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1969

RVNAF PSYWAR MINISTRY ON MOBILIZATION

HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON MICROFILM

POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

1. First Steps

a. The following steps should be taken without delay to implement the Prime Minister's Arrête #1147, which established the Political Mobilization Committees at the national and provincial levels.

b. First, an organizational meeting of the National Committee should be called at the earliest feasible date to:

(1) Discuss, and agree in principle to, an outline SOP on the operation of both the National and the Provincial Committees. Such an outline should be drafted and circulated before the meeting. It should cover the frequency of meetings, the assignment of responsibility for such tasks as the preparation of the monthly information booklets to be distributed to government personnel, and in general all procedures necessary to ensure that the Committees can carry out their mission.

(2) Agree on the theme and text of the first booklet to be distributed. At least two possible alternatives should be distributed to committee members before the meeting.

(3) Agree on a set of priorities showing the national programs which will be given the major emphasis through the Political Mobilization Committee structure in the months immediately ahead. A draft set should be distributed in advance of the meeting. A task force should be designated to review ongoing information programs in the light of the priorities agreed upon and submit a report at the next meeting.

(4) Designate a task force to draft Political Mobilization Guidelines, taking into account actions already agreed upon. This should be completed no later than 15 January 1970.

(5) Decide how these initial decisions should be briefed to the Prime Minister.

c. The second step is to brief the Prime Minister on the decisions taken at the initial meeting and elicit his approval. A transcript of the briefing should be sent to the Province Committees with instructions that they conduct an initial meeting to inform all members of what has been decided.

d. The third step is to publish the first booklet (agreed upon at the initial meeting) and distribute it through the national ministries and the Province Committees together with a set of instructions as to its use (See below). This should be done prior to 15 January 1970.

e. The final step, which will, in fact, already have been begun under the actions outlined above, is to plan for the fulfillment of all four of the missions assigned by Arrete 1174 to the National Political Mobilization Committee. The balance of this paper lists these missions and suggests techniques for their accomplishment.

2. Missions of the National Political Mobilization Committee

a. Prepare a national political mobilization plan to implement national policies and objectives.

b. Set up a general program for both political and psychological warfare.

c. Give general guidance on the political indoctrination program for military personnel, cadre and civil servants throughout the country.

d. Coordinate the Government's efforts with those of people's associations and groups in order to create an atmosphere conducive to an effective political struggle against the Communists, generate a spirit of self reliance, and achieve national development.

3. National Political Mobilization Guidelines

a. National Political Mobilization Guidelines should be drafted to guide the political mobilization element of the Pacification and Development Program during the year in question. There are listed below some of the features that such guidelines might include.

b. The Guidelines should be based upon recent statements of the President and Government as to national objectives. They should first prepare the people for a successful political struggle against the Communists. This political struggle refers not only to an open confrontation with a Communist or Communist-front party in a free election in South Vietnam, a confrontation which may never occur; it refers more directly to the continuing struggle already in progress against Communist political subversion and against the proponents of policies which would have the long-range effect of allowing that subversion to succeed. This must clearly stress the positive future offered by GVN programs, not merely denounce the Communist effort.

c. The Guidelines should next outline a strategy for progress toward the long-term goals during the year. This might take the form of a phased program to explain to the people the details of democratic GVN programs (VSD, decentralization, PSDP, etc.) under the existing Constitution which offer them a better alternative to communism, and organize them into groups prepared to work together in defense of that Constitution.

d. The Guidelines should then define intermediate objectives for Phase I, a program for the achievement of those objectives, and tasks for the different ministries and Corps Commanders. It should identify the programs to be given priority support by the Political Mobilization Committees during the year.

e. A critical feature of the program is that it is a responsibility of leadership, or command, in the same fashion as in a military unit. It thus must be given the full personal attention of leaders at all levels, from national down to squad or hamlet, and is not a technical program to be left to a staff while the leader concentrates on "more important matters."

f. Of equal importance to leadership is the use of all GVN personnel as transmission belts to all remaining Vietnamese. Through the million in the RVNAF, the two and one-half million in the People's Self Defense, the two hundred thousand civil servants, teachers, local officials, etc., plus their families and close associates, the GVN can be in contact with 10 or 12 million people and they in turn will inform others.

g. To activate this apparatus, periodic seminars of government personnel will discuss subjects announced by leadership levels. These personnel will be required to attend and then to carry the message developed outward to the citizenry. Each month each must then report back that they did so and the reaction of the citizenry. A procedure must be established in all services for the reception, consolidation and forwarding to higher authorities these public reactions and attitudes.

h. Mass media will back up but not substitute for this face-to-face communication.

1. The technique will be used for motivational purposes, to explain national and international policies and also to explain the details of important national programs so that the word is spread generally among the public as to its rights and interests. A major emphasis will be to stress local issues and local problems, and how government assistance can be called upon to assist in their solution, rather than expressing broad general doctrinal positions. It will thus be tied in to such programs as Village Self Development, People's Self Defense, PHUNG HOANG, etc., with stress on identifying clearly for the general public the ways in which these programs impact on their locality, and specifically how the citizens must participate in their own interest for peace.

4. Political and Psychological Warfare

The Committee will also generally supervise programs directed against the enemy. Such programs must be coordinated by the same group which designs the long-range political mobilization strategy and be consistent with, and support that strategy.

5. Indoctrination of GVN Personnel

a. Effective application of the concept that all military personnel, cadre, and officials should participate in political mobilization by explaining national policies and programs direct to the people in face-to-face discussion requires that all government personnel have a correct and up-to-date understanding of these national policies and programs. This is an important function of both the National and the Province Political Mobilization Committees.

b. The role of the National Committee is to forward to the Provincial Committees and Corps Commanders, no less often than once a month, printed booklets containing guidance on new policies or programs about which the people must be informed in order to obtain their participation and support. This would be kept as brief and simple as possible and be limited to points of basic importance. References should be made to public speeches, VIS bulletins or government directives for further details. Extensive use should be made of actual examples of things done well in different parts of the country; this illustrates in an understandable way the points to be made and demonstrates that the policies and programs are not just abstract ideas but are a practical way of improving people's lives. The booklets should avoid general statements to the effect that the enemy is bad and the Government good. They should concentrate on what the people can do to help themselves and on how the Government will assist them.

c. Each Ministry will establish an internal Political Mobilization Committee of appropriate officials. This Committee will hold monthly senior seminars using material received from the National Committee and will organize seminars in various offices and bureaus so that all employees in the Ministry who are not included in Provincial or District seminars participate in the program.

d. The role of the Provincial Political Mobilization Committees is to ensure that the booklets are distributed to all military and civilian personnel under province control, including district, village, and hamlet personnel. The Provincial Committee should also prepare a supplement to the booklet covering matters of particular local interest or significance. This

might be linked to the provincial information campaign being conducted during the month in question. The Provincial Committee must also conduct a monthly seminar for all province-level officials.

e. The Provincial Committee must conduct monthly seminars in each district. These seminars should be chaired if possible by the Province Chief and have key members of the Committee in attendance. All personnel of the district office, all Village Chiefs, all village VIS cadre, all RD Cadre group leaders and all NP/PF unit commanders should be required to attend. At this seminar the monthly booklet (with provincial supplement) will be explained and discussed and problems raised by the local officials will be discussed and resolved.

f. Immediately following the district seminars, Village Chiefs will hold similar seminars at the village level, including village/hamlet personnel, and PF, NP, RDC and PSDF leaders.

g. The Corps Commanders will ensure that all military unit commanders (other than those under province control) participate actively in the program and distribute the booklets to all literate military personnel.

h. All training courses of all Ministries must include a detailed course on political mobilization.

i. Face-to-face campaigns of political mobilization require not only that the participating government personnel understand clearly the message that they are to deliver to the people. They must also have an awareness of techniques of communication best calculated to arouse the understanding and acceptance of that message by the people. This requires special training in simple psychology and political mobilization procedures.

To this end, the National Committee should establish mobile teams of trained propagandists to visit each province and conduct short courses of training in techniques of communications for similar mobile teams to be established in each province. Ministry of Information personnel would provide the nucleus of these teams at both the national and provincial levels, but other ministries (notably the Ministry of Education and MORD) should be drawn on for special expertise. Selected RD Cadre could also make a useful contribution to the province teams. The province teams would give instruction to all cadres, including regular force military personnel, in seminars at the district and village levels throughout 1970. These are training, not political, seminars and are separate and distinct from those discussed in paragraphs d and e above.

j. Political indoctrination of private citizens will have the best chance of success if it is conducted in low key and as an adjunct to the normal daily contacts of government personnel with the general public. Each category of employee should be instructed to concentrate on the clientele with whom he deals in the course of his regular job, as well as on his individual family connections. Thus animal husbandry technicians would explain the government's position to pig raisers, the teachers to their students and their parents, social welfare cadre to the refugees and other needy persons, and the soldiers to the people for whom they are providing security. VIS, RD, Village Technical and other general cadres, plus elected officials, would deal with a wider segment of the community. The Provincial Committee should prepare a plan to ensure that no major components of the population are overlooked. Youth and women's groups are of particular importance in this program.

k. All personnel should be clearly instructed that the best advertisement for a form of government is the efficiency with which it operates and the extent to which it serves the people with responsiveness and courtesy. Every thoughtless act which alienates the people from their government does more harm than any information campaign can offset.

6. Coordination Between Government and People

Coordination of the Government's efforts with those of people's associations and groups should be covered under each of the three missions discussed above. To assist this process, all seminars of officials and government employees will be open to the public and leading local citizens will be invited to attend. However, no private citizens will be compelled to attend seminars at any level, as their attention must be aroused voluntarily.

7. Reporting

Monthly reports will be submitted by the Provincial Committee to the National Committee through the Regional Pacification and Development Council and by the Ministries and services to the National Committee, to include:

- a. Meetings held and attendance.
- b. Public reactions and attitudes.
- c. Recommendations for future seminars.

The National Committee will provide a monthly report to the President.

Tinh
Trung Quang See Aust to Pres
Gen Dan Min W. Portfolio
Prof Hung NPM
Tran Van An Aust to Pres
Col. Be

PEOPLE'S INFORMATION - THE MECHANISM

A mechanism must be developed to carry out the People's Information Annex of the 1970 Pacification and Development Plan. The following might usefully be considered for this purpose.

An inter-ministerial committee has been suggested which would include the principal ministers whose ministries should be especially active in the People's Information Program. This committee at monthly meetings could review proposals for monthly People's Information campaigns, presented to it by its staff.

The monthly People's Information Campaign could be written in a small pocket booklet such as the one attached. This booklet would provide a simple outline of basic points to be included in the month's campaign. The committee would recommend this booklet to the Cabinet, which could review the substance of the campaign and conduct a Cabinet level discussion of the points contained in it as the first national seminar on the subject.

Following the Cabinet's seminar, the booklet would be widely distributed throughout the government, and all units of the government would hold similar seminars discussing the booklet. Thus each ministerial office, each province staff, each district staff, each village staff, each military unit, each PSDF unit, would hold a discussion among its members of the points in the book. No meeting should include more than 20 people. Each member of the discussion would receive a copy of the book to retain in his possession during the month. An inspection system should be implemented in order to require the retention of the book by government employees during the month.

After the first discussion session, which would include an explanation of the ideas in the booklet, individual participants in these sessions should be instructed to go out and discuss with their families, the general public, etc., the ideas in the book. Before the end of the month an additional meeting of the original participants should be held at which a further discussion of its ideas would be undertaken. This should not only discuss the ideas themselves, but should also report public reactions to the ideas for submission up through channels to the chiefs of province, ministers, etc. These sessions should also report on precisely what each government employee actually did to transmit the material in the booklet to the general public.

Non-governmental citizens will not be required to participate in seminars or otherwise engage in this program. Government employees will be required to contact them, however, and arouse their interest.

At the end of the month, the People's Information Inter-ministerial Committee should hold another meeting to review the comments received from the meetings

of the various offices of the government. These comments should be consolidated for submission to the Cabinet and to the President of the Republic as the opinion of the public.

Directives must be developed by which the subordinate command levels can be clearly informed of their role in the People's Information Program. All individuals receiving pay from the government, civil and military, should be under obligation not only to receive and discuss the ideas in the monthly campaign, but also to report at the end of the month what they had done to spread the word to their families and non-governmental citizens, and to report back to the government the views of the public on the issues raised.

Attachment

TOPIC FOR STUDY SEMINAR
POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
SELF-SUFFICIENCY
and
US TROOP REDEPLOYMENTS

Since the enemy was defeated at Tet Mau Than, the government has made the greatest effort to increase the size and capability of our armed forces. Taking advantage of the enemy's weakened condition, we have mobilized the nation, created the peoples self-defense forces, increased the RF/PF, and added air and artillery firepower to the Vietnamese forces. We have a large "river navy" to secure our rivers and canals, and mechanized armored forces to assist in securing our road networks. All of this has been done by the Vietnamese using the support and aid provided us by our allies,

notably the United States. Why have we been able to do this in the last two years when we have not accomplished such a large task before? There are two answers: first, since the beginning of this phase of the war, the attempt by Hanoi to take from us by force the free part of Vietnam, it has been our goal to carry on the fight alone against the communist supported enemy; but a nation and its armed forces must take time to mature. It is no unusual or unique thing that we are doing, for it has always been our aim to fight our own battles alone. In 1970 and 1971 we are able to do more and more of this

task alone because the work, effort and sweat of former years begins to have fruit. That fruit is sweet and of good quality.

The second reason that we are able to advance so quickly to self-sufficiency in the armed forces is because the enemy gambled at Tet Mau Than and lost. He lost many of his best commanders and political cadre. As it takes us (the government) a long time to build leaders and expertise in our government and military forces, it also takes many years for the enemy to replace the experienced people that he lost at Tet Mau Than.

Taking advantage of his weakness

these last years we have accelerated our efforts in taking over the burden of the fighting from our allies. We will continue at a fast rate to do this in 1970 and 1971. The enemy continuously under our (and our allies) guns and bombers has not been able to win in spite of the large amount of war material and infiltrated manpower. These new NVA units came to South Vietnam because the local VC were and are unable to recruit or kidnap enough local people to build up their weakened forces. The NVA forces are at a great disadvantage when they come to the south to fight us. They are young and inexperienced. They do not have the firepower.

support that our forces have. As a result, the RVNAF have been victorious each and every time we have met this invader. We have twice shown our sting to the NVA forces in Chau Doc. Our forces are eager to administer a beating if they crawl out of their "mouse houses."

Our forces have gained the confidence that comes with meeting and defeating the enemy in battle. At Tet Mau Than the enemy surprised us. At least one-half of our forces were not on duty because they were observing the cease-fire. Many of our officers were away from their units to observe the holiday.

Even in this weakened condition our army rose to the task and defeated the well prepared and well-led enemy. Since that victory, our national confidence has increased a hundred-fold. We have introduced democracy and election of village officials in the midst of a war. Not because of weakness but because we are strong enough to afford it.

CONFIDENCE IN OURSELVES

is the key to our self-sufficiency. People who for generations have lived under a foreign domination as this nation did under the French, often lose their national self-confidence. This nation did so from 1946 until 1968.

But at Tet Mau Than we had our confidence restored. We shall not lose it again regardless of the hardship of self-sufficiency.

We can now walk on our own two feet. We cannot yet run. For that reason we need our allies support for our armed forces for some time to come. The United States has lost more than 35,000 dead in assisting us to turn back the aggressors until we could gain military self-sufficiency.

In 1970 many US infantry soldiers will leave Vietnam for home. This is because many American people feel we should carry the combat role and that US combat deaths and injuries should be

lowered. It is also because we no longer need as much help as we once needed and we can, therefore, say to these Americans--"yes, to some extent you are right and we are ready."

So in 1970 as US troops are reduced in number there is no reason to be fearful. Our armed forces are ready and able. These redeployments of our allies are done with prior planning and knowledge of our armed forces. We will not be surprised. Our allies have stated they will provide the means and extra support needed by our forces to bear the burden of the war. This is all we can ask for because it is true

that with such support the enemy cannot overcome us.

We believe the enemy will have to try to make a military effort against our armed forces and our pacification program in the near future. This is no reason to become alarmed. It is an opportunity to show him our strength and capability so that his leaders will accept the fact that he cannot take by force what is ours. This will damage the VC cadre morale.

This new self-sufficiency should be a motivating factor for all Vietnamese. It means cooperation, determination, and hard work for all citizens. The rewards for self-sufficiency is self-government and self-determination.

NATIONAL UNITY

Seminar Study Notes for
Political Mobilization Topic

Background: Since the beginning of recorded Vietnamese history, in times of great crisis the Vietnamese have put aside their individual, religious and regional differences and have met the challenge of the invaders. Our history is filled with the heroic acts of a united Vietnamese population who heeded the call of their leaders and placed the nation's survival above all the family and personal considerations.

In recent history there was a unity of political forces banded together to oust the French rulers who had temporarily taken from us our sovereignty. These political parties served as a unifying force for popular discontent and a political structure

with which the nation forged an army who went on to defeat the French. In order to survive the inquisition of the French security police, the Nationalist political forces had to operate its cadre and leadership in secret fashion. When the outcome of the war had been essentially decided against the French, the communist elements of the national political fronts betrayed the non-communist political parties and succeeded in causing a major disaster within these parties' leadership.

Later, under the Diem regime over-zealous police and political advisors to the President succeeded once again in suppressing most of

V the overt leadership of the nationalist
to political parties. The fact that the
st Vietnamese political systems have
been covert in nature has saved
sufficient leaders and cadres from
extermination under the trying
circumstances of our struggle to
independence and maturity.

Emergence of Vietnam Nation

With the establishment of the constituent assembly followed by national elections and the effective democratic political system which has been the mark of the second republic, Vietnam has reached a political stability which it has sought since the end of World War II. The mark of this new political system is that of constitutional

government. Our future lies in mass participation by the people in the elections of those leaders at all levels and other democratic processes. With the massive increase in educational facilities since our independence; the increasingly good use of the mass media such as radio and TV; the freedom of the responsible press; our people now have the experience to permit them to choose wisely their own representatives and leaders.

With the stability and strength of the Vietnamese political system and the nation, the future must be concerned with improving the government from the village to the national level. This can only be accomplished with national unity.

National Unity

The major part of the struggle against the communist invader is over. With the massive help of our allies and the determination of our armed forces, and the tremendous sacrifice of our people of all levels and regions, we have succeeded in destroying the most elite forces the enemy can send across our borders. We are now entering the final phase which is a vital one. It is the phase of consolidation which will allow us to hold politically that which we have won on the battlefield at the cost of so much blood and tears. We shall only succeed in this final phase if we can put aside our small internal differences and form a united front to defeat the enemy on the political field

as we have defeated him on the battlefield. The basis of a political party today must be based upon its real following among the people. This real following can only be measured by the votes and the representatives that that political party can win in the various elections being held, and that will be held in the future. The winning of an election allows us to view the muscle of the candidate. The people can then judge this candidate upon his performance and not his oratory. It is in this way that the people can understand who is the true nationalist and who is the false nationalist.

The only acceptable course of action by the patriotic nationalists is to

engage openly in the election process and to build support among the population. Such a course of action by all of our political parties will give confidence to the people that our form of constitutional government will work.

Differences in our internal affairs should be settled in the legislative houses. Debate and discussion on domestic issues is to be encouraged. Differences should be ameliorated. Only by this system can we judge the right course of action.

Individuals, who claim to represent the people without benefit of a show of strength provided by elections, must not mislead the nation.

The July 11 formula for a political settlement still stands as the only acceptable basis for ending the war and inviting our enemy to join in the political life. Because of the strength the nation and the people have gained, we can afford this invitation. The enemy can be sure he will be represented to the extent that he has won the confidence and hearts of our countrymen.

The False Nationalist Concept

To insure that all of the people will have their true wishes recorded at election times, now and in the future, it is most necessary for the national political parties to engage in the strengthening of the democratic political

processes. True nationalists must identify themselves now and bear the political inspection of the people. Political parties should seek provincial council seats and other such elected offices by presenting the most capable and honest people that can be found. At some future date when the enemy has been thoroughly discouraged, he will beg to enter the political arena with us as his only hope. The nationalist parties who have succeeded in showing the population who is the true nationalist by protecting the interests of the people and helping them to raise their standard of living, will not be misled by a false nationalist—who is in reality a communist.

The time for secrecy and deception by a nationalist is past. The danger

to us from the enemy demands that all nationalists stand up and be counted, to be known by the people. The communist who attempts to hide in a nationalist mask can then be demasked.

Having lost his bid for power on the battlefield, our enemy will try to take advantage of our allies' reduction in the fighting forces which have assisted us for so long. The Vietnamese people were fortunate to have this assistance during the military struggle, however, no one but the Vietnamese nationalist can wage the political war in which we are now engaged. While our allies support us with materials to defend ourselves in the future, and economic aid to improve our economy, it is we, the

Vietnamese patriots, who must work toward national unity to assure the sovereignty of the country.