

----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

((Page 1 of Item 1 of O.T.))

No. 289 B.C. 12.1((VC)) Absolute Secret*Duc Hue*ANNUAL RECAPITULATIVE  
REPORT FOR 1969

A	
FILE	SUBJ.
DATE	SUB-CAT.
12/69	

DUC HUE DISTRICT SECURITY STAFFI. ENEMY SITUATION

In order to realize his general plan for coordination of military and political activities with espionage and to attain rapid pacification to secure a strong position for a political solution, the enemy has intensified his military and political activities in the Duc Hue area, as follows:

A. Military Field: The enemy planned to launch attacks against our bases as well as to blockade them and to block our communication lines. From January to June ((1969)), he landed over 1,000 US soldiers of air reconnaissance and Special Forces units and positioned them in Binh Thanh, My Thanh Dong, My Thanh Bac, My Quy Dong, and My Quy Tay Villages. These personnel coordinated with the Special Forces units located at Queo Ba and Kinh Xang and the local force units in Than Cuong and Hiep Hoa Sub-Sectors in their attacks against the surrounding villages. They launched attacks against Dong Hoa Nam Hamlet (MTD ((possibly My Thanh Dong))) and relocated the inhabitants of that hamlet. From June to the present, US troops began to withdraw from the above positions, and were replaced by Puppet ((RVNAF)) troops who conducted sporadic operations. However, their activities were conducted regularly in the areas along the river, especially in My Thanh Dong Village and more recently in My Thanh Tay and Binh Thanh.

At the same time, the enemy patrolled on the Vam Co Dong River and attacked the areas along the river. Villages located along the ((Cambodia)) border were constantly attacked by the enemy's air force and artillery. B-52's destroyed the terrain and sprayed toxic chemical agents ((sic)). In Binh Hoa Nam, Binh Thanh, My Thanh Bac, My Quy Dong, and Con Voi, they dropped pungent ingredients ((sic)). In addition, delayed-fuse bombs were dropped in a line along the border. From My Quy Dong to My Thanh Tay and down to Binh Thanh, the enemy increased fierce attacks to carry out the plan of relocating the people. His intent was to establish a white belt area in order to block our corridors, intercept our transportation, and prevent our attacks ((against him)).

Recently, jet fighters dropped cluster bombs on a populated area located in the ((Cambodia)) territory from Cay Queo to Coc Ca Ban to interrupt our movement along the border. Gunships also circled and fired into the Tru Co and Beh Xuong areas. These airstrikes caused difficulties for production, hindered the people from going out to earn their living, endangered their lives, and undermined their morale. This interdiction was performed in order to carry out the de-Americanization of the Vietnam war, so that the US can secure a lasting and strong political position in the immediate future.

Because of the enemy's operations, we suffered 112 persons killed, including 38 cadre and combatants and 74 civilians.

Of these, 20 civilians were massacred in Hamlet 7, Mỹ Thanh Đông Village. In Jun ((69)), enemy warships battered Hiệp Hòa Strategic Hamlet and inflicted the following casualties:

9 killed;

118 wounded, including 38 cadre and soldiers;

12 captured, including 8 cadre and guerrillas;

4 missing.

Over 300 families, including more than 800 old people, women, and children in Hamlet 7, abandoned their houses for other areas.

The Rear Service Group (100) lost all its weapons and ammunition, and the damage caused to the people was evaluated at over 800,000\$ ((SVN)) ((118\$ SVN = \$1.00 US))

#### B. Political Situation:

Even as he was being defeated, the enemy endeavored to consolidate the Puppet ((GVN)) administrative machinery and psywar organizations.

((Page 2 of Item 1 of O.T.))

He exerted efforts to re-establish the local administration whose personnel had been in exile.

For example, the local authorities in Mỹ Thanh Đông were re-elected with seven village council members, headed by one member of the Administrative Committee of Hamlet 1.

The latter was assisted by one security agent. The local administration in Mỹ Quý, Bình Hòa, and Bình Thanh was also consolidated.

In hamlets, the Puppets recruited administrative personnel to maintain close contact with and control of the people. Individuals from 15 to 45 years of age had to join the People's Self-Defense Force.

After having received military training in Quang Trung ((Military Training Center)), they were upgraded to soldiers. All the people, including our cadre's and soldiers' families, were listed and classified into categories.

In Thôn Cường Strategic Hamlet, there were 34 People's Self-Defense Force members.

The enemy spread demagogic propaganda to deceive our people. He disseminated news of false victories, stating that he was superior to us in strength and in armament (B-52's) and that he was taking the initiative in the war. Such a theme had the purpose of undermining the morale of our personnel and the people. He promoted their weariness of a protracted war; their fear of poverty, starvation, and death; and their underestimation of our fighting abilities in order to lower their confidence in our victories. To implement his de-Americanization of the war and accelerated pacification

plan, the enemy spread the rumor of an approaching peace to inspire a "wait-and-see" attitude and foment the fear of violence and death among the people.

To intensify the Chiêu Hồi ((Open Arms)) activities, the enemy dropped leaflets from aircraft and used loudspeakers to urge our cadre, soldiers, and people to surrender. He praised his regime and libelled ours. In his leaflets, there was the picture of an enemy hospital and the enthusiastic activities of his troops. They also showed the poor conditions of our hospitals and the poor fate of our troops. The enemy also staged a movement in which women and children claimed that their husbands and fathers, who had joined our side, had returned to them. He encouraged the relatives of our cadre and soldiers to call them back to the Puppet Government. Those who cause the defection of one of our high-level cadre will be awarded 250,000\$ ((SVN)) ((118\$ SVN = \$1.00 US)).

As a result, 46 persons came to our areas recently to urge their relatives to surrender.

Through his psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities in 1969, the enemy succeeded in proselyting 51 persons. Of the ralliers, nine carried with them two AK's, one Canadian Colt, one red-stock rifle ((SKS)), and two grenades. The majority of the ralliers are enemy deserters, defectors, and dishonest people who had been reoriented ((by the VC)) many times, but did not correct themselves.

Most of the persons who defected to the enemy were influenced either by their families or by enemy psywar activities.

There is nothing new in the enemy's psywar activities, but his plan is very cunning and dangerous. The enemy increased his fierce attacks, inflicted more personnel casualties on us to undermine the morale of our personnel, and urged them to respond to the Chiêu Hồi program. Though our cadre, soldiers, and people had a deep hatred for the enemy, they always feared the fierceness of war, and torture and imprisonment by the enemy. For this reason, the people did not dare to actively participate in revolutionary activities.

### C. Espionage Activities:

In close coordination with military and political activities, the enemy has exerted great efforts to establish a widespread and secret intelligence network.

There is nothing new in his activity plan, but the enemy stratagems are very dangerous and cunning. The following are some particular points:

Intelligence and public security agents and policemen of Gò Dầu, Trã Cao, and Hiệp Hoà went to different axes of communication and halted the people to examine their identity papers. Sometimes these agents arrested the people for interrogation. Sometimes they detained or released them after having forced them to act as their agents in our base areas.

The road to Hiệp Hoà was blocked in March ((1969)). For this reason, very few people took this road. Many people who moved toward the direction of Chợ Trời and Tra Cao were arrested. From the beginning of the year, 260 people who moved in and out of the enemy-controlled area were arrested. We must take notice that only 102 of them lived in our base areas. The rest of the people came from other areas to pay a visit to their spouses and children or to trade.

Recently, Cambodian intelligence agents went to the border to investigate the activities of our government and the way we dealt with the people. They recorded information and photographed the sites.

As for the people who went visiting their spouses and children, the enemy agents interrogated them and forced them to summon their relatives. Then they let them go after exacting some money from them.

The enemy agents operating in the Chợ Trời and Gò Dầu areas collected information with the above procedure. They employed those who shuttled between the two areas as informants. The enemy frequently planted his agents in our units. They either surrendered to us or penetrated our ranks after they were trained by the Puppet Government.

The enemy usually interrogated the people they arrested about the locations of our revolutionary agencies and units in their areas, our storage facilities, our communication and transportation lines, the activities of Đoàn 70 and Công Trường 9 ((9th VC Division)) in particular, our local administrative machinery from village to district level, our way of living, and our treatment of the people. They also asked residents of each village about the names of our cadre and administrative personnel from village to district level. As for the people who come from the outside areas ((RVN-controlled areas)), the enemy agents confiscated their ID cards or PHS's ((personal history statements)), these people to obtain the return of their papers by divulging information on our activities, and intimidated the persons whom they suspected to be our agents planted in their areas.

When the enemy agents arrested the people, they usually photographed them individually or collectively. We do not know how the agents intend to use the pictures.

The intelligence agents of Section 2, Hậu Nghĩa, also planted their personnel in our base areas to collect information.

As regards the social and cultural activities and security and order in the rural areas, the enemy has spread his depraved culture widely. He wants to debauch our youth so as to weaken their determination to fight and promote their avarice and selfishness. All this is aimed at training the youths to be thieves and robbers and at dividing the people of all social classes.

Robbery, drinking of alcohol, and gambling occurred frequently. Some hooligans robbed the Cambodian people, causing disorder in the border areas.

The enemy agents in the Hậu Nghĩa and Hiệp Hoà areas disguised themselves as civilians and penetrated our villages along the river in order to detect the locations of our communication lines and provide information for the enemy Special Forces to operate in coordination with aircraft and artillery. This was aimed at driving us away from our base areas and creating white belt areas to separate the two areas ((VC and RVN areas)). In 1969, the enemy hit us six times, including three times in Mỹ Thạnh Đông, twice in Mỹ Thạnh Tây, and once against the troops of Đoàn 10 ((265th VC Battalion)) while they were moving. Those attacks caused us six killed, three wounded, ((blank)) missing, and a loss of AK's and people's property valued at over 800,000\$((SVN)).

Furthermore, he also applied technical intelligence, dispersed troop landings with helicopters, and sound detectors to help the ((GVN)) Special Forces, artillery, and aircraft launch attacks against us.

((Page 4 of Item 1 of O.T.))

The enemy increased his activities in and near abandoned villages. His aircraft frequently circled around the riverside area and in particular flew along the ((Cambodian)) border to detect our troops so as to intercept them as they tried to cross the border to reinforce the different battlefields (chiefly Đức Hoà and Đức Huệ).

## II. FRIENDLY SITUATION

At present, four villages of Đức Huệ District are still under our control, but our personnel have taken temporary refuge in Cambodia. Both our main forces and district level forces are assembled in this area, and use it as a base from which to attack the enemy.

Besides the regular inhabitants of the district, people have moved in from other districts, ((RVNAF)) soldiers who have rallied to us, and deserters also live here; also included are several merchants who commute between the two areas ((Đức Huệ District and Cambodia)).

Moreover, there are also cadre and soldiers who have abandoned their posts or deserted our ranks and came to live here. For that reason, it is very difficult to control them and to distinguish between the loyal and disloyal.

Most of the local population subsists by fishing and gathering logs for sale. But now, they dare not venture into the outer areas for fear of the enemy's delayed-action bombs ((sic)) which were dropped along the border. They concentrate along the road to Bảo Huyệt and Chợ Trối to earn their living. Due to the above complex situation, there are frequent criminal acts in our base, such as several cases of robbery, drinking of alcohol, quarrels, murder caused by jealousy, homicide, and so on ((sic)). Due to the present miserable conditions, many poor people have moved to the border to trade and concentrated in the Trã Cao and Bảo Huyệt areas.

Therefore, effective control could not be established. Dishonest Cambodian people took advantage of this situation. They intercepted the people and confiscated their property and raped the women, etc.. ((sic)). In addition, enemy aircraft continued to strike on the border, hindering the people from earning their living. The people's morale is low. The

above are the most difficult questions ((for us)) to settle.

The execution of base regulations by our cadre and soldiers has also been lax, while eating, drinking, and talking have been obvious ((sic)). But recently, there has been a considerable reduction in this.

Because many families are presently in need and suffer from famine, etc.. ((sic)), it is difficult to motivate them to join our revolutionary activities. In addition, our performance of tasks has failed to meet the requirement due to the lack of people's organizations and the irregular activities of our security personnel.

In 1969, under the leadership of the higher echelon security section, the district and village security sections achieved the following:

According to the statistics of 1969, we conducted 2,883 motivation sessions gathering 28,877 participants. Of these sessions, 2,159 were participated in by Party members, and they were attended 358 times by Group members, 4,911 times by personnel from agencies and branches, and 31,381 times by the people.

Statistics for each quarter:

((Page 5 of Item 1 of O.T.))

Quarter	Motivation sessions	Participants	Within the Party	Within the Group	Within the branches	Among the people	Remarks
1st Quarter	617	6,492	380	134	276	4,514	((Blank))
2nd Quarter	151	8,672	642	212	3,076	7,589	
3rd Quarter	352	5,086	446	12	969	4,035	
4th Quarter	563	7,188	691	((Blank))	658	5,251	

In the motivation task, internal organization personnel have themselves been highly motivate; thus, they have been effective in their motivation of the people.

The security maintenance mission was satisfied in all Chapter Party Committee and Party Chapter conferences and in all meetings of Party cells, branches, the people, and security guard cells. Therefore, the personnel in internal organizations and branches and the people displayed a sense of responsibility. They detected and reported strangers, other suspicious persons, thieves... etc.. ((sic)) to the security agencies. In the past, we detected 56 cases ((of disloyalty)), including 13 political crimes and 43 cases of social crimes.

Our cadre knew how to combine the exploitation of documents concerning the enemy scheme of propaganda, psywar activities (Phuong Hoang Campaign), and regulations for the rural areas, with our plan to counter enemy deceptive and demagogic activities. They especially know how to counter the enemy's Open Arms activities, and his plans for getting information from the people by arresting and torturing them. They also know how to coordinate the actual situation in local areas to work out appropriate motivation plans. In their implementation, the cadre succeeded in motivating personnel of all branches and organizations to fulfill the security maintenance task. Therefore, in the last year we were successful in this task. In addition, slogans on security maintenance were printed ((on the wall)) in restaurants to remind the guests to maintain security.

However, there were still some shortcomings in the maintenance of security. Cadre did not perform this task continuously and carefully. Therefore, the level of security awareness of the people was not high, and the collection of information by security agents was still poor. In some areas, the branches did not pay attention to motivating the people to maintain security. As a result, we obtained good results only in conferences which were attended by security agents, while in the conferences not attended by security agents the cadre discussed security maintenance superficially, then neglected to implement it.

The themes used for motivation were not appropriate to the situation due to a lack of study and preparation. As a result, the motivation was still superficial. Recently, the cadre failed to combine the main themes of the motivation task with slogans and folk songs.

There were 99 (old and new) law enforcement teams, consisting of 2,583 personnel. These cells were classified as follows: Thirty-six good, 30 fair, and 34 poor. In the development of capabilities, cadre of all levels have tried to improve their working procedures and have gained some achievements. However, the results were not completely satisfactory.

The hamlet security guard cells did not operate regularly, and secret agents failed to meet the professional requirements.

#### Research and study:

We controlled four villages located within the base area which consisted of 1,797 houses with 8,781 persons (male and female, young and old). As for the other villages, they were located outside our base area, and we could not control them. There were 4,709 children from one to 15 years old, 3,706 persons from 16 to 45 years old, and 366 persons 46 years old or older.

#### Investigation mission:

During 1969, we succeeded in re-educating 183 old and new enemy personnel from various areas, including 94 Chiêu Hồi personnel, 58 deserters, 19 Special Forces troops, four rural pacification cadre, six former administrative personnel (two hamlet administrative personnel), and two reconnaissance agents.

Upon completion of a political indoctrination period, 137 of them volunteered as civilian laborers; the remaining 46 continued to receive further training.

Fourteen individuals were suspected of being enemy agents; we captured four of them, indoctrinated four others, and are watching six of them. There were three others whom we are trying to recruit as our agents. Thanks to investigation and study, we gained control of a number of people in the local ((enemy)) areas and indoctrinated them to participate in the resistance.

However, the general situation concerning the suspects was unsatisfactory and did not meet the requirements of the present situation. Because of the ineffectiveness of our cadre due to their poor training and ability, we failed to detect and capture the enemy personnel in time.

### SUPPRESSION ACTIVITIES

#### Arrest and trials in the district camp:

In 1969, we captured 14 persons, consisting of five guilty of political crimes and nine guilty of social crimes. During the summer, we captured two criminals; we captured three during the fall, and also three during the winter.

The total was 28, including 14 prisoners held over from 1968. We investigated and released two females and settled the cases of 16, including eight political prisoners, six criminals, and two suspects. One male was sent to the Sub-Region Military Security Section; one female and one criminal were sent to the Security Section of Sub-Region 2. There are presently 11 prisoners in the district camp consisting of one female, five political detainees, and six criminals. One political convict named Ut has been sentenced. We regularly maintained the system of requesting instructions from and submitting reports to ((higher headquarters)) before arresting or punishing an individual. We maintained close control over the prisoners. The policy for prisoners and the control of their thoughts were properly carried out. We planted secret agents in the camp to control all activities of the prisoners. Thus, we could easily find out their erroneous thoughts, and schemes. As a result, we succeeded in finding out the plot by Phan Uót to spread bad propaganda against the Revolution and his intent to disarm our personnel so he could escape from the camp. We promptly prevented his reactionary actions. We did not use torture or bad treatment, nor did we beat or humiliate the prisoners. We immediately took care of them when they were sick and correctly applied our regulations; we also succeeded in keeping the prisoners from escaping.

However, we were guilty of several shortcomings. We failed to properly indoctrinate the guards on their responsibility and vigilance. Some soldiers were passive and were not alert while they were on guard duty or when they led the prisoners to work. As a result, the prisoners had a chance to chat with each other, and once the prisoners were allowed to date each other ((sic)). Preventive sanitation was not carefully observed. A number of prisoners suffered from scabies, influenza, and paralysis. The treatment of sick prisoners was poor and slow. The soldiers failed to observe our policy in the treatment of prisoners. They intimidated them or punished them of their own will. Sometimes, they beat and humiliated them.

### INTERROGATION.

Our cadre were patient in exploiting information and interrogating the prisoners. They did not force prisoners to confess. Even though the training material on investigation was insufficient, they exerted every effort to interrogate the personnel and exploit information with a view to finding out the detainees' accomplices and discovering the enemy plans. They tried to capture the enemy and punish him according to the Party's policy.

However, we also had some shortcomings. Our cadre did not promptly investigate cases. Some cases took a long time. For this reason, we did not meet the requirements of the present situation. In trying to solve difficult problems, our cadre lacked patience and did not know how to accomplish their missions.

In 1969, we caught 55 violators red-handed, i.e. stealing a boat, a pig, chicken or duck, rice, and a radio and one man stabbing another with a machete.

((Page 7 of Item 1 of O.T.))

We settled some cases in villages in only three to five days. In these cases, we recovered and returned all stolen goods to their owners. However, we still failed to promptly solve many cases which should not have taken a great amount of time, such as: Quan's case in My Quy Tay Village which took 20 days; and Gon's case in RVN MR 3 ((sic)) which was not solved for over a month. One case involved the My Quy Tay Village authority which sent Lan to the security section, but due to negligence on the part of the latter, Lan succeeded in escaping.

#### IDEOLOGICAL REFORM

In 1969, the village authority conducted two ideological reform phases for 22 Puppet troops and administrative personnel. Those soldiers who surrendered to our areas were also ideologically oriented many times. Yet, they were still stubborn and did not observe the regulations of the local authorities. They did not follow the regulations, moved everywhere on their own will, and sometimes used rough words to the local cadre. We usually conducted a 3-5 day period of reform, during which we thoroughly investigated and classified each individual. We also sent a report to the district authority and security section. The district security section assigned cadre to help us. After the ideological reform phase, we assigned cadre to control ideological evolution. The cadre in charge reported that a number of prisoners made ideological progress. Some others who were stubborn were sent to the people's organizations and security cells for additional reform and control. The district security section was in charge of this task. When this section released the prisoners, most of them were well reformed, but some were not; therefore, those who were released in the liberated areas left these areas for the enemy's. Some others were freed for three or four months, then they were captured again, such as Chia and Tru. This indicates that the ideological reform was not satisfactory.

#### INDOCTRINATION TASK

In 1969, the village authority indoctrinated 1,841 persons consisting of 865 persons who shuttled between the two areas ((VC and GVN)), 394 returnees and deserters, 290 illegal residents, 239 persons guilty of fighting and quarrelling with one another, 25 suspects, and five People's Self-Defense Force personnel. We succeeded in regularly conducting individual as well as collective indoctrinations. Due to our profound study of the personality and class of individuals to be indoctrinated, we provided appropriate ideological indoctrination.

Further, however, we failed to help the protection cells learn how to conduct the indoctrination program in their units. Only the security section took charge of the indoctrination activities. For this reason, during the last year, the indoctrination program could not be conducted continuously in order to meet the requirements of this task.

## PROTECTION TASK

For the protection of district organizations, a meeting was held on this matter. The meeting pointed out the importance of the security task in the agencies. To protect our organizations and personnel from destruction by the enemy, security measures and principles must be practiced.

The above only mentions that measures must be taken for protection of the district organizations. For more effective protection of the organizations, specific plans must be worked out. The importance of security maintenance was repeatedly announced in villages; therefore, political awareness was increased.

The villages and district still paid little attention to the recruitment of personnel (especially in the military field).

When they recruited men to join the army and guerrilla units, they did not thoroughly screen their personal history statements. For this reason, a number of recruits caused difficulties within the internal organization. Recently however, recruiting practices have improved.

((Page 8 of Item 1 of O.T.))

The protection task was not accomplished because the Security Section failed to request that the Party Committee motivate its personnel to promptly deal with the enemy scheme. The district did not assign a Party Committee member to take charge of protecting the agencies, nor did the villages establish security councils.

### Strength:

In 1969, the district security section was increased by six additional members. One assistant security section chief was transferred to be Chief of the Administrative Office; and one cadre was assigned from the district unit to take charge of training the four security guards.

Seventeen personnel were transferred. Of them, 10 were assigned to higher headquarters, including two section chiefs, one assistant section chief, one espionage cadre, one unit leader, and five reconnaissance agents. Four were sent to government agencies, including one administrative office chief and three protection personnel. One reconnaissance cadre was assigned to the village. One security guard deserted. One law enforcement cadre was sent to the Finance and Economy Section. The number of comrades present in the district security section was 27, including one chief, one assistant chief, one member, one village guide, one law enforcement cadre, seven reconnaissance cadre, one administrative office chief, 12 security guards, one medic, and one liaison agent.

There were 35 underground agents, including eight secret agents and 27 secret members of people's organizations. Of them, three operated in weak areas, five carried on trading, four were responsible for investigating suspected persons, and 23 were assigned to specific areas of operations.

### Village and hamlet machinery:

The village Security section consisted of 28 members, including five section chiefs, 14 assistant section chiefs, and eight members. One section chief was assigned to the district Youth Section; one section chief violated discipline; two assistant section chiefs were killed in action; one assistant section chief was assigned to the district Security Section and one to the district Farmers' Association.

At present, these are 27 persons in the section. There are five section chiefs, 14 assistant section chiefs, and eight members. The number of the new and old comrades who were sent to the sub-region for training was 12.

Hamlet security personnel numbered 24, of whom 13 have been trained.

The actual number of personnel of the village and hamlet security sections is as follows:

My Thanh Tây: Village Section: Five personnel with one chief, three assistant chiefs, and one member; Hamlet Section: Seven men.

My Qui Dong: Village Section: Five men with one chief, two assistant chiefs, and two members; Hamlet Section: Three men.

My Qui Tây: Village Section: Seven men with one chief, four assistant chiefs, and two members; Hamlet Section: Five men.

My Thanh Dong: Village Section: Three men consisting of one chief and two assistant chiefs; Hamlet Section: One man.

Binh Thanh: Village Section: Five men with one chief, two assistant chiefs, and two members; Hamlet Section: Six men.

Binh Hoa Nam: Village Section: Two men: One chief and one member. The section chief was a district cadre detached to the village section.

My Thanh Bac: Village Section: One man: Assistant chief; Hamlet Section: Two men.

#### General comments:

The following strong points and weak points were noted in all fields of security activities in 1969.

Strong points: Motivation was conducted regularly within the internal organization as well as among the people. It helped the internal personnel and the people to understand their task and realize matters concerning security. The form and themes of the motivation caused the branches and associations to actively take part in detecting suspected personnel.

The organization of the security movement in districts and villages during last year was nearly accomplished. Only four villages in the base areas needed to train security cell leaders and assistant cell leaders for the activities of their cells. As a result, there were a number of cells which successfully performed their security activities in the hamlets.

The district and villages succeeded in solving some problems in compliance with the policy and requirements of the mission. In particular, the villages, by themselves, succeeded in settling some matters, such as larceny and robbery, and conducted indoctrination in the local area; they also worked out a detailed plan for detecting and watching suspected personnel.

The district machinery was interested in increasing its quality and quantity by strengthening ideological leadership and professional skills. So its activities brought about good results. Due to efforts made in the implementation of the resolution of the branch and efforts to improve personnel and professional skills, the village machinery performed its activities well during the last year; especially in the four villages in the base areas.

Progress was made in working procedures. In the district, meetings were organized regularly for gaining experiences. In the village, monthly meetings were organized at which specific and practical resolutions were prescribed.

The above results were obtained due to the close leadership of the higher-level security personnel and of the district and village authorities. They understood their responsibility and the current situation and eagerly carried out their security tasks during the Summer Campaign. The security organizations and elements in the villages did a better job than before. They paid much more attention to security maintenance and performed this task satisfactorily.

Weak points:

The implementation of resolutions last year indicated the following weak points:

The security maintenance movement was neither widely developed nor continuous. Oppression of reactionaries and ideological indoctrination left much to be desired. Thus, we failed to satisfy the present requirements of the security mission. The investigation of suspected individuals and ideological indoctrination were slow. The evidence necessary to justify the crimes of suspected people still took too much time to collect. The security activities in villages were relatively successful, but those in hamlets were poor: The district and village security sections did not thoroughly fill their role with regard to the Party Committees.

Because internal security was not taken into account, confusion often occurred within the sections.

These shortcomings were the result of a lack of determination to fight against the enemy and failure to understand the security role which acts as the main tool for the Party.

The district security section failed to provide the village security sections with practical assistance in professional guidance and ideology.

In general, the districts and villages failed to attack the right individuals, to practice strong oppression, and to realize the significance of the security action provided for the base areas. Therefore, no considerable results were obtained from the implementation of resolutions.

Date, 20 December 1969

A 12

Distribution:

- S5
- D10
- C25
- File

Information. Một bãi ô quan ((sic))

Kiên Tường within the sub-region ((possibly name of an agent)),

(There are details that we could not understand about the attitude of Sihanouk and the Central Government of Cambodia). Why was it possible that while he was in convalescence in France, Prince Sihanouk did not know anything about what happened in his country, though all reports were sent to his private office?

He ordered his Prime Minister ((sic)) to return to Cambodia, but the latter could not do so. So, he delegated all power to the Vice-Premier. This one, a young man and a schoolmate of Trần Bửu Kiếm, belongs to the group of our opponents.

The scheme of Sihanouk was to pretend to ignore the entire situation, and he entrusted all power to the Vice-Premier.

Later, when he was informed of the events at Hồ Bà Tây with burning and killing ((possibly a conflict between the VC and Khmer troops)), he proposed that we cease all hostilities, and the ((VC)) Revolution agreed to cease all actions. After that, there was a coup d'etat ((possibly conducted by Lon Nol)).

((Page 2 of Item 2 of O.T.))

We secretly sent a message to Bửu Kiếm, assigning him to contact his former school mate and persuade him to reveal secrets. At the same time, we tried to plant our personnel in some ministries of Cambodia, but failed.

After they found the situation critical, five Cambodian ministers resigned and went to France. And the new government replaced them with five extreme-rightist ministers who are our strong opponents.

So far, the situation in Sub-Region 2 has not been very bad. However, we propose to purchase this border area from the Khmer defense elements with 600 ((possibly 600,000 Riels)). (The CBD Council). ((possibly the Party Cadre Council)) thought it could convince the majority of the personnel ((to accept the proposal)).

Nevertheless, the plan was not successful because they ((the cited elements)) considered this amount too small.

On 29 Jan, ((Cambodian)) soldiers came to the area in which elements of FK 6 ((Sub-Region 6, COSVN)) were stationed, cut down the trees, and ordered the elements of FK 6 to move away.

Moreover, they also blocked Road 1 and pillaged our belongings in the Ba Tây area.

((Page 3 of Item 2 of O.T.))

Two artillery pieces conducted shelling in Ba Hút area. (A representative of the Cambodian Government is in charge of this area..)

Friendly area. The Cambodian troops took weapons from Sóc Chit area and distributed them to the troops in Qiong Ket and Chon Ra areas.

(13 Feb) The enemy militia and police personnel were hateful towards us.

The Cambodians also expelled our units from Gò Mây, Cồ Mây, Giông Két (our military staff elements).

16 ((Feb 70). Over 200 Cambodian troops came to occupy these areas. They once robbed ((the people)).

While the Cambodian troops conducted artillery fire at us, some of their units were stationed throughout the neighboring villages. Fearing that we could retaliate, they came to pledge that "it was the actions of their higher echelons, of which they were unaware"(They came twice).

((Page 4 of Item 2 of O.T.))

After that, they asked us to arrange everything neatly ((sic)) to avoid possible damage.

We had to take their advice and arranged a few places, hoping they would report our good will to their higher echelons.

Counterplan:

We are determined to stay close to the former bases.

We will use skillful methods to convince them not to burn houses and seize items in the daytime and rob our locations at night.

Protect the hospital.

Avoid all types of conflict (with the Cambodians).

Remove some movable facilities and leave behind only the most necessary items.

In Đúc Huệ, Gò Mây, and Cồ Mây areas: Dig trenches in houses and build strong fortifications.

Conduct direct struggles ((against the Cambodians)) to proselyte them.

Strictly observe the regulations concerning the movement of troops.

((Page 5 of Item 2 of O.T.))

Events occurred in Bao Hut.

When we first came to the area, they ((Khmers)) opposed us and forced us to lay down our arms. We used loudspeakers to call them.

They((the Khmers)) confiscated our mortars, which made some of our personnel angry.

The Cambodian troops rolled up the barbed wire they had used to defend their posts and carried it away.

Assignment of missions.

In Đĩa Gai ((area)): Ba Văn, Út Chính, Tiên, Bẩy Sát.

In Giồng Két ((area)): Tứ Thanh, Ba Nhiều, Hùng, Mi, and Hai Đao.

In Ba Thu ((area)): Tam Thanh.

In Sóc Mối ((area)): Ba Nhu.

In defensive areas: Tứ Nhuận, Hai Mao.

The above cadre will be assigned to those areas even if they are captured by the enemy.

((Item 3 of O.T.))

((A photo))

((Caption)): 25, vehicles crossing the river by ferryboat enroute to the great front line ((SVN)).

-----END OF TRANSLATION-----