reasons have been put forward to justify the American involvement.

Now we come at the end of a long trail to the new emphasis placed upon self-determination for the people of South Vietnam.

I am certainly not opposed to self-determination. It is a good thing in itself if it can be obtained, but as I look at that map, it is just full of countries all around the world where the people have not obtained self-determination. Many of those countries are allies of ours, which we support with vast sums of money and military assistance. It is amazing. Just look at the map—Burma, Arabia, most of Africa, Greece, Spain, nearly all of the countries of Latin America today.

We have not assumed the responsibility—nor should we—of guaranteeing self-determination to all the people of the world. We usually operate on the pragmatic and realistic assumption that this is not our duty. It is hard enough for us to maintain self-determination for our own people. Yet, in Vietnam this enormous outpouring of our blood and treasure continues for the sake of obtaining self-determination for these people.

Nevertheless, I do want to say that I find your position on Vietnam more sensible and realistic than the policies of the past, and as an aside, before I commence my questioning, I also want to congratulate you for the cuts you have made so far, as Secretary of Defense, in trying to bring the overall military budget down to manageable size. I commend you for that.

NUMERICAL BREAKDOWN OF VIETNAM ARMED FORCES

I would like to commence my questions by going back—if you have the figures available—to the present size of the Armed Forces in South Vietnam, including the regional, popular and regular. You gave us the total this morning but you were not able to give us a breakdown. I would appreciate having that breakdown.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not have the breakdown with me by support and other functions.

Senator CHURCH. I see.

Secretary LAIRD. I did not go back to my office. I went to this luncheon for the Prime Minister of Japan and I did not bring the breakdown over with me. I gave you the total force level figures this morning and I do not have the breakdown.

Senator CHURCH. You do not have the totals?

Secretary LAIRD. I can get it now.

Senator CHURCH. For regular and for popular forces.

Secretary LAIRD. We will get it now. I just did not bring it.

Senator CHURCH. May I ask you this about the totals, Mr. Secretary? That figure which you gave us this morning, I believe was 1,103,300.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Does that figure represent the total of combat troops or does that figure also include the supply and administrative?

Secretary LAIRD. That includes all forces, including logistic forces and paramilitary forces.

Senator CHURCH. So that figure, then, would compare to the totals you gave us for the enemy forces in South Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. That is correct. I can give you those figures off the top of my head but then I would have to correct them a little bit.

FIRST PHASE OF WITHDRAWAL PLAN

Senator CHURCH. I am glad to wait for them. That is all right.

As I understood the President in his address on November 3, you contemplate the Vietnamization effort as taking place in two phases, the first phase having to do with the complete withdrawal of U.S. combat ground forces. You have since made it clear that this would exempt security for our own remaining force in Vietnam. But this, the first phase would transfer the burden to the South Vietnamese in the field, while retaining a support force of American troops in Vietnam.

Now, you have also told us why you do not want to give us specifics as to the timetable, but you have assured us that it is within a reasonable period.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes.

Senator CHURCH. Can you give us an idea of how many American troops would be involved in the first phase, that is, in order to complete the first phase, what approximately would be the number of troops to be replaced before you would feel that the first phase of this plan has been fully executed?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, this is something that is very much a part of the plan. If I start getting into these figures with you right now, I am not just sure how far we want to go on that, Senator. But as far as the combat responsibility is concerned, we would have to get below a figure of [deleted] if that answers your question.

Senator CHURCH. I will not press you any further, because the reason I ask the question is to get some notion as to how large an American force would remain in Vietnam after the first phase of the plan is completed. And you have given me a sufficient idea.

COST OF MAINTAINING RESIDUAL FORCE IN VIETNAM

Now, my next question is, what would be the cost of maintaining that residual force in Vietnam, based upon your present knowledge of how much it costs to maintain our forces there at the present time? Can you give us some idea of what the continuing cost of this program would be during the second phase, if it moves along as you hope?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes. The current cost as you know, Senator, of our commitment in Vietnam for this fiscal year, and these are total costs, will be \$23.2 billion. I am giving you total costs and not incremental costs. As you know, I used to have arguments with former Secretary of Defense McNamara because he used incremental costs when he talked about the cost of the war and I am using total costs. There is a difference.

When you use total costs, you are including those activities that would continue even after the war comes to an end. For example, a tactical Air Force squadron, operating in Vietnam would be in existence after the war. When you use total costs of the war, I include all of the squadron costs, their operation, maintenance, as well as their ammunition. If you use incremental costs you only include the ammunition.

So the total cost at the present time, not the incremental cost, is \$23.2 billion.

The expenditure rate for total costs on an annual basis, on July 1, 1970, will be about \$17.5 billion, although the yearly rate will be \$23.2 billion.

Senator CHURCH. Senator Symington wants to ask a question.

Senator SYMINGTON. In that \$17.5 billion the figure of what you spend only on Vietnam. You keep the unit somewhere else if—

Secretary LAIRD. Yes. You see—

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to be sure. That is a good question Senator Church asked.

Secretary LAIRD. In the \$23.2 billion we include, for example, the cost of the Marine division that is now on Okinawa. We still will be paying for that Marine division on Okinawa but we will no longer include it in the cost of the war. That Marine division came from Okinawa before it went to Vietnam, and that is the point. I am just trying not to mislead anybody, because you still will have the cost of that Marine division, but it will be in another section of the budget.

Senator SYMINGTON. Does the \$17.5 include the Marine division?

Secretary LAIRD. It does not, because the Marine division was only funded in Vietnam costs for 6 months. So 6 months of the Marine division is in the \$23.2 billion but when you get into the annual spending rate as of July 1, the Marine division will not be in there. That is true with several tactical air squadrons. In addition, for example, we have scaled down the use of the B-52 bombers. We still will have those B-52 bombers in our inventory, but their cost will not be attributed to Vietnam costs. They still will be charged to the Department of Defense, of course, because they are part of our total overall strategic force.

And so, if I gave you incremental costs of the war in Vietnam, then none of these things would be included, and you could get your war cost down very low. But I am giving you total expenditures that can be actually attributed to the war.

Now, as we progress on a total cost basis as far as the war in Vietnam is concerned, we can substantially reduce these figures each year. We could bring the costs of the war down, for example, with a force level of [deleted] or below. The total annual cost could be reduced by another [deleted] billion or more.

Now, I would like to make it clear that there are certain other increases in costs that would be attributed to military assistance. I am giving you the total cost. This is not a saving, however, for the Department of Defense budget. I want that understood, because many people think that when the war costs go down, that every bit of that money means a saving in the budget. We are not going to abandon our F-4 squadrons. We are going to maintain those. We are also included in war costs. We are going to maintain some of the forces which are in Vietnam, such as the Marine division I used as an example, and that will be in the regular Department of Defense budget.

Senator CHURCH. Yes. Well, I think it is clear that all of the reductions in cost would not automatically become savings.

NIXON DOCTRINE FOR ASIA

A few minutes ago, Mr. Secretary, you said that you hoped that Vietnamization would work because, in a way, it was a testing of the Nixon doctrine for Asia. I would take issue with that, as one who is inclined to support the new Nixon doctrine for Asia. I think it is a far more realistic policy than the one we have been following in Asia. But I do not agree with you that Vietnam is a good testing ground for it, because in Vietnam we did Americanize the war. We took charge of the fighting and we moved in so massively that we inevitably reduced the Saigon Government to a condition of total dependency upon us. Therefore, the circumstances in Vietnam in which you now attempt your Vietnamization, which is an effort to turn the war back to the Vietnamese, hardly represent an ideal place to test out the validity of the Nixon doctrine. The doctrine is much wider in its scope. And I should think Vietnam would be the hardest place of all to determine whether or not the doctrine has efficacy.

What I am saying, I suppose, Mr. Secretary, is that even if Vietnamization fails in Vietnam, under the special circumstances of the case, it ought not to be concluded that the Nixon doctrine, as such, should be abandoned elsewhere in Asia.

Senator MCGEE. If it works there, it works anywhere.

Senator CHURCH. The opposite of the coin, I agree, is what Senator McGee says. If it works in Vietnam, it will work anywhere.

Secretary LAIRD. I understand what you are saying, Vietnamization is the first step toward implementing this new Asian policy, and I do not believe that the Nixon doctrine would be a credible doctrine if we fail in Vietnam in this new program.

Senator CHURCH. Well, of course, that is a bridge we will have to cross if and when we get to it.

Secretary LAIRD. I appreciate your help, though, and I know you are trying to be helpful there.

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Secretary LAIRD. Maybe I am overstating the case. I do not think I am. I believe that we must be successful with this program.

Senator CASE. Off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Secretary LAIRD. I think this program of Vietnamization recognizes our obligation to our allies in South Vietnam but it recognizes

what we will do to support them in a much different way than the policy we followed for the past few years. I would doubt if this new policy toward Asia could be successful if we walked away from Vietnam at this time.

Senator CHURCH. Well, that is still another proposition. My only point was that if Vietnamization fails in Vietnam, I hope that the Nixon doctrine will not be abandoned by the administration. I think that, in the light of past experience there is plenty of reason for many of us to doubt that Vietnamization is going to work in Vietnam. Yet the war there stems from its own peculiar roots. Internal conditions there are unlike those in other Asian countries, even neighboring countries, and it does not necessarily follow that what happens in Vietnam will inevitably happen elsewhere in Asia.

In other words, I do not think these countries are so many dominoes, all alike, and destined to fall if one falls.

SETTING SCHEDULES FOR WITHDRAWAL PROGRAM

But getting back to Senator Case's point, Mr. Secretary, when you were answering Senator Case's questions earlier today, you seemed to imply that we intended, that is to say, the administration intended to adhere to the schedule it had set and [deleted] we intended to proceed on our schedule. In other words, that we [deleted] had settled upon a reasonable schedule and we expected them to meet it.

Secretary LAIRD. I would like to make clear that they are meeting those schedules.

Senator CHURCH. Yes, you said you felt they were but [deleted] we nevertheless had set certain deadlines and that these would be controlling.

Secretary LAIRD. I want to make clear that these programs are not set unilaterally by the United States. We have worked this modernization program out in cooperation with the Joint General Staff of the South Vietnamese Armed Forces, and these goals have been established on a reasonable basis, and we are ahead of the program as of today. I have confidence that these goals will be met.

Now, I was not trying to hedge my answer this morning but I do want to make it clear that Hanoi has some influence on this.

Senator CHURCH. I understand that. But leaving aside Hanoi for the moment—

Senator CASE. Let us leave Hanoi out of it.

PERFORMANCE OF VIETNAMESE FORCES

Senator CHURCH. Leaving Hanoi out of it for a moment, assume Hanoi does not accelerate the war and create a new problem for us, I am really more concerned that when it comes to a testing under fire, the South Vietnamese forces will not perform better in the future than they have in the past, and if that should happen, what then do we do? I mean, in your response to Senator Gore you seemed to say that the Vietnamization was not a unilateral withdrawal because it was based upon replacing the Vietnamese forces as they proved themselves adequate to take our place in the field. But what if that does not happen? If that does not happen, what is the contingency plan?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, first, I want to say it is happening. This idea of—

Senator CHURCH. Well, it has happened so far, but we have withdrawn only about 50,000 troops—

Secretary LAIRD. Assuming that it is not going to happen, I just cannot accept that assumption. I am confident that the Vietnamese can take over this responsibility. It is their responsibility and I am confident that they can take it over. I think that they could have taken it over much sooner if in the past the primary responsibility for the combat mission had not been assigned to the American ground forces.

Now, this idea that the South Vietnamese cannot fight, I just do not agree with that premise—

Senator CHURCH. Very well, Mr. Secretary—

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). Because in every engagement that they have had where we have watched them and given them the responsibility, they have been successful.

Now, I do not want to leave this committee with the impression that they are going to win every battle.

Senator CHURCH. I understand.

Secretary LAIRD. And I hope that this committee and Members of the Senate and of the Congress will not be surprised if they lose a battle or two, because they will. But they have been winning every major conflict that they have been in in the last few months.

Now, just this past week they had two fairly major operations, and although I am not one to get into comparison of casualty figures, but they fought and they, of course, lost some lives. They lost 11. But the casualties on the other side were almost 300. And they have delivered in each of these instances where they have had the full responsibility, and this idea that they cannot fight is not the proper way to start in building a Vietnamization program.

WILL WE CONTINUE IN VIETNAM?

Senator CHURCH. I understand that, Mr. Secretary, and I hope you are right in your protection and anticipation. Quite possibly you will be proven right. But so far we have withdrawn only about 50,000 troops and it is at least possible, I think you will have to concede, that after we have withdrawn 250,000, the South Vietnamese Army might not perform as we had hoped and anticipated. That is certainly a possibility, and, in the light of past history, one that is not outlandish.

In that event, are we just going to stay there and continue to fight their war for them as we have done for the past 5 years?

Secretary LAIRD. No. I think they will understand that the responsibility is theirs, if you will allow me to make a personal observation. Although I said we were not going to go back and deal with the past here today, that I would rather explain this program of Vietnamization rather than discuss why we are in Vietnam, let me say this: I think one of the mistakes we made was putting the modern equipment in the hands of Americans first and not in the hands of the South Vietnamese.

General Wheeler, when he testified before the Appropriations Committee on Monday of this week—and I hope you will look at that rec-

ord—made a very good point out of that in answer to questions of why this had not been done before. In his testimony, he said the reason was that it was more important to give the equipment to the Americans than it was to the South Vietnamese.

Now, that is true if you are always going to be there, but under this program, we are going in a little different direction. I believe that we can be successful if we make everyone realize that this is a serious business and that we mean business as far as Vietnamization is concerned.

MAKING IT PLAIN THAT AMERICANS NOT IN VIETNAM FOREVER

Senator CHURCH. I agree with that. In fact, my own personal opinion is that the success of Vietnamization may very well depend upon our making it clear to Saigon that there is a day coming when they can no longer depend upon American forces.

Senator CASE. May I say, if the Senator will permit me, this is shared by several other people around this table, including myself.

Secretary LAIRD. I think the South Vietnamese understand that, too.

Senator CHURCH. I am wondering if the President has made it very plain to South Vietnam, to the Government, that if they do not develop the capacity you think they will, that they cannot—there comes a time when our forces are moving out regardless?

Secretary LAIRD. I am sure that the South Vietnamese are aware of this time factor.

Senator CHURCH. Very well.

VIETNAMIZATION DOES NOT INCLUDE GIVING U.S. FORCES TO VIETNAM GENERALS

Mr. Secretary, does Vietnamization include a plan at any time to give command of the U.S. forces to a South Vietnamese general?

Secretary LAIRD. I am sorry. I did not hear the question; I was looking for these important figures. I have the breakdown of these troops you asked for but I do want to get the support logistics.

Senator CHURCH. I do want to get the figures today.

In light of the contingency plan with Thailand I ask this question: Does your plan for Vietnamization of the war in Vietnam include, at any point, the giving of U.S. forces to the overall command of a Vietnamese general?

Secretary LAIRD. You mean American forces?

Senator CHURCH. American forces.

Secretary LAIRD. No.

LOWER RATE OF ENEMY ACTIVITY

Senator CHURCH. Just two more questions and I am through.

You have mentioned the lowered rate of enemy activity in the last few months. Can you tell us to what you attribute this?

Secretary LAIRD. I really am not sure. I am not sure what the major reason is for the lower level of enemy activity. We have had a lower rate of infiltration. I think it should be pointed out that we have had—the President pointed this out—a very low level of infiltration until recently and now the rate of infiltration has gone up [deleted]. And

this certainly causes us concern. But I am not prepared to evaluate and give you an adequate response to that question.

LEAVING A FORCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN VIETNAM

Senator CHURCH. One final question, Mr. Secretary. You mentioned earlier in your testimony that if your plans work out as you contemplate, there will be residual forces of American troops in South Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. I am sorry we used that term "residual." It is a term, you know, that is used in military planning and also is used in the budget document. What I would like to refer to, if we could—maybe we cannot change the vernacular of military planners—but if we could use the term transitional force, and then perhaps a training force. Residual force gets us back into what some people refer to as the force in Korea and the force in Europe and—

Senator CHURCH. That is the point I want to get at.

Secretary LAIRD. Then I think it is misleading.

Senator MCGEE. Still easier than precipitate.

Secretary LAIRD. Yes; much easier for me.

Senator CHURCH. That is the point I want to get at. You are not contemplating leaving an American force in South Vietnam that would be comparable in any way, to the military forces we have left in South Korea and in Europe?

Secretary LAIRD. Not in the Vietnamization plan.

Senator CHURCH. Good. That is all the questioning I have, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I join those who have commended you for things you have accomplished. You have made more progress than any Secretary in reducing the military budget. Also you forced the draft issue, to the point where we have now passed something that is an improvement. I want to also thank you for the cooperation the Defense Department has given us in the subcommittee hearings we have had about commitments.

U.S. SHIELD AGAINST NUCLEAR THREAT

I would run through some questions against your statement specifically, if I may.

At the beginning of your statement you say, "We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of the nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider critical to our security." Does that mean we would, if necessary, go to nuclear war with China or the Soviet Union in order to defend Vietnam if it were attacked?

Secretary LAIRD. If it were attacked with nuclear weapons? Is that what you are referring to?

Senator SYMINGTON. You say we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power—

Secretary LAIRD. Well, this is—we provide the shield so that—

Senator SYMINGTON. Let me put it this way, to be sure.

Secretary LAIRD (continuing). So that nuclear weapons will not be used.

Senator SYMINGTON. We would defend South Vietnam against Red China or the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union or Red China attacked Vietnam. If necessary we would go to nuclear weapons; would we not? You used the word nuclear. I want to understand what you meant.

Secretary LAIRD. [Deleted.] As far as Asia is concerned, and this is one of the things that, of course, we must discuss with the Japanese; they are enjoying the protection of the nuclear umbrella which we provide to Asia. This is the thing that I think has been very important to them and to that country as well as to our NATO friends. And I think it has had a considerable effect upon the nonuse of nuclear weapons all over the world.

TOTAL COST OF VIETNAMIZING

Senator SYMINGTON. Some years ago I became interested in preserving the value of the dollar along with the danger arising as a result of the heavy money we were spending out of the country. I have had sort of a hobby about the balance of payments and am convinced the major reason for this unfavorable situation is the money we spend outside the United States.

You remember, when you took this position, I am sure you took it with reservations because of the great potential of your future political career, I said you were going to have trouble because you were a hawk but also a hard money man. At that time I was more of a hawk myself.

What is the total cost of Vietnamizing? I have seen a figure in the Armed Services Committee of around \$6 billion for Vietnamizing the South Vietnamese; that is, giving them the equipment and letting them fight with it.

Secretary LAIRD. The total cost could be in that general area.

Senator SYMINGTON. Around \$6 billion?

Secretary LAIRD. The total amount that we plan to spend in this fiscal year in that area of Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam, for assistance to their forces, is \$2.3 billion. As you know, we have a limitation that was put in the authorization bill for procurement for a maximum limitation of \$2.5 billion expenditure in that area. If we move forward with the Vietnamization program as rapidly as I hope we can, I would hope that the Senate next year would not place this same limitation on the authorization bill.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was looking up the AID figures and they run high, what we do about a [deleted], \$2 billion to the Philippines, over \$5 billion to Taiwan and over \$7 billion to Korea. I am just talking aid, and wanted to check with you the figure of some \$6 billion for Vietnamization.

Secretary LAIRD. The aid will go up in Vietnamization.

Senator SYMINGTON. I understand.

Secretary LAIRD. That is why that authorization limitation that the Senate has placed on the procurement bill, I would hope, would be changed next year, because we may make the \$2.5 billion mark by the end of this year. We are spending now, for a program of \$2.3 billion. This is one of the things that bothers me about Vietnamization. We are going to have to have some change in that figure in fiscal year 1971.

But compared to our expenditures back over the last 4 years, as far as American forces are concerned, I hope that the Senate and the House will realize that this is a wise and prudent investment.

BUDGETING OF FREEDOM FIGHTER

Senator SYMINGTON. At one time this committee felt in debate on the floor that it had jurisdiction over foreign military aid; also that it would be unwise to build the so-called Freedom Fighter. When it was put in the military authorization bill by the House and agreed to, and passed in the conference [deleted]. It was specifically said by a proponent of the Freedom Fighter that it was being designed for Vietnam.

Could I ask two questions? First, was this done with the approval of the Department of Defense?

Secretary LAIRD. We did not ask for the Freedom Fighter in the original budget or procurement request which we submitted to the Congress. The Johnson budget and procurement request did not have it in. Our amended budget request did not have it in.

This matter became a very hot issue in the House of Representatives. It was approved in the first supplemental bill without the support of the Department of Defense. It came over here and as you know, the first supplemental bill was not even acted into law and it was dropped.

Then it was in the procurement bill as it came over from the House.

We were asked to comment on this, and I sent a letter not only to the chairman of the Senate and the House Armed Services Committees but also to the chairman of this committee and the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in which I pointed out that we had not made a final decision on this particular matter. I added that if a decision was made, we would look at this very carefully, and I did not object to having the option available to go forward with a program like this.

There may be some merit in having a low cost fighter available in Southeast Asia and in other sections of the world.

Now, I want to make it very clear that I am not wedded to the fighter that seemed to be talked of in the House of Representatives, the F5-21. I believe that we should look at other options that are available, too, like a stripped down version of the F-4, to get a fighter that is in the cost range of from \$1.7 to \$2.2 million.

These modern fighter planes that we are manufacturing and have on our drawing boards now are very costly. Some of these countries feel they should have a capability to compete with the MIG-21 and some of the other fighters that are being supplied under military assistance programs of the Soviet Union. I do not believe they can afford to buy, or we can afford to help them finance fighter aircraft in the neighborhood of \$6 to \$7 million apiece.

So this is something that I think we undoubtedly should look into, but I want this Committee to know that a final decision has not been made.

Senator SYMINGTON. I wanted to know your position. There was quite a little discussion between the two Houses.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for a comment?

Senator SYMINGTON. I imagine it will come up again in appropriations.

Secretary LAIRD. Perhaps it would be well if we could put in the letter I wrote to Senator Fulbright. I did not want to get into this dispute. I tried to stay out of this dispute because it really is a jurisdictional dispute between the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees of both Houses. And if I have learned one thing, having been elected to nine terms in the House of Representatives, and moving into the executive branch, it is to try to stay clear of that kind of controversy. I think that is something that should be resolved up here and not in the Department of Defense.

Senator SYMINGTON. That answers my question.

AUTHORIZATION OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT FOR VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with that, if the Senator will allow me, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee stated on the floor in open session, that it was his understanding that the authorization and the appropriation in that bill related to planes only for Vietnam, and that for any place else it would have to be authorized by this committee in the foreign aid bill. Do you understand it that way, too?

Secretary LAIRD. The situation, Mr. Chairman, is that the money in this authorization bill is to develop a Freedom Fighter.

Now, the problem is, if we develop a Freedom Fighter, I am sure you realize that there might be places other than Vietnam that a low cost fighter plane could be used.

The funds for purchasing it, or financing it, if it were used in any place other than Vietnam. I would certainly assume would have to come before your committee.

Senator SYMINGTON. That was in accordance with the discussion.

The CHAIRMAN. The discussion was that you would develop a plane that was not intended for your own use. You have never done this before, that is, deliberately develop a plan that your own armed forces had no use for. You have never done that before, have you?

Secretary LAIRD. Not to my knowledge. I do not know of any plane that has been developed solely for the military assistance program.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not, either, and it is a very peculiar development due to the enthusiasm of the chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services.

Senator CASE. An interesting suggestion, though.

Senator SYMINGTON. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

LEVEL OF COMBAT CAPABILITY SOUGHT FOR VIETNAMESE

Senator SYMINGTON. Later in your statement you say the objective we set was attainment by the South Vietnamese of a level of combat capability which would be adequate to defeat not only the Vietcong but the invading North Vietnamese forces as well.

I know you will agree that is a large order. There are two things that worry me, the North Vietnamese, back in the early 1960's were doing pretty well against the South Vietnamese, even though we were giving a lot of aid to the South Vietnamese, and the idea we are going

to make this little country able to defend itself against the North Vietnamese, including the Vietcong seems to me to be a large order. Now, I would like to place in the record a statement made by Secretary Dulles in the Mutual Security Act testimony before this committee of 1954; "to try to develop more intensively the local indigenous forces and that is what called for the increase in expenditure. That plan was worked out by the French and put up to us by the military people in September of last year." It continues:

They judge that it was a good plan for the training and equipping of the native forces who should carry the burden of the ground fighting in that part of the world. The program has gone ahead although it is somewhat shaky at the present time because of the morale of the local people. The native people are somewhat disturbed by events and as to uncertainty as to whether the French would continue their efforts there.

I make that part of the record because this Vietnamization—the concept—worries me.

STRENGTHENING ECONOMY OF SOUTH VIETNAM

Then you say: "The economy of South Vietnam is one of the areas which needed to be strengthened."

When I was once out there there was a man in our embassy who they told me with some pleasure sort of stood Secretary McNamara on his ear because he knew his figures and facts, and apparently the argument at that time with Ky was that he did not want to follow the concept of our Federal Reserve and have his government buy his government's securities. He just wanted dollars. I am oversimplifying it, but that was the basic thrust.

Do you think we can really adjust their economy. If we do, will it not cost a great deal of additional money to set their economy straight?

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Symington, this is one of the very difficult problems that we face and one that has not been solved. The Council of Economic Advisers sent a group out there within the last few months. We also have another group going out there within the next few weeks. And I wish that I could report to you that this problem did not exist, but it does.

Senator SYMINGTON. I knew you would be frank and wanted to bring it out because it is obviously one of the worries we have to face in any plan for Vietnamization.

Secretary LAIRD. It is.

GROWTH OF VIETNAMESE ARMY

Senator SYMINGTON. You also say: "The size of the South Vietnamese military establishment continues to grow."

For the record, would you supply for the years 1961 to date, year by year, what the South Vietnamese Army has been in numbers?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes; I will.

(The following information was later supplied:)

Army of Vietnam growth, 1961-69

[In thousands]

Dec. 30, 1960	138.2	Dec. 30, 1965	267.9
Dec. 30, 1961	163.8	Dec. 30, 1966	284.0
Dec. 30, 1962	197.8	Dec. 30, 1967	302.8
Dec. 30, 1963	192.1	Dec. 30, 1968	380.3
Dec. 30, 1969	220.4	Sept. 30, 1969	[Deleted]

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

U.S. AND OTHER COUNTRY MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID GIVEN TO
SOUTH VIETNAM

Would you also supply for the record, by years, the economic and military aid segregated in those two categories we have given the South Vietnamese?

Secretary LAIRD. I will supply it at this point.

Senator SYMINGTON. Also information about any economic or military aid given them by any other country, including the SEATO signatories?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes; I will.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

(The following information was later supplied:)

ECONOMIC AND MILITARY AID TO RVN

[Estimates in millions of dollars]

United States	Economic aid	Military aid	United States	Economic aid	Military aid
Fiscal year—					
1961	146.6	65.0	1966	745.1	861.0
1962	146.0	144.0	1967	656.8	1,203.5
1963	188.6	185.6	1968	558.1	1,054.5
1964	220.5	182.5	1969	430.7	1,892.4
1965	273.2	269.0	1970	614.4	1,578.3

During the period July 1964–December 1968, over thirty nations, exclusive of U.S., contributed material, technical, and humanitarian assistance to the people of Vietnam valued at an estimated total of \$94 million. Of this, approximately \$31.1 million was for medical assistance and about \$22.5 million was for refugee, social welfare, relief and rehabilitation programs. Of the \$94 million, \$4 million was contributed by voluntary agencies in 20 countries. In response to the 1968 Tet Offensive, about \$24 million in goods and technical services were contributed for urban victims.

BURDEN OF FIGHTING IN DELTA

Senator SYMINGTON. I am worried about your statement where you say:

I believe it is significant that the Vietnamese have carried the primary burden of fighting to free the Delta and the U.S. is now in a support role in this important area.

Has it not been pretty much true, Mr. Secretary, that we have let the South Vietnamese handle the Delta? It certainly was true when I was there in 1965, 1966, and 1967. We had very few combat troops down there. It was turned over to the South Vietnamese.

Secretary LAIRD. The South Vietnamese had not made great strides as far as the delta was concerned, but up until a few months ago we had the 9th Division operating in the delta area, operating with the South Vietnamese.

Senator SYMINGTON. When did that division go into the delta?

Secretary LAIRD. The 9th Division was in the Delta for some time. I will give you the exact date that it went in, but the 9th Division has now been withdrawn.

(The following information was later supplied:)

9TH INFANTRY DIVISION IN DELTA

Elements of the 9th Infantry Division established the first U.S. base in the Mekong Delta in Dinh Tuong Province in mid-January 1967.

Senator SYMINGTON. When I was there, a high ranking general told me it had gotten to the point where rice coming into Saigon from the Delta was taxed more by the South Vietnamese than by the Vietcong—paying graft so as to move it on. He mentioned this in 1966 as evidence of the fact we had little real control of the Delta.

The last time I was in said Delta was the fall of 1967, when we started that Navy riverine operation in conjunction with the Army.

Secretary LAIRD. The riverine force has been one of the most successful operations in the Delta and that has been Vietnamized almost completely and the Vietnamese program will be completed as I said this morning, in June, but the Navy activity and Marine activity in the Delta have been substantial during the last 12-month period. I would like to supply for the record if I could, Senator, the amount of rice moving into the Saigon market now from the Delta as compared with a year ago and 2 years ago.

Senator SYMINGTON. I would appreciate it.

(The following information was later supplied:)

DELIVERIES OF RICE FROM DELTA TO SAIGON

Deliveries of rice from the Delta to Saigon totaled 180,000 metric tons during the first half of 1969 compared with 161,000 and 116,000 tons during the comparable periods of 1967 and 1968. It is anticipated that deliveries for 1969 will total more than the 282,000 and 310,000 tons delivered during 1967 and 1968.

ESTIMATED TIME SCHEDULE AND NUMBER OF TROOPS LEFT IN VIETNAM

Senator Cooper asked some questions about the time angle and I know it is not fair to try to pin you down; you say in your statement:

There is an obvious difference between a massive American force in Vietnam until the North Vietnamese withdraw and reducing the size of the American force as South Vietnamese forces assume greater responsibility for the conduct of the war.

Do you think you could give any estimate or even guesstimate, as to how many troops will be left there? I was in the executive branch when the Secretary of State said the maximum length of time the troops would remain in Germany was 18 months. They have been there over a quarter of a century. It is 19 years last June, we have been in Korea. Is there any time schedule you can tell us about?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, that is what this plan is all about, Senator. We do plan in the Vietnamization program to turn over the combat responsibilities to the South Vietnamese and then remove the transitional force of the United States from Vietnam. That is part of our plan.

Now, when you get into an estimate of what a training mission might be in the event we are not successful in negotiations, I would rather not make that estimate.

At a press conference the other day I used the statements made by former Secretaries of State in regard to our forces in Korea and also our forces in Europe, and I would not want to get into that kind of a situation. But I can assure you that the force level would be substantially below that because I do not—

Senator SYMINGTON. Below what?

Secretary LAIRD. Below the forces that are left in Europe and Korea because I do not look to those forces as training forces at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. We have 50,000 roughly, in Korea. You say substantially below 50,000?

Secretary LAIRD. The training mission? Absolutely.

CAPTAIN MAI

Senator SYMINGTON. I want to get a feel of it. Another thing that worries me about your Vietnamization plan is that, when out there in 1965, somebody alerted me to two men. One of them, your head general up around Da Nang, told me was about the bravest man they had. I spent a rainy afternoon up around Da Nang with him.

Then there was a man who worked down at Vung Tau. He ran the pacification school at that time. [Deleted.] That was in 1965.

[Deleted.]

He was the head man at the Vung Tau School, educating them in pacification and democracy.

Senator MGEE. Captain Mai. He got involved in one of those political factions over there.

Senator SYMINGTON. He was highly thought of.

He came from the North, came from Hanoi. First he fled to Hanoi, then he came back from there and they were satisfied he was on the level, but he became also very politically—

Secretary LAIRD. I will try to check him out.

(The following information was later supplied:)

CAPTAIN MAI

Major Le Xuan Mai—then Captain Mai—was assigned to the RD cadre training program from its inception in 1964 until June 1966. As Director of Training at Vung Tau he was responsible for motivational content of the training given the cadre. After the entire cadre program, and the training school as well, came under the direction of the Ministry of Revolutionary Development in February 1966, when it became an official GVN activity. Mai was sent to II Corps as the psychological warfare advisor to the Republic of Korea forces.

Senator SYMINGTON. The reason I bring that up is this Vietnamization at such gigantic expense—and it is never as little as you originally estimate. So it is bound to be a lot more than \$6 billion, and we have so many things around this country that are beginning to sag because there is not enough money. I hope you would consider the enclave theory of General Gavin, whereby you could say to people who felt they were going to be killed if we left to come here; we will protect you. Put the enclave next to the water around a place like

Cam Ranh Bay or Vung Tau. Saigon might not be right because it is up the river.

PESSIMISM VOICED ABOUT VIETNAMIZATION POLICY

I want to tell you although I know I may be wrong, but I believe it is very doubtful that the policy of Vietnamization would work under the Thieu government. We will have to face what more to do. Based on all I could find out in my six trips out there in the 1960's, this South Vietnamese Government cannot defend itself regardless of how many arms we give them, because they do not represent a majority of the people of South Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator, you realize, though, that most of these costs, or a large portion of these costs, for the equipment that we have turned over to the South Vietnamese has already been funded. I would just like to comment that I am not as pessimistic as you are. I am optimistic about the Vietnamization program, and if there is a better program that we can follow, and the Congress has such a program, or if anyone else has a better program, we want to hear it.

Senator SYMINGTON. I suggest the enclave theory—not my original idea. Maybe we could have reached a conclusion in the past without such a theory, but the way this war has been handled is a sad and terrible business. Many of my friends were killed bombing targets they knew were useless and we knew were useless. We were far from candid, in the previous administration, in the information we gave the people as to what was going on.

We did not tell the truth to the American people. I think now that the enclave theory is the best that is left, and would have more results than Vietnamization.

You say, in your statement: "And I can assure you that we expect no heel dragging in the future."

We may not expect any heel dragging in the future, but what are we going to do if we have it; and we have always had it before.

There never has been anyplace where there wasn't some heel dragging when you have as much political turmoil inside of a country as you have in Vietnam. I agree with Senator Church that this is much better than what has been presented to us in recent years, but the way you pin everything on and to Vietnamization, without any alternative, worries me. What happens if Vietnamization does not work?

SUCCESS OF VIETNAMIZATION DEPENDS ON SOUTH VIETNAMESE

Previously you said, "Vietnamization does not make us captives of Saigon."

That is in an earlier part of your statement. But then later you say: "Let me emphasize that the success of Vietnamization depends primarily on the South Vietnamese."

To me those two are not consistent. If it does depend primarily on the South Vietnamese, at least to some extent, it does make us captives of Saigon.

Would you comment?

Secretary LAIRD. If they understand it depends upon them, and I think they understand that this depends upon them.

Senator GORE. And we understand that it depends on them.

Secretary LAIRD. And if we understand that it depends upon them. I do not think it makes—

Senator GORE. So therefore we depend on it.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not believe that makes us captives of the South Vietnamese.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, semantically I would agree with you, but I believe there is great danger here, because we have seen so many plans, policies, procedures, and programs that have failed out there; and in my opinion the reason they have failed is because we have run into nationalism rather than communism.

I worry that in this plan may be the problem of what do we do if the people over whom we have no control fail after we give them the equipment. That has happened many times before.

MILITARY CONDUCT OF VIETNAM WAR

I will always remember back in 1953, when General Van Fleet came back and protested the way we were handling the Korean War, the controlled way. He said then that before he left the Army his great love had been football and he went to length to describe how he coached in various towns and cities. He said, "I learned in football never to put an American boy in any game you don't want him to win." This Vietnam war is not a war that has been handled in accordance with the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

There is no winning in it from the standpoint of the military side—don't misunderstand me, I am no longer recommending any acceleration—but am trying to analyze why there is this growing restlessness and frustration.

Now one other point.

Secretary LAIRD. Senator Symington, could I make one comment?

Senator SYMINGTON. I wish you would, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary LAIRD. I know as a former Member it is probably better not to comment on some of these things, but I want to make it clear for this record that it is true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did take certain exceptions to the conduct of the war in Vietnam. But I want the record to be very clear that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accepting conditions as they are today, are supporting this program that I have outlined to this committee one hundred percent.

There is no dissent as far as the Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned in supporting this program.

Senator SYMINGTON. I was not talking about the present Joint Chiefs, but, for the record, would say that at least two members of the present Joint Chiefs have told me they would have liked to see the harbor of Haiphong taken out if we were going to continue to sacrifice Americans in Vietnam. I would guess that under oath any member of the Joint Chiefs would say if you are going to fight at all, you ought to fight to win, attack with everything you have, short of nuclear weapons, to reduce American casualties and try to achieve military victory as quickly as possible.

Why defend a hill like Hamburger Hill, sit on it, have all the casualties involved in defending it, and then a few days later abandon it? Why fight a war in a country where you fight their ground war, in a

climate and in a terrain our soldiers know little about, but in which the enemy have lived all their lives; on the ground instead of utilizing the qualitative advantages of American technology.

That is what many members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have told me over recent years and I believe if you pin them down today, they would say the same thing.

The recent book of Townsend Hoopes illustrates clearly the degree that purely military decisions, and tactical decisions at that, were made in the State Department and White House.

DOUBT EXPRESSED ABOUT POPULAR BASE OF THIEU-KY GOVERNMENT

I do not believe the Thieu-Ky government represents the people of South Vietnam, a majority of the people, and I have done my best to try to find out, on an objective basis. You have heavy political turnover in so many other countries to whom we have given aid, and put in our troops, telling them how to live, telling them what to do, merchandising our concept of democracy.

WORRY EXPRESSED ABOUT FUNDING VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM

It worries me terribly, the degree that we are counting on their being able to do the job based on history, my past experience, and the degree that you emphasize Vietnamization. For the first time we are in effect saying we are going to give all these billions to them to fight—and that is where we are going to sink our money.

Would you comment on this? My premise is that I am terribly worried as to what is happening to the American economy.

Secretary LAIRD. First, Senator, as far as the equipment is concerned, our major equipment costs have already been paid for in the Vietnamization program.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said funded. Does that mean the money and material has been appropriated?

Secretary LAIRD. The money has been appropriated and the material has been delivered.

We have been delivering the material at a rapid rate this year and we are doing very well as far as the equipment is concerned. The last of the M-16 rifles were funded in last year's budget. And we have moved forward on the equipment program.

Now, the training program and the leadership program are the most important but they are not the high-cost part of Vietnamization. They are the most important aspects of the Vietnamization program left for us to complete.

I would like to go back and perhaps live over the last 4 years but I do not think that is what we can do here today. We have to face up to where we are now and what we are going to do about the situation that we find ourselves in today. I believe that the program that I have outlined in this statement before this committee today is the soundest, most appropriate, the best-thought-out program as far as our country is concerned, to bring peace to Southeast Asia and to relieve the United States of the tremendous combat responsibility which it has accepted on the ground in Vietnam.

Senator SYMINGTON. Well, I appreciate that, Mr. Secretary. And I haven't the slightest doubt about your sincerity.

I do worry about the cost, lives first, and treasure. I know you must worry about the degree you are committed in other places around the world, with a limited number of Army divisions, and the cannibalization of equipment in Europe to maintain our Vietnam position, our commitments in Korea, and so forth. It must worry you.

Secretary LAIRD. It does because of the commitments we have and the type of resources we have to meet those commitments.

Senator SYMINGTON. Right. Let me thank you for the best statement about the Vietnam war I have seen since it was accelerated. I do also appreciate your courtesy and tolerance in answering my comments and questions.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Wyoming.

Senator MCGEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

COLLEGE CAMPUS DEMONSTRATIONS

I have been very much interested in many of the things said here today, Mr. Secretary. I was taken by the very interesting things said in regard to Mr. Symington's statements just now. A lot of us have been wrestling with this sort of thing for a very long while. I remember as a liberal in the fifties we were all torn up about a world that either had to be America first, isolationist, or rattle the nuclear saber. The liberals came up with an alternative, that was limited war if you had to have it—you could not afford a nuclear war—an undeclared war.

Well, we have been through this excruciating experience and I have to confess I have very serious doubts any more about whether a free society can wage a limited conflict successfully. I am not giving up on it yet. I think it still is our most reasonable option, given the other options that we have, but I am not sure how you do it, and I think it needs to be rethought by all of us. But I share with you a little bit of your impression of the veterans.

I am not playing oneupmanship here, but I just got back from my 221st college campus demonstration on Vietnam in 5 years and I think, in talking to the presidents of those colleges and the presidents of the student bodies and the dissident groups, that it is the explosiveness of the campus situation, of which Vietnam is only one part, that involves an increasing number of veterans.

I think we would make a mistake in oversimplifying it by thinking the veterans who did come back that something different had happened to them over there. I think they are going back into entirely different campus situations than what existed 2 or 3 years ago.

That is just another seat of the pants observation here but it seems to me that that is true. You find many different groups of veterans. There were a great many of them down here over the weekend for the Moratorium, large numbers of them. I had a son in there and he was impressed with the numbers of men in uniform who were there. I think that is great. They are speaking out.

I think the campus thing has just surfaced. I think if it had not been Vietnam it would have been surfacing other ways on campus. This is a

new generation with a new sense of explosiveness. But this is not necessarily relevant to our discussion today, only that your interesting dialogue triggered my comments.

PRaise FOR SECRETARY'S SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY

But I think what stands out most in your testimony and most in your prepared text and has not been stressed sufficiently is how much you have cut back or how much you have turned around. I think it is underscored by the word "responsibility." I really think you have put a great stress on doing what has to be done in as responsible a way as we can and I think sometimes you do not get enough credit for taking the consequences of the decisions you have to make now. I want to commend you on your sense of responsibility, if I may.

SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

The last point that I would suggest before my two or three questions here has to do with the exploration that was made yesterday with Secretary Rogers and today again with you by Senator Church and some of the others, too, in regard to this whole concept in Vietnam of self-determination. I am afraid that phrase has come to mean too many different things to too many different people. I think you put it best when you say we have to start where we are and where we are is 15 years after the Geneva agreements. And I just think we are totally unrealistic if we think we can unravel that or separate ourselves from it all of a sudden as though it had not happened.

It did happen, whatever the reasons at the time, and you can make a good case for it even so. It is unhappy in lots of ways as are the two Koreas or the two Berlins. Nobody intended any of them to become a solution to the problems of the world. They were ultimately frozen in that situation and I think that we have to start where we are and that means what are the consequences for us of these 15 years, for better or for worse. How can we get things turned around in a more hopeful way.

I do believe we ought to be focusing more realistically. We like to rake over the past, I do particularly. But I am afraid we get bogged down in it from time to time.

But self-determination—when you started with the two Vietnams, could you say that there was ever a time that you have come across in the records when our country advocated that we take North Vietnam or that we were going to take territory away from her or somebody else ought to divide it up or swallow her up in any way?

Secretary LAIRD. No. That has not—

Senator MCGEE. I have never been mindful of any such time as that, and I think that what we have stood for in one limited way here was that at least once you started with two Vietnams, that you were not going to produce a change by outside force of arms if you could avoid it and to my knowledge that has remained a fair constant. Is that a reasonable generalization or am I straining it too much?

Secretary LAIRD. I think that is a reasonable statement.

Senator MCGEE. I think this is really what we are talking about when we use the phrase self-determination in South Vietnam, that

given the fact of Geneva, that starting there, at least the South Vietnamese ought to hopefully wrestle with their own civil war problems, with their own Vietcong problems, free from the pressure of the outside effort to change it by force of arms, and I think this still remains a fairly definable basis.

I do not think it is the total basis. But I think it is a significant one and would clear some of the air in regard to self-determination.

AGGRESSION IS NOT NECESSARILY COMMUNISM

My colleagues on the committee are mindful of the other condition I would impose and that is that we abolish the use of the word "communism," because I think that louses up the dialog every time you mention the word "communism." It means too many things. You think of Tito, Mao, the Red Guard, you think of Ho. Too many different things, and they are not necessarily related.

I think it is only coincidental that what is basic there is happening and that is there have been acts of aggression but acts of aggression were not invented by the Communists. Methodists can commit acts of aggression, I suppose. It does not matter who it is but it is aggression, is it not, the attempt to change the territorial lines in significant areas by force, and it just happens in these instances currently to be Communists, and would you find it difficult to describe our interest or objectives if the word "communism" were left out? Would you find some synonym for it?

Secretary LAIRD. No. I do not think we can shut our eyes to the fact, though, that the outside support that is being given to the forces that are committing the aggression in South Vietnam happen to be primarily from the Soviet Union and China. At the present time, 80 percent, a little over 80 percent of all the support that is being given to the forces that are committing the aggression in South Vietnam happens to come from the Soviet Union, and this is just a fact of life.

Senator MCGEE. I understand that fully. I know the realities of the coincidence, but what I am trying to separate here, it seems to me it is important that we try to separate it, is some of the old notions we had many years ago about the international Communist conspiracy that was marching in unison, all carefully integrated and this was one of the frightening things about it.

The time has changed. It has failed in some places, has worked in some places, been defiant and independent in some places, and I think it tends to close off or freeze out too much of the dialog too readily when we get plunged into what the Communists are doing.

I think again if you talk about what Hanoi was doing and where they get their aid, they did not get it from the Soviets or Red China, you are still talking in realistic terms and I would not think it would cramp your style in trying to describe the problem as you see it.

This word has become almost a substitute for thinking or at least a substitute for speeches that all of us make and it does not help us get down to some of the central points and I think we have come very close here in this very long and protracted series of exchanges here today.

PROPOSALS FOR FREE ELECTIONS FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

The next question I want to ask you has to do with the proposals for some kind of meaningful elections, free elections. Have any of these proposals been advanced to the point where it would include elections in North Vietnam that you know of?

Secretary LAIRD. No. The proposals that have been discussed, with the South Vietnamese, that have been advocated and discussed in the meetings thus far, have dealt with elections in South Vietnam.

Senator MCGEE. These are not, in other words, total Vietnamese elections. These would just be in South Vietnam.

Secretary LAIRD. These are South Vietnamese elections.

Senator MCGEE. And this is what North Vietnam would like to be interested in talking about again, for the south.

Secretary LAIRD. For the south.

Senator MCGEE. This raises the specter of the contradiction that that itself connotes in regard to the proposition here. I agree with the points that you made earlier very well, that really in terms of the shape and form and the personnel of the Government of South Vietnam, that just cannot be our business. If we get into that, you have got to get into it in so many other places.

I do not think we have any right to get into that, any business to get into that. I think they have to resolve that and our one basic concern still ought to be to disentangle from all that mess, at least the outside impact of the North Vietnamese. The others, God knows, will be tough enough but I think that this still would be a definable and an explainable and a supportable kind of concept, that people would at least understand even if they disagreed with it, if they did not want to pursue that.

But suppose we were to have as a negotiable subject a provisional government in South Vietnam? Suppose we were to insist that that is what we have as a negotiable instrument. Would it be your judgment that a provisional government would be stronger than the present regime or not as strong as the present regime?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not believe that I can pass judgment on that question. I believe that that would be very difficult for us to assess.

REPRESENTATION OF POPULACE IS DIFFICULT

Senator MCGEE. Well, it does raise a question that bothers a good many of us in terms of who the people want, of course, and how you represent the people. In my few trips there, I think only four to Vietnam, it was impossible to find, it seems to me, any common political denominator and I do not know who would represent the people, who could speak for them in a country that is as fragmented, as lacking in history in terms of elections, an election experience, long victimized by colonial suppression as the whole peninsula of Indo-China. This has been a part of its bitter history. I do not know where you would find a candidate. There are a thousand candidates and they all speak out and when they are not the ones that are in, they speak out more vociferously.

Big Minh is a case in point. He is very popular while he is out but there are other significant generals and the old competitions.

Secretary LAIRD. I think many of the people of South Vietnam are more interested in their local rather than their national elections.

Senator MCGEE. I think you made that point this morning. And the same could be said in this country as to the Federal Government in Washington. But I think we do overreact sometimes in trying to project the American experience with self-government on comparable terms into an area like Vietnam and I would suppose it is going to take a long time, probably a few generations, to ever achieve our level. Ours is one of the most sophisticated of all and we are still working at it pretty hard.

I do not think we have a right to expect that in any case. I think that is their business. If they want to go Communist they ought to go Communist as long as they make that choice within and it is not crammed down their throats from the outside by force. At least that would be my view of it.

NATIONALISM IN VIETNAM

Attendant to that is the thought that there could be a nationalistic Vietnamese. The historical competitions and the bitter rivalries between the Tonkinese and the Annamese and the Cochin Chinese fill the pages of our history books and they antedate even the French, and so this is again where I think we overreact assuming there is a national entity here with a sense of patriotism. That makes quite a difference as I see it.

One of my concerns about imposing a government as a subject for negotiation is that North Vietnam's obvious interest is that any provisional government for the time being would be a little easier to topple from the outside than at least the existing regime. Short as it is on a great many things as we can point out, one of the Vietnamese I talked to said at least it is the broadest based government we have ever had. It is not very broad but it is the broadest one we have ever known and we are learning.

It seems to me again we have to make an allowance for that.

POSSIBILITY OF A MULTINATIONAL FORCE LEFT IN CONTROL

In regard to the point that you made, Mr. Secretary, about our residual forces or our transitional forces, to change the term that you changed it to, if there were to be in a settlement somewhere along the line, an agreement that a multinational force might become a controlling factor, let us say, along a DMZ, would the present policy looking toward disengagement in phase 2 or beyond, rule that out, do you think, or is that a bridge that has not been crossed yet?

Secretary LAIRD. No. That is a matter that could come about through negotiation. The Vietnamization program does not in any way limit the negotiations as far as Paris is concerned, nor should it be interpreted as a limitation on negotiation.

Senator MCGEE. Would it, outside of Paris, rule out some agreement that was not negotiated but arrived at on a multinational basis for, let us say, policing a DMZ of some sort?

Secretary LAIRD. No. I do not think it would necessarily.

Senator MCGEE. Anything like that would still be open as a possibility.

Secretary LAIRD. It would certainly be open as a matter for consideration, but I still feel that the place to carry on negotiations is where we are set up to carry them on and that is in Paris right now.

DOUBT EXPRESSED ABOUT NEGOTIATIONS

Senator MCGEE. It has been my judgment for a very long time that it is difficult to see where the North Vietnamese can afford to survive the political consequences of meaningful negotiations there but I hope I am wrong; I have often argued that it was more likely going to take place by a gradual unannounced, unadvertised disengagement in a very gradual way.

Secretary LAIRD. I am more optimistic about the Vietnamization process than I am about the negotiation process, but perhaps that is because I have more contact with this program than I have with the negotiation process. That really is the responsibility of the State Department.

Senator MCGEE. Yes, I understand that, too. But we have all been burned a little bit for a long while by negotiating frustrations in Paris.

Secretary LAIRD. I am trying to keep everybody in the Department of Defense away from negotiations.

Senator MCGEE. Yes, that would become a complication and an understandable one in itself. Your process in Vietnam may—

Secretary LAIRD. I hope that is not misinterpreted. What I mean is, in the foreign policy area, the negotiation process is one that is the responsibility of the State Department and not the Department of Defense.

EFFECT OF NORTH VIETNAMESE ON MILITARY ACTIVITY

Senator MCGEE. In your conversations with the members of the committee about the state of military activity, pointing to its changed complexion and its lower key at the present time, is there any part of that that your intelligence groups find possible to attribute in any way to the North Vietnamese?

Secretary LAIRD. I had a question along a similar vein earlier and I would like to be able to read something into that but I cannot at this time. I felt for a while that perhaps this might be more significant than it presently is because recently we have seen this change as far as infiltration is concerned, and today as I testify I am concerned and I do not know how to interpret that.

Senator MCGEE. You do not rule it out.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not rule it out.

Senator MCGEE. But you would not act upon that premise at this state yet?

Secretary LAIRD. I do not think I would take positive action based upon my view or my appraisal of what it means today.

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN POPULAR FORCES AND REGULAR FORCES

Senator MCGEE. In the manpower assessment that we were ranging over several times today, how many combat troops, how many administrative or support troops, how many guerillas and all the rest—when we talk about the Vietnamese forces in military terms, is there any difference between the Popular forces and the Regular forces?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, there is quite a difference. The Regular forces are a part of the national armed forces that are under complete control of the national government, whereas the Popular forces are under the control of, and are local forces. They are not even under the same control as the Regional forces. The Popular forces are actually engaged in other pursuits in their own local communities and they are involved in—

Senator MCGEE. Are they part-time soldiers?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes, they are, and they are paid at a much lower rate than the Regular forces, but the important thing that I wanted to point out, is that the Popular forces were equipped for the first time and this has made quite a change. There are now [deleted] in the popular forces. This is a much lower force level, in the eyes of people looking at the whole military structure, but they are close to their homes, and they fight well close to their homes, and they have been given proper equipment. Just 18 months ago they had one rifle for each five members of the Popular forces. Today each has his own rifle. When they are protecting their homes and their communities, they fight well. And I think this is an important development. The Popular forces have been doing well.

Senator MCGEE. Does it do any violence to our numbers if we lump the Popular forces numbers together with the Regular forces as a total figure that we would compare with the combat troops in the North?

Secretary LAIRD. Yes. It is difficult. If you take the Regular forces as of November first, are [deleted] a little over [deleted] Regular forces. There are [deleted] Regional forces, [deleted] Popular forces. Now, the so-called elite in the military force structure in South Vietnam are the Regular forces. But from the standpoint of progress, I think greater progress has been made in the Regional and in the Popular forces in the past year.

Senator MCGEE. That would be as much psychological too, if anything, is it not, because it is confidence—

Secretary LAIRD. It is confidence and these people are close to their homes and I think it is very important that we support them. This is one of the decisions that was made at Midway, to increase the Popular and the Regional forces, and I think that was a good decision for us to agree to give more support to these local forces.

Senator MCGEE. Well, I think it is a good point to stress. I do think we get carried away once in a while with our numbers. We talk about our half million Americans there fighting against 90,000 or 85,000 North Vietnamese and how incompetent does that make it look. We could reduce it all to relative comparable troop groups and I think at least it would take on a little more meaning for us.

USEFULNESS OF PUBLIC HEARINGS

The whole range of these questions today really was skirting the basic issue which I think might be well recapped at this stage, but if you do not mind and that is, what is the relevance of all we have been saying here in regard to the possibility or to the usefulness of public hearings? This is why, as I understand it, we have had these sessions. Would public hearings by the committee pose any problems? I am not asking you now to judge what the committee ought to do because we are going to make up our own mind but we need to know and the reason we had you in here was to find out if there are any things relevant to this overall decision that we really ought to bear in mind.

Secretary LAIRD. I think we have had a good and complete discussion today. I am a little reluctant to make recommendations to a distinguished committee of the U.S. Senate as to the procedures that they should follow.

Senator MCGEE. I do not think you should be interpreted as telling us what we ought to do.

Secretary LAIRD. But I am pleased that you are going to release a record of this hearing because I think it is important that testimony such as this be released, so the people on the outside do not think we are just deciding things here in this committee that they have no knowledge of. And I think this record will be helpful for the public to have.

Senator MCGEE. I think that is a very useful step, too. Would it have changed the dialog, do you think, had these been open hearings?

Secretary LAIRD. I think there will be very little that we will have to take out of the record on the basis of security review. As far as I am concerned, I think there will be very little that will have to be taken out of the record.

When we get into some of the troop figures and matters such as infiltration, and enemy activity, I think then there are certain areas that we have to be somewhat careful about. The means of our intelligence gathering and other things. But I think most of our discussion and the statement which I made this morning, as I told the chairman—

Senator MCGEE. Except for the front page.

Secretary LAIRD. Except for the front page and I put "Secret" only on the front page because it was a matter for this committee to make a decision on and not for me.

Senator MCGEE. We proceeded in closed sessions and I thought had a very helpful dialog both days and that is why I asked if a public hearing would have made any difference in the dialog.

Secretary LAIRD. I think we can have a fuller and more detailed discussion this way, but this is a matter for your committee to decide. When I was up here, I would probably have resented the executive branch making too many recommendations as to how we should proceed.

Senator MCGEE. We do not bear those resentments. We are big boys now. We understand those problems now.

I think that concludes my questioning, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I was at an executive meeting on seabeds all morning and afternoon. I regret not having been with the Secretary. I am sure all the questions I would have asked have been asked and I will read the record and I will not burden the record with what might be repetitious questions.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, you have been very patient. The staff has prepared some questions which I have not had a chance to go over. I note one or two of them I believe you have adequately handled already today, but we will present them to you anyway.

Secretary LAIRD. I will do my best. (See page 140.)

NORTH VIETNAMESE ATTITUDE TOWARD TOTAL WITHDRAWAL

The CHAIRMAN. There are just one or two things I want to mention. You said in the course of your exchange with the Senator from Missouri that if anybody had any alternative ideas you wanted to hear them. Of course, you have heard plenty of advice, I am sure, as we all have had. I have had in the last day or two a rather long, and I thought very well written, copy of a letter from Roger Hilsman to Henry Kissinger. It is very much along the lines of Professor Starobin's letter. As you know, Starobin is a former American Communist, who I take it is reformed and is now an assistant professor at York University in Canada. Do you happen to know about him?

Secretary LAIRD. I know about him.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know much about him. There is an article by Wechsler who knows about him and —

Secretary LAIRD. I think he also wrote Dr. Kissinger.

The CHAIRMAN. He wrote a long memorandum to Mr. Kissinger which he included in his letter to me. What they both stress is what I mentioned this morning, that the North Vietnamese representative in Paris has indicated that they no longer demand total withdrawal before they will negotiate. They only ask for the principle, that eventually, after negotiations, there will be total withdrawal.

Well, I assume from the President's statement this would not present any difficulty. Your own Vietnamization program looks to the day when there would be total withdrawal, does it not?

Secretary LAIRD. Well, the President has talked about this, too, and Secretary Rogers I think yesterday assured this committee —

The CHAIRMAN. That that is the objective.

Secretary LAIRD. That this was the program. Total withdrawal is something that the President offered in his May 14 speech based on a 12-month program. That is a very rapid total withdrawal program. This is subject to negotiation.

Our particular program of Vietnamization would not be as rapid as a negotiated withdrawal.

NEGOTIATION EFFORTS URGED

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly the point I wanted to bring up again. I think several members have indicated that they are very anxious to explore as far as possible the possibilities of a negotiation because if it could work at all, it would clearly shorten the war more quickly than the Vietnamization program, which would seem to entail

an unknown number of years and possibly very large amounts of money and lives. So all we can do, I think, in the time left, is to urge that perhaps greater attention be given to the possibility of negotiations. Here again it comes to that critical point as to the provisional government idea in which Mr. Thieu or some members of that government would have a part but not be the government in power.

I think that is the critical point. All I can say is to urge you to consider it.

DOUBTS EXPRESSED ABOUT FIRM POLITICAL BASE

I agree very much with Senator Symington's views about the probabilities of success of Vietnamization. That is no reflection upon your technical capacity to furnish arms. I think it is a political judgment that a regime closely identified with any foreign power—no reflection upon us as a foreign power; it would not matter whether it was us, the French, British, Germans, or anybody—is not likely ever to establish a firm political base. I think you notice that even within our own country. You notice it everywhere, that they are identified too closely with us to support a lasting political regime, and if that is true, then we are fighting and sacrificing lives and money for a lost cause.

You said the Vietnamese people are not interested in national elections. But our objective, according to you and the Secretary of State, is to give them self-determination at the national level. So in a way it is sort of contradictory.

Secretary LAIRD. They have moved very well on the local level as far as—

The CHAIRMAN. It is not local elections you have in mind when you say self-determination. They already have that.

Secretary LAIRD. As far as local elections are concerned, back just a few months ago only six out of 10 of the local hamlets, local villages, were controlled under local elections. There are now over eight out of 10. And this is important. This is an important part of the security program and an important part of the pacification program.

But, Senator, the problem that we face in the Department of Defense and in military planning as far as Vietnam is concerned, and that I face as a new Secretary of Defense, is to look at where we are and what we can do about it in the best possible manner. I do not want anything that I have said today to indicate that the military aspects of the Vietnamization program in any way negate our desire for a negotiated settlement, but it takes two sides to negotiate, and the Vietnamization program does not interfere in any way with a negotiated settlement.

As a matter of fact, I think it is an asset in moving toward a negotiated settlement.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it should if the Government gives the same attention to negotiation, but I detect much greater enthusiasm on your part for Vietnamization and this is in your field. You have properly said that the negotiation is a responsibility of the State Department.

Secretary LAIRD. We have been criticized by some of the Congress for getting Defense officials in the foreign policy field, the negotiation field, and I have not wanted to transgress on the responsibilities of the Department of State in the foreign affairs field, but I believe that the

military aspects of the Vietnamization program are the responsibilities of the Department of Defense.

SPEECHES OF DEFENSE CHIEFS

The CHAIRMAN. Speaking of transgression, there is one matter that I want to call to your attention. As reported in the Washington Star certain Defense chiefs, such as General Wheeler, General Walt, and Admiral McCain, are going about in apparently a well-organized program of making speeches. This seems a little odd in the midst of a war. The nature of these speeches is always to criticize those who do not approve of the war.

I will quote you one.

Are you familiar with this?

Secretary LAIRD. I have encouraged the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretaries of the services, and the Assistant Secretaries of Defense to appear, when invited before public gatherings, to explain the program of the Department of Defense. I think they have a responsibility to explain the program.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this really explaining it? Now, you are explaining it here today. You have made, I submit, no statements comparable to this. This is as quoted in the Star.

"Within the last year"—this is referring to General Walt who has been doing this for the last year.

It says here: "By far the most prolific speechmaker is General Lewis Walt, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, who delivers a slightly modified version of the same basic speech an average of better than twice a week to such groups as the Rotary Club of Pensacola and the Florida State convention of the American Red Cross.

"In the past year over 10,000 Americans have been killed in Vietnam, he told the Red Cross. Those who dissent may not have fired the rifle or thrown the grenade. But they must bear a part of the responsibility for the losses of those gallant Americans."

In his Pensacola speech he phrased it slightly differently: "Well, this past year over 10,000 Americans have been killed in Vietnam. That loss is the price of irresponsible talk and I can tell you that isn't cheap," and so on.

(The complete article follows:)

[From the Washington Evening Star, Nov. 12, 1969]

WAR SUPPORT PRESSED—DEFENSE CHIEFS CARRY MESSAGE TO CITIZENRY

(By Orr Kelly)

Star Staff Writer

While President Nixon has been seeking support for his efforts to end the Vietnam war, high ranking Pentagon officers have been out giving the word to the "silent majority."

In an almost steady stream, they have been speaking to Rotary Clubs, to Reserve Officers meetings, at ship launchings and almost anywhere a responsive audience might be expected to gather.

Frequently they have taken a tough line—using language more forceful than that of the President and even outdoing Vice President Spro T. Agnew on occasion according to a spot check of speeches delivered over the last two months.

Speaking to the Association of the U.S. Army here on October 15, for example,

General Earle G. Wheeler, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff, referred caustically to "groups of interminably vocal youngsters, strangers alike to soap and reason . . ."

"For my part, I must confess to a bit of fatigue on this score when new words are produced, most often by the 'academic-journalistic complex,' which describe vacillation as being flexible and nervousness as being compassionate."

But the occasion which Wheeler spoke clearly implies a distinction between various forms of dissent. He was speaking in honor of Cyrus R. Vance former U.S. negotiator in Paris and now a prominent critic of American policy in Vietnam.

By far the most prolific speechmaker is Gen. Lewis Walt, assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, who delivers a slightly modified version of the same basic speech an average of better than twice a week to such groups as the Rotary Club of Pensacola, Fla., (Oct. 21) and the Florida State convention of the American Red Cross (Oct. 10).

"In the past year, over 10,000 Americans have been killed in Vietnam," he told the Red Cross. "Those who dissent may not have fired the rifle or thrown the grenade. But they must bear a part of the responsibility for the losses of those gallant Americans."

"Our young Americans in Vietnam may not be a part of our nation's loose tongue—but they certainly have proven themselves to be a vital part of our strong backbone."

In his Pensacola speech, he phrased it slightly differently:

"There is an old saying that 'talk is cheap.' Well, this past year over 10,000 Americans have been killed in Vietnam. That loss is the price of irresponsible talk and I can tell you that it isn't cheap."

On Nov. 6, speaking to the Annapolis Rotary Club, Walt, who commanded the Marines in Vietnam for two years, reflected the themes of the President's speech three days before—and added to it.

"Those who are in positions of authority know the potential cost of a premature pullout," he said. "They know that the blood of millions of Vietnamese would be on their hands . . ."

"Our premature withdrawal from Vietnam would become a major victory for the forces of international communism."

On Oct. 14, Gen. Leonard F. Chapman Jr., commandant of the Marine Corps, spoke to the Rotary Club of Memphis.

He drew a line between the "doves—gentle people who have never seen war, or terror," and the "anti-everything organizations who . . . have waved the flag of the enemy, burned our own flag, practiced violence, and preached their own war as a means to destroy our present society."

The whole thrust of this is not unlike recent speeches about those who, including myself, do not agree as to the vital national interest involved in Vietnam for this country and who feel the war ought to be brought to a close more quickly than is contemplated. Our group, of course, is those who dissent. I assume that is what he is saying there.

Now, you have unlimited numbers of men, 3.5 million people under arms. I do not know how many generals. I would question the wisdom of their going out and making such speeches. It is very divisive politically. I did not suppose you were encouraging that kind of speech. For the Vice President to make political attacks is one thing. For the Defense Department and all the generals to make them is another thing, it seems to me. Quite a different thing. Nobody can complain I guess if the Vice President becomes primarily political, but I hate to think our generals are being cast in the same role.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, I can assure you that they are not getting into political activity.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is very, very close to what the Vice President is saying. You have not said anything like that here today in explaining your program.

Secretary LAIRD. I do feel, though, that it is important for all of us to speak when we can. I take as many speeches as I possibly can. I

just have not been able to accept too many, but I have taken probably one a week.

The CHAIRMAN. In your statement today, I do not recall one word you made along this line. You have not suggested it once here in an all-day session that those who have different views about the wisdom of the war are in some way responsible for the death of men in Vietnam. I do not know that you have ever said it.

Secretary LAIRD. I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that we will have great dissent from this program of President Nixon's, on, first, negotiations, and second, Vietnamization, if it is well understood by all of our people. I have tried to go around this country as much as I can to explain this program, and I believe that most people will support it if it is clearly understood.

The CHAIRMAN. From your point of view and from your responsibilities, you make a very persuasive case, and the point—

Secretary LAIRD. I have talked to many of these young people who were here this week, and I am sure that most of them are working for the same thing that we are.

SKEPTICISM ABOUT REPORTS OF WAR

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is no substantial difference between your objectives and those of a great many young people. I do not believe there is, nor between your objectives and the objectives of this committee.

We have heard, as you well know, on this committee, going back to 1963, optimistic reports about progress in Vietnam. That all happened before you came in. But we have heard it since 1963. There is a very great skepticism on the part of members of this committee growing out of that experience, for which you are not responsible, I want to make it clear. But naturally we are skeptical about it.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, you notice, though, today I did not make any prophecies or forecasts. I reported the facts and progress as of today.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, for its being a very bad case, you handled it extremely well. I do not for a moment discount this.

Secretary LAIRD. I would hate to feel you call it a bad case. Negotiation efforts should not be ignored.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will allow me a minute, what I really think is the basis of this is the negotiation and you have properly said that this is not your primary responsibility. You have now said that that should come first.

Secretary LAIRD. That is the first phase in the President's—

NEGOTIATION SETTLEMENT URGED

The CHAIRMAN. Yesterday the Secretary of State was here, as you well know. I can only speak for myself, but I do not feel that we are willing to make this one concession, if you want to call it that. Whether it is true that self-determination is our objective, it is one that has come to be accepted. I think it may be unfortunate, but I do not know whether those people in Vietnam know what we mean by that, but we think we do. If that is true, then this acceptance of a provisional government in which everybody is represented, including the Viet Cong, is the critical point.

Now, I share this belief and others too, that this is worth a try in order to promote negotiations in view of the high cost of the Vietnamization.

Now, if you really give it a bona fide trial and it fails, then, I think, your second point, that is Vietnamization, is a valid course. It faces us with a very long prospect and a very expensive one, and this has grave possibilities, and they are very well set out by Mr. Roger Hilsman. There is the possibility of the Chinese coming in. Anything could develop if we stay there for 3, 4, or 5 years. And you say a reasonable time. Well, reasonable has to be viewed in light of the circumstances.

I can imagine circumstances in which you could perhaps properly say 5 years is reasonable because of North Vietnam actions or other things.

All I am trying to say is, it is a very dangerous situation over there, and I think it is dangerous here and the cost at home is so great that those of us who have heard these optimistic statements before feel a greater urgency than the administration does to move toward a negotiated settlement.

The Vietnamization I think is given much more attention than negotiation. It is partly because your Department is the more powerful one. It has more generals to send out to make talks. Vietnamization has become really, whether you intend it to or not, the central part of this program. It is the program. And there was a clear sense yesterday, and I think today, of almost a hopelessness about any negotiation. Nobody has any confidence that it can be done. I think you have almost given up hope in negotiations. I think this is a tragedy because this would give an opportunity for all kinds of agreements for neutralization, for even asking the Russians to join in guaranteeing it. There are possibilities in negotiation that do not exist in Vietnamization because that is a unilateral program.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, I tried to make that point in my opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am directing this more to the overall program and especially with the Department of State's inability to generate any enthusiasm or any hope. There is nothing but lack of hope.

Secretary LAIRD. I think we have very good cooperation between the Department of State and the Department of Defense. I think it is a very fine working relationship that I have with the Secretary of State and that we have no conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not suggesting there was not. In the nature of things, being at war as long as we have, the military establishment has just overshadowed other activities. This is no reflection on you, but a fact of life.

Secretary LAIRD. I made every effort to get everybody in the military aboard this program. They are aboard and are supporting it.

The CHAIRMAN. They are supporting Vietnamization, but they do not feel responsibility for negotiation.

Secretary LAIRD. I cannot put the responsibility for negotiation on the military, but I want to make it clear that the Secretary of Defense and Department of Defense certainly hope that we can have successful negotiations because this will speed up the program much more than Vietnamization. But we have to have a fallback position and when I

came into this Department, and when I found that the only program for troop modernization was a program that prepared the South Vietnamese to meet the VC threat only, that is not a program that has any end. That is why we had to change and embark upon this new program.

The CHAIRMAN. Within that context, I think I indicated it has great appeal but what I feel is being neglected and almost given up as hopeless is any possibility of a negotiated settlement which is far more flexible and gives you many more opportunities to achieve what I think you want to achieve.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLANATION OF MASS MURDERS

I am not going to ask you to do it now. It takes too long. But someone suggested it would be good and healthy if you would use this opportunity to explain, this matter about the mass murders. Your Department undoubtedly has something to say about that. Put that in for the record.

Secretary LAIRD. All right.

(The following information was later supplied:)

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPLANATION OF MYLAI MURDERS

Mr. Chairman, I would be pleased to give you my comments on the alleged mass murder incident in March 1968 which is currently being reported in the press.

First of all, I want to tell you and the Members of this Committee how shocked and sick I was when these allegations first came to my attention. Of course, under our system of jurisprudence, and particularly under the provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice as enacted by Congress, it would not be appropriate for me to comment on the specific allegations and on the particular individuals allegedly involved.

This matter first came to my attention in early April. I immediately looked into it and shortly thereafter a full investigation was launched by the Army. I want to make clear, Mr. Chairman, beyond any doubt, that the Nixon Administration is determined to insure absolute compliance with our orders and with the laws of war.

I also want to make clear, Mr. Chairman, that the Nixon Administration program of Vietnamization, which we have been discussing today, is the primary mission of the United States forces in Vietnam.

I am sure you will understand that as Secretary of Defense I cannot comment on the specific allegations concerning the incident that is alleged to have taken place in March 1968.

Mr. Chairman, I am providing for the record a Department of the Army memo dated November 12, which covers certain facts pertinent to the 1968 incident.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY,
Washington, D.C.

INFORMATION FOR MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

ALLEGED MURDER OF NONCOMBATANT CIVILIANS IN THE HAMLET OF MY LAI,
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

1. On September 5, 1969, charges were preferred at Fort Benning, Georgia against Lieutenant William L. Calley alleging the premeditated murder of approximately 100 Vietnamese civilians in violation of Article 118, of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Lieutenant Calley was due to be released from the service on 6 September, but this separation is being held in abeyance pending disposition of the charges, as authorized by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

This situation was explained to the news media by the Fort Benning information officer, on 5 September, in these words:

"1Lt William L. Calley, Jr. is being retained on active duty beyond his normal release date because of an investigation being conducted under Article 32 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

"Lt Calley, who was to have been separated from the Army on 6 Sep 69, is charged with violation of Article 118, murder, for offenses allegedly committed against civilians while serving in Vietnam in March 1968.

"Whether the matter will be referred to trial by courtmartial will be determined by the Commanding General, Fort Benning, upon completion of the Article 32 investigation. In order not to prejudice the continuing investigation and the rights of the accused, it is not appropriate to report further details at this time."

2. The offenses are alleged to have occurred during combat operations conducted by elements of the American Division in mid-March 1968 in the area of a hamlet in the I Corps Tactical Zone known as My Lai Four, Quang Ngai Province, Republic of Vietnam; this hamlet had been under VC control for years. After the operation, the area returned to VC control. Lieutenant Calley was the platoon leader of a unit taking part in the operation.

3. The investigation which led to the filing of charges against Lieutenant Calley was initiated in March of 1969 when a former soldier wrote to the Department of Defense and to several members of Congress, alleging that a number of Vietnamese civilians had been murdered in My Lai during this operation. The Department of the Army began an investigation in April 1969. The Provost Marshal General is responsible for the investigation which is continuing to determine whether others were involved in the commission of the offenses alleged to have been committed by Lieutenant Calley.

4. During the operation a small group of American soldiers reportedly shot many (possibly 100) Vietnamese civilians. Those who had knowledge of the incident did not report it. Subsequent assertions of the Viet Cong that the Americans were killing civilians were investigated by the commander of the 11th Infantry Brigade and by Vietnamese provincial authorities; that investigation developed nothing to indicate any disciplinary action or to warrant further investigation. Also, some of the witnesses were medically evacuated during the combat operation and were not available before the battalion commander was killed during another combat action. At that time (1968), the matter was not brought to the attention of the Department of the Army, there being no apparent requirement for doing so.

5. The charges against Lieutenant Calley and allied papers were forwarded through military channels to the appropriate authority who referred the charges to an officer for formal investigation, analagous to a grand jury proceeding, as required by Article 32, Uniform Code of Military Justice. During this investigation, Lieutenant Calley and his counsel have been present at all times, have been entitled to examine all the evidence, to cross-examine all witnesses called, and to present evidence. The investigating officer has prepared a report of the proceedings, which includes his recommendation as to the disposition of the charges. This report is being submitted to the appointing authority who will determine what other action is warranted.

6. Lieutenant Calley has retained George W. Latimer of Salt Lake City, Utah as civilian defense counsel. Mr. Latimer is a former judge of the United States Court of Military Appeals. Major Kenneth Raby, a military lawyer, was requested by Lieutenant Calley and made available to him.

7. A statement of Lieutenant Calley's service is inclosed.

STATEMENT OF SERVICE

Name and Grade: William Laws Calley, Jr., 1LT.

Date and Place of Birth: 8 June 1943, Miami, Florida.

Education: Civilian—Palm Beach Junior College. Military—U.S. Army Infantry School, Officers Candidate Course.

Military Service: Enlisted in Regular Army, 26 July 1966 at Albuquerque, New Mexico. Appointed Second Lieutenant, 7 September 1967.

ASSIGNMENTS

From—	To—	Organization
Sep 67-----	May 68-----	Company C, 1st Battalion, 20th Infantry, 11th Infantry Brigade.
Jul 68-----	Oct 68-----	Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry, 198th Infantry Brigade, Americal Division.
Nov 68-----	Jun 69-----	Company G, 75th Infantry Rangers, Americal Division.
Jul 69-----	Present-----	Ranger Department, U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia.

Awards and Decorations:

Bronze Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster.
 Purple Heart.
 Combat Infantryman Badge.
 Good Conduct Medal.
 National Defense Service Medal.
 Vietnam Service Medal.
 Vietnam Campaign Medal (Vietnamese).

Home of Record: Waynesville, North Carolina.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this hearing could go on, but you have made a very good witness. I think you have been very cooperative.

Secretary LAIRD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been very interesting, as you can see.

There is one item I will put in the record, an excerpt from a copy of General Thieu's speech of October 6, 1969.

(The excerpt referred to follows:)

SPEECH BY PRESIDENT THIEU TO SOUTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,
 OCTOBER 8, 1969

The essential thing is that the free world, primarily our U.S. ally, should not abandon Vietnam to the hands of the communist imperialist aggressors. So long as the communist aggressor troops from the north remain on southern territory, the allied troops cannot leave the Republic of Vietnam's territory. So long as a guaranteed peace has not yet been restored Vietnam and the threat of renewed communist aggression remains in this part of the world, I think that the free world forces must, in one form or another, remain in this country.

(The following answers are in reply to staff questions previously referred to:)

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY THE COMMITTEE
 STAFF

Question. Do you think the South Vietnamese forces today could handle the Viet Cong without U.S. combat support? How long will it be before the South Vietnamese forces can handle both the Viet Cong and a sizeable North Vietnamese force—without United States ground combat troops? Without air and other support forces?

Answer. I believe that today, the South Vietnamese forces could handle most of the current Viet Cong threat, but we are not fighting two isolated enemies in Vietnam today. The South Vietnamese now require and have U.S. combat support, and the program for improvement and modernization is in progress. I cannot predict the specific date on which they could handle both the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong combined threat, because to answer that would be to give you my estimate of when the military program of Vietnamization would be completed. I also cannot estimate when, or if, the North Vietnamese will withdraw from the South, so that the South Vietnamese would face only the Viet Cong.

Question. Do our military commanders in Vietnam believe the South Vietnamese armed forces can be trained in the foreseeable future to handle—without our help—any degree of military pressure the North Vietnamese choose to put on the South? Is there agreement within the intelligence community on this?

Answer. The operational ability and combat effectiveness of the RVNAF are under continuous review, and the RVNAF is being improved and modernized to increase its combat capability as a part of the Vietnamization program. Progress has been made, target goals have been established jointly with the South Vietnamese, and I am confident that these targets will be met. As I pointed out in my testimony, a major or massive effort by the North Vietnamese could certainly cause disruptions in our plans. I believe that our policy of frequent review, and decisions based on this review of the current situation, is more appropriate than forecasting what may or may not happen some time in the future.

Question. Doesn't a plan for unilateral, piecemeal withdrawal assume that the enemy will not challenge seriously the capacity of the South Vietnamese troops? What will happen to the withdrawal plan if North Vietnam should greatly step up attacks on South Vietnamese forces to prove that the South Vietnamese forces to prove that the South Vietnamese are not capable of handling the war alone?

Answer. Our plan is not a unilateral, piecemeal withdrawal plan. The plan is based on the South Vietnamese progressively assuming more of the responsibility for conduct of the war, and is particular at this time, the combat activity. The modernization and improvement program has been agreed to by the Joint General Staff of the South Vietnamese, and they know that the momentum that has been achieved must continue. I am confident that the target dates we have jointly set will be met. Certainly if Hanoi goes forward with a massive escalation of the war it will interfere with the plan, and our program. I cannot and will not speculate on the extent of such a disruption.

Question. Since one of the criteria for withdrawal is progress in the capacity of the South Vietnamese forces, what will the United States do if the Saigon government disagrees with our analysis of their progress and attempts to block a scheduled withdrawal?

Answer. I don't foresee such a disagreement. We have worked closely with the South Vietnamese on each redeployment to date, and will continue to do so. Our combined planning includes an analysis of the overall situation, in which we compare the total threat at the time with the total capability to meet the threat. We deal with the same essential facts. The South Vietnamese understand the program and support it.

Question. If United States combat forces are progressively withdrawn and enemy infiltration increases, the relative strength of the enemy will increase. Can the South Vietnamese handle such a situation without help from U.S. ground forces? Will South Vietnamese forces be taken away from local protection for pacification and put into the field in greater numbers or will more of the countryside be allowed to go to the Viet Cong by default?

Answer. The basic objective of the military part of our Vietnamization program is attainment by the South Vietnamese of a level of combat capability which would be adequate to defeat not only the Viet Cong but the invading North Vietnamese forces as well. To answer the first question requires that I predict the status of progress in Vietnamization at some specific time, and further that I forecast the levels and capabilities of both allied and enemy forces—in other words, will the basic military objective of Vietnamization be realized. We are confident in the progress being made in Vietnamization, but I cannot predict the future. However, I should emphasize that if Hanoi does increase the level of activity, we may have to modify our plan. With regard to adjusting the disposition and mission of allied forces, this would depend on the developing situation. Changes in forces assigned to pacification support could occur, but the total effort would be designed to prevent a regression in pacification, and to expand the pacified areas as much as possible.

Question. Department of Defense statistics show that there were [deleted] desertions (net) from the South Vietnamese forces in the first nine months of 1969. [Deleted.] Is there any reason to expect the desertion rate to lessen as the burden on the South Vietnamese forces increase?

Answer. Official Department of Defense statistics available at this time show (deleted) net desertions from South Vietnamese forces, including both military and paramilitary, for the first nine months of 1969. [Deleted.]

Over the past year a broad range of actions have been taken by the Vietnamese to bring the desertion problem under control; such as adopting a more liberal leave policy and fingerprinting RVNAF personnel. Definite improvement in 1969 over the 1968 desertion rate has been accomplished, though desertion continues a matter of great concern. An indicator of a possible lower future trend in desertions is the decline in the desertion rate in August and September of this year; a period during which US withdrawals were in progress and when a greater combat burden was beginning to be placed on Vietnamese forces. It was also a period of relatively low intensity of enemy initiated activity.

Question. How effective are the South Vietnamese combat forces compared with U.S. forces? Are there any percentage measures of their combat effectiveness?

Answer. No satisfactory method has yet been developed for precise comparison of South Vietnamese with U.S. combat forces. In the first instance there are basic differences in the organization of the units and in the relative kinds of firepower, transportation, and support available to each. These differences are compounded by the differences in training, leadership, tradition, language, experience, and other significant factors between the two forces. The U.S. Military Staff in Vietnam does make use of statistical indicators to provide certain percentage measurements of progress. This permits identification of trends in status and performance related to combat effectiveness within each unit and to some extent permits comparison among different ARVN units, though not between ARVN and U.S. units. Using such evaluations, the Vietnamese Air Force is regarded fully competent in both its fixed wing aircraft and helicopters. The Vietnamese Navy is also effectively assuming missions formerly performed by the U.S. Navy. The effectiveness of ARVN divisions and other units varies. Some divisions, such as the 1st ARVN Division, are fully capable, and essentially are on an equal footing with U.S. Divisions. Some others are not. In any case, the Vietnamese units and their support are organized along more austere lines than U.S. forces. The combat and logistic support provided to RVNAF forces does improve their performance. Current plans call for organizing and equipping improved support forces as a part of the Vietnamization program.

Question. What effect has the withdrawal plan had on the morale of the South Vietnamese troops?

Answer. I believe that the morale of the Vietnamese armed forces has not been significantly affected by those U.S. troop reductions thus far officially announced or accomplished.

Question. What are the assumptions about North Vietnam's intentions on which the Vietnamization program is based? Does the program assume that North Vietnam will not increase the pressure?

Answer. We have made no assumptions about North Vietnam's intentions. Our program is based on capabilities. The objective of the Vietnamization program is to effect an orderly transfer to the Vietnamese, within a reasonable time frame, of the major responsibilities that the United States has assumed in that country. One aspect of it is the development of GVN forces, accompanied by a progressive reduction of our forces as our estimates show we can do so. North Vietnam's actions will, of course, affect our decisions on the scale and timing of our redeployments. Aggressive actions and threatening dispositions obviously will slow the process, but we need not assume future intentions in these areas because we base our decisions on current estimates of the situation at the time each redeployment is considered.

Question. How long can Hanoi continue to absorb manpower losses and carry on the war at the current level? How many troops can the enemy infiltrate and recruit (in the South), per month, if he chooses to step up the military action? What is the current monthly enemy loss rate?

Answer. Hanoi could continue to absorb personnel losses and carry on the war at current levels of activity at least through 1970, provided foreign aid continues to offset internal manpower requirements. More than one million males are estimated to have served in North Vietnam's armed forces from 1966 through mid-1969. Assuming that these came primarily from the 17-35 year age group, there would still be just under a million—possibly as few as

700,000—physically fit males available for military service. With a full mobilization, North Vietnam could also draw from the estimated additional 750,000 physically fit males in the expanded 15-49 year age group, who are not now in the service. In addition, approximately 130,000 physically fit males reach military age (17) annually.

[Deleted.]

The monthly enemy loss rate due to killed, died of wounds, PW's, and military Hoi Chanh has averaged 23,395 per month for the past ten month period.

Question. Does the enemy have the initiative in controlling casualty rates—for both sides?

Answer. Yes—by increasing the level of his offensive activity he can raise Allied casualties somewhat. In almost all cases when he elects to follow this course of action, however, the increase in enemy casualties greatly exceeds the proportional increase in Allied casualties. On the other hand, when he employs economy-of-force tactics or elects to remain out of contact, his casualties drop significantly while Allied losses drop to a somewhat lesser extent.

Question. Does the enemy still have the capacity to launch a major offensive at will?

Answer. He still retains the capability to launch a major offensive at selected times of his choosing—but not completely at will. Thus, he can launch such an offensive if he is able to stockpile sufficient logistics to support a large-scale effort and successfully concentrate large enough forces to conduct it. To date the success of Allied search operations on the ground has retarded his logistics efforts and Allied air operations have punished him when he has concentrated his forces.

In the past, large-scale offensives have been very costly to the enemy. We would assume that this would also be true of similar efforts in the future.

Question. Does the enemy have the capacity to upset the pacification program if it so chooses?

Answer. A concerted all-out offensive by the enemy, primarily against the pacification program, would disrupt the GVN's pacification effort. Moderate level country-wide enemy operations employing economy-of-force tactics would also have a disruptive effect on the pacification program. The significant progress by the GVN during the current year, however, would tend to counter much of the impact of such operations by the enemy.

Question. The President on November 3, stated that enemy infiltration over the last three months was "less than 20 percent" of what it was in the same period last year. What does this signify, in your opinion?

Answer. In the light of the recent accelerated pace of infiltration, I would not want to speculate on the significance of infiltration rates at this time.

Question. What is the total enemy strength, now, by categories, compared with the beginning of 1969? Combat strength only? Viet Cong infrastructure?

Answer. A classified table for the record was submitted previously.

Question. How much of the enemy's external supplies come down through Laos, and how much through Cambodia? How much do they need daily in external supplies? Can he still get all the supplies he needs. [deleted].

Answer. There is insufficient intelligence to quantify precisely the amount of material obtained through Laos and Cambodia. On balance, the Lao route appears to be the more significant, but this estimate is based primarily on judgment.

Current estimates of the enemy's external requirements (expenditures and losses) range from [deleted] short tons per day. The enemy has apparently been able to meet his external requirements in RVN over the past six months (rainy season), only by reducing levels of combat, and by relying on a combination of external inputs and stockpile drawdown.

Evidence suggests that the enemy was not able to replenish his supplies and meet all external requirements during this period [deleted].

Question. The South Vietnamese claim to control over 90 percent of the population of South Vietnam. Do you equate "control" with allegiance to the Saigon government? If not, what does the figure mean in political terms?

Answer. The 90 percent (more precisely, 92%) figure refers to the population of the cities and towns, and hamlets rated A, B or C in the Hamlet Evaluation System.

We by no means equate "control" with allegiance to the Saigon administration. Rather, the statement signifies that 92% of the population of South Vietnam is reasonably free from Communist terrorism, that once more they are able to lead fairly normal lives, that by and large they live under a constitutional

rule of law protected in the first instance by police or a militia force of their neighbors. It also means that, under the Constitution. They are able to elect hamlet, village, and municipal councils which conduct local government, and are free to organize, and participate in, national political parties of their choice, or to support groups of political leaders of their choice.

"Control" particularly does not imply any popular attitude for, against, or apathetic toward the present national administration. It *does* mean, however, that over 90 percent of the population enjoys the rights and duties of the system of government established by the Constitution. This system of government is, of course, young. Political parties, especially, are still incipient—as were American political parties in 1790–1800. It will obviously require more time to become a deeply rooted, settled way of life.

Question. What portion of the rural population is subject to significant influence by the Viet Cong?

Answer. The best available data we have on the extent of significant VC influence in the countryside comes from the subjective evaluations of the security situation by US district advisors in the Hamlet Evaluation System (HES). By definition, hamlets rated D, E, or VC are particularly susceptible to varying degree of VC activity, presence, or influence. [Deleted.]

Question. Will you provide the Committee with the periodic reports you receive concerning overall progress in Vietnamization and pacification?

Answer. In accordance with our established policy to keep the members of Congress advised regarding matters within the purviews of the Department of Defense, we will keep the Committee informed concerning the overall progress of Vietnamization and Pacification in the Republic of Vietnam.

CASUALTIES

Question. If the Vietnamization program proceeds as you hope, how many casualties do you estimate the United States will suffer and how much will the war cost next year? In 1971?

Answer. I would hope to reduce U.S. casualties to zero as quickly as possible. However, U.S. casualties are primarily dependent upon three factors: the level of enemy activity, the number and type of U.S. combat forces, and the method of U.S. operations. We do not control enemy activity which in turn affects the level of U.S. forces and how they operate. Thus, it is impossible to predict with any accuracy the number of U.S. casualties which we will suffer in 1970 or 1971. [Deleted.]

COST

The current estimate for the cost of the war in FY 1970, including allocated costs of research, equipment procurement and continental U.S. training and logistics support, is \$23.2 billion. The incremental cost of the war, that is the net additional defense cost due to the war, is considerably less and approximates \$15 billion. With respect to what the war will cost by the end of another year, such estimates are not possible at this time due to the fact that precise numbers and schedule withdrawals cannot be determined. As President Nixon stated, this will largely depend on the capability of the South Vietnamese to assume greater responsibility for the war and the actions of the North Vietnamese.

Question. How many of the South Vietnamese generals fought with the French? With the Viet Minh?

Answer. Of the 54 RVNAF general officers on active duty 50 served with the French, two served with the French and Viet Minh and the remaining two did not serve with either group.

Question. Do you anticipate any morale problem with U.S. troops as a result of a military victory being ruled out but fighting continuing with no end in sight?

Answer. No, I do not anticipate any significant morale problems.

The committee is adjourned.

(Whereupon, at 5:35 o'clock p.m., the committee was adjourned.)