

1. COUNTRY: SOUTH VIETNAM	8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 0616 70
2. SUBJECT: Political Reorientation Speech by High-Ranking Cadre of Region 5 Party Committee	9. DATE OF REPORT: 29 July 1970
3. ISC NUMBER: (U) A157.613 A701.600 A707.000 A748.200 A723.210 A135.275 A135.279	10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 6 November 1969	11. REFERENCED: DIRM 1A, 1D, 1D1, 1D2, 1J, 1R
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: VS; 30 May 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV, (CDEC)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u> B </u> INFORMATION <u> 3 </u>	13. PREPARED BY: <i>Harvey S. Bartash</i> HARVEY S. BARTASH, CPT, MI OPNS G. US ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>Alvin W. Lotz</i> ALVIN W. LOTZ, LTC; USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY: (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 30 May 1970, and concerns a transcript of a speech, dated 6 November 1969, delivered by Brother Nam ((possibly a high-ranking cadre of the Current Affairs Committee, Region 5 Party Committee)) during a political reorientation congress held ((by Region 5 Party Committee)). The speech is composed of four principal parts which were titled as follows: (1) An assessment of the enemy and friendly capabilities in SVN; (2) subjects emphasized in the resolution adopted during the recent congress of the Region 5 Party Current Affairs Committee; (3) a recapitulation of achievements concerning our counterpacification activities, the breaking of the enemy's oppressive control, and the gaining of the people's confidence; and (4) ideological task. CDEC COMMENT: The speech appears to have been designed to psychologically prepare VC/NVA field commanders of Military Region 5 for the 1970 spring and summer campaigns. These campaigns were to be conducted in compliance with Resolution 9, Region 5 Party Committee, which was similar in content to COSVN

Leave 51a

-----FULL TRANSLATION-----

((Page 1 of O.T.))

TRANSCRIPT OF THE SPEECH DELIVERED BY BROTHER NAM,

((possibly a high ranking cadre of the Current Affairs Committee, Region 5 Party Committee)) (dated 6 Nov 69), concerning the recapitulative report on a political reorientation congress and the uprising movements in Region ((5)).

(The transcription of this speech was approved by Brother Nam).

Dear Comrades,

In the name of the Region ((5)) Party Current Affairs Committee, I will recapitulate all the activities performed by the congress and recognize that we have all fulfilled the prescribed requirements after working energetically for 14 days.

First, we have made a relatively accurate assessment of the enemy and friendly situations and fully understood our strong and weak points and the reasons for our weaknesses in providing guidance for our movements, especially in winning the people's confidence and preventing them from moving ((into the enemy controlled areas)). Moreover, we thoroughly understood our guidelines and future tasks, especially the principal tasks laid down by the Region ((5)) Party Current Affairs Committee.

Secondly, through the congress we have improved our attitude and ideology and successfully eradicated all rightist outlooks and individualism.

Thirdly, we have carefully discussed plans for initiating uprising movements in rural and urban areas.

Our congress was conducted on the basis of the actual situation, on our own initiative and awareness, and on the people's viewpoint, and has proceeded successfully and cheerfully.

Due to the efforts and the participation of all of you, we brought our congress to a successful completion and fulfilled the prescribed requirements in a satisfactory manner.

Now, I would like to present to you the summary report on the activities performed by the congress. It is composed of four parts.

Part I: An assessment of the enemy and friendly capabilities in SVN.

Part II: Subjects emphasized in the resolution and adopted during the recent congress of the Region ((5)) Party Current Affairs Committee.

Part III: A recapitulation of achievements concerning our counter-pacification activities, the breaking of the enemy's oppressive control, and the gaining of the people's confidence.

Part IV: Ideological task.

((Page 2 of O.T.))

PART IThe strategic failures of the US in the limited war in Vietnam.

First of all, we should understand the two basic points of the limited war ((conducted by the enemy)). Such a war will be defeated and will certainly be crushed by our army and the people.

The first point is that the US imperialists have been driven into a strategic defensive position. They are steadily becoming bogged down in this position. This is a great contradiction between the defensive strategy of the US imperialists and the purposes and nature of their war of aggression. The objectives of the US imperialists in their limited war are to occupy all of SVN. As all of you know, they have initiated the search-and-destroy campaign with the purpose of annihilating all of the revolutionary forces and specifically the revolutionary armed forces.

Search and destroy is the main purpose of the US imperialists' offensive strategy to occupy SVN. Their intention is that once SVN is seized, they will make preparations for launching attacks against the North ((NVN)). But, after the serious defeats caused by our counterattacks against their strategic offensive campaigns (dry season plans), the US imperialists realized that they would be in a bad predicament if they tried to launch more strategic attacks. In reality, they are incapable of launching such attacks and they have had to shift to a defensive strategy which is aimed at preserving their forces. Such are the contradictions between their defensive strategy and the purpose and nature of their war of aggression. Historically, in all wars of aggression, any aggressors who were driven into defensive positions were defeated. As it is known to all of our comrades, the history of wars in the world and in our country has proved that all wars of aggression waged by the feudalists and imperialists, have always shifted into defensive positions, when on the brink of failure. The war of aggression waged by the French in our country is an example. The French imperialists were defeated after they were driven only partially into defensive positions.

The above mentioned are the contradictions between the nature of the war ((of the US)) and its strategy and between its ambition and its strength. It is a very amazing fact that the US imperialists who have more than a million troops equipped with the most modern weapons (except nuclear bombs) have had to shift to a defensive position. What can we tell from this fact? This fact proves that although the US imperialists have numerous forces and war facilities, they still are too weak to cope with our people's war which has been developed to the utmost in this period of time. The enemy is becoming increasingly bogged down in his strategic defense, and will suffer more serious defeats. It is evident that he cannot emerge from this state.

Secondly, the aggressive will of the US imperialists has been shaken to the foundation. The aggressive scheme of the US is to seize and control SVN, then make preparations to launch attacks against the North and the

socialist bloc countries.

((Page 3 of O.T.))

The US imperialist aggressors intended to achieve great goals, but they were attacked and shaken to the foundation by our friendly forces and the people. Although we have not yet completely crushed their scheme, their failures have been evidenced by their de-escalation of the war. Their de-escalation of the war started with their cessation of bombing of the North, and this means that their limited war was partially defeated. Moreover, they have been compelled to negotiate with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front, and they are gradually withdrawing their troops from SVN. When (~~President~~) Nixon assumed power, he was faced with a dilemma. He did not know whether to carry on the war or to get out of it. At that time, Nixon intended to send 200,000 additional troops to defeat us. This intention was based on the fact that, if he could not achieve military victories, he would at least create a strong position to negotiate with us (at the conference table). But after due consideration, he realized that the increase of 200,000 additional troops would not bring victories to him, but might drive him into greater failures and a more awkward predicament. For this reason, he had to de-escalate the limited war. Because of these facts, we can say that the US imperialists were not in a dilemma, but were forced to make a step backward in their limited war and try to seek a way to extricate the US Army from the despicable failure of their war of aggression.

The causes of the two above main facts (~~possibly the failures of the US imperialists~~) are as follows:

The first cause is their defeats on the (~~SVN~~) battlefield. It is obvious that the US imperialists were defeated in their unconventional war. They escalated the limited war to the highest degree, but they were also defeated.

Although the US imperialists have resorted to the use of the most modern equipment, the most savage tricks, and all types of combat tactics and strategy to massacre our people to the largest scale in a limited war, they are finally being defeated by our people's war. As a matter of fact, the more the enemy fights, the more he will lose; and the more we fight, the more we will gain.

Although the US imperialists have a large force and many war facilities and although they have increased their naval, ground, and air forces, they have been defeated because they were weak and because they have to cope with the sacred resistance of our people. One journalist even said: "The weapon depots belonging to the US imperialists cannot ensure their victory in the war in Vietnam." This statement is true. Nixon, once complained that even though the US had many troops and war facilities, its army was composed of draftees and not professional troops like those of the French who fought against us (~~US~~) previously. They are therefore incapable of defeating us. In reality, the US Army is not strong, and cannot win this war. However, if the US imperialists trained a professional army like the French expeditionary forces that were in our country before, they would still only be an aggressor army and would still be defeated. We are proud of the fact that our army and people have defeated the US Army, an army which believes itself to be the most powerful army in the world because it has never been defeated. At the

beginning, some people doubted our capability and wondered whether or not we would be able to defeat the US imperialists.

((Page 4 of O.T.))

Many countries in the world are afraid of the US. But, our people and troops have daringly fought and defeated the US Army. It is obvious that the US Army is not strong due to the fact that it was defeated by our people's army, which always fights violently and resolutely. The US Army is weak, but the Puppet Army and Government ((RVNAF and GVN)) are even weaker. The main cause of the US failure on the SVN battlefield has been the weaknesses of the Puppet Army and Government. The objective of the US imperialists was to use the Puppet Army and Government to fight our people and then use them as their henchmen to dominate our people in order to implement their neocolonialist policy, thus using the Puppet Army as the main fighting force against us. However, the Puppet Army and Government were too weak to become the backbone of the ((policy of the)) US imperialists in the implementation of their neocolonialist policy. Although the Puppet Army is fully equipped and has many troops, it is still too weak. The Puppet troops have been demoralized and their political knowledge is very poor. We can say that the deficiencies of the Puppet Army and Government are the basic weaknesses of the US imperialists and are the reason why they were unable to implement their neocolonialist policy. Therefore, the longer they fight, the more the Puppet Army and Government will become disorganized. The Puppet Army and Government have many people who look good, but who have no ability.

In the political field, the US imperialists and their henchmen have been defeated, isolated, and weakened for a very long time. Their internal organizations have been divided into five or seven parts ((sic)) and their organizations have been set up and toppled several times. This is also a basic weakness of the US imperialists because they have no foundation for their war of aggression. But our people's war is very valiant, powerful, and completely developed. We are now capable of crushing any type of warfare waged by the US imperialists.

The above weaknesses are the first reason explaining why the US imperialists are being defeated by our people's sacred struggle on the battlefield of SVN.

The second reason for their defeat is the internal strife within the US Administration and that between the US Government and the American people. In the United States, there are two opposing sides, one which advocates the end of the war and withdrawal of all US troops from SVN, while the second, Nixon's side, is composed of those who are stubborn and warlike. The first side belongs to the Democratic Party and the second side belongs to the Republican Party. However, even within the Republican Party there is some opposition to the Nixon clique. At present, the Democratic Party vigorously opposes the Republican Party, Nixon's side. This opposition is due to the conflict between the interests of the two parties. Generally, when the US imperialists become involved in the affairs of any country, they always seek ways to gain their interests. But this time, contrary to their aims, they have suffered great losses. This has greatly affected the interests of these two parties. Therefore, they

have to oppose their leaders. Those in the Democratic Party protest this war of aggression and the Republican Party struggles for its own interests and not for humanity or from love for the Vietnamese people. In reality, they are both gangsters and cannibals who have a great deal of influence. As you know, the American people are waging the anti-Vietnam war movements which are the greatest and most decisive and violent in the history of the US. These movements are the consequence of the increasingly critical contradictions between the US Government and US people. The US people have opposed the Vietnam war because it has cost a great number of American lives and has endangered the lives of the servicemen. The Nixon Administration has to satisfy the demands of the US people's antiwar movements, because they are a steady and powerful force. Although Nixon has boasted about his actions, his mind has not been calm at all.

((Page 5 of O.T.))

In short, the contradictions between the two parties and between the American people and the US Government have developed to such an extent that these contradictions must finally come out into the open. This is a very critical problem for Nixon's Government.

Another important problem in the US is the costly war expenditures. Up to now, the US Government has spent 300 billion dollars on the war in Vietnam (from 65 to now), which is a considerable amount of money. Yearly, the US capitalists receive an income of two and a half billion dollars from Latin America, which has the highest income ((sic)). Asia is not a zone of important investment for the US. Here, its investment is from five to six billion dollars, but this war has cost them a huge amount of money. With that 300 billion dollars, we ~~←(VC)→~~ could finance a war like the present one for thousands of years. The US imperialists must think this over; it is not a question of how much money we spend, rather it is of how much we affect the interests of the American people. The US capitalist cliques have suffered an increase of taxes; therefore, the market price has increased and inflation has developed. This makes the living standard of the US unstable and leads to the American people's protests. This is also the cause for the lack of stability in the US society and the defeat of the US imperialists.

The third reason is that the war in Vietnam has affected the international strategy of the US imperialists, and is now their international strategic center. Their international strategic center should be in another place. The US imperialists' main economic interest is not in Vietnam. But, the war in Vietnam has driven the US imperialists into such a situation that they are becoming bogged down in their own international strategy. The US imperialists suffer military defeats in the war in Vietnam because they have used up more than half of their naval, air, and ground forces for their international strategy.

"If a second Vietnam ever erupts in the world, the US would not be able to cope with the situation because the present war has involved most of its forces," said some US senators.

In the economic and financial fields, the US imperialists have also suffered heavy losses and had to reduce their aid to foreign countries. (Their economic aid gives them control of the countries which receive their aid. Their aid has only been given for the purpose of domination

and gaining benefits. They use their military forces to compel the foreign countries to obey them. Their economy in the international strategy has been affected. In the political field, they have become increasingly isolated. The US imperialists are perhaps at present more politically isolated than ever before in the history of the US.

These are the three main causes for the failure of the military strategy and aggressive will of the US imperialists, which has forced them to de-escalate the war and to seek ways to get the US troops out of difficulties. The main and basic cause is still their defeat on the Vietnam battlefield. This means that we are the victors and the enemy is the defeated.

The second problem is the scheme of the US imperialists.

((Page 6 of O.T.))

Although the US imperialists have suffered the above defeats, we must realize that they are very stubborn and warlike and are extremely cruel and cunning. Their plans are as follows:

First: They will continue to de-escalate the war and withdraw their troops step by step; but still they will drastically dispute us and maintain their strong position during the negotiations. When they think that they can draw advantages from negotiations, they will surely put an end to the war.

Second: If they fail to achieve their schemes to end the war as aforementioned, they will protract the war by de-Americanizing and Vietnamizing the war and also by creating civil disorders among the Vietnamese.

The US imperialists contemplate that they will withdraw their troops gradually and that the Puppet troops will replace them. They intend to shift the limited war into an unconventional war with more favorable conditions. This means that they will use the Puppet forces to play a key role against our people, while the US forces defend all the bases and cities and provide air and artillery support to the Puppet forces. If the US imperialists are successful in this plan most of the US troops will leave this war. However, they will still maintain the war by using a small force; it would enable them to sustain the war with only small losses of manpower and equipment. This would help them carry out their neocolonialism.

Both the unconventional war and the limited war were also defeated. Now the US imperialists have returned to the unconventional war in order to try to defeat us. This is an illusion because we have strong base camps and favorable conditions to frustrate this plan and will certainly win and force the US imperialists to end the war and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam.

Now, the entire Party, army, and people must make great efforts to struggle enthusiastically in this direction and must be determined to achieve victories because the unconventional war was defeated once before.

The limited war, which has reached its culmination, was also defeated. In the limited war, the expeditionary troops (US and satellite) played a key role. If the plan of Vietnamization of the war is carried out, the key forces will be replaced. This means that the weak Puppet forces will replace the strong US forces. This cannot be done because both the US and

what it was in quality and quantity at the time of the unconventional war. Therefore, if the US imperialists carry out the unconventional war in the above mentioned way, they will certainly be defeated by our troops and people. The Puppet Government and troops will certainly be destroyed.

Strategy: We are on the offensive and the enemy is on the defensive. If the change in the enemy forces takes place, his strategic position will be upset. He will not be able to maintain his present strategy. In regard to the ideological and political fields, the enemy's collapse is unavoidable and most of the Puppet troops and

((Page 7 of O.T.))

their Government clearly foresee defeat. In this way, morale and political awareness are basic factors. Since the enemy's morale and political awareness are poor, he will certainly be defeated. Our morale is high and our ideology is strong. These are key factors which will decide our success and the enemy's defeat. An example from the battlefields of Region 5 in 1965: There were 50,000 US troops in Jun 65. On 10 Mar 65, 35,000 US troops landed in Da Nang; in the middle of the year there were 50,000; and in Dec 65 the total number of troops was 100,000. At that time, the Puppet strength was 165,000 troops, and we had a few main forces in the area at all. We had only two regiments in the entire region, and these were poorly equipped and were not even qualified ((for combat)). The local and guerrilla forces were newly activated. There was one rifle for every five guerrillas. However, the people had never seen atrocities. The political movements in the cities were very weak as compared with the present ones. Based on the above comparison of the enemy force and ours, if major units of the US troops had not landed in such strength, we might have had been able to defeat the Puppet Government and troops at that time.

At present, in Region 5 the Puppet troops have the same strength. There are 240,000 expeditionary troops (in Region 5). This means there are about 400,000 of the enemy's armed forces there. If the expeditionary troops are partially withdrawn, the situation will change. We believe that if the Vietnamization of the war is carried out in Region 5, the Puppet troops there will be destroyed when they face attacks from our present forces.

I reiterate that the enemy can carry out the plan of Vietnamization of the war to a certain degree if we stand still without attacking him. If we make efforts and are determined to fight the enemy, he will not be able to carry out this plan and we will surely defeat him. This is clear because we have defeated the US troops many times. Therefore, if we do not become overconfident, if we do not commit great mistakes, and if we are determined to intensify the three-pronged attacks, especially military attacks on the battlefields, and are determined to make greater efforts, the US imperialists will be defeated, give up their will of aggression, end the war, and withdraw their troops. This end can be achieved depending on our efforts and attacks, but we believe that in the days to come the entire South Vietnam as well as the entire Region 5 will make great efforts and be determined to intensify attacks against the enemy in order to force him to give up his plans and comply with our conditions.

Although the US imperialists are strong, they will have to change their plans if we continue to attack them vigorously (might overcome ? right) ((sic)). This is the rule. Success will depend on our attacks, our efforts, and our determination to fight. If we fulfill the requirements, we will succeed in forcing the US imperialists to lose the war, accept our conditions to end the war, and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam.

In short, I have not mentioned all the characteristics of the US imperialists. I have only analyzed their strategy.

PART II

A number of points stressed in the resolution of the Region Current Affairs Committee.

I. OUR SUCCESSES AND THE ENEMY'S FAILURES.

Recently, the enemy's activities caused a number of difficulties and casualties to us and created a tense situation. Since the beginning of this year, the enemy has suffered heavier losses in personal and war facilities. The enemy force has increased, but his mobile forces have been reduced. His secondary forces ((possibly Regional and Popular Force)) have increased, but this is only a small number which, of course, we must strive to destroy. The enemy's combat potential has been reduced further.

Our armed and political forces have been well developed. Although our force is small, it is qualified. We recently destroyed a large number of the enemy's force. The political struggles in the rural areas and cities have also been well developed.

In general, the enemy has suffered heavy losses, and his combat potential has been reduced while our forces have been strengthened, especially in quality. Therefore, the more we fight, the stronger we become, and the greater successes we achieve.

Concerning the positions between the enemy and us:

The enemy has failed, step by step, in his defense and has strived to defend cities and bases by launching attacks. His defense system is always broken; we always launched attacks directly against his bases and key agencies, and attacked the cities constantly. In general, we have maintained our strategic positions in the three areas and have succeeded in strategically attacking and encircling the enemy in the cities.

For example:

On the Quang ¹Đa battlefield, the enemy has concentrated a large force consisting of one US division and approximately one Puppet main force division. These are only his mobile infantry forces. In Đà Nẵng, he established a multi-line defensive system. All of Quang ¹Đa lies within these defensive lines. The enemy established a four or five-line defensive system in the inner and surrounding areas of Cẩm Lệ, Bồ Bồ, Lê Nghi along Routes 100 and 104, and in bordering areas.... ((sic)). The multi-line defensive system is maintained by a large number of enemy forces, including naval, air, and ground forces with strong firepower. This defensive system also includes a system of strongholds and mobile forces stationed in the areas surrounding the defensive system, etc. ((sic)). That is to say that the defensive system in Đà Nẵng is relatively fortified and perfect. Previously, the French used only one mobile infantry battalion for this purpose. Now the US imperialists use a large

force for the defense, but still Quang Bả and Bả Nặng have been attacked repeatedly by our troops; their defensive lines are now breached. We have continuously attacked the enemy and encircled him.

The situation in early spring of 1968 was quite different from the current one. At that time, we moved our troops in mass because the enemy did not believe we would.

((Page 9 of O.T.))

Now the enemy is vigilant and his defense is strong. However, even with this defense we still succeed in attacking him. In some cases, even though the enemy knew the dates and the direction of our attacks, we were still successful. This proved that our offensive strategy does not cover only military activities. If our attention was only paid to military activities, our offensive strategy could not have become as well developed as it is now.

First, we must rely on the political activities and the people's struggles.

Secondly, we must develop guerrilla warfare, especially in the bordering and core areas of cities.

Thirdly, we must maneuver troops and adopt combat methods in a resourceful manner.

The enemy's defense system is strongly organized, but it has many gaps. We can still attack him and drive him into the defensive. Most of our favorable conditions have been created by our political activities, guerrilla warfare, effective combat methods invented by our armed forces, and the cooperation of the people in the three-pronged attacks. Therefore, our strategic offensive must be developed in accordance with the above conditions.

We must develop our strategy in this way, instead of using a large force to conduct massive attacks. An example is Bả Nặng. In other provinces, it is more favorable for us to develop our offensive position. Only in a few areas where our forces are unqualified and vulnerabilities are prevalent are our troops confused.

In short, we have continuously attacked and defeated the enemy by using our strategy, regardless of where he is or what system of defense he has organized. Even when he knows the objectives of our attack, the date when we are going to attack, and what our objectives are, we can still attack him successfully. However, we must always try to maintain secrecy and insure surprise. At present, we are in drastic contention with the enemy in rural areas where he has carried out the accelerated pacification plan and his plan of de-Americanization of the war. Recently the enemy has made intensive efforts to pacify the rural areas, de-Americanize the war, strengthen the Puppet forces, spray toxic chemicals, drop bombs, and conduct shellings. This causes many difficulties to us and the people, thus causing a tense situation. But in general, the struggle movements in rural areas have been maintained and developed.

At the beginning, we partially frustrated the enemy's accelerated pacification plan. The US, South Korean, and Puppet forces gathered together and resorted to the cruellest acts possible, but they were still defeated. If in the near future, we exploit our achievements, gain experiences, and become more determined to fight, we will surely smash the enemy's pacification plan.

Recently, in rural areas, we have improved our organizations, and progress has been made in conducting our activities. We have continued to gain and develop achievements in the rural areas.

((Page 10 of 0117))

As you know, the enemy strove to maintain stability in the towns and cities because they are considered to be his key locations and rear bases. However, from the beginning of 1968, political movements in the cities have steadily developed. Once political organizations and military agencies are developed, our revolutionary forces will be also. When the people's struggle and the guerrilla warfare movements are developed, the people's revolutionary pride will be promoted.

Generally, the enemy has been striving to sustain the cities, thwart our attacks against him, and oust us from the cities. He has failed to do this. On the contrary, the situation in the cities has become increasingly confused both politically and militarily. The enemy's economy has been undermined while our political movements in the cities have developed successfully.

Furthermore, the enemy has been weakened politically and ideologically. The people have opposed and isolated him. His government personnel and the soldiers in his army have protested the aggression of the US imperialists and their dictatorial henchmen. Consequently, the enemy's political isolation has become most critical, and he has become more demoralized.

As for us, our political situation has increasingly developed. The revolutionary pride in the cities was highly promoted, and the morale of the entire people, soldiers, and Party has been strengthened. Although rightism still exists, the revolutionary pride in the rural and urban areas of the troops, Party members, and people is generally high. What is revolutionary pride? Revolutionary pride is the determination to surge forward to defeat the American aggressors; and because of this, we are enthusiastic. This is a basic factor for defeating the enemy and bringing about victory. We are winning, not because of our superiority in weaponry or troop strength, but because of our sound policies and strong ideology. The enemy is now seriously defeated in the political field and is demoralized, while our revolutionary pride has been strongly promoted.

The above are additional reasons for the enemy's many failures and our great victories. We must fully realize the enemy's new schemes.

Stress the following three main points of the enemy's forthcoming scheme, because they cover his entire plan.

1. The enemy is trying to consolidate his defensive position and adopt the "clear-and-hold" tactic.
2. The enemy's de-Americanization of the war.
3. The enemy's accelerated pacification program.

Other activities are designed to attain the above objectives. At this time, we must pay attention to the second and third objectives: De-Americanization of the war and the accelerated pacification plan.

The accelerated pacification plan is the key factor to achieving the other objectives; because only when the enemy succeeds in maintaining his controlled areas, relocating the people into his controlled areas, and pacifying our controlled areas will he be able to achieve his scheme of de-Americanization and strengthen the defense of his base camps and cities. Therefore, even though they

((Page 11 of 0117))

all are strategic objectives, the accelerated pacification program is the most important of the above three.

We should remember that the enemy has carried out his pacification plan, not only in our controlled areas, but also in his controlled areas, because he considers pacification a basic task. Only when he fulfills these requirements will he be able to develop his espionage and psychological warfare activities. However, only when he succeeds in attaining his three major objectives can he achieve his political goal.

In order to frustrate the enemy's schemes and gain greater victories, we must make efforts to fulfill the following tasks:

Successfully correct the present deficiencies and shortcomings.

Develop our victories and our forces in order to launch continuous attacks against the enemy.

1. Successfully correct the deficiencies and shortcomings which we have recognized in the recent self-critique session:

In the military field, we must either annihilate the enemy or completely destroy his forces. This should be done not only by the local and main forces but also by the guerrilla forces. We must not only disrupt the enemy's forces, but we should strive to completely eliminate his platoons, companies, and battalions and put brigade-size units out of action. The guerrilla forces must also annihilate irregular force squads and platoons. We are capable of fulfilling this task.

We must also break the enemy's oppressive control and eliminate cruel "tyrants" in order to create conditions for us to win over the people and secure liberated areas. We have many shortcomings in carrying out this task. The most consequential shortcomings are as follows: Cadre did not understand their assigned missions and the combat leadership and tactics were confusing and unsuitable. Consequently, we have not met the requirements. Usually the criteria set forth are high, but the results attained are far below them. In the forthcoming days, we must be determined to correct these deficiencies. Province Party Committees should directly provide their members with immediate, close, and specific military guidance in accordance with the prescribed policies. The province and district Party Committees should be responsible for the implementation of these combat missions, because they have set forth their missions, requirements, directions of attacks, and employment of their forces.

Guerrilla warfare is of strategic importance. This is very difficult to comprehend. Although it has been previously discussed and explained several times, it is still not fully understood. The reason for this deficiency is that the guidance for guerrilla warfare provided by the Party Committees of all echelons is vague. Therefore, Party Committee echelons and province units have not paid much attention to guerrilla warfare.

Guerrilla forces are present throughout the country and are resourceful. Our guerrilla forces have created many difficulties to the US aggressors. We must understand this and develop guerrilla warfare everywhere, especially in the cities.

Improving our forces: The quality and quantity of our forces are generally good, but we still have some weaknesses. To meet the forthcoming requirements, we must improve the combat skills of our units, so that they can implement the policy of the Central Headquarters and accomplish the missions set forth by the Region.

For this reason, the improvement of the combat skills of our troops is very important, for it is the decisive factor for our victories. Our requirements are to annihilate as many enemy forces as possible. The more we increase our combat efficiency, the more we decrease our casualties. For this reason, we must urgently improve the combat skills of our forces. Only by improving the combat skills of our forces can we meet the actual requirements and fulfill the prescribed missions. Failure to improve the combat skills of our forces will cause us to not fulfill our requirements and our missions. Improving the combat skill of our forces is not difficult, but it is not very easy either. However, we will be successful because we are doing it. The following are some important points in the improvement of combat skills of our units:

Increase the revolutionary spirit and determination to positively attack the enemy. Make sure that our cadre and soldiers are well-trained militarily. Consolidate our organizations, and especially the main units. Provide good leadership for training cadre. Ensure that the troops are supplied with the necessary things, etc. ((sic)).

All provinces should be determined to conduct training to improve the combat skill of a number of village and hamlet guerrillas, as prescribed.

We must strive to turn out an adequate number of well-trained guerrillas, as prescribed, so that they can be used to conduct attacks in the forthcoming phases. Presently, in order to implement his pacification plan, the enemy is striving to set up scattered, small key positions. If our district units and local guerrillas are trained well, we can destroy these key positions. We must make great efforts to achieve this end. Winning over and preventing the people from moving ((into enemy-controlled areas)) will be mentioned in more detail in the subsequent part. We must be determined to overcome weaknesses, shortcomings, and rightism in order to be able to provide our personnel with the best possible guidance and to meet the requirements of winning over and preventing the people from moving into enemy-controlled areas.

While carrying out our activities in cities, we must successfully correct weaknesses and shortcomings which have been criticized by our comrades. Even though the activities to be performed in cities have been developed, weaknesses and deficiencies still exist. These deficiencies have been observed while performing the following missions: While strengthening our forces, increasing guerrilla warfare, breaking the enemy's oppressive control, seizing control, expanding and intensifying the political struggle movements, and while creating strong areas surrounding the cities.

In the economic field, providing food is one of our most difficult problems. If the amount of foodstuffs available ever decreased, a critical problem would arise. Recently, our greatest anxiety concerned provisions. There was famine, though not serious, in some places in Region 5. We must check production and the leadership for production provided to the people, self-sufficient production, economic management, and the protection of production. Actually, we have suffered from natural disasters, enemy sabotage, and from poverty, but we are also capable of surmounting the above disasters if we make greater efforts. For this reason, we must strive to correct weaknesses and deficiencies in production and be determined to solve the problem of providing food provisions.

To meet the food provision requirements; we must insure production, requisition, purchasing, transportation, and economical management. Presently, there is a reliance on the support of higher echelons in our units. The self-sufficient spirit should be improved. We must be determined to carry out the guidelines of self-sufficiency; otherwise, we will become seriously confused when famine occurs. Consequently, we must endeavor to collect taxes in cities, in enemy-controlled areas, and in our liberated areas. We should collect money as well as rice. We have not carefully checked this problem, which is one of importance to Region 5. All comrades must try to correct the shortcomings and deficiencies in the financial and economic fields, and we should focus our efforts on the above actions, so that we can provide adequate food supplies to the resistance forces, which are increasing more and more, and stabilize the people's living conditions. Attention should be paid to stabilizing the people's living conditions. We must not leave the people alone because we are relying upon the people to fight the enemy. Therefore, we must care for them. If we let the people suffer famine, we shall commit a big mistake which should be avoided. For this reason, we must strive to overcome difficulties encountered in the economic field.

We must correct the parties ideological and organizational deficiencies and shortcomings. This is dealt with in the subsequent parts of this speech. Our purpose is to improve our ideology and oppose rightsism in order to make the Party headquarters, the troops, and the people have "determination-to-fight-and-win" over the US aggressors and determination to rush forward to attack the enemy and suppress the fear of death and bewilderment. To defeat the enemy, we must strive to overcome weaknesses and shortcomings. We must also endeavor to improve the Party's organization in accordance with the resolution laid down by the Region Party Committee.

2. We must successfully develop our own forces among the people. Due to the support of the people, we can defeat the US aggressors. It is necessary for us to completely develop our people's forces. We must motivate the people to join the struggle movements in the rural areas, step up the "Five Movements" ((sic)), develop the people's struggle movements in cities, and strive to struggle against the enemy to implement our prescribed missions. In rural areas, we have established a strong position, and in urban areas we have been supported by the people's forces, and have also established a strong position. We must develop the people's forces in both the rural and urban areas. To this end, we must strive to ideologically motivate the people to strengthen our organizations, provide leadership for the people to decisively struggle against the enemy, and strive to prevent the people from moving into the enemy-controlled areas and seize control. The second mission is to successfully increase the strength of the armed forces. In order to increase the strength of the armed forces, we must strive to improve the combat skills of our units. We must also make efforts to use, motivate, and successfully develop the guerrilla, main, and local forces. Our primary force is the people and our secondary force is the armed forces. We must strongly develop these two forces. The third mission is to strengthen the Party's leadership. The Party headquarters has undergone the most terrible and fierce trials possible. As a result, it has obtained progress in ideology and organization. The Party Committee echelons and all the Party members have gained a great deal of experience. Therefore, we must successfully

develop our capabilities in order to provide our units with proper guidance to gain the decisive victory.

On the basis of the three above mentioned missions, we must develop our offensive strategy and promote the revolutionary pride in order to conduct continuous and vigorous attacks in the three areas.

((Page 14 of O.T.))

To successfully fulfill the forthcoming missions, we must overcome the weaknesses mentioned above and strengthen our forces and position. At the same time, we must thoroughly understand the Party's policy and guidelines.

II. FORTHCOMING MISSIONS.

1. I suppose that you have studied the Resolution. Therefore, I will only emphasize the two following points: From now until 180 ((sic)), we must intensify our activities to meet the required end results of our plans and at the same time, prepare for 180.

These two missions must be thoroughly understood and implemented; otherwise, the requirements of 180 will not be achieved. Due to the present situation between the enemy and friendly troops on the battlefield, an irregularity in activity may lead us to a loss in position and strength and create disadvantages to our preparations for 180.

Therefore, our leadership should be focused on countering the accelerated pacification program to win over the people and on maintaining and enlarging the movement. The Region Party Committee has determined several phases of operations to be successively carried out from now until that day ((sic)). Regular activities should be maintained during these climaxing phases. Leadership must pay due attention to this regularity in action as well as in the preparations for 180 in order to achieve the consistency required in activity and accomplish the missions of 180. Emphasis must be placed on these two aspects. Inconsistency in activity will lead to unsuccessful preparations, and a lack of preparations will also lead to the failure of 180. These two problems are in close correlation (organic relationship). After 180, other phases of operations will be initiated. Presently, the Region Party Committee does not have any specific plan concerning this matter as of yet; but we must always be ready for the coming operation phases that the Region Party Committee has not yet determined because of the fear of dispersing our efforts while preparing for 180.

Another problem is profoundly understanding and implementing the missions of greatest importance. This does not mean to neglect the other missions; on the contrary, they must all be intensified in order to support the important ones. Good implementation of the chief missions will facilitate the realization of the ordinary ones. Once again, I would like to remind you that you must pay strict attention to the accomplishment of both priority and ordinary missions. The immediate task to be carried out is to counter the enemy's pacification activities.

The third problem is thoroughly understanding the following missions set for the 180 climaxing phase:

Conduct military offensives.

Conduct general uprisings in rural areas.

Conduct uprisings in towns and cities.

((Page 15 of O.T.))

The Region Party Current Affairs Committee and Military Region Party Committee have already discussed the first of the three fundamental problems mentioned above.

Now, we should discuss the two following problems: Popular uprisings in rural and urban areas must be conducted in coordination with three-pronged attacks and popular uprisings must start from the basic level and evolve into a legal political struggle.

These are the main points of our mission. I only mention part of the problem. Only when you master this spirit can you profoundly understand the Resolution.

From now to 1960, the five following requirements of the Resolution determined by the Region Party Current Affairs Committee should be fulfilled:

Fight the Americans.

Annihilate the Puppets.

Win over the people.

Promote the city movements.

Strengthen our forces in all aspects.

You must have determination to meet these five requirements. The success of this mission will help us to change the situation on the battlefield to our advantage. In brief, the two major requirements of the problem are: To achieve the five requirements and change the situation on the battlefield. From now to 1960, we must fulfill these two requirements. In my estimation we must attain the five requirements mentioned above to change the situation on the battlefield. If the situation is unchanged, we will at least attain these five requirements, then determinedly move forward to achieve victory and change the situation on the battlefield. This constitutes the basic foundation for a decisive victory. Our region by itself would not be able to change the situation of the war; it is only possible if a coordination in efforts is made by the entire population of South Vietnam. However, Region 5 must also contribute its part to the change of the situation of the war. This means that the Americans must end the war, withdraw their troops, and establish a coalition government. Only then can we move toward the final victory. In my opinion, we must realize the following missions:

The first one consists of frustrating the limited war waged by the Americans and forcing the Americans to recognize their defeat and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam. This is very important because the existence of the Puppets depends on the support of the Americans. Therefore, we must

defeat and force the Americans to withdraw their troops. The second mission is to annihilate and disorganize the Puppet troops in order to accelerate their disruption once the Americans are gone.

The third mission is to gain extensive control of rural areas and win over the majority of the population in towns and cities. Basically, it would be a success if we could gain the control of 70 to 80% of the population. We must have determination to meet this requirement.

((Page 16 of O.T.))

Furthermore, our armed and political forces in both rural and urban areas must become quantitatively and qualitatively stronger, the troops must be well-trained, and cadre and key personnel must be also improved.

Unless the above problems are satisfactorily solved, the basic foundation for a decisive victory cannot be established. Can the above problems be solved? In my opinion, it is possible. If the efforts in South Vietnam are focussed on extensive attacks, the US troops will surely be forced to withdraw and the Puppet troops will be defeated.

We are capable of gaining control over most of the people, not in this phase, but in future ones. I believe that both the armed and political forces must be strengthened since they play the determining role in defeating the enemy. The establishment of a coalition government is of course very important, but our present duty is to implement the above tasks to help South Vietnam to achieve a decisive victory. Of course, these tasks will not be completed by 180 ((sic)), so further efforts should be made.

2. Controlling leadership:

We must be ready to wage a protracted war and try to gain the decisive victory within a relatively short period of time. This matter was pointed out in the resolution of the Central Headquarters, but was not fully understood by our men. This matter is significant. At present, it is necessary to be reminded of the above stated schemes of the US imperialists which include the de-Americanization plan aimed at prolonging the war and Vietnamizing it in order to maintain the existence of their troops. Thus, our fighting against the Americans is not a simple struggle waged by a small country against a large empire. It requires that we have a profound knowledge of our long-range policy and that we make greater offensive efforts to swiftly defeat the enemy. There is no contradiction between these two points. In launching long-range and extensive attacks, the most important problem is annihilation of oppressors and tyrants ((meaning RVN village and hamlet officials and leaders of the RVN police and pacification elements)) and gaining control over the population. Once control over the population is gained, the foundation for long-range and strong attacks to accelerate the defeat of the enemy will occur. Secondly, intensification of attack efforts must be made to destroy the enemy's vital war facilities, weaken his strength, and create favorable conditions for the development of our forces. The rural and urban areas must also be consolidated. Rural improvement must be overall and must include the improvement of our productive capacity and public living conditions and the development of ((friendly)) organizations, guerrilla warfare, etc... ((sic)). Urban consolidation must include personnel recruitment development of guerrilla warfare, intensification of political struggles, etc... ((sic)).

Our forces must be well trained. Above are the main points in the long-range fighting policy. Long-range preparations are the basis for speeding up attacks against the enemy to defeat him for the decisive victory in a short period of time. This is the basic policy which must be mastered. There are also long-range and short-range policies which are different; but when we adhere to them, we can pursue a protracted struggle and cope with the enemy in all circumstances, and we will be able to defeat him some day. Some places have thoroughly understood the policies, but they failed to put them into practice; they lacked determination in conducting constant attacks to weaken the enemy and develop our forces.

((Page 17 of O.T.))

A good knowledge of the targets is required.

The Current Affairs Committee's resolution indicates that the struggles against the US and Puppet troops are of equal importance. According to the resolution decided on by the entire Region, the area should consider its available forces as a basis to determine the combat targets in its locality.

I mention here only the targets for local areas and provinces, with the exception of Quang Da (where many US units are stationed and where our main forces are available). Provinces should focus their attack efforts primarily on the Puppet troops. When choosing combat targets, we should make a comparison of the enemy and friendly forces in order to decide if the attack to be conducted will be beneficial to us politically. The choice of combat targets is a problem of great importance. At present, most of our attack efforts must be aimed at the Puppet forces (yet, in some battlefields, they must be focussed on the US troops). Our increased efforts in the destruction of the Puppet troops will help frustrate the accelerated pacification plan and the de-Americanization plan and allow us to successfully gain control of the population, develop our forces, and destroy the weakest positions of the enemy's military network.

Furthermore, to prevent dangerous situations in the future, we must successfully attack the Puppet troops now and in the future. Of course, the dangers cannot be eliminated completely at once, so efforts are still to be made to develop the revolutionary struggle. While attacking the Puppet troops, the primary objectives are reactionary elements, tyrants, administrative officials, and pacification cadre. Naturally, we cannot stop our attack efforts against the US troops. Yet, in my opinion, provinces should direct their attack efforts toward the Puppet troops for the above reasons and to meet the present requirements of the main mission. When attacking the Puppet troops, we should choose vulnerable targets to ensure fulfillment of the requirements and gain control of the population and frustrate the pacification plan. The suppression of one "tyrant" should be regarded as important as the killing of 100 to 200 enemy soldiers. Only when the tyrants are annihilated can the dangers be eliminated and the enemy troops totally disorganized. Suppression of tyrants is the best way to attain success.

The main targets for our attacks are the cities and the rural and mountainous areas. Of these, cities are emphasized more in the resolution of the Central Headquarters. We also realize the pivotal role of the cities. Hence, the immediate mission of our areas now is to promote the urban movement and determinedly and violently attack the cities. Attacks on cities are aimed at fulfilling the city requirements ((sic)) and killing oppressive personnel ((meaning EVN administrative personnel)) to help gain control of the rural population.

We must consider rural areas as the basic foundation for our operations. This is not contrary to the spirit of the resolution and does

not mean less attention should be paid to cities. In cities, we must develop our forces, intensify attack efforts, and use three-front attacks to serve the rural requirements. It is emphasized that the rural areas also include the mountainous, forested, and lowland areas (especially areas adjacent to cities). Since we have failed to control a large population in the rural areas, in the future we must try to control 700,000 rural people as mentioned in the rural control plan by the formulated provinces. We must struggle for control of over 2,000,000 of the population, and the rest will come under our control after we disorganize the enemy and defeat him in battles.

When control of the rural population is in our hands, we will have succeeded in defeating the enemy's plan of pacification and de-Americanization of the war.

((Page 18 of O.T.))

The successful strengthening of the rural areas will create favorable conditions for increasing our movement in the cities. For this reason, our present offensive policy is to concentrate attacks on the rural areas to meet the prescribed requirements. The current situation in the rural areas proves that the enemy's position is unstable. In cities, we must intensify political, military proselyting, and guerrilla warfare activities in coordination with attacks by the outside forces. We must build up our forces and improve our leadership in order to increase our activities in cities to achieve our prescribed missions there and to facilitate the tasks in the rural areas. We must attack the cities because if we do so, the enemy will have to concentrate his forces to defend the cities and thus will leave many gaps in the rural areas. We do not mean to place less emphasis on cities, but by reason of leadership and force deployment, we must now focus efforts on attacks in the rural areas, as I have mentioned earlier.

In brief, we have pointed out the failures and schemes of the enemy and our victories and capabilities to defeat the enemy and gain victory in the near future. First, we must correct our deficiencies and develop our supremacy and strong points. We must understand our three main missions: Conduct continuous attacks while making preparations for 180 ((sic)); understand the principal mission and the basic purpose of 180 which is to conduct military attacks and a general uprising in the rural areas and cities; and comprehend problems concerning leadership.

PART III

Our Counterpacification and our Gaining Control over the Population.

I. STRONG POINTS, WEAK POINTS, AND REASONS.

Strong points: In Region 5, our counterpacification task was successful during the first step. We frustrated the enemy's pacification plan in some of his priority pacification zones and succeeded in holding the rural areas even though we encountered difficulties and the people in some areas were disturbed. In general, we were able to hold our liberated areas. We have enthusiastically engaged in the task of breaking the enemy's oppressive control and gaining control over the people. According to statistical reports, since early 1968, 500,000 people have come under friendly control, and we have successfully loosened the enemy's oppressive control and developed our forces in many enemy-controlled areas. The city movement was expanded. We broke and loosened the enemy's control and partly gained power in some areas. In some cities, we gained limited control over several sections and wards, killed tyrants, and developed the guerrilla warfare movement.

In brief, we have basically defeated the enemy's pacification program, held firmly to the rural areas, broken the enemy's oppressive control, and won more people over to our side. The task of breaking the enemy's control and building installations in enemy-controlled areas has been carried out more intensively than before. As for the city movement, we have killed tyrants, developed the guerrilla warfare movement, and gained partial control over some areas.

there felt satisfied with its merits and maintained normal activities in normal conditions instead of continuing to attack the enemy in order to smash

((Page 20 of O.T.))

his accelerated pacification plan completely in these two areas. This occurred because of the lack of adequate planning and the superficial knowledge and low determination of our comrades. At present, the enemy has only launched a few sweep operations against Bình Dương, and is now establishing some key positions in southern Bình Dương. It is natural that he has not yet gained overall control over the population in places where he is stationed, but if we make no reaction, he will, in a certain time, extend his control to the surrounding areas. Therefore, we must be determined to encircle enemy posts and destroy the troops who fan out to attack us by using district guerrillas and troops who have been trained in sapper tactics. We must also strive to destroy his sweep operations which he will conduct from time to time.

The situation in Ba Lăng An was reported differently by the province Party Committee, province unit members, and the Region cadre who had been sent on a mission in Quảng Ngãi Province. Presently, although the enemy has failed to control the people closely, he has succeeded in relocating 11,000 people to concentration centers. This resulted from the reduction of activities of our forces after they had inflicted a partial defeat on the enemy as mentioned above.

In northern Bình Định Province, the enemy pacification elements scored some successes due to the local officials' loose leadership and inadequate planning.

At present, the enemy is continuously moving ahead with his pacification program in the city border areas. Though repeatedly reminded by the region, our cadre are still subjective. This has led to a steady decrease in population gains in these areas. The cause of the subjectivity is that our cadre do not fully understand the enemy's insidious schemes or properly understand the problems, and they do not resolutely lead the people and troops to react against the enemy. If they have wide knowledge, make good preparations, and have a high determination to fight, they will certainly frustrate the enemy's pacification plan.

In the past, in some of the climaxing and population gaining phases which had been carefully prepared, we won over a great number of people, but none in periods of normal activities. For instance, we gained 350,000 people during the 1969 Spring Campaign. This was reduced to 30,000 - 40,000 people during the Summer Campaign, and then dropped to nothing during the Autumn-Winter Campaign due to our lack of endeavor. We had the capability, but we did not resolutely focus efforts and leadership on this task, so the results were sub-standard. Some areas failed to keep the population from being relocated by the enemy. The killing of tyrants and the loosening of the enemy's oppressive control over the population to create favorable conditions for gaining power were weakly conducted. This is one of the causes of our sub-standard results (the main cause is our loose leadership).

The annihilation of the enemy administrative personnel to gain partial control in cities has been carried out rather successfully by some units.

But generally speaking, this task has still left much to be desired. The political struggle in cities has not been increased a further step.

Above are a number of our main shortcomings.

The reasons for these shortcomings are as follows:

((Page 21 of O.T.))

We have not yet relied on the people and been determined to win over the people, which means we have not yet thoroughly learned the significance of the task of winning over the people.

If we neglect or slovenly carry out the task of recruitment of agents in enemy areas and the consolidation of our areas to counter enemy pacification, we will not be able to gain control over the population. Generally speaking, Party Committees, armed units, and province units are not fully aware of the importance of this task.

Rightism has been rife because the task of gaining control over the population and the counterpacification mission are rigorous struggles with the enemy in which we have to meet the enemy face-to-face. Rightism is reflected in such wrong attitudes and erroneous ideology:

1. We dared not cling to the people to counter the enemy pacification; and we dared not recruit agents in enemy areas and motivate the people to rise up to break the enemy oppressive control and seize power.

2. We lacked determination and enthusiasm to fight and we displayed a shirking attitude. Some cadre remained inactive after recruiting agents. Some others only conducted moderate activities, not daring to intensify them for fear of the fierceness of the enemy's reaction.

3. We dared not break the enemy's oppressive control to gain control over the population or conduct counterpacification activities because we feared death.

Such are the results of the build-up of our forces in liberated areas to fight the enemy. What needs to be pointed out is the fact that we are only concerned about our liberated areas and pay little attention to developing our forces and instigating the people to annihilate tyrants in enemy areas. In fact, we should first recruit underground agents and legal and secret guerrillas in the enemy-controlled areas in order to lead the people to wage armed and political struggles. Actually, in order to develop our movement, there must be strong armed and political agents to lead the people. At present, these agents are so weak that they dare not stay close to enemy areas to recruit agents. In addition, we dared not provide leadership for the conduct of three-front attacks or to urge the people to rise up due to the rightist attitude.

The military, political, and military proselyting fronts were not coordinated. Units were not determined to instigate the people's uprisings. Many of them did not zealously perform their duties, nor did they know how to coordinate military, political, and military proselyting activities to facilitate our gaining control over the population.

Briefly, the motivation of the people to rise up and the political and military proselyting and the armed struggles were all weak. In general, the leadership in ideology, organization, and planning at all echelons is loose.

These are a number of important reasons for our deficiencies, of which the most serious one is in the field of ideology. Consequently, we must strive to correct erroneous thoughts, then other deficiencies.

((Page 22 of O.T.))

II. RECAPITULATION OF LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCES IN ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE ENEMY'S PACIFICATION PROGRAM AND IN THE TASK OF WINNING OVER THE PEOPLE.

Know how to rely on the people.

Assess the enemy and friendly situation properly.

Launch three-pronged attacks.

Strengthen our forces to counter the enemy's accelerated pacification program.

Break the enemy's oppressive control, motivate the people to rise up, and win the support of the people in rural areas.

Motivate the people in the provinces to rise up.

Provide leadership.

1. It is necessary to consider winning the support of the people as the main task.

Presently, the plan of the US imperialists and their henchmen is to exert all efforts to carry out their accelerated pacification program. With this plan, the enemy plans to win over more people and put them under his oppressive control in order to carry out his "clear-and-hold" strategy, de-Americanize the war, and weaken our forces. It is certain that we will be weakened if we lose many people. Thus, the enemy is striving to concentrate his forces and resort to very cunning schemes, to compete with us in winning the support of the people.

We should clearly realize the enemy's plan. If we successfully counter his pacification program, break his oppressive control, and win over the people, we will defeat his accelerated pacification program and break his oppressive control of the people in his controlled areas, thus defeating his Vietnamization plan. De-Americanization of the war can only be achieved if he can control the people. To defeat his plan of winning the support of the people, we must defeat his de-Americanization of the war completely. Gaining the support of the people is our greatest achievement, and the enemy's poorest achievement. His weakest point is in the task of holding the people, while this is our strongest point. So the most efficient way to weaken him and to strengthen our position is to attack him in this task.

I will repeat some of the features concerning the task of winning the support of the people in the past. At the end of 1959 and at the beginning of 1960, there were no armed forces in all SVN. Nambo (VC designation for the southern part of SVN, e.g. the former Cochinchina) had only a few platoons, and Military Region 5 had almost none. However, we knew how to rely on the people and motivate them to rise up to break the enemy's oppressive control and take over power in villages and hamlets, creating a foundation for waging a large-scale war. At the beginning, we had nothing, having neither weapons nor controlled hamlets. Yet, we relied on the people and motivated them to rise up and wage a large-scale war. Controlling the people is the main factor to have a successful movement. In Military Region 5, we should restudy the lessons and good experiences we gained before. Sometimes, we performed the task of winning the support of the people well, then neglected the task and forgot the lessons which were learned. At the beginning of 1963, 1964, and 1965, we encountered many difficulties; but the Region Party Committee was determined to motivate the people to wage a spontaneous uprising.

As a result, from controlling a few ((people)), we proceeded control about 2,000,000 people. With a large population under our control, we had favorable conditions to wage the war. I remember that at that time we adopted the proper slogan: "Do everything to control the people; with the people, we will succeed in everything." The slogan was correct. We should have studied and understood this slogan better. In the Revolution, we have problems which must be studied and restudied over and over again, and we must learn from our past experiences in order to perform our tasks more successfully. But instead, we have gradually forgotten our experiences. In SVN, the periods of spontaneous uprisings and of destroying "strategic

((Page 23 of O.T.))

hamlets" and "targeted pacification zones" were historical events. In Military Region 5, during the period of spontaneous uprising to destroy strategic hamlets, we made a great leap forward and learned many valuable lessons. In particular, in many areas in our Military Region, we had large armed forces and launched many attacks against the enemy. Our Party Committees, cadre, Party members, and soldiers made many efforts and sacrifices and endured many difficulties and hardships, but in the end our armed forces gradually decreased and became mere "rear" soldiers.

Why could we not control the people although we had made so many efforts and conducted so many fierce attacks against the enemy? Should we continue this way? Certainly not. We should severely criticize ourselves and admit that it was the wrong way. We have not fully understood the concept of the masses; we have failed to depend upon the people, use them as the basis, and provide proper leadership to them.

We should look at the movement to determine whether the Party Committees have provided good leadership. Concerning emulation, we should consider winning the support of the people as the principal mission. We

CAC LOG NO. 06-1790-70

should control the number of people we are holding now and the number of people we will win over in the future. We must give awards ((to deserving cadre)) and develop achievements. We should consider the people as our basic task. A province has different districts. So, I suggest that the comrades in the same province motivate districts and villages to successfully win the support of the people and severely criticize those districts and villages which fail to win the people's support.

What is the relationship between the task of winning the support of the people and the policy of general offensives and uprising? The general offensive and uprising is a long phase of activities which cannot be achieved overnight. It is a period during which the people are motivated to rise up, to overthrow the enemy's government at low levels and assume control. It is a period of breaking the enemy's oppressive control; assuming control at low levels, villages, hamlets, and city wards; along with destroying the enemy. It is also a period of gradually overthrowing the enemy, gradually attaining victory, and gradually proceeding toward a General Uprising to overthrow the enemy government. This means a period during which a partial uprising will lead to a General Uprising. During this period, it is fundamental to overthrow the enemy government at low levels, assume control of low levels, and step up our activities to destroy enemy forces.

Emphasis is to be placed on overthrowing the enemy government at low levels, assuming control, establishing our government at low levels, and reducing the enemy-controlled areas while expanding ours. So, it is wrong to only try to overthrow the enemy government at the upper ((central)) level and neglect the task of destroying the enemy government at low levels and winning the support of the people.

It is clear that we have not yet fully understood the General Offensive and Uprising policy. To wage a General Offensive and Uprising, we should motivate the people in the rural areas and provinces to overthrow the enemy government, especially at low levels, break his oppressive control, and assume control.

In addition, we should anticipate our future plan when the limited war is basically ended. Naturally, armed struggles will continue, but political struggles will then play the most important role. To defeat the enemy, we need control of a large part of the population. If we can control a large part of the population, we will surely defeat the enemy under any situation, no matter what form of struggle we conduct or how the struggle is conducted.

I mention this to stress that we should fully understand that reliance on the people must be considered as the main task.

2. How should we assess the enemy and friendly situations in our task of winning the support of the people ?

Generally, we think that the enemy is strong and that we encounter many difficulties and have few favorable conditions. This erroneous thought badly affects our task of winning the support of the people.

Presently, the enemy is oppressing and controlling the people and gathering them along communication lines, around provinces, districts, and bases. He uses large armed forces to hold them, uses spies and local administrative personnel, and sets up more fences, etc. ((sic)). These activities have caused us many difficulties. Winning the support of the people is a keen competitive problem between the enemy and us, not a simple problem; but we have the capability to handle it. The enemy concentrated a large force as compared with his force in 1964 and 1965. He then gathered the people in strategic hamlets, established a system of strategic hamlets, and trained tyrants and the armed forces. However, we succeeded in destroying his strategic hamlets and controlling large areas. Now, we have reduced the enemy's control in many areas and resettlement centers. Puppet administrative personnel at low levels have abandoned their posts and Puppet spies and local administrative personnel leave their areas at night.

Through use of the ideological campaign, the people in rural areas and in enemy-controlled areas have clearly realized our victory. They believe in the Revolution and are influenced by the Revolution. Their ideological awareness has improved as compared to the past. Moreover, the enemy's economic crisis and his terrorism have made the majority of the oppressed people hate the enemy more deeply and believe in the final victory of the Revolution. However, they still fear the harshness of war and are concerned about their living conditions. We should solve this problem. We should improve their ideology and at the same time ensure protection of their lives by digging trenches and increasing ((farm)) production to improve their living conditions. This problem is not beyond our capability.

Everybody knows that our forces are more developed than before. In the past, we only planted a few agents in each strategic hamlet. We even failed to plant our agents in some hamlets. But, our situation has now changed as well as in our provinces. We have stronger support from the people and a larger rural area under our control. We now have a larger armed force. In the past, our three types of armed forces were very small. Then, we only relied on our determination and skillful leadership. Cadre and Party members then thought that we were at a standstill and pessimism was widespread. Now, the main task is to develop the people's ideology and use the armed forces effectively.

Solving these problems, properly assessing the enemy and friendly situations, and successfully controlling the people are being conducted

successfully. Now, we have to solve many problems, but the main problem is to correct our erroneous thoughts.

After considering the facts mentioned in this conference, we will realize that our armed forces are still very weak as compared with the enemy's; however, we will certainly win. For example, in Ba Lang An ((Village)) the enemy had nine battalions while we had only guerrilla and local force units; but we finally defeated his accelerated pacification teams in this main objective area. In Binh Duong, we only had guerrilla units while the enemy had five US and Puppet battalions with the support of auxiliary forces: Naval, army, air forces, and army. If we had considered the balance of power between the enemy and friendly forces, we should have seen that it would be difficult for us to defeat the enemy. However, we have defeated him at last, because we had the support of a large population which hated the enemy deeply and which was determined to fight and to defeat him. We should consider this in assessing the balance of power. We must understand that the quality of our forces can override the quantity of the enemy's. For example, H Village in Binh Dinh ((Province)) located between the communication lines was defended by enemy ((RVNAF)) and ROK troops. If we had thought that the enemy was too strong, we would not have been able to do anything. Thanh's report revealed the two following problems:

The illegal Chapter Party Committee members of this village ((H Village)) overestimated the enemy. They were invited by the people to stay two nights at the people's houses but because they feared the enemy, they only stayed one night. Thanh commented, that as revolutionary members, they were very happy to meet the people, but they stayed only one night despite the fact that they were warmly invited to stay two nights. These comrades said that the enemy completely controlled this area as well as its people; therefore, they dared not stay in this area. This is a frequent occurrence and we should review our policies. Thanh believed that we could motivate the people, who were a very strong force, and that the enemy was weak and could not cause any harm to us. We were then determined to attack the enemy and succeeded in breaking his oppressive control over the people. This is the most specific example of an accurate assessment of the enemy and friendly situations. The situation in the Dong Cat District Seat was the same. The district was defended by enemy troops and tyrants, but our action units held the area and killed the tyrants and succeeded in loosening the enemy's hold and regaining control of the people. In this case, if we had thought that the enemy was stronger than we, we would never have been able to achieve anything. An Thach Village was also an important area, but we were able to control it because our cadre believed in the people, properly estimated their capabilities, and succeeded in launching three-pronged attacks. In Gia Lai Village located in an important enemy area, the enemy had a large armed force while we only had guerrilla units and the people, but we had favorable conditions to break the enemy's oppressive control and to assume control.

The main problem is to properly assess the enemy and friendly situations. For example, in T Quang-Da Village, the enemy had a large force occupying 14 big and small strongholds, but our position was still strong. Enemy tyrants dared not travel on Route 1. In addition, a city ward in a province capital was under our control. If the enemy was strong, how could we control an area?

Reasons ((for our success)):

All Party Committee echelons made efforts to achieve their missions.

Three-front attacks were intensified.

Our people experienced many trials, so they have a high ((ideological)) consciousness and determination to fight the enemy.

Our armed forces were all determined to fight and they have achieved victories.

Commanding cadre had an iron determination. They worked out specific plans of activities for each phase and closely controlled their implementation.

Recently, some areas in the South (from southern Bình Định to Khánh Hòa) made new progress. As commented previously by Resolution 9, issued by the Region Party Committee (in Apr 69), the gaining of control over the people in the South had left much to be desired. Afterwards, the performance of this task was comparatively better. Southern Bình Định has been considered the best area in the South. Recently Phú Yên and Khánh Hòa have also made some strides forward, though still very slowly.

Friendly shortcomings:

First shortcoming: Some areas, especially provinces, were not fully aware of the enemy's malicious pacification plan because of their subjectivity. For this reason, when they were attacked by the enemy, some of them were embarrassed, lost composure, and reacted weakly. The region knew this shortcoming and has urged areas to increase their vigilance, but this was unsuccessful because the region failed to provide specific leadership for each area, nor did they create close coordination in the three-front attacks.

Second shortcoming: The preparations for countering the enemy's accelerated pacification were made too carelessly, and in the target pacification areas, these preparations were made ahead of schedule. In preparation, the primary task was to recruit agents in villages and hamlets (the Region Committee touched on this problem in Feb 69) with the aim of holding on to the villages and hamlets and countering the enemy's pacification plan. However, the local units used different methods to recruit agents. Consequently, the results in several areas still did not satisfy the requirements. In general, they placed less emphasis on this task. Only when we succeed in this task can we frustrate the enemy's pacification plan. Some local areas have countered enemy pacification without making preparations or anticipating enemy plans in the future. Their leadership was not focused on the main tasks or on the application of three-front attacks. As a result, in the recent period, the enemy has succeeded in remaining in some key positions, building posts, and bivouacking near a number of villages. This has caused many difficulties to us, though the enemy has not yet succeeded in regaining control over the population. So, in the future, if we concentrate all our efforts, we will be able to change the situation; otherwise, our position will be further shaken. In targeted pacification zones, we have spoiled the enemy's pacification plans, but only partially and not completely as required.

For instance, in the two targeted pacification zones of Ba Lăng An and Bình Đông, after defeating the enemy and compelling him to withdraw, the force

The essential point is to understand that if we properly evaluate the people's capabilities, motivate them to improve their revolutionary awareness, organize them according to the situation, and kill tyrants, we can control the people, regardless of the presence of enemy divisions and warships. We should take advantage of the enemy's weakest points and our strongest points in order to motivate the people to rise up.

((Page 26 of O.T.))

Our strengths and weaknesses arise from this fact and not from our strength as compared to that of the enemy. We cannot compare our combat strength and that of the enemy to estimate the enemy's and our capabilities. Therefore, the problem is estimating the enemy and friendly forces in a clear manner. Everyone knows that the enemy has influence in towns, and since our forces are still small, we cannot control these areas. Yet, we still succeed in controlling parts of a few towns and everyone knows this. The most important way to control towns is to kill the tyrants who directly oppress the people. If we kill nearly all the tyrants simultaneously, the enemy will not be able to find others to replace them, and he will no longer control the people. If we motivate the people to unite, struggle and put confidence in each other, we can control the towns. This is an easy method and everyone can use it.

At present, we have favorable conditions to break the enemy's oppressive control and win the support of the people, because now the enemy has been defeated in the limited war and consequently must de-escalate the war. This de-escalation will influence the whole situation, the Puppets' troops' and Government's morale, the tyrants who are controlling the people oppressively, and the enemy's forces. Now, the people's attitude has changed ((in the VC favor)). They understand the enemy and us more thoroughly. They are more enthusiastic and have a higher determination. The enemy's failures and our victories provide greater opportunities for us. Therefore, the assessment of friendly and enemy forces must be accurate. We must especially make the low-level cadre estimate the enemy and friendly elements properly. That is a matter of experience, an experience that we have gained while breaking the enemy's oppressive control and winning the support of the people in the past. We must estimate the enemy and ourselves properly in order to move forward, motivate the people, break the enemy's oppressive control, and win control over the population. That is a great experience we gained in the past while trying to break the enemy's oppressive control and win the support of the people.

3. Use of the three-front attack.

The targets we must suppress to gain the support of the people are principally the Regional Force, the Popular Force, the People's Self-Defense Forces, spies, and local RVN administrative personnel, especially tyrants and hard-core elements who are really in command although they do not wear any insignia which identify them as such. Therefore, we must concentrate our efforts on killing them. In order to kill tyrants, we should by all means use all the necessary forces, such as local troops, guerrillas, security forces, the people's forces, and the military proselyting forces. We must launch three-pronged attacks ((military, political, and troop proselyting)) to annihilate and disorganize the tyrants. With the people's forces, armed forces, and military proselyting forces we can achieve this aim, but not with a single prong of the three. In using the three above forces and conducting the three-pronged attack, we must properly select targets to obtain good results. Obviously, we must attack the reactionary elements, such

as the Puppet regular force, but we had better contain it only, so that we can concentrate our forces to attack the enemy's oppressive force. We must understand that the main purpose of the task of breaking the enemy's oppressive control and winning over the population is to get the people to rise up. If the people do not rise up, we can still break the enemy's oppressive control of the population and win over the people in some areas, but not for a long time and not in many areas. Therefore, we should motivate the people to rise up, launch three-front attacks, wage guerrilla warfare, and conduct political struggles and military proselyting activities. These are the basic contents of the people's uprising problem. If we do not understand this problem, we cannot succeed in breaking the enemy's oppressive control and winning the support of the people. But, if the people rise up, we must use the three-front attack;

((Page 27 of O.T.))

we cannot conduct a one-front or two-front attack.

If the people rise up and conduct political struggles alone, the enemy will regain control of the areas; and if we only carry out armed activities, we will be driven back by the enemy. That is why the three-front attack is necessary when the people rise up.

Our control over rural areas must be overt but legal. On the contrary, we must control a number of towns secretly (but legally, we must keep our organization, our activities.... ((sic)) secret). The three-front attack, which consists of armed activities, political struggles, and military proselyting activities, is necessary to maintain our control and our legal status. Our legal status derives strength from the political struggles, from the people's forces, and that is why we must apply three-front attacks. To carry out the counterpacification task, we must apply three-front attacks. To defeat the enemy pacification plan, we must use the people's forces. This is also why we must use three-front attacks. To defeat the enemy's pacification plan, all areas should use the people's forces, and make the people conduct three-front attacks, that is, make them coordinate guerrilla warfare with political struggles and military proselyting activities. We must always use the three-front attack if we want to frustrate the enemy's accelerated pacification plan and smash his counteroffensive successfully. We cannot achieve the above purposes with armed activities alone or with only political struggles.

In brief, in order to gain success, we should absolutely rely on the three-front attack conducted by the people and step up the military, political, and military proselyting activities.

We shall discuss the political problem more thoroughly. In the task of breaking the enemy's oppressive control and winning over the people to bring about the peoples' uprising, violence is an important factor. Rising up means using violence and not peaceful means. It also means that we must be highly determined to overthrow the enemy's government to seize power. Therefore, we should develop the people's strength to the utmost and deploy this strength in the military, political, and military proselyting fields. After we annihilate the enemy and seize power, political struggles need to be waged under various forms. These political struggles are necessary at this time because after we break the enemy's oppressive control, the enemy will

react. This is why we must use not only the armed forces and guerrillas to attack the enemy, but the people must also conduct political struggles and proselyte enemy soldiers. When the people rise up, they need not worry about too many things; they should just rise up with whatever strength they have. They must use whatever they find available to attack the enemy, to destroy all his belongings, and to build up our forces. When they seize power, they must maintain a legal status during the political struggles. In short, there are several ways to conduct political struggles, which may take either inferior or superior forms ((sic)). The political force made up of the uprising people is a basic and essential force, the strongest attacking force, and the force which can exert the strongest control over any area. Our past experiences prove this fact. In many areas, the armed forces were composed of only a few persons, but the people's uprising forces were numerous. For example, in the area ((unspecified)) where a boy named Thanh lives, there were only a few young guerrillas in addition to the people's uprising forces. In order to become an uprising force, the people needed to be motivated, organized, and led by key cadre. Consequently, we should motivate and organize the people to arouse their revolutionary pride. In addition, we should step up the three-front attacks and the armed uprisings to annihilate the enemy and seize power.

((Page 28 of O.T.))

The armed forces should fully understand combat leadership in order to annihilate the enemy, support, and motivate the people, win over the population, and accomplish the primary mission set forth by the Region Party Committee. Especially, the forces from province level down, should concentrate their efforts to accomplish this mission at any cost. The main force must have an element directly in charge of supporting the task of winning over the people. It should conduct military operations to provide direct support for the task of winning over the people. Thus, in order to support this task directly and successfully, the armed forces must meet the following requirements: First, select the appropriate combat zones; second, choose the proper objectives, targets, and areas to be attacked. The armed forces should also coordinate their activities with their political struggles and military proselyting activities, because armed activities alone can achieve nothing. The armed forces must attack and annihilate the enemy and not merely pursue him. In military operations, we have two choices. If we pursue the enemy, the work is easy, and we can avoid the violence of combat, and nothing will become complicated. If we try to annihilate the enemy, we have to face the violence of combat and death and we will encounter difficulties because we are then determined to attack and annihilate anyone who reacts. Therefore, we must strengthen our determination to be able to attack and annihilate the enemy. We should hold the ground at any cost.

But, after we have annihilated the enemy in a certain area, we may leave an element there to motivate the people. Our main forces must move to another area to attack the enemy. That is what we mean by "hold the ground." We should not hold any given area for an indefinite period of time

nor must we attack the enemy continuously in the same area, because this will cause the people to flee to other places. We must repeatedly launch attacks in different areas. After we attack an area, we should leave a small element there with cadre and agents to motivate the people and continue to crush the enemy's reactions.

We must disperse and mass our forces in a flexible manner. There is no fixed rule on dispersion and concentration. If it becomes necessary to disperse our force, we will do so. Likewise, if only one person is needed to kill tyrants, he must carry out this task. In addition, we should concentrate our forces according to the specific situation. After we attack and annihilate the enemy, we must prepare to defeat his counterattacks. If the enemy conducts counterattacks, we must try to wipe out his forces.

The military proselyting task is an important part in the mission to win over and hold the people. Its effect is not readily visible, but latent. The reason why the military proselyting task is important is that the enemy forces which control the people oppressively, cling to the latter, who in turn, have many relations with the enemy. Furthermore, the enemy's morale is low at present, and he fears death. So, the conditions are good for the people to proselyte him. Therefore, the military proselyting task is very important.

4. Consolidation of liberated areas and the counterpacification task.

The counterpacification requirement is to defeat the enemy's pacification plan, this consists of pacifying the main objective areas and the local areas. This requires that we also encircle the enemy posts to pin him down, maintain our control of the liberated areas, and consolidate these areas into a strong rear and stepping-stone area to step up the task of breaking the enemy's oppressive control and winning over the people and support the towns.

The experiences we gained in the past prove that the areas which made preparations, carefully succeeded in countering pacification activities, whereas those which did not make careful preparations failed.

Therefore, the basic requirement to counter the pacification plan successfully is to make careful preparations. Preparing to counter pacification activities is tantamount to consolidating villages and hamlets, as set forth in the plans, but to consolidate villages and hamlets means to motivate the people incessantly and strengthen their determination to frustrate the enemy's pacification plan, defeat the US aggressors, and maintain control of their areas without fearing death. Consolidating villages and hamlets also means developing the guerrilla warfare movement, striving to reorganize and strengthen guerrilla forces in order to fight successfully, and according to the conditions of each area, building combat villages and hamlets. First of all, we must strengthen the Party Chapters and consolidate all agencies and branches, placing emphasis on the Farmers' Association. We should strengthen the Party Chapters, reorganize them, improve their ideology, and heighten their political level. In addition, we must make them stay close to the people. The important point to be made is that we should strive to strengthen the secret guerrillas, hard-core cadre, and secret Party members, so that when the enemy conducts sweep operations, we may have a legal status to lead the people as in the Binh Duong area. In the Binh Duong area, we were able to maintain a legal status: We had a legal force that consisted of guerrillas, Party members, and cadre who stayed close to the people in order to oppose the enemy. That is why we succeeded in this area in leading the people to struggle, even when the enemy was trying to relocate them. If we had not possessed that legal force when the enemy conducted sweep operations and after he relocated the people, no one would have been able to lead the people. Besides, we should look after the people's living conditions and prepare a means of production, defensive positions, and camps for them. A trench is more important than a house for the people in this struggle period. Another problem is that we must provide close leadership. We should anticipate the directions in which the enemy may conduct sweep operations and the areas he intends to pacify in order to provide specific leadership. If we want to defeat the enemy's pacification plan, the most basic problem is to make overall preparations, focussing attention on the essential points. When the enemy conducts sweep operations and carries out pacification activities, the cadre, Party members, and guerrillas must try to stay close to the people; the higher echelons must do the same and also provide close leadership. In case the enemy carries out pacification activities, close and prompt leadership is the decisive factor to frustrate enemy efforts.

Because of this, we must carry out the following tasks: First, we must continuously provide ideological guidance because at that time, the people's ideology will evolve in a complex manner, for they will have to witness bombings and destruction and even face death and the violence of combat. Therefore, we will have to step up the ideological indoctrination task and carry it out more promptly.

In addition, we will have to motivate the people continuously. If we succeed in meeting the above requirements in all areas, the people, Party members, cadre, guerrillas, and soldiers will have a firm attitude. At that time, we will be able to defeat the enemy. Secondly, we must provide leadership to carry out the three-front attack in a flexible manner. If the enemy relocates the people to areas under his control, three-front attacks are also necessary to attack the enemy continuously. If the people stay in their areas, we must also provide close leadership on conducting the three-front attack. It has been established as a fact and proved by the average reports, that if we can gain great successes, it will be a result of our flexible leadership in carrying out the three-front attack. Thirdly, at that time, we will have to look after the people's living conditions, which will then be disturbed.

((Page 30 of O.T.))

The enemy continues to launch his sweep operations against the people, set fire to their houses, commit murder, destroy the people's trenches, and steal their property. For that reason, we must pay a great deal of attention to protecting the people. If we neglect this matter, the people will become discouraged, remain passive, and some may even leave their areas because their houses will be burned and the rice in their paddies stolen if we do not help them dig trenches to conceal their property and take care of burying their dead. The protection of the people is now a major problem to us, and we must continue to punish the reactionaries, purify the people's organizations, and strengthen all fields of activity.

The district and province must be in command of the other areas in order to attack the enemy successfully. Sometimes, our attack must be directed against other places in order to scatter the enemy forces. We may also request reinforcements for our attacks on the enemy. We must provide guidance for our men in the encirclement of enemy posts and district towns to prevent the enemy in his strongholds from launching sweep operations.

To counter the enemy sweep operations and pacification activities successfully, we are required to make preparations and stabilize the situation upon the withdrawal of enemy troops; quickly stabilize the people's living conditions, morals, and other fields of activity; improve our leadership; gain experiences; and make plans to defeat all other enemy attacks. All areas must oppose the enemy's sweep operations and pacification activities, especially at the critical points in Ba Lang An and Binh Dong. Other areas must be ready to counter the enemy sweep operations and pacification activities in a continuous manner. Some areas, including Quang Da, were repeatedly and frequently attacked by the enemy. Therefore, they must always be prepared to attack the enemy and counter his pacification activities continuously. The people of these areas must be guided by cadre to continuously counter enemy pacification activities.

5. Destroying the enemy's oppressive forces and winning the support of the people:

From now until 180 ((six)), the requirements are:

Destroy half of the enemy's auxiliary troops ((Regional and Popular Force)). This includes tyrants and oppressive forces. We must annihilate all types of enemy troops, but the most essential thing is to destroy his oppressive forces. We must also kill the tyrants, break the enemy's oppressive administration in the areas under his control, and be determined to encircle his posts and district towns.

Try to gain control of 700,000 people.

Build up the ((possibly defensive)) areas. Each province must build up one or two ((defensive)) areas, from the east to the west, which are to be linked to the various bases and districts in the province.

In our attacks, carry out all the missions mentioned in the plan already drawn up. If the aforementioned requirements are fully met, we will

((Page 31 of O.T.))

be able to enlarge the liberated areas, control a great part of the population, and create favorable conditions for our fighting. This is also our most basic and essential condition in the achievement of a decisive victory.

Every province must take charge of attacking the secondary and main targets. The attacks on the secondary targets can be conducted by all areas, but the mission of the province is to be responsible for one, two, or three main targets. Our main targets are the areas where a great number of people are still living, those which are situated in critical areas close to province capitals or on the lines of communication, and also areas where approximately 20,000 or 30,000 people are settled.

There are several ways that can be used to win the people over: First, in areas where they are not to be relocated, motivate them to struggle and to gain control of the local people. Secondly, in relocation areas containing both the local people and those relocated from the outside, motivate the people to struggle for the control of the local area; set the people free when the enemy's oppressive control is broken; then relocate them in liberated areas. Some areas believe that the relocation of the people cannot be made. This is untrue and reflects a pessimistic attitude. We must try to carry out this mission step by step.

In short, to win over the people, we must try to regain the control of local areas from the enemy, set the people free, and resettle them in liberated areas.

Each province has its own opinion of how to determine the requirements to gain control of the population. Some areas classify our control of the population into different degrees, A, B, or C; some others say there are no liberated areas. Why are there no liberated areas? They definitely exist and it is a pessimistic attitude to say that there are no liberated areas. Some areas say pessimistically that our control is B degree and not A, but the truth is that we are maintaining an A degree control. We will be able to gain control of the population when we succeed in:

1. Breaking the enemy's oppressive machinery (including RVN local administrative personnel, spies, paramilitary forces, strategic hamlets), not including his posts.

2. Motivating the masses to struggle, maintaining unity in struggles, and purging our internal organizations.

3. Organizing the masses into groups and building up guerrilla forces and Party Chapters with at least one coordination and operations section.

4. Conducting three front attacks: Military, political, and troop proselyting.

5. Motivating the masses to contribute their efforts and property to the Resistance.

The establishment of Party Chapters is the most essential requirement of all those cited above. These requirements are not equally met by various areas. Additional efforts must

((Page 32 of O.T.))

be made by us to succeed in gaining the control of the population. Our control is definitely not classified into A, B, and C degrees. We are fighting the enemy to win the support of the people in areas that are under mixed control.

Gaining the confidence of the population means to succeed in making them accept our propaganda, indoctrination, and leadership. At the present time, this is a very critical problem which needs to be solved in the towns and cities, as well as in the rural areas. In the days ahead, try to hold the population, not control them.

We must also destroy the enemy's oppressive machinery, and motivate the masses to rise up.

Destroying the enemy's oppressive machinery and winning over the population.

First of all, we are required to make preparations. Some areas are either careless in making preparations or fail to make preparations altogether. Making preparations is the basic mission which decides the success or failure in winning the population. From now on, preparations must be made carefully by every province, district, and village. How to make preparations?

Kill tyrants frequently, either by using our fifth columnists alone, or in conjunction with our elements in charge of conducting deep thrusts. The killing of tyrants will help us succeed in breaking the enemy's oppressive control, motivating the people to struggle, and gaining control of the population.

Always carry out propaganda activities, motivate the masses to struggle through propaganda agents, education, armed propaganda, leaflets, and word-of-mouth propaganda, with a view toward arousing hatred for the enemy and the thought of killing the US for our national salvation and freedom and breaking the enemy's oppressive control to gain control of the population.

Recruit agents in enemy-controlled areas. Strengthen guerrilla troops and political struggle elements, and recruit Party members, Group members, etc. ((sic)). It will also be necessary to recruit youths, women, schoolboys, and teenagers, as they are the basic and most enthusiastic elements of the revolutionary forces. Pay attention to the recruitment of legal agents, guerrilla troops, Party members, and legal cadre that are to be used as fifth columnists to guide the masses to struggle. It is a very important thing. By using the legal forces as fifth columnists, we can kill the tyrants anywhere and create favorable conditions to motivate the masses to struggle.

Provide guidance for the masses to organize violent, armed political struggles of all types against the enemy and also to conduct three-pronged attacks.

We can be successful in gaining control of the population only if we make careful preparations. We must strongly motivate the masses to struggle for control of the population.

It will also be necessary to activate additional action units. The provinces must try to organize sufficient action units at various districts and strengthen

((Page 33 of O.T.))

them qualitatively and quantitatively. Action units must be perfectly organized and have a thorough knowledge of our guidelines and policies, so that they can serve the people and attack the enemy effectively. Due to the important effect of their activities and their specific roles, the action units must be actively strengthened in areas where Party Chapters do not exist and where our inside forces are still weak. As soon as the Party Chapters are formed, either integrate them with the action units or assign them to other areas. Do not let the action units command the Party Chapters. Organize outside forces to be sent to assist the inside forces to conduct the uprising. The inside forces usually play a key and basic role, but the outside support forces are also important. The outside support forces are composed of action units, guerrilla units of various outside hamlets, and district and province units. We must especially organize outside and well-trained guerrilla units to launch raids against the Popular Force, tyrants, and the People's Self-Defense Forces. If the aforementioned tasks are carried out well by all areas, the annihilation of the enemy to gain control of the population will be a difficult task. This does not mean that

However, the basic thing is to try to make careful preparations.

Before we can conduct an uprising, we must destroy the enemy's oppressive machinery in order to gradually gain control of the population. Then, we should organize spontaneous uprising phases throughout the regions, provinces, and districts. Spontaneous uprising phases are to be conducted, depending on the time and situation in each area, in order to create a strong position for us and to weaken and demoralize the enemy troops. The weakness of the enemy greatly encourages the masses and creates enthusiasm among them. For this reason, spontaneous uprising phases are necessary in every campaign. Spontaneous uprising phases for entire regions or provinces should not last just one night. The phase should last at least half a month or even a whole month. Following our climaxing phases, we should continuously destroy the enemy's oppressive machinery in order to gain control of the population, strengthen our forces, and oppress the enemy's actions. If we do not, we shall fail to exploit the success gained by the spontaneous uprising phase.

The three-front attack tactic must be used in those spontaneous uprising phases which are primarily aimed at destroying the enemy forces, especially his oppressive machinery, gaining the control of the population, and creating favorable conditions for the masses to rise up. The support of the guerrillas and the people's local forces for spontaneous uprising must also be considered very necessary. All types of armed forces are to be employed in spontaneous uprising phases. Local areas, hamlets, villages, guerrillas, and the masses must exploit the successes of the spontaneous uprising phase. Additionally, exploit our combat success to motivate the masses to rise up and struggle for the control of the population. Do not rely on higher echelons. Attack the enemy and rise up at all times. Conduct large-scale uprisings with the participation of the people of all walks of life, but do not use many key Party members and legal guerrilla troops. These personnel are not to remain idle; they are to attack the enemy and motivate the masses to rise up. Except for those who are kept as legal agents, all the remaining people must be motivated to participate in the uprising. If our large-scale uprising is successfully conducted, we will be able to recruit more legal agents. The selection of cadre to operate as legal agents must be based on the success of their activities during the uprisings.

Accordingly, the attacks must be waged intensively against the enemy, annihilating tyrants totally and breaking all forms of the enemy's administrative controls. We must continuously motivate the masses to join the people's organizations, extensively develop guerrilla warfare, etc. ((sic)). Counterattacks must be conducted unceasingly by applying the method of three-pronged attacks which must be gradually expanded from one area to another.

6. With regard to cities:

The city is the area where the enemy's forces are concentrated. It is where his key military, political, and economic agencies are located and well defended. For this reason, his forces in the cities are considered powerful. But at present, the cities are also the enemy's weak spots because all of the dead, wounded, and battlefield losses are concentrated in the cities.

Contradictions arise between the US and Puppets, among the Puppets themselves, and among the Puppets and the opposition factions and the people. We can say that the cities are the places where the most critical contradictions are focussed. The people in the cities are the ones who can clearly see the enemy's defeats and our successes. Our city agents have reported that the people appear very enthusiastic and regard us as heroes and the enemy as incapable.

The political situation in cities, as I have mentioned above, is ripe. The defeats, serious contradictions, and the economic and political crises faced by the enemy have become visible to everyone. Such a situation has raised the people's resentment to its climax. The cities have a peaceful outlook, but a storm may occur some day. The political situation is likely to take a sudden change some day, because the atmosphere is tense and the people's situation is critical. This is the weakness of the enemy. In the military field, the enemy has set up a strong defensive system, but he is still incapable of defeating our continuous attacks launched against any area, because the enemy troops in the cities are heterogeneous. As soon as we attack an area, those in other areas run away. The enemy combat troops are heterogeneous. They fear our combat tactics. By all means, victory will be ours. The enemy has recently faced an economic crisis. He is increasing all taxes, and there is a currency inflation. His budget has shown a tremendous deficit, amounting to hundreds of billions of piasters. Prices of goods have been rocketing upward. In general, the economic situation in the SVN cities is presently in a decline. Such a situation has made the SVN Government unstable. If we launch attacks on many fields, the Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm clique will be doomed to collapse. This critical situation continues to develop and the Puppet Government is in a perilous situation.

As far as the masses are concerned, the working class has decided to side with the Revolution and will rise up some day. In addition, the people of the middle class, who have been

((Page 35 of O.T.))

sympathetic toward the Revolution, now constitute a relatively powerful force. A noticeable fact is that the Buddhist movement has recently been initiated with activities favorable for us: The Minh and Lién ((possibly Dương Văn Minh and Trần Ngọc Lién)) factions have introduced a political plan which is fairly good. They will gradually begin to oppose Thieu stubbornly and take advantage of the political and economic crisis and the difficulties met by the Thiệu clique to rise up, particularly in Central Vietnam, where opposing factions are supported by some generals and colonels. They have frequently opposed the central government. This is a favorable condition for us.

With regard to the friendly situation, our position and forces have been already developed. Motivation has been carried out among the people; our political and armed forces have grown up, etc. ((sic)). This is a favorable condition for us.

With regard to activities in cities, it is necessary to understand the following matters:

First: Attack the enemy continuously, strengthen friendly forces, and make good preparations.

Second: When the climaxing point comes, we will accomplish the following tasks:

Rise up to break the enemy's oppressive control and gain control of the infrastructure in accordance with the prescribed requirements.

Conduct heavy attacks against the enemy.

Initiate overt and legal political struggles.

If we fulfill the above three requirements, our movement will develop intensively and we will create conditions for defeating the US.

With regard to preparations made within the cities, we must first strengthen the ideology of Party members and the people. An ideological task in cities is difficult. However, the enemy and friendly situations, as mentioned above, are favorable for us to carry out the task. The people are waiting for our guidance and leadership to rise up. The people are active enough; we only need to convince them to overthrow Thiệu-Ky-Khiêm and regain political control. Propaganda activities and political indoctrination can be conducted for urbanites. As for preparation of forces, we should develop the guerrilla forces and the political struggles, train our forces to break the enemy administrative control at the infrastructure levels, and train leadership cadre.

In short, we should prepare our political and military forces for a successful offensive and uprising to break the enemy administrative control at lower levels and to conduct political struggles. In the present phase, it is imperative that we exert control over the overt organizations, such as the labor unions, Buddhist associations, etc. ((sic)). To this end, we must plant our agents among them. Through the overt organizations, we will intensify the struggle movement overtly and legally by gathering the people and motivating them to struggle. We must recruit legal agents and cadre to guide political struggles, annihilate tyrants, and break the enemy's oppressive control. Concurrently, we must intensify guerrilla activities.

((Page 36 of O.T.))

At the same time, we must increase armed activities, eliminate tyrants, step up political struggles to demand social welfare and democracy, and develop military proselyting activities.

Emphasis should be placed on making preparations for the bordering areas which include important areas, such as stepping-stone areas ((VC term for controlled areas used to obtain access to uncontrolled areas)) and foothold areas. Also, we should create conditions to attack and encircle cities and try to turn them into our controlled areas as we have done in some cities ((sic)). Concurrently, we should strive to establish penetration

bases within the cities. Plans must be prepared for the offensive and uprising to seize control. We must also make plans for political struggles, etc. ((sic)).

During the climaxing phase, we must substantially coordinate the three above tasks. We must maintain coordinated actions between the cities. Now, let us go into the details of each task:

First, the offensive: The offensive is designed to destroy the enemy's key installations, war facilities, and especially the administrative control at lower echelons in support of the people's uprising to break the enemy control and seize power. Wherever it is possible or when necessary, we must try to occupy cities for a few days in order to create enthusiasm among the people. Troops to be employed will be comprised of our most important forces, such as guerrillas, special action units, sappers, and military proselyting agents in the area, sappers penetrating from the ~~outer-~~perimeter, spearhead elements, and artillery and mortar elements for fierce attacks launched from the bordering areas. The phase of offensive is also the one of strengthening our forces and increasing guerrilla activities to conduct incessant attacks.

Second, the uprising:

The uprising is designed to weaken the enemy, annihilate tyrants, loosen the enemy's oppressive control, and confuse the enemy in the cities. Motivate the people in the cities to increase their revolutionary pride and seize some areas as prescribed. Build up our forces, develop three-pronged attacks, and increase guerrilla and military proselyting activities in the ~~inner-~~perimeter so as to create a position for attacking and encircling the cities.

The above are activities to be performed in province capitals. As for the district seats, we should destroy their inner areas and attack their surroundings, then seize power in some areas as we will do in the province capitals.

Different forms of uprising:

In the city, we must coordinate uprising with offensives in order to pursue and annihilate tyrants and support the attacks conducted by the armed forces from outside.

Meetings, military proselyting, and sabotage activities are also indispensable for the uprising. The scale of the uprising differs with each area or city, depending on the intensity of our military offensive and the conditions for breaking the enemy's administrative control. The fact is that not every area will rise up simultaneously nor will every city do the same. The people's uprising must be conducted in such a way that it enables us to eliminate the enemy administrative control, regain political control at lower levels, and support guerrilla activities.

((Page 37 of O.T.))

The conditions for seizing control: First, we must eliminate tyrants and oppressive personnel who are the main tools of the enemy's oppression against the people. Once the enemy's key personnel, tyrants, and secret agents who try to mingle with the people are eliminated, the enemy's oppressive machinery will become ineffective. (There are many ways of eliminating tyrants. Some will be killed, others will be threatened, dismissed from office, reformed or persuaded to rally to our side, etc. ((sic)).) Secondly, we must motivate

the people to remain confident and unified, so that they can maintain the power they have seized. Thirdly, we must organize revolutionary forces with key cadre providing leadership. We must have at least a Party Civil Affairs Committee and must try to establish a Party Chapter. Fourthly, we must step up political struggles, military proselyting activities, and guerrilla activities in accordance with the three-pronged attacks.

These activities should be increased. But the main point consists of eliminating all of the tyrants among the people. We can eliminate them separately from one area to another and expand our activities gradually from small to large-scale, from low level up. In areas not under our control, we should try to seize power from one city ward or inter-family block after another by eliminating tyrants and loosening the enemy's oppressive control. We must decide to do this in the near future, because experience has shown that we have succeeded in seizing control in the inner-perimeter ((sic)). Now, we must try to expand our control. The main condition for seizure of power requires the elimination of tyrants and oppressive personnel at lower echelons. Wherever control could not be gained despite the fierce attacks launched by friendly forces, we must admit that the requirements were not fulfilled. Consequently, our main task is to try by all means to eliminate oppressive personnel and seize power.

Third, political struggles:

The enemy has been confused several times by our political struggles. Therefore, the conduct of overt and legal political struggles has become a very important question. The political struggles waged by several cities in Military Region 5 have weakened and isolated the enemy and put him in an situation of unrest. Therefore, the forthcoming political struggle will be of great importance.

The requirement of the coming political struggle requires us to further weaken and upset the enemy, motivate the people to increase their revolutionary pride, and establish a united front against the war of aggression demanding the US to end the war. This endeavour must enable us to overthrow the Thieu-Ky Government. To meet this requirement, we must develop our political and armed forces.

With regard to slogans, we should choose those which can attract everybody. In the current situation, we had best choose slogans demanding peace, an end to the war, and social welfare. These two slogans are appropriate to all strata of people and factions, and can be used by all of the people legally. For the time being, the earnest aspirations of the people in the city are peace, an end to the war, and social welfare. Other slogans must be suitable to each area and each circumstance.

Concerning the methods, we must assemble workers, laborers, students, intellectuals, people of the middle class, soldiers, civil servants, and different factions to struggle against the Thiệu-Kỳ clique and to demand the end of the war and the improvement of living conditions. We need to rally different forces, such as those of Minh ((possibly Dương Văn Minh)), Liên ((possibly lawyer Trần Ngọc Liêng)), and the Buddhist sects ((Thích Trí Quang)) in order to establish a large front and coordinate actions with them in the struggle against the Puppet Government to demand the end of the war, the restoration of peace, the improvement of the people's living conditions, and the overthrow of the Thiệu-Kỳ clique. We should not hesitate to initiate a large coalition front because it will be effective.

The above factions will realize that in the present situation, if they do not cooperate with us, they will have no support at all. Naturally, they will not admit their coalition with us openly. For that reason, we must have a broad coalition policy. We should not fear that the above factions will affect our forces, because our personnel and sympathizers are numerous and they are completely loyal to the Revolution. The revolutionary history of Vietnam proves that we have sometimes coordinated with reactionaries. For example, formerly we cooperated with Group 1884 ((sic)) which had a different policy from other groups. However, we succeeded in turning this cooperation in our favor. At present, we may continue to do as we did in the past. We are capable of leading the people, but the fundamental mission is to be able to control the population.

As for the flag, we can choose any flag. In Region 5, the Buddhist flag is the one we should utilize. It will bring us advantages if we use it correctly. In Region 5, we should coordinate actions with the Buddhists' and students' struggle movements. We will use the Buddhist struggle movement as a cover and the students' movement as the fuse of the fire cracker ((sic)). We should pay attention to the workers, who constitute the largest and most basic social class, and the soldiers. For the above reasons, we should not hesitate to use the Buddhist flag. We must in the near future step up the struggle movement for democracy and social welfare because at present, the people live with difficulties and poor conditions under the enemy's increasing exploitation. We should intensify the struggle for social welfare and other movements and turn them into great struggles. For instance, during Buddha's previous birthday, the number of people demonstrating in Đà Nẵng Province was over 50,000 persons. In these movements, we will use the same slogans as those used in Đà Nẵng, but the struggle must be stronger, with the cooperation of many other movements. Under the present circumstances, with favorable conditions, we can stage a broad, strong, open, and legal struggle movement like that conducted in Đà Nẵng 76 days ago ((sic)). To be successful, we must make appropriate preparations as suggested above. We must realize the importance of the Buddhists in struggles. However, I have found that many comrades have neglected to take advantage of this matter. Some others even criticized ((the attitude of cooperating with the Buddhists)). We do not have to be Buddhist monks, nor do we have to worship Buddha. Furthermore, we are not trying to support and strengthen the Buddhist sect. While cooperating with this religion, we want only to employ the revolutionary individuals among the Buddhist followers to serve our cause.

Characteristics of the Vietnamese Buddhist Religion:

It is a great religion. In SVN, it is the most important. In central Vietnam, most of the people are Buddhist (according to statistics 70-80% of the population), though we believe they make up approximately 50% ((of the population)).

The Buddhist followers are composed of people of different social classes, including officers and civil servants. But the majority of them are laborers and revolutionary people.

Secondly, the Buddhist movement has a national character. Though the Buddhist religion is an important one, like many other religions, it has become second nature to the Vietnamese people. For this reason, the characteristics of Buddhism differ from other religions. Its believers adopt it more out of political reasons than they do out of creed. The majority of Buddhist believers are revolutionary people, and even those who do not belong to the proletarian class have some nationalistic feelings in them, though there are also many Buddhist reactionaries.

Thirdly, since the days it rose up against the Ngô Đình Diệm regime, the Buddhist sect has played a determinant political role. Many times it has confused the enemy. The reason is that the majority of the Buddhists are revolutionary people and belong to the working class. When they stand up and struggle, their force is very strong. We must notice that the Buddhist sect has no revolutionary struggle history, but it has occupied a determinant position, particularly from the days it struggled against the Puppet Government and overthrew Ngo Dinh Diem's regime.

Fourthly, because the Buddhist sect is supported by such a tremendous number of people, the US, the Puppet Government, the political factions, and even the Buddhist leaders want to use it as a tool. Nevertheless, on one hand, they take advantage of the strong force of the Buddhist people; on the other hand, they oppress the Buddhist followers for fear that the latter may stage strong struggles against them. We only employ the Buddhist sect to promote the revolutionary spirit of its believers and to take advantage of its legal position in order to conduct struggles and oppress reactionaries. Because of the above characteristics of the Buddhist sect, we should make the utmost use of its prestige and legal position to serve our cause. The comrade in the 3rd Precinct ((possibly in Saigon)) was right when he said that he had successfully motivated over 20,000 Buddhists to conduct a demonstration. When he told them to struggle under the Front's name, he failed. When he motivated them under the Buddhist label, they accepted quite easily. On the contrary, when the Buddhist leaders themselves appealed to the people for a struggle, they did not succeed in gathering more than 100 persons.

This fact is worthy of notice. It proves that the Buddhists are revolutionary people. They did not respond to the appeal of the Buddhist leaders, but responded to ours, instead.

They did not want to demonstrate under the Front's name because they lived in Da Nang and feared the oppression of the Puppet Government. Thus, our policy is to make use of the Buddhist faction and motivate its believers under its name in order to stimulate the revolutionary individuals of this religion to rise up. No other factions will be able to dispute with them because the revolutionary people and those of the working class in this religion are too numerous. In the near future, we should do our best to motivate the Buddhist mass. This force is not entirely ours, but the mass of the Buddhists is supporting the Revolution. We should take advantage of the Buddhist name to make appeals to the people to struggle and should introduce our slogans into the struggles.

((Page 40 of O.T.))

7. ((sic)) Leadership.

We must understand our main mission and step up our activities in all fields.

We must concentrate all efforts to accomplish the main task in order to develop other tasks.

We must provide guidance for constant counterpacification activities and to control the people. In each specific period, we must know our main task and step up all other tasks. In our activities for population control, we must pay attention to the three areas: Mountainous areas, rural areas, and cities. We must maintain close coordination between the three areas, particularly between the rural areas and cities. We must also coordinate three-pronged attacks, military activities, political struggles, and military proselyting. The ideological task is important. Eliminate rightism and develop the spirit of launching continuous attacks:

Motivate the people to rise up to support the armed forces. All echelons must have good coordination plans, especially in key areas.

We must draft combat plans and submit them to higher echelons for approval.

We must pay attention to the training of cadre, especially legal cadre. Party Committee echelons should personally perform the task of winning over the people. They do not need to establish a special element for this task. Otherwise, they will not be able to direct various branches and military units. However, in each important area and main position we can establish a leadership committee consisting of military cadre and Party Committee members and place it under the direct command of the province and district Party Current Affairs Committees.

The province Current Affairs Committee is the main element at province levels and the district Current Affairs Committee is the main element to provide leadership for the mission of winning over the people.

We must often supervise and control our personnel, correct their errors, and gain experiences from the main areas in order to disseminate them to other areas.

Part IV

Ideological task

1. Ideology: Generally, in the past, we made some progress in ideology.

The revolutionary ethics of our cadre, Party members, Group members, and soldiers have developed through indoctrination, training, and trials.

((Page 41 of G.T))

The rightist attitude seen partly eliminated in some areas.

Individualism was swept away to a considerable degree.

Fundamentally, we made progress because our cadre, soldiers, and Party members were well trained and combat-tested. However, rightism still prevailed. Recently, as the war became intensified in our base areas, difficulties increased, especially those concerning the materiel facilities. Due to the above situation, the personnel's ideological evolution became complicated. Following are some typical erroneous thoughts:

They did not properly assess the enemy and friendly situations. They overestimated the enemy. They claimed that our difficulties were numerous. They always advocated that the enemy was strong and that we were too weak to gain control of the population.

They did not thoroughly understand our policy line, especially the one pertaining to the General Offensive and Uprising and the guidelines on the three-pronged attacks launched in the mountainous and lowland areas. In some areas, cadre did not place their confidence in our policy line.

In the recent days, they lost much of their aggressiveness in fighting. They displayed rightism, individualism, confusion, fear of death, passivity, and a negative attitude which affected our activities and which will influence our coming missions. This demoralization was due to the following factors:

The increasing fierceness of the war, increased difficulties, shortage of personnel, lack of understanding of the policy and guidelines, inadequate indoctrination for cadre, Party members, and soldiers, and carelessness in the performance of the ideological task. Moreover, various echelons and units still have deficiencies in organization.

Briefly, the reason for the above weaknesses is that we did not properly classify the personnel in accordance with their social classes, nor did we carefully indoctrinate our cadre and soldiers.

Ideological situation in this conference. Through a review of the achievements attained by the local areas and branches, it is noted that our cadre and Party members have used all-out efforts, endured hardships, and overcame all difficulties to accomplish their missions.

They had a high determination to fight and win over the American aggressors; they thoroughly understood and believed in the Party's policy lines and resolutions. They displayed enthusiasm, put their confidence in higher echelons, and were trying to eliminate rightism in order to carry out their tasks effectively. Generally speaking, they recognized their shortcomings and tried to correct them. They were enthusiastic and determined.

Through this session of political reorientation and indoctrination, we realized that rightism, fear of death, passivity, and negative attitudes still prevailed in local areas and units.

In general, the morale of cadre was poor. Even a number of command cadre at province levels realized that their fighting spirit was low. Specific signs were noticed as follows: The cadre estimated the friendly and enemy situations inaccurately; they saw only the atrocious war waged by the enemy and his obstinate characteristics, but not his weaknesses. Therefore, when facing the enemy's fierce attacks, they became demoralized.

When they were victorious, they overlooked their shortcomings. They had a pessimistic attitude when they learned about their shortcomings or when confronted with difficulties. In general, they saw only our difficulties, but failed to recognize our capabilities and advantages. They knew their strong points, but neglected their weak points and advantages. Sometimes, some units were self-satisfied when they were victorious.

Secondly, they did not fully understand the policy ((possibly of the Party)). Through this conference, we realize that our cadre did not thoroughly understand the meaning of the General Offensive and Uprising, nor could they distinguish long-range tasks from immediate tasks. The policy concerning the winning over of the population was not fully understood by them. There were also matters regarding the military concept that they did not fully understand.

Thirdly, as mentioned above, the rightist attitude, fear of death, selfishness, and the fear of the fierceness of war still prevailed. As a result, our cadre did not dare to attack the enemy. Many comrades did not wholeheartedly carry out their missions, showed reluctance to contact the lower echelons, feared a protracted and fierce war, and cherished illusions about peace. Even cadre who did not contact the enemy displayed a pessimistic attitude. They did not exert efforts to accomplish their missions. They were slow in performing duties. Sometimes, they adopted negative attitudes when assigned difficult tasks. They relied on higher echelons, lacked a sense of responsibility, hesitated to conduct critiques within the internal organization, and had a rightist attitude. They did not fully understand the revolutionary spirit, objectives, ideals, and the communist philosophy of life. Secondly they had the tendency of placing more importance on one aspect or another in their task performance. Thirdly, they did not conduct a serious critique in the ideological field to correct their erroneous thoughts. Through the political reorientation conference, we succeeded in eliminating an important part of the rightist thoughts and have thus enhanced our combat spirit. On this basis, we should continue to improve their awareness in order to correct their rightist attitude.

2. Main points of the forthcoming ideological task: At present, our main objective is to counter rightism, individualism, demoralization, fear of death, pessimism, and passivity in order to strengthen our will to fight and to defeat the US and cope with the extremely critical situation. That is our main ideological task.

((Page 43 of O.T.))

From now to 180 ((sic)), we are required to settle the remaining ideological weaknesses. In order to successfully perform the ideological tasks, we must eliminate rightism and strengthen realistic ideologies. We will initiate our ideological activities through self-discipline, and depending on the specific missions and situation, we will review our activities and conduct necessary critiques in order to heighten our ideology. In order to meet the future requirements of our political reorientation sessions and ideological tasks, we must properly evaluate the friendly and enemy situations. We must find out the specific reasons for our shortcomings and thoroughly understand our policies and main tasks and increase the revolutionary attitude and the will to fight. We should positively settle our ideological weaknesses in order to work out proper plans for the various echelons and branches and to successfully accomplish our missions.

3. I would like to express my ideas concerning the revolutionary tasks. In addition to the settlement of the aforementioned ideological weaknesses we should increase the revolutionary spirit of cadre and Party members in order to meet the requirements of the forthcoming missions and situation. You should remember that our enemy is the US imperialists and the obstinate ((Puppet)) Government leaders. We have realized their most stubborn, cruel, belligerent, and reactionary nature. They have massacred our people, spread toxic chemicals, and bombed several towns. We have met many imperialists, but we can say that the US imperialists are the most stubborn and cruel. Moreover, they are crooked and have many cunning and sinister schemes. Their strategy and tactics are always varied in order to deal with the changing circumstances. We should thoroughly understand their schemes and anticipate the situation in order to promptly cope with it and frustrate their plans. Obviously, the US imperialists have been defeated, but they continue stubbornly with their schemes. The war will end, but the US will not give up its invasion aims and its efforts to create a new type of colonialism in Vietnam. Naturally, under any form of scheme, they will distort peace with a desire to invade our country. Their henchmen are the worst in our history. They are also the most cruel and evil persons with "buffalo heads and horse faces" ((meaning cruel pirates)). We should clearly know the enemy in order to strengthen and enhance our revolutionary attitude.

Secondly, we should also strive to increase our revolutionary ideals. Every cadre and Party member should improve his revolutionary concept and be determined to fight against the enemy to attain the common goal. Specifically, we have devoted our entire lives to defeating the US invaders for the liberation of SVN, for the accomplishment of the democratic Revolution, and to move towards socialism and communism. We understood our duty, but did not clearly understand its importance. Therefore, our class concept faltered as we encountered revolutionary concept and continually struggled to accomplish our revolutionary tasks.

((Page 44 of O.T.))

Thirdly, we should clearly understand our strategy and stratagems. To cope with the present situation, we should fully understand our strategy and apply our stratagems to accomplish the revolutionary missions. However, our

cadre and Party members have often displayed hesitation. Their morale has been unstable. They had an illusion of peace because they did not understand the true purpose of our participation in the peace negotiations. In the past, we eliminated the illusion of peace. However, this illusion of peace still prevails because we do not clearly know the enemy, nor do we thoroughly understand our strategic missions and our stratagems. This has resulted in a lack of firmness. Our strategic mission is to accomplish the national democratic Revolution and proceed toward socialism. The immediate objective is to defeat the US imperialists, liberate the South, and reunify our country. Concerning our peace negotiations and our proposal for the establishment of a coalition government, these are mere stratagems. Stratagems are to be used to weaken the enemy and to intensify the Revolution. If we do not understand our strategy, we will be easily confused. Our policy is to fight and negotiate. However, combat activities are the decisive factors of the war. Negotiations are only a method of attack. The past negotiations have exercised a great influence on the ideology of our cadre and Party members. The latter cherished their illusions of peace and they did not thoroughly understand our strategy. In the future phases, the situation will be more complicated. Therefore, we should strengthen our concepts and thoroughly understand our strategic missions in order to cope with the future situation. We have gained many experiences from the correction of our erroneous concepts after the restoration of peace in 1954. We had sacrificed innumerable lives for the cause of our country. Our political situation at that time was very complex and the enemy was still strong. Then the war was ended, but it was not a real end. The Revolution was not strongly intensified in the South, therefore, the conflict between the enemy and us became increasingly critical and our struggle became fierce. The national and class dissensions became more critical. The enemy strived to destroy us and we also strived to annihilate him at all costs. There is no way leading to success in SVN other than by the use of violence. Our illusion of peace without violence is wrong. If we want to successfully accomplish the Revolution, we must use violence in several forms. Basically, we can use the people's violence or stage a civil war. The class struggles must be fierce because the reactionary class in the South still exists. The feudalists, together with the reactionaries, strive to take revenge on the people of the working class and oppose the Revolution. Therefore, the class struggle must be fierce. We should also increase the working class' ideology and attitude and strengthen its determination to fight the US and conduct future class struggles.

((Page 45 of O.T.))

4. We have recently studied Uncle ((Ho's))^A testament and the oration read on the occasion of his funeral. These constitute the first steps of the training course. We will continue providing lessons for the whole Party headquarters, army, and people in accordance with the plan of the Region Party Committee.

Our Uncle's death is a great loss for our entire Party, army, and people. We are mourning his death, and we will remain grateful to him forever. He is dead, but left a great heritage for our entire Party and people. This is the revolutionary strength of our Party and people.

Our immediate mission is to continue studying the followings:

Uncle's noble thoughts.

Uncle's brilliant revolutionary ethics.

Uncle's concept of solidarity.

Uncle's wisdom and courage.

Uncle's great love for the people and his policy toward the masses.

END OF TRANSLATION