

SR

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How the Vietcong sees the war

12/69

(VÀ VIÊN THI HÀNH BAN ĐIỀU LỆ CHÍNH THỨC CỦA ĐẢNG)

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(L) A) Tổng qua bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức cho Đảng bộ
 miền-Nam nhận "điều lệ Đảng nhận dân cách mạng
 Việt-Nam" nhưng thực chất vẫn là điều lệ của Đảng
 lao động Việt-Nam. Để được 2 như từ trên thành để tiện việc
 nghiên cứu học tập và thi hành, TVR xin giới thiệu những điểm chính
 với bản điều lệ dự thảo, ấn định ngay thi hành và 1 số yêu cầu
 học tập bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức này thế như sau:

1) - Những điểm khác của bản điều lệ chính thức:

Bản dự thảo điều lệ Đảng trước đây gồm có 4 phần cương lĩnh
 tóm tắt 10 chương 41 điều, còn bản điều lệ Đảng chính thức hiện nay
 thì có 4 phần tóm tắt chỉ mục định 10 Chương chỉ có 39 điều vì có bỏ

Documents such as the one published below are generally roneoed rather roughly as this sample shows.

The document published below was captured on June 1, 1969 by a unit of the Ninth US Infantry Division. It is dated 12 April 1969. It is clear from this document, and from other documents captured, that the Communists expect complete victory only by way of a number of steps. They recognize that they cannot win militarily; but they believe that a process has been set in train, beginning with the cessation of the bombing of the North, and including the decision to negotiate in Paris with the NLF, which, though "tortuous", will end in complete victory.

Since it is just not true, as is claimed, that "The fighting spirit of the US and puppet troops continues to decline", and since it is admitted that the South Vietnamese Government administration has yet to be "disintegrated" and that the anti-Communist regional forces have to be "worn down and disintegrated", it is clear that very great emphasis indeed is being placed on the weakness of the American domestic situation and the consequent political difficulties of President Nixon.

If anyone ever doubted the role played by the "Protest Movement" in sustaining the morale of the Communists, they could hardly do so any more after carefully reading this document. There is no suggestion any more, as there was before the Tet Offensive of early 1968, that the people will rise up in sympathy with the Communists if offered the opportunity, as they were during the Tet. The purpose being expounded is clearly this: inflict as many casualties as possible, spread the killing of selected civilians as widely as possible, destroy as much as can be destroyed of the Government's local administration, but above all hasten the process by which "serious negotiations", the withdrawal of US troops, and the acceptance of coalition government may be expected to arise out of American political weakness, the nature of which is accurately described and the intensity of which is in direct proportion to the strength of the "Protest Movement".

[STUDY] OF MAJOR THEMES

1. VICTORIES SCORED DURING THE SPRING PHASE:

- The Spring phase was a great and overall victory having strategic significance.
- This is clearly pointed out by Circular No 13.

Here we state only the general aspects of the military, political, and economic fields which we think are connected with strategic problems, the aggressive intention and war policy of the Americans.

MILITARY FIELD: The US forces this time sustained heavier casualties than in the first phase of Mau Than ((year of the Monkey)) New Year. The elite units (the 1st and 25th US Infantry Divisions, the 1st US Air Cavalry Division and the Americal Division) suffered very heavy losses.

This is a very important point because the US planned to prolong the war, but they must protect their forces ((US forces)) and maintain and develop the puppet forces in order to force us to negotiate in a weak position.

The losses sustained by US forces have exerted an impact on the afore-mentioned political scheme and pushed the American people to ask for an end to the war, the restoration of peace, and the withdrawal of troops ((from Vietnam)) (as shown by the demonstrations staged on 5-6 April 1969 by the people in the United States).

DISSENSION WITHIN THE US GOVERNMENT IS GROWING MORE AND MORE ACUTE:

- The puppet forces also sustained heavy losses:

This is also a very important factor, because if the puppet troops and puppet government are shaken and demoralized by these losses, the US cannot rely on them to realize their neo-colonialism, prolong the war, and their aggressive will is increasingly shaken.

- **STRATEGIC BACKWARD STEP:** From the offensive position they stepped backward, applying a ((new)) strategy which includes both the offensive and defensive (search and destroy and pacification).

But, with their "Clear and Hold" strategy, despite their preparedness, they were fiercely attacked and sustained heavy losses. Their forces which were deployed in the field and in blocking positions were subjected to our "thunder-like [sic] blows." strongholds and military bases such as Dong Du [Airborne training area], Trang Lon and Long Binh were continually attacked by our forces.

To protect Saigon, they built a system of bases around the Capital (Dong Du, Long Binh). The fact that these bases were continuously attacked drove the Americans into a very critical position. To cope with the situation, they set up small bases to protect their larger bases. But the more they deploy troops to protect these bases, the more they are driven into a defensive position.

Being in a defensive position, their already depleted forces are more scattered, and they cannot organize strategic reserve forces. They counter our attack with a piecemeal commitment of force, using small forces of company and battalion size only; these can be very easily destroyed.

THE US IS MORE AND MORE BOGGED DOWN IN A CONTRADICTION-FILLED POSITION:

- There is indecision between concentration and dispersion; between offensive and defensive; between self-protection and destruction of the enemy.

We have a creative method of conducting our attacks, successfully using small forces against larger ones. We always develop the traditions of such particularly Vietnamese (fighting outfits) such as the special action units, the commandos and direct fire ((flat trajectory)) artillery units.

- The fighting spirit of the US and puppet troops continues to decline.

POLITICAL: Enemy military failures caused the failure of his political scheme to continue the war while at the same time preserving US and puppet forces and maintaining the puppet government, and forcing us to negotiate in a weak position.

His aggressive will was again shattered. Recently, the American people's movement to oppose the war, and demand the restoration of peace and the withdrawal of US troops, has boiled up again with greater intensity.

US INTERNAL CONFUSION:

- On our side: Paralleling our military attacks, the people in the 3 areas [mountain lowland and city] simultaneously rose up to attack the enemy politically. Particularly, they conducted attacks against the civilian self-defense forces, punished and educated "Phuong Hoang" [members of the Phoenix project]. They also initiated struggles against enemy sweep operations, looting, air, artillery shelling and pacification activities.... They opposed the war, demanded peace and exposed the true face of the US war mongers and the "Country-selling" Thieu-Ky-Huong clique.

Disregarding the enemy barrages of bullets and bombs, the people participated in combat activities; served as civilian laborers; and sabotaged communication lines. Expressing their determination to fight and defeat the enemy to seize power, they joined our revolutionary organizations, thus strengthening our forces.

The desertion rate among the enemy ranks has increased and the movement to oppose the war and sweep operations has been developed.

Good political developments were noted in the weakest areas that is the lowland areas of the Cuulong River and Region 5, and especially in the area of "Hoa Hao" religious sect.

For the first time the revolutionary and armed forces had come to the sacred land of the "Hoa Hao" village to visit and talk with the Hoa Hao compatriots. Many Hoa Hao units in charge of mobile counter actions remained inactive and did not open fire on us.

ECONOMY: Difficulties in the field of economy encountered by the US have increased. Therefore, the US had to take the following actions:

- Cut the budget for outer space study (which actually is a program designed to prepare war against the socialist bloc).
- Cut down the number of military bases in foreign countries which are used to coerce these countries to side with the US.
- Cut down the budget for social welfare programs.
- Increase taxes.

These actions have intensified the American people's movement to oppose poverty, starvation, illiteracy and diseases.

- The gold flow.

These factors caused an adverse effect on the dominating role of the US over the world's economy and finance.

It is evident that the US had suffered heavy failures in the Spring [campaign], failures of strategic significance. This effected its aggressive will and political plots and presses it to quickly adopt a clear-cut policy on VN, i.e. whether to prolong or end the war.

OUR DEFICIENCIES:

- Activities in cities and areas bordering cities were weak.
- The guerrilla warfare movement was developed slowly.
- Political and military proselyting activities left much to be desired.
- Force building was slowly.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE YEAR 1969 ESPECIALLY THE 1969 SUMMER. + OPPORTUNITIES IN 1969.

FOR THE ENEMY:

1968 is the year when the enemy was constantly attacked and suffered heavy losses in lives and materials.

- The aggressive will is shaky, a military success is impossible.
- A political decision has to be made.
- Expand the war?

+ THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The period of "honeymoon" has passed, the Democratic Party cannot allow the Republican Party to take too much time before making decisions.

The authority belongs to the Republican Party. But the congress is largely controlled by the Democrats. Therefore, Nixon must make a decision that will enable his Party to gain more seats in the 1970 election year.

- For these reasons, Nixon had:
 - Flown to Europe
 - Met Lodge
 - Sent Laird to Viet-Nam
 - Recalled Bunker and Sullivan.
- The US people want an end to the war, and a withdrawal of US troops (demonstrations held on 5 and 6 April 1969 with the participation of servicemen).
- + The US internal situation is tense.

- OUR SIDE:

The reasons which prompt the US to quickly settle the war are also the ones that press us to develop our victories and to conduct successive attacks to force the enemy to adopt a clear-cut attitude.

After a year of General Offensive, we have obtained a considerable victory, but we need more and bigger victories in order to decisively change the situation.

Example: If the water is at 70-80 degree, we should heat it to 100 degrees until it boils.

We should take advantage of the time when the enemy is in hesitation to launch attacks to drive him into a deadlocked position where he is forced to accept a war settlement which is advantageous to us.

WHAT HAS TO BE DONE:

AMERICANS: Staying one more day, they will suffer more casualties, spend more money, and be opposed by the American people, without any hope of being able to strengthen the puppet troops and government.

PUPPET TROOPS: They are severely battered.

PUPPET GOVERNMENT: All governmental structures are paralyzed and the government cannot control the people. ((We)) are racing against time, so ((we)) must step up ((our)) offensive during the first six months, i.e. during the coming summer.

It is also necessary to emphasize the importance of summer, a very vital period in which the enemy is forced to adopt a policy, to accept serious negotiations with us, withdraw troops and recognize the Front ((NLFSVN)) and a coalition government.

Therefore, we should not consider summer as a decisive phase, but a phase with special significance in which the Americans will be obliged to adopt a policy which is consistent with our line.

ROLE OF SUMMER PHASE: Recently, the Spring phase has given a painful blow to Nixon, embarrassing him in his attempt at prolonging the war to secure a position of strength. For that reason, we should make great effort so as to exploit the victory of the Spring phase and be determined to aim repeated military and political blows at Nixon in the Summer phase to force him to renounce his policy of prolonging the war for securing a position of strength, and cause him difficulties, when he is about to make a final policy decision on Viet-Nam in June of this year.

We must make everybody clearly see this opportunity and the strategic importance of the [1969] Summer Campaign. It must be conducted simultaneously, continuously, and widespreadly. Everybody must accomplish all missions prescribed, deal a heavy blow at the enemy's plot to gain a position of strength, to change the balance of power to our advantage, to rush forward to win a decisive victory.

Specific missions for the Summer Campaign:

- + We must inflict casualties on the enemy in men and war facilities 50% higher than during the ((1969)) Spring Campaign. Specifically, continual attacks must be directed at cities, towns, enemy base areas and storage facilities. Work out a plan for a proper use of forces to attach specific objectives and defeat a number of US and puppet trump card units. In addition, concerted efforts must be made to wear down and disintegrate a large number of [RVN] Regional and Popular forces, security and police agencies, and especially the forces which occupy and control the districts and villages.
- + In rural areas, initiate 3 phases of attack in order to destroy and basically disintegrate the enemy's governmental infrastructure. Particular efforts must be made to kill enemy tyrants, spies, break enemy oppressive control, and in coordination with the people, force the enemy to surrender and confess himself guilty in the face of the people.
- + Disintegrate the enemy's Civil Self Defense organizations and other reactionary ones, to basically defeat his pacification plan, organize the people into a strong guerrilla movement, and through the revolutionary organizations and administrations, to ensure the people's mastership.

In addition, consolidate the Party Chapters, Youth League Chapters, improve the people's living conditions, and mobilize manpower and material resources to support the frontline.

+ Organize widespread guerrilla warfare in cities and towns. Promote political movements and try to take over the power at the infrastructure level. Coordinate with the united front ((sic)) to operate on a large scale at the upper level and coordinate with the diplomatic offensive to wage the struggle against the stubborn Americans and their henchmen, the Thieu-Ky-Huong clique. Establish a Peace Cabinet to conduct serious negotiations with the Front, to break the enemy's control in many city areas and confuse it in its rear areas.

- Conduct strong and continuous attacks on land and water communication axes.
- Motivate a people's troop proselyting movement.
- Positively develop our revolutionary capabilities.