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D I R E C T I V E

Number 26/CT-K

SUBJECT: Continue the completion of our plan for the Winter Campaign, make preparations in all fields, grasp all opportunities, step up our all-sided offensive, improve our position and strength, deal a decisive blow at the U.S. imperialists' Vietnamization-of-the-war, bring about a new situation in order to achieve the decisive victory.

I. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION SINCE OUR LAST INDOCTRINATION ON RESOLUTION . . . [BLANK]

A. In Our Sub-Region

Enemy situation: To implement his plan of Vietnamization-of-the-war and his "clear-and-hold" strategy on the Sub-Region 5 war theater, the enemy has achieved the following since the beginning of this winter.

He strengthened the puppet troops (especially the Regional and Popular Forces). Step by step, he assigned the defense of strategic hamlets to his Regional and Popular Forces units. He upgraded his People's Self-Defense Force to Popular Forces, increased their equipment, and used them to replace main force troops stationed at a number of military posts and in a number of areas of operations. He enlarged the puppet main force's range of operations and used U.S. troops only as a mobile force for the support of various battlefields.

Prior to our operational phase and during this phase, the enemy attempted to foil our operations, intercept our troops, and at the same time, support his pacification activities by conducting continuous attacks on our rear area adjacent to our middle line and by deploying an arc-shaped offensive line with puppet main force troops, U.S. Special Forces units, and U.S. armored units. This offensive line covered our staging areas

and interdicted our troop penetration routes. It started from the villages of War Zone D, ran along Routes 16, 14 and 7, crossed Phú Giao District, and ended at Lai Khê. The enemy also conducted long-range operations in which several company-size units covered and swept sensitive areas, many squad-size airborne and platoon-size Special Forces units reconnoitered our communication routes and waterways. The enemy also relentlessly attacked our bases and leveled the terrain on our middle line and in the fringe areas. In the meantime, the enemy Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and pacification units intensified their activities in strategic hamlets and areas under their responsibility. They increased patrols; laid ambushes; searched for our secret tunnels and caches; intensified their intelligence activity; captured our agents; and terrorized, deceived, and compelled villagers to participate in their organizations. They gradually reactivated the People's Self-Defense Force units that we had disintegrated. They forced civilians to enlist, trained them, and assigned them guard duty.

The enemy tried to stimulate his village administrative personnel and pacification cadre, intensified his psywar activities, bought off [the people] to use them as spies, and employed defectors to break our base organizations and control and place pressure upon the revolutionaries' families. He thoroughly controlled the people's purchase, sale, and storage of foods. He closely searched the harvest areas, forced the farmers to bring their crops into strategic hamlets, and controlled their reserves of unhusked rice with a view to blockading our source of supply and robbing the people's victory.

In short, before and during the Winter Campaign the enemy tried to ward off and frustrate our offensive, force the puppet troops into action to replace the U.S. troops, carry on his pacification plan, intensify his psywar activities, and blockade our economy in every area. The enemy did not use force on a large scale. However, his operations were uninterrupted and were launched in successive waves in several directions with a deep penetration range.

Our attacks were not regular or strong enough. In some areas, our countermeasures were ineffective. As a result, some difficulties were created for us which created favorable conditions for the enemy to:

Conscript youths to replace his Regional and Popular Forces personnel who were upgraded to take over the role of the puppet main force units in the defense of certain areas. The enemy pushed a number of Regional and Popular Forces to operate in different pacification hamlets. Thus, an element from the main force could be relieved and assigned to operate on the frontline. The enemy in Sub-Region 5 suffered fewer casualties than he did in the previous phases.

Carry out pacification activities in some areas. Such activities have caused some personnel losses to friendly units, destroyed some of our agent networks, and created difficulties for our personnel to hold the ground and to operate in these areas. The movement has decreased to a certain extent. Our position in some areas (south of Tan Uyen, south of Chau Thanh) has been weakened. We have also experienced difficulties in movement. Movement and food supply in the rear have encountered more difficulties than before.

However, the enemy still has weak points and deficiencies as previously revealed in Resolution 9. His shortcomings are as follows.

As a result of the Vietnamization-of-the-war, the war theater of Sub-Region 5 has become the scene of intense disputes. The enemy made every effort to replace main force units by upgrading Regional and Popular Forces personnel in order to enable these main force units to operate on the frontline, so that the U.S. troops could operate on more important battlefields. However, it is obvious that the enemy could not implement his plan. In areas where our activities were strong, Regional and Popular Forces personnel became demoralized, and they shrank back. This resulted in main force units being returned to these areas (Thu Duc, Lai Thieu, south Tan Uyen, and Chau Thanh) to reinforce them. The U.S. troops, whose withdrawal from the above areas had been planned, could not be withdrawn. During this period, the U.S. and puppet main force troops had to use part of their forces to harass our areas and prevent our activities in the middle line adjacent to our rear (Chau Thanh and Tan Uyen). Consequently, the U.S. and puppet main force units could not withdraw any of their elements during the Winter Campaign despite the enemy's efforts to increase Regional and Popular Forces personnel.

Because of his deployment of troops over a large area and the constant employment of his troops to harass our areas and prevent our activities being launched from different directions, he could not concentrate a large force and conduct large attacks against many areas. He could not even effectively defend his positions which are scattered everywhere. The majority of the puppet troops became increasingly demoralized. They fear our artillery attacks, our trap mines, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops. Therefore, in areas where we can maintain our forces and our personnel can stay close to the enemy, we will have more opportunities to attack the enemy (in areas surrounding district seats, such as Tan Uyen, Tan Binh, Vinh Tan and in Hoa Loi) and force him to withdraw. In areas where we planted mines, attacked the enemy with trap mines, and countered raids well (such as those conducted in villages located along the Đông Nai River and north of Châu Thanh) we succeeded in restricting his search operations and annihilating a large number of his personnel. If we employ our troops properly and promptly, we will have more opportunities to destroy enemy small- and medium-size units (the attack against a U.S. blocking position at Bang Lang intersection by our artillery unit is a good example).

Although the enemy has obtained some successes in his pacification activities, he still finds himself in a state of confusion. The Self-Defense Force in some areas, after having been disorganized by our troops, has not been reconsolidated (such as in LT, CT, Nam TU) [possibly Lai Thieu, Chau Thanh, and south Tan Uyen]. Most of his administrative control machinery is ineffective. In some areas, his attacks against our important areas have created some difficulties for us; however, we succeeded in re-establishing our positions (LT and CT) [possibly Lai Thieu, Chau Thanh]. In some areas, we succeeded in expanding our control over the population more effectively (LT, TD, and CT) [possibly Lai Thieu, Thu Duc, and Chau Thanh]. In brief, we were in a seesaw type of battle with the enemy in our counterpacification activities during the Winter Campaign.

Friendly Situation:

In the light of Resolution 9, we proceeded with the political reorientation within the Party. Although some areas' activities have been slow, a great part of our cadres and Party

members completed their reorientation courses and started their activities among the people. Changes have been as follows: Our fighting stand and mass viewpoint have been consolidated. We understood the enemy's deficiencies and contradictions and succeeded in mastering our policies and guidelines. We have started correcting our weak points during operations and adopted more appropriate guidelines for these activities, which resulted in our overcoming numerous difficulties, [war] fierceness, and privations and continuing to step up our activities in all fields. Thus, we achieved the following:

Our armed forces maintained stable activities in all areas, particularly the intermediate areas. We made a step forward in promoting the guerrilla warfare movement (TU [possibly in Tan Uyen District] and CT [possibly Chau Thanh, meaning in the city district]) and destroyed or wore down a number of the puppet's forces and his oppressive control personnel. Our main activities included the coordination of our political struggles with military proselyting and guerrilla warfare activities to kill tyrants, destroy the enemy's oppressive control, counter enemy sweep operations, destroy the pacification program and the organization of the People's Self-Defense Force, etc. Thus, we succeeded in maintaining and developing our movement, particularly in the military proselyting field, which scored the greatest successes. We resumed our activities in the Thu Duc area, created some new areas for activities in Lai Thieu District, and developed the movement in the city and in Tan Uyen District. We have consolidated Bu Chap Base politically and economically. As a result, we frustrated the enemy activities, checked his pacification program, and disrupted a number of his oppressive control units and People's Self-Defense Force units. Our agents still exist. They stayed in the area, and some even developed their areas. We have consequently remained stable in our position of besieging the enemy in all areas, particularly in Thu Duc, the fringe areas of Saigon Capital, and in the intermediate line of Chau Thanh [city district].

Although our progress is still slow in the building of forces, we have successfully studied Resolution 9 and gradually consolidated our ideology and attitude. We became more resolute to surmount difficulties, hold the areas, and operate in the battlefield of the fringe area as well as of the intermediate area despite difficulties and privations encountered in the rear area.

We have more efficiently applied guidelines and principles, and some areas have realized their shortcomings and the cause of the slow development of forces. Those areas now have plans to overcome these difficulties.

In short, through the political reorientation course on Resolution 9 combined with efforts to fulfill the testament of Chairman Ho, the first steps of activities produced impressive effects throughout our Party body. Although the results of our Winter Campaign were not high enough, we scored sufficient achievements which help us to accomplish our mission in the coming months.

However, if we revisit Resolution 9 and our plan for the Winter Campaign and consider the advantageous conditions of the situation, we will realize that our achievements are considered too small due to our numerous major weaknesses. These are as follows:

1. We have not developed to the maximum the effect of the armed forces nor correctly applied guidelines and principles. We did not strive to overcome difficulties in the destruction of enemy forces. Therefore, the destruction of the enemy forces was not great, as compared to that of previous phases and to the prescribed norms. We did not strongly hit the U.S. and puppet in their troop development plan, thus allowing them to continue their attacks and cause difficulties to our base areas.

Concurrently, we failed to fully develop our political capability or heighten the role of political struggles and military proselyting in coordination with the military and diplomatic struggle, to keep up with the favorable development of the situation and to meet the prescribed norms.

2. Even though the coordinated three-pronged attacks against enemy pacification units were persistent and continuous, they still backed strength and aggressiveness. The Winter Campaign was the high point of activities. However, our achievements did not meet the prescribed criteria. Although we succeeded in harassing the enemy, hindering his activities, and increasing our control of the populace in some areas, these victories were not stable. We did not make vigorous efforts in breaking the enemy's oppressive control of the population, eliminating the tyrants, or disrupting the People's Self-Defense Force, and the development

of the guerrilla warfare movement in populated hamlets has not progressed significantly. The area under our mastership was not expanded, our personnel still have difficulty holding their positions, and there were many casualties. Friendly activities in enemy pacified hamlets were sporadic because underground agents were both scarce and weak. This seriously affected other fields of activity. This was why our encirclement and harassment of the enemy was not effective.

3. The consolidation and development of various types of forces in some areas evidenced some initial improvement. However, the bulk of our forces has made no progress. The armed forces, local forces, militia, and guerrilla forces continued to suffer losses and were unable to replenish their strength. Party and [Youth] Group base organizations and people's organizations developed slowly. The quality of available organizations and of the people's organizations was not improved. Thus, the organized forces were not only weak, but small and incompetent. For that reason, the implementation of our guidelines and principles in each area was still loose. We continue to lose cadre and loyal sympathizers, and the development of new cadre did not meet the prescribed criteria. In comparing forces at the base level we realized that we were not superior to the enemy and that we were inferior to him in certain areas, especially... [blank], and in some areas in ...[blank].

4. The battlefield situation was in general irregularly developed. Our activities were successful in Thu Duc, Chau Thanh, and Tan Uyen. In Lai Thieu, the friendly situation was stabilized and consolidated. The revolutionary movement faltered in the province capital, and was unimproved and encountered many difficulties in Di An. It is certain that the enemy activities increased mercely in some areas, but the main reason for our weakness was the deficiencies of the local authorities, subjective leadership and a lack of determination and thorough understanding of our guidelines and principles of operations. In every field of activity, for example, military proselyting, we attained some success; however, the general situation was not improved. The situation was the same for civilian proselyting.

5. Organization for implementation of our policy has not moved ahead as was prescribed in the present leadership requirements. It still showed many deficiencies, especially in the dissemination of the Resolution to cadres at lower levels for

guidance and implementation of both the resolution and the signal, liaison, and situation assessment tasks. There were many causes for these deficiencies, but the main reason is as follows: Recently the political reorientation session on Resolution 9 of our Party body gained some initial success, but, in some areas, as the dissemination of it to the Party Chapters was too late, cadres did not thoroughly understand the contents and requirements of the Resolution. No basic changes were made in attitude, ideological concepts, political awareness, adoption of guidelines and principles, or conduct and organization for implementation; therefore, our subjective leadership failed to keep pace with the development of the situation or to conform with the content of Resolution 9. Some fields of activity, such as civilian proselyting, the motivation of people, and the consolidation and development of force, did not meet the requirements; this was also a cause of the cited shortcomings and deficiencies which limited our successes in the Winter Campaign and must be overcome in the future.

B. General Situation:

1. Since we disseminated the Resolution ... [blank], only a short period of time (from early autumn to early winter 1969) has elapsed but the situation has undergone a new step of development. This development is additional evidence which proves that the Resolution is proper. The situation has specifically evolved as follows:

The enemy continued to increase his activities of pacifying, encroaching upon land, constructing more posts, and developing the People's Self-Defense Force. He has striven to build up the puppet army and commit the puppet main force to the frontline in order to fight under the control and with the support of the Americans. His purpose is to decrease American casualties and use the puppet main force to gradually replace the U.S. troops which are withdrawing step by step. He has made considerable efforts and has successfully encroached upon land in many areas, causing us many difficulties, especially in holding on to densely populated areas. However, from the beginning, he has displayed many gaps and deficiencies:

We inflicted more casualties on the Americans; the puppet troops being sent to the frontline suffered more casualties. The morale of both U.S. and puppet troops deteriorated. Their remote defense system against us became increasingly weak. Their

accelerated pacification plan has been stopped on the frontline and defeated in the rear. Our base areas are firmly held; we have worn down much of the enemy's force. In the lowlands, we have largely frustrated the enemy pacification and encroachment schemes, developed movements, and expanded our control over many of the weak areas and communication lines. Concurrently, in the rural areas surrounding Saigon, we have firmly held the ground and maintained a combat position and the link between the front and the rear. In many cities, our guerrilla warfare has been maintained in the inside and outside areas. We are able to exert pressure on the enemy and attack him by using infantry troops when necessary.

Political and diplomatic fields:

The U.S. imperialists have tried to rally the reactionary factions in order to secure a political backing. Along with this action, they have stepped up espionage and psywar activities and consolidated the puppet government and army in order to preserve legal and constitutional status for Thieu. They opposed the plan of forming a peace cabinet and a coalition government. At the same time, they were preparing a new plan, trying to win over the uncommitted force, sowing illusions of peace, and smoothing down the anti-war movement in Viet-Nam, the U.S., and the world. But these schemes have been unmasked and frustrated. This has driven the U.S. and puppet into a more isolated situation. Thieu's Six-Party Front became divided and disorganized right after it was activated. The replacement of Huong by Khiem revealed a new weakness of Thieu. Many personalities in the National Assembly, in the puppet government, and in the army, who previously had been more or less associated with Thieu, have now lost their confidence and are inclined to a third force. The U.S. imperialists are very confused. They are afraid that if they replace the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, they will not avoid the collapse [of the regime], but if they cling to the reactionary, extremist, rotten, and incompetent clique they will easily fail in their plot to consolidate the puppet government and army and to cope with the attacks launched by the Vietnamese, U.S., and world peoples.

On our side, on the basis of carrying out the reorientation down to the Party Chapters and motivating the people to study President Ho's testament, the people's struggle movement and political prestige have scored a new step of development. This

struggle movement is smoothly coordinated with our political and diplomatic struggles and the anti-war movements of the American and world peoples. These movements became increasingly effective, and have weakened the Vietnamization and false peace policy of Nixon. In the rural areas, there has been a new change in our movement. We have countered the enemy's sweep operations and encroachment; led the people back to their abandoned lands and rice-fields; encircled enemy posts; killed tyrants; and broken the enemy's oppressive control in order to regain political power. At the same time, we developed military proselyting activities, causing enemy troops to remain inactive, and inducing more of them to desert. In cities, the people's movement to gain control at the base level and their struggles demanding necessary rights and improved living conditions have developed strongly. The economic struggle movement demanding social welfare has rallied the forces of the workers and other classes. This is increasingly creating favorable conditions for us to expand the united action front and to coordinate the slogans concerning democratic rights and social welfare with the slogans demanding the restoration of peace, overthrow of the Thieu-Ky-Khiem Government, and establishment of a peace cabinet. On the diplomatic front, we continuously unmasked and denounced the stubborn and wily schemes of the U.S. and puppets and stepped up the U.S. and world peoples' movement demanding that Nixon quickly withdraw troops from Vietnam and abandon the Thieu-Ky-Khiem henchmen. The movement has developed more strongly and widely than ever before, attracting many statemen in the U.S.A. and in Western Europe. Therefore, it has created an increasingly stronger pressure on Nixon and promoted the supported of our people's struggles. It is apparent that our popular political and diplomatic struggles have made new developments, driving the U.S. and puppets into a dangerous situation. Therefore, the more stubborn they are, the more they are thrown into a state of isolation, and the more they meet difficulties in implementing the Vietnamization plan and carrying out the false peace policy.

Economic and financial fields:

Due to the war of aggression and the enemy's policies concerning resettlement of the people, conscription [of youths], robbery [of the people's property], inflation, and devaluation of the SVN currency... the puppets' economic and financial situation became more serious.. In order to improve their war budget which

has greatly increased due to the Vietnamization of the war, the puppet government has resorted to unpopular economic measures which seriously disrupted living conditions of the people of all social classes. Recently, the enemy has increased the taxes levied on 1,500 commodities, causing the cost of living to increase manifold.

At the same time, the enemy has intensified the economic blockade of our liberated areas, worn down our manpower and property, and reduced our combat potential. All of the above unpopular economic measures have raised strong protests and given birth to a struggle movement against him, which is supported by people of all social classes in rural and urban areas, including personnel of the puppet army and administration.

Meanwhile, our economic and financial policies are correct, being based on production activities. We motivated the people to stage struggle movements against the enemy's piratical acts and forcible removal of people from their villages, to maintain [farm] production activities and protect their products and to counter the enemy's economic blockade and robbery. We also motivated the people to purchase and reserve food provisions, and encouraged our agencies and units to increase self-sufficient production activities and practice economy. We successfully overcame many difficulties to maintain the people's living conditions and serve the Resistance.

The slogans used in economic and welfare struggle opposing the enemy's measures of increasing taxes and robbing [the people's property], and demanding pay raises and lower cost of living have the capacity to rally the people of all social classes into an increasingly broad struggle movement demanding the improvement of living conditions and restoration of peace. At the same time, the struggles for maintaining production activities and protecting life, etc. became daily necessary requirements of the people in rural and urban areas. They were transformed into a great power which is accelerating the collapse of the U.S./ puppet regime.

2. Considering the above-mentioned development of the situation and the main spirit of the Resolution...[blank] we should determine the following main points:

a. As a result of the study of the situation ... [blank], we have achieved repeated and great victories in all fields; the revolutionary movement and forces and the leadership and guidance of our Party organization have been greatly improved. However, we have not yet succeeded in turning the situation in our favor. Although having sustained several new defeats, being driven to a deadlock, and facing the failure of their plan of "Vietnamizing the war," the U.S. imperialists still have not lost hopes. They still cling to the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, increase pacification activities, strengthen the puppet troops and government, and strive to dispute us in order to maintain the situation and create a strong position while withdrawing their troops step by step.

b. We must know in what situation the Americans are showing their obduracy.

They are obdurate, not at a time when they are escalating the war with their troops increased to the maximum level and capable of strong counter-actions, but they are obdurate in a situation where they have sustained heavy defeats caused by our surprise strategic attacks during Tet Mau Than [Tet 1968] which forced them into a strategic defensive position.

They are obdurate not at a time when they begin deescalating the war, but at a time when they are forced to withdraw their troops, which adversely affects the deployment of troops on the battlefields, the intensification of their pacification program, and the strengthening of the puppet troops and puppet government.

Presently, the Americans are coming to a strategic deadlock which forces them to continue to deescalate the war. In addition, their Vietnamization plan has failed in its initial step. This is causing great dangers to the Americans:

- Indeed, while the puppet troops and puppet government are collapsing and are incapable of recovering from the fall, the Americans must continue to withdraw their troops.

- The coming phases of U.S. troop withdrawal will considerably decrease the U.S. troop strength. This will inevitably create adverse influence on their military capability on the battlefield.

- This will undermine the morale of the U.S. and satellite troops and discourage and disorganize the puppet troops and government. Desertion will certainly increase, causing a very alarming situation for the Americans.

- If the U.S. continues to pull out its troops, its position will be weakened. But, if it withdraws its troops "drop by drop" to appease and deceive [public opinion], the U.S. will face the increasingly fierce opposition of the people in our country, in the U.S., and in the world who vehemently denounce the obstinate policy of the U.S., and compel Nixon to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. troops and abandon the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique.

c. If the U.S. continues to pull out its troops, the enemy's force will be reduced. Then the military and political weak points of the Americans and Puppets will be clearly exposed. This will be a very favorable time for our people and army to develop our superiority, take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses, and rapidly overcome our shortcomings and weaknesses.

Therefore, the year of 1970 will afford the most favorable conditions to us and the most unfavorable ones to the enemy. We should leap at opportunities and make tremendous efforts to turn the situation in our favor. We are provided with the following advantages to make this historical change:

- Our people's position and strength have been consolidated and developed more strongly than in 1968 or 1969 throughout the three strategic zones.

- The leadership and guidance of all levels, sections, branches, and associations have been improved after the study of the Resolution.

- Our troops and people are on the road to victory. They have displayed a strong enthusiasm for the fighting and accumulated abundant experiences. They have developed their strengths and capabilities through the studies of, and efforts to carry out, President Ho's testament.

The year of 1970 will be a decisive year to turn the situation in our favor if all echelons of our Party body, all cadre, and Party members properly assess the situation, fully exploit the advantages, display a high determination, and make tremendous efforts

in their work. If our subjective efforts are incomplete, thus allowing the stubborn U.S. imperialists to overcome some difficulties in pursuing the fight against us, we still have won great successes [sic]. On this basis, we should patiently intensify offensive activities for another period of time in order to change the situation in our favor and achieve the decisive victory.

d. The struggle of our troops and people is very complicated and full of hardships, but has very good prospects. The situation has become ever more favorable for us and unfavorable for the enemy. The U.S. imperialists remain obstinate, even though they are deescalating the war and withdrawing troops unconditionally, and the puppet troops and government are collapsing more seriously than ever. We have many difficulties and weaknesses, but we have the initiative and have obtained great victories and significant successes in every field. We are rushing forward. This is the basis for future missions to achieve victories in accordance with the first possibility. It is also the inspiration to motivate the efforts of the Party body, the people, and the troops to achieve victories in compliance with the first possibility. We must make countless efforts during the coming year since it is the year that will decide the war. In the coming months, we must counter the enemy in order to achieve great and overall victories and create favorable conditions for strengthening and developing our power and position. We must make careful preparations in order to bring about a great change in the situation in our favor and to gain the decisive victory as required by the Resolution.

II. OUR ACTIVITY PLANS FOR THE COMING MONTHS

"We must urgently develop the results of the political reorientation and motivate the entire Party, troops, and people to make Chairman Ho's testament come true. We must be determined to achieve great and overall victories and strengthen our forces throughout the three strategic zones in order to frustrate the enemy plans of pacification and strengthening the puppet troops and government. We must develop our forces and create favorable conditions for climaxing offensives and uprisings and launching attacks against the enemy throughout the three areas, so as to change the situation, and for forcing the Americans to abandon the Thi^{eu}-Ky-Khi^{em} clique, for accelerating the withdrawal of U.S. troops, and for gaining the decisive victory."

It is necessary to fully understand the following principal requirements:

1. Develop the strength of the three types of forces [main, local, and guerrilla forces], strongly attack both the American and puppet forces, and continue to attack the enemy rear-base areas, storage facilities, key agencies, training centers, and communication lines. Destroy a major portion of his potential and war facilities, inflict heavy losses on the U.S. and puppet troops, and make the puppets unable to replace the Americans. Motivate the people to rise up, kill enemy tyrants, break his oppressive control, disorganize a great part of his People's Self-Defense Force and closely coordinate with the three-pronged attack movement to encircle the enemy posts. Concentrate efforts on providing guidance for the destruction of large chunks of enemy controlled areas and liberate a great number of villages and hamlets.

Make positive efforts to intensify guerrilla warfare in compliance with Resolution 14 of the Standing Committee of COSVN. Protect our rear areas and communication corridors while striving to develop the guerrilla organization and activities in densely populated areas. At the same time, increase the strength of our consolidated units, provide closer leadership for the province and district local force units, and do not neglect the political and ideological tasks aimed at heightening the fighting spirit, the determination to annihilate the enemy, and the sense of serving the people.

2. Provide leadership for counter-pacification activities, widely expand our control, conduct more sustained and penetrating attacks, and pay attention to the coordination of attacks by local forces and guerrilla units with the three-pronged attack movement of the people. Coordinate leadership in countering enemy encroachment upon liberated areas, with leadership in intensifying our movement in areas bordering cities and weak areas; and coordinate the destruction of large chunks of enemy controlled areas with the development of the people's anti-spy movement. Kill a large number of enemy tyrants; wear down, annihilate and disorganize a great part of the enemy oppressive and pacification forces; break his control of the populace; gain control and expand liberated areas; and strengthen the revolutionary forces.

Make every effort to fulfill the following basic requirements: Be determined to stay close to the people, organize a people's force to struggle by applying three-pronged attack tactics. This struggle is closely associated with the people's pressing needs which are: to maintain production activities, to protect lives and property, to go about their business freely. Strive to strengthen our Party Chapters, associations, and guerrilla and security organizations to realize the mastership of the people. In enemy relocation areas, especially along communication units, we must coordinate the requirement of killing enemy tyrants, and breaking the oppressive enemy control in strategic hamlets with the requirement of taking the people out [of relocation centers] for production and combat.

3. Provide leadership for [local] administrations in order to improve their capabilities, protect and consolidate our rear areas, frustrate the enemy schemes and tricks of intensifying air and artillery attacks, sweep operations, encroachment upon our lands, and the activities of his spies, Special Forces, psywar and Open-Arms organizations. Protect [farm] production and improve the living conditions of the people in all fields, and mobilize the manpower and material resources to serve the frontline.

Provide closer leadership on security activities, and indoctrinate the people, agencies, and troops to counter espionage and preserve our secrecy. Closely control our hamlets and villages, educate the politically backward people, suppress enemy spies, correct those who are forced or bribed by the enemy, and punish the reactionary elements. Kill the enemy ringleaders in their own sanctuaries.

Party Chapters and [local] administrations and associations should pay particular attention to providing specific guidance in the production task and the improvement of the people's living conditions by intensifying cultural, educational, and public health activities and promoting mutual solidarity among the people in the hamlets. This is the most practical measure to make the people increasingly cooperative with the revolutionary administration. On the basis of this, we will indoctrinate and motivate the people to participate in the fight and to contribute their manpower and material resources to serve the frontline. In light of the people's important contribution, we cannot allow ourselves to show indifference toward the people or negligence in taking care of their lives and their essential requirements.

initiate
4. Clearly understand the pressing needs of the people from all walks of life in the cities to initiate a movement demanding democracy and social welfare measures. We should especially provide guidance for the workers' and laborers' movement.

We should issue slogans demanding peace, an end to the aggressive war, the overthrow of Thieu-Ky-Khiem, the formation of a peace cabinet, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops [from South Viet-Nam]. We should use overt organizations and exploit dissension in enemy ranks to step up our movement; strengthen the front of united action, and isolate the Americans and their obdurate and warlike henchmen. In addition, we should develop, strengthen, and protect our forces to the greatest extent possible; step up the guerrilla warfare movement; annihilate tyrants; and break the enemy's oppressive control to gain control in local areas.

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5. Clearly realize our very great capabilities in the enemy military proselyting task and thoroughly understand the contents of Directives 105 and 124 relating to the implementation of this mission, and disseminate their contents to our personnel for organization and implementation according to the following requirements:

Strive to motivate the people, servicemen's dependents, puppet troops, and administrative personnel to participate in the people's movement demanding social welfare and peace; and opposing pacification, encroachment, conscription, and [forcible enrolment] in the People's Self-Defense Forces.

While implementing the proselyting mission among the puppet troops, it is essential to make the Party Chapters and the people in hamlets and villages understand that effective leadership must be based on the people; that we must develop our initiative in using enemy soldiers' dependents in inducing enemy soldiers to desert or remain inactive. Enemy posts must be overrun with the support of fifth columnists or military revolts.

In [areas where there are] puppet regular force units in which the anti-war movement and desertion are prevalent, the province and district [authorities], in coordination with village [authorities], must direct the people to initiate troop proselyting activities, especially at [enemy] operation and bivouac sites.

As for U.S. and satellite troops, we must step up propaganda activities, motivate them to join the American people's anti-war movement and to demand return to their country.

6. In addition, strengthen ideological guidance, and strengthen our forces.

a. Widely disseminate this directive to Party Chapters. Make them thoroughly understand the directive's contents, properly assess the enemy and friendly strength, clearly realize new characteristics of the present strategic situation, build a firm determination, and a persistent combat morale, attempt to overcome such erroneous thoughts as seeing only our difficulties and deficiencies, and failing to see our advantages, the general progress, and new developments of the situation.

Because they see the forthcoming months and phase are just a routine period of activities, our personnel fail to make determined efforts to win bigger victories.

Because of their procrastinating attitude and reliance on the forces of higher [echelons] and other local areas, they do not have self-confidence nor trust their own capabilities or know how to develop the strength of their local areas and units.

Because they entertain expectations on the withdrawal of U.S. troops, they lacked positiveness and aggressiveness in launching attacks against the enemy on every front, which would accelerate that withdrawal.

4. 11/10/5

For these reasons, it is necessary for our leadership to attach the greatest significance to providing intensive ideological indoctrination and intense motivation for our Party organization~~s~~ troops, and people in order to further strengthen their resolve to rush forward for new victories, eliminate all fears of death and hardships, and double efforts to change the situation in our favor.

b. Continue to conduct indoctrination on Resolution 9, carry out the testament of Chairman Ho.

During this political reorientation and concurrent with the strengthening of our will to fight, strong emphasis should be placed on tightening the ties between agencies, troops, cadre, Party members, and the people, significantly improving our attitude toward the latter. Only in this way can we hope to obtain the best results from the task of motivating the people, and thereby meet the requirement of mobilizing the extremely great potential and exceptionally high revolutionary spirit of the people in the mission of attacking the enemy and developing our forces in every aspect. All echelons must provide close leadership for this ideological reindoctrination of Party Chapters and motivation of the people. They must promptly send reports thereon [to higher headquarters].

c. Proceed with the task of consolidating "Four-Good" Party Chapters and Group Chapters. (There will be additional instructions on this subject).

2/10/5

Take immediate steps to further develop and consolidate all revolutionary organizations and militia and guerrilla forces. Establish the revolutionary administration. Work out plans for political activities and ideological indoctrination within these organizations. Play up the role and mission of the latter. Strengthen the leadership system from high to low level. Recruit and train a great number of base-level cadre in local areas and enough district cadres to take charge of immediate tasks.

Based on the situation of each local area, work out plans to meet the above requirements. In addition, each local area must pay attention to the following specific requirements.

a. Areas bordering Lai Thieu, Thu Duc, and Di An:

1. Conduct three-pronged attacks against pacification teams; initiate the political struggle movement; motivate [RVN] soldiers and the local people to join with us in making determined efforts to vigorously counter all forms of oppression, especially terrorism and conscription; and break up the People's Self-Defense Force. Conduct military activities to cut down tyrants; destroy the personnel of the enemy's oppressive control machinery and pacification program to cause the latter to shrink back; loosen the enemy's control grip; engage in seesaw fighting with the enemy to gradually frustrate his pacification plan; pin down the puppet regular forces to prevent them from pulling out of the [city] fringe areas; take immediate measures to build and develop our local forces; and extend our control to a number of hamlets.

2. In addition to motivating the people to initiate struggles against the enemy's oppressive control and his pacification activities, we must guide the people to stage struggles during Tet to demand their rights and privileges, (placing emphasis on struggles in district seats and fringe hamlets).

In particular, taking advantage of the enemy's appeal to a number of local inhabitants to return to their former hamlets for pacification purposes, we should motivate the people to break out of [relocation sites] to return to their former homes to take care of their farms and orchards. We should also motivate them to struggle legally, opposing the enemy's destruction of our orchards and farms and preventing the enemy from establishing his control and pacification machinery such as building concentration houses, laying barbed wire fences, organizing the civilian Self-Defense and assigning guard duties. The purpose of doing this is to fill up a number of "white hamlets" in the area east of Route 13 and north of Route 9.

3. We must urgently develop our forces in all fields, recruit Party and Group members, and establish secret Party Chapters and Group Chapters. We must recruit covert and overt guerrillas, train them, equip them with weapons, and then use them to attack the enemy in his own areas. We must rally the people into organizations, use the personnel available to conduct activities, and give additional training to Party members and loyal sympathizers so that they thoroughly understand the guidelines and operating methods in the city fringe areas and know how to guide the people ~~in enemy-controlled areas and coordinate th~~

in enemy-controlled areas and coordinate the activities of overt and covert forces. We must organize secret steering elements from district to village and hamlet levels. In Di An especially, we must focus our efforts on annihilating tyrants, breaking the enemy's oppressive control, building and rebuilding our base-level organizations in white hamlets and villages, especially in "stepping stone" villages. Overt elements must stay close to objective areas, and maintain close relations, especially with the people. We must strengthen penetration bases and establish additional ones to provide footholds, and maintain a close liaison between them. We must counter enemy espionage activities. We must heighten our vigilance and maintain security in billeting and messing areas and in movement in order to minimize casualties.

III. IMMEDIATELY, IN THE MONTH OF ... [BLANK]
WE MUST EXERCISE LEADERSHIP IN THE
FOLLOWING MAIN TASKS:

a. Continue implementing the [activity] plans for the Winter Campaign to accomplish the following essential missions:

Concentrate three-pronged attacks to frustrate the pacification program and expand our control.

Based on a review of the counter-pacification task during the first two months of the Winter Campaign, we should review the directives issued by A.15 which provide guidance of this task. Then, we should work out plans to correct shortcomings and to exercise leadership, especially in coordinating three-pronged attacks to support the [counter-pacification] task more effectively. We should use the armed forces to strongly attack [RVN] administrative and pacification personnel, to support the people's political struggles and military proselyting activities, and destroy the enemy's oppressive control. When providing leadership, we should place emphasis on the necessity of attacking the enemy in all aspects. We should also attack enemy units and disorganize them. We should build up our forces on the spot and at the same time, motivate the people to struggle in order to break the enemy's oppressive control. We should motivate the people to return to their former villages to participate in [agricultural] production activities, counter enemy espionage, and adopt the

tactics of attacking the enemy with improvised mines. In addition, outside elements should stay close to the enemy, conduct continuous attacks against enemy areas, concentrate forces to destroy many areas and hamlets located in positions which provide support for each other, and make all-out efforts to turn the situation in the village, hamlets, and main objectives in our favor.

We should continue to conduct political indoctrination for Party Chapters, agents, and people in accordance with Directive No. 21/CT-K, concerning the motivation of the people, and Memo No. 73/CV-K or A.15.

We should use the ideological task mentioned above as a basis for improving the ideology of the personnel and cadre in the internal organization and the people so as to transform Resolution 9 and the activity plans of local areas into revolutionary actions in order to ensure the achievement of the Winter Campaign plan and successful preparation for the coming phase.

We should exercise leadership in recruiting personnel and strengthening our forces. A.15 has issued directives to provide guidance and H's [possibly Districts] have also realized that our shortcomings are serious and are holding back our activities in the local areas. However, due to poor leadership, we have failed to settle the difficulties and problems of lower level cadre and agents and to effectively supervise this task during the Winter Campaign. As a result, we have not obtained satisfactory results (during November in Chau Thanh [District], we only recruited two female cells and in Tan Uyen one Party member, two female cells and nine association members).

Attention should be paid to collecting rice and protecting crops. Efforts should be made to counter the enemy's plans of concentrating, controlling, and robbing the people of their rice. Preparations should be made for planting crops in the coming dry and rainy seasons. We should break the enemy's economic blockade in order to help the people buy and preserve food, demand freedom of movement, and freedom to carry out businesses and purchase necessary food. In addition, we should motivate the people to contribute their money and rice to the Revolution and store food in strategic hamlets for revolutionary forces.

b. Preparation for the coming phase:

If we achieve the above task, the preparation for the coming phase will be successful. In addition, we should pay attention to the following tasks:

Ideological task:

During additional political reorientation training, we should motivate the people to carry out the mission mentioned above and make our personnel in our internal and base-level organizations and the people thoroughly understand and properly assess the situation and realize our favorable conditions in the months to come. By doing so, we will succeed in promoting their enthusiasm and determination to surge forward as we did in the early spring of Mậu Thân [1968]. In each local area, we should correct erroneous thoughts to help every man and unit overcome difficulties in accomplishing their missions.

In addition to developing our strength in every aspect and expanding our control, we should study the situation to aid effective deployment of our troops throughout the battlefield, close in on objectives to be attacked, and be ready for combat when the order is given. The armed, political, and military proselyting forces should deploy troops in both inside and outside areas. In addition to properly deploying troops, efforts should be made to urgently recruit more troops to meet the prescribed requirements and launch attacks against the designated areas and objectives. Improve signal and liaison systems between hamlets, villages, districts, and sub-regions. The district Standing Committee must hold a meeting to review the activities of the Winter Campaign, carefully study this directive, and then work out plans for implementing it and assigning missions to villages. The plan should aim at overcoming shortcomings in order to successfully implement the plan for the Winter Campaign in January 1970 and aid preparations for the next campaign.

We should clearly point out the requirements, objectives, plans of attack, employment of forces, preparations, assignment of responsibility, leadership, and the activity plan for armed, political, and troop proselyting activities. We should designate those comrades who will remain behind to provide necessary guidance for and supervise the work without waiting for the return of our comrades working at A. 15. They will return later and assist them as required.

This directive is classified Absolute Secret. It will be disseminated only down to the District Party Committee. It is not permitted to produce it or transport it. (Note main features of the directive to disseminate to villages). After the District Committee studies it, the comrade in charge must keep the directive in a special place. He must not carry it with him.

30 December 1969
For Sub-Region Standing Committee
s/ Nguyen Chi Thanh