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11/1969 Protracted War tactics continue for COSVN.

Some Communist forces are ordered to strengthen guerilla bases and intensify activity, since: (1) guerilla bases are needed for larger operations, (2) guerilla operations are the practical way of coping with a stronger enemy, and (3) guerilla operations are needed to defeat Pacification.

(COSVN Resolution 14,
11/69)

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SPEECH BY RANKING DRV CADRE : NOVEMBER 1969

Delivered at [redacted] Political [redacted] Reorientation Congress probably in Binh Dinh province (or [redacted] Quang Tin).

Dealt with assessment; Party resolutions; antipacification work.

The speech is composed of four principal parts which were titled as follows:

- I. An assessment of enemy ((PWMAF/RVNAF)) and friendly ((VC/NVA)) capabilities in SVN.
- II. Some subjects emphasized in the resolution adopted during the recent congress of Region ((5)) Party Committee.
- III. A recapitulation of counterpacification achievements ((in Region 5)).
- IV. The ideological task.

In Part I, the speaker predicts a rapid collapse of the Puppet ((RVNAF)) forces in Region 5, once the bulk of the 240,000-man ((US)) "expeditionary force" ((in Region 5)) has withdrawn. It was further disclosed that a large scale offensive phase was planned to be launched in Region 5 and other parts of SVN in the near future in an effort to compel the US to change its strategy and accept a solution dictated by the friendly ((VC/NVA)) side to end the war. Violence will force the US to change its attitude on the SVN war.

Part II emphasizes the necessity of conducting destructive attacks designed to "exterminate" entire enemy units ranging in size from platoons to battalions. Furthermore, guerrilla warfare, which thus far had far been overlooked by many province units, should be implemented within the framework of the overall war strategy. Therefore, actions should be taken to upgrade the role of guerrilla units, especially those in urban areas.

Combat skill of friendly units as a whole should be improved in the near future. - 1 -

In a subsequent paragraph, the speaker directs that all provinces of Region ((5)) with the exception of Quang Đà, should focus their attack efforts on Puppet units. These attacks will be vital in frustrating both the accelerated pacification program and the "de-Americanization" plan. Priority targets of such attacks would include primarily the "oppressors" and the "tyrants" ((meaning RVN village/hamlet officials and leaders of RVN police and pacification elements)), who were to be suppressed at any cost. The suppression of one "tyrant" should be regarded as tantamount to the killing of 100 - 200 enemy soldiers.

As directed by "Central's Resolution" ((possibly meaning Politburo resolution)), enemy cities would be primary objectives for future attacks. In the Region ((5)), however, emphasis should be placed on the intensification of "city movements." In addition, the criteria set for various provinces within the region in the future ((unspecified)), i.e. gaining control of 700,000 ((additional)) people, should be attained. Thus, the total population to be placed under ((VC/NVA)) control ((in Region 5)) would be over 2,000,000. The speaker indicates that 500,000 people have come under friendly control during the period from early 68 to Nov 69.

With regard to the counterpacification task, the speech indicates that some progress was made by friendly forces in Phú Yên and Khánh Hòa Provinces as compared to the assessment in Resolution 9 by Region 5 Party Committee in Apr 69. In northern Bình Định Province, the enemy pacification elements scored many successes, due to the local Party officials' loose leadership and inadequate planning. Similar shortcomings had led to a steady decrease in the population gains ((in Region 5)) during 1969. These gains were 350,000 people during the ((1969)) Spring Campaign. They were reduced to 30,000 - 40,000 people during the Summer Campaign, and then dropped to nothing during the Fall-Winter Campaign. It was to be noted that the gaining of the bulk of the population ((in SVN)) would carry far-reaching implications, given the fact that whoever controlled the larger part of the population during the post-war period would become the winner.

The speaker further prescribes the tasks to be fulfilled by the friendly side in the cities, to include military attacks, people's uprisings, and political struggles. Particular attention should be paid to the rallying of

Unless such an improvement was achieved, the combat criteria set forth by higher headquarters were not likely to be met.

different strata of the city dwellers, such as workers, students, intellectuals, and even ((RVN)) civil servants and soldiers. It was imperative, under present circumstances, to cooperate with Minh ((possibly ex-RVNAF General Dương Văn Minh)), Liên ((possibly Trần Ngọc Liên, a lawyer in Saigon)), and the Buddhist faction of Thích Trí Quang ((a noted Buddhist leader)). Such cooperation would be only temporary and apparent, and thus beneficial to the friendly side. In the future, a steady effort should be made to utilize the Buddhist movements in Region 5 to attain ((VC/NVA)) basic goals in the cities.

Regarding the ideological status of friendly forces, the speech notes that the troops' morale has somewhat worsened recently. Rightism, negativism, and fear of death were among the most common attitudes of cadre and soldiers in many units.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This speech appears to have been designed to psychologically prepare VC/NVA field commanders of Military Region 5 for the 1970 Spring and Summer Campaigns. There is a great tone of emphasis on VC/NVA capabilities to overrun the RVNAF in Military Region 5 after the redeployment of the bulk of US forces in the local areas. These campaigns were to be conducted in compliance with Resolution 9, Region 5 Party Committee, which was similar to COSVN's Resolution 9.