

Document ~~F~~ No. 1

A	FILE	SUBJ.
	DATE	SUB-DAT
12/69		

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D I R E C T I V E

Number 26/CT-K

SUBJECT: Continue the completion of our plan for the Winter Campaign, make preparations in all fields, grasp all opportunities, step up our all-sided offensive, improve our position and strength, deal a decisive blow at the U. S. imperialists' Vietnamization-of-the-War, bring about a new situation in order to achieve the decisive victory.

I. SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SITUATION SINCE OUR LAST INDOCTRINATION ON RESOLUTION [BLANK].

A. In our Sub-Region

Enemy situation: To implement his plan of Vietnamization-of-the-war and his "clear-and-hold" strategy on the Sub-Region 5 war theater, the enemy has achieved the following since the beginning of this winter

He strengthened the ~~P~~uppet troops (especially the Regional and Popular Forces). Step by step, he assigned the defense of strategic hamlets to his Regional and Popular Forces units. He upgraded his People's Self-Defense Force to Popular Forces, increased their equipment, and used them to replace main force troops stationed at a number of military posts and in a number of areas of operations.

He enlarged the puppet main force's range of operations and used U.S. troops only as a mobile force for the support of various battlefields.

Prior to our operational phase and during this phase, the enemy attempted to foil our operations, intercept our troops, and at the same time, support his pacification activities by conducting continuous attacks on our rear area adjacent to our middle line and by deploying an arc-shaped offensive line with Puppets main force troops, U.S. Special Forces units, and U.S. armored units. This offensive line covered our staging areas and interdicted our troop penetration routes. It started from the villages of War Zone D, ran along Routes 16, 14 and 7, crossed Phú Giáo District, and ended at Lái Khê. The enemy also conducted long-range operations in which several company-size and battalion-size units covered and swept sensitive areas, many squad-size airborne and platoon-size Special Forces units reconnoitered our communication routes and waterways. The enemy also relentlessly attacked our bases and leveled the terrain on our middle line and in the fringe areas. In the meantime, the enemy Regional Forces, Popular Forces, and pacification units intensified their activities in strategic hamlets and areas under their responsibility. They increased patrols; laid ambushes; searched for our secret tunnels and caches; intensified their intelligence activity; captured our agents; and terrorized, deceived, and compelled villagers to participate in their organizations. They gradually reactivated

the People's Self-Defense Force units that we had disintegrated. They forced civilians to enlist, trained them, and assigned them guard duty.

The enemy tried to stimulate his village administrative personnel and pacification cadre, intensified his psywar activities, bought off [the people] to use them as spies, and employed defectors to break our base organizations and control and place pressure upon the revolutionaries' families. He thoroughly controlled the people's purchase, sale, and storage of foods. He closely searched the harvest areas, forced the farmers to bring their crops into strategic hamlets, and controlled their reserves of unhusked rice with a view to blockading our source of supply and robbing the people's property.

In short, before and during the Winter Campaign the enemy tried to ward off and frustrate our offensive, force the ~~P~~uppet troops into action to replace the U.S. troops, carry on his pacification plan, intensify his psywar activities, and blockade our economy in every area. The enemy did not use force on a large scale. However, his operations were uninterrupted and were launched in successive waves in several directions with a deep penetration range.

Our attacks were not regular or strong enough. In some areas, our countermeasures were ineffective. As a result, some difficulties were created for us which created favorable conditions for the enemy to:

Conscript youths to replace his Regional and Popular Forces personnel who were upgraded to take over the role of the ~~P~~uppet main

forces units in the defense of certain areas. The enemy pushed a number of Regional and Popular Forces to operate in different pacification hamlets. Thus, an element from the main force could be relieved and assigned to operate on the frontline. The enemy in Sub-Region 5 suffered fewer casualties than he did in the previous phases.

Carry out pacification activities in some areas. Such activities have caused some personnel losses to friendly units, destroyed some of our agent networks, and created difficulties for our personnel to hold the ground and to operate in these areas. The movement has decreased to a certain extent. Our position in some areas (south of Tân Uyên, south of Châu-Thành) ^{has} ~~have~~ been weakened. We have also experienced difficulties in movement. Movement and food supply in the rear have encountered more difficulties than before.

However, the enemy still has weak points and deficiencies as previously revealed in Resolution 9. His shortcomings are as follows:

As a result of the Vietnamization-of-the-war, the war theater of Sub-Region 5 has become the scene of intense disputes. The enemy made every effort to replace main force units by upgrading Regional and Popular Forces personnel in order to enable these main force units to operate on the frontline, so that the U.S. troops could operate on more important battlefields. However, it is obvious that the enemy could not implement his plan. In ^areas where our activities were strong, Regional and Popular forces personnel became demoralized, and they shrank back. This resulted in main forces units being returned to these areas

(Thủ Đức, Lái Thiêu, South Tân Uyên and Châu Thành) to reinforce them. The U.S. troops, whose withdrawal from the above areas had been planned, could not be withdrawn. During this period, the U.S. and Puppets main force troops had to use part of their forces to harass our areas and prevent our activities in the middle line adjacent to our rear (Châu Thành and Tân Uyên). Consequently, the U.S. and Puppets main force units could not withdraw any of their elements during the Winter Campaign despite the enemy's efforts to increase Regional and Popular Forces personnel.

Because of his deployment of troops over a large area and the constant employment of his troops to harass our areas and prevent our activities being launched from different directions, he could not concentrate a large force and conduct large attacks against many areas. He could not even effectively defend his positions which are scattered everywhere. The majority of the Puppets troops became increasingly demoralized. They fear our artillery attacks, our trap mines, and the withdrawal of US troops. Therefore, in areas where we can maintain our forces and our personnel can stay close to the enemy, we will have more opportunities to attack the enemy (in Hòa Lôi) and force him to withdraw. In areas where we planted mines, attacked the enemy with trap mines, and countered raids well (such as those conducted in villages located along the Dong Nai River and north of Châu Thành) we succeeded in restricting his search operations and annihilating a large number of his personnel. If we employ our troops properly and promptly, we will have more

opportunities to destroy enemy small- and medium-size units (the attack against a U.S. blocking position at Bang Lang intersection by our artillery unit is a good example).

Although the enemy has obtained some successes in his pacification activities, he still finds himself in a state of confusion. The Self-Defense Force in some areas, after having been disorganized by our troops, has not been reconsolidated (such as in LT, CT, Nam TU) [possibly Lái Thiêu, Châu Thành and South Tân Uyên]. Most of his administrative control machinery is ineffective. In some areas, his attacks against our important areas have created some difficulties for us; however, we succeeded in re-establishing our positions (LT and CT) [possibly Lái Thiêu, Châu Thành]. In some areas, we succeeded in expanding our control over the population more effectively (LT, TD, and CT) [possibly Lái Thiêu, Thủ Đức, Châu Thành]. In brief, we were in a seesaw type of battle with the enemy in our counterpacification activities during the Winter Campaign.

Friendly Situation :

In the light of Resolution 9, we proceeded with the political reorientation within the Party. Although some areas' activities have been slow, a great part of our cadres and Party members completed their reorientation courses and started their activities among the people. Changes have been as follows: Our fighting stand and mass viewpoint have been consolidated. We understood the enemy's deficiencies and con-

traditions and succeeded in mastering our policies and guidelines. We have started correcting our weak points during operations and adopted more appropriate guidelines for these activities, which resulted in our overcoming numerous difficulties, [war] fierceness, and privations and continuing to step up our activities in all fields. Thus, we achieved the following:

Our armed forces maintained stable activities in all areas, particularly the intermediate area. We made a step forward in promoting the guerrilla warfare movement (TU [possibly in Tân Uyên District] and CT [possibly Châu Thành, ^{meaning} ~~meeting~~ in the city district]) and destroyed or wore down a number of the Puppets' forces and his oppressive control personnel. Our ~~main~~ activities included the coordination of our political struggles with military proselyting and guerrilla warfare activities to kill tyrants, destroy the enemy's oppressive control, counter enemy sweep operations, destroy the pacification program, and the organization of the People's Self-Defense Force, etc. Thus, we succeeded in maintaining and developing our movement, particularly in the military proselyting field, which scored the greatest successes. We resumed our activities in the Thủ Đức area, created some new areas for activities in Lái Thiêu District, and developed the movement in the city and in Tân Uyên District. We have consolidated Bù Cháp Base politically and economically. As a result, we frustrated the enemy activities, checked his pacification program, and disrupted a number of his oppressive control units and People's Self-Defense Force units.

Our agents still exist. They stayed in the area, and some even developed their areas. We have consequently remained stable in our position of besieging the enemy in all areas, particularly in Thủ Đức, the fringe areas of Saigon Capital, and in the intermediate line of Châu Thành [city district].

Although our progress is still slow in the building of forces, we have successfully studied Resolution 9 and gradually consolidated our ideology and attitude. We became more resolute to surmount difficulties, hold the area, and operate in the battlefield of the fringe area as well as of the intermediate area despite difficulties and privations encountered in the rear area. We have more efficiently applied guidelines and principles, and some areas have realized their shortcomings and the cause of the slow development of forces. Those areas now have plans to overcome these difficulties.

In short, through the political reorientation course on Resolution 9 combined with efforts to fulfill the testament of Chairman Ho, the first steps of activities produced impressive effects throughout our Party body. Although the results of our Winter Campaign were not high enough, we scored sufficient achievements which will help us to accomplish our mission in the coming months.

However, if we review Resolution 9 and our plan for the Winter Campaign and consider the advantageous conditions of the situation, we will realize that our achievements are considered too small due to our numerous major weaknesses. They^s are as follows:

1. We have not developed to the maximum the effect of the

armed forces nor correctly applied guidelines and principles. We did not strive to overcome difficulties in the destruction of enemy forces.

Therefore, the destruction of the enemy forces was not great, as compared to that of previous phases and to the prescribed norms. We did not strongly hit the U.S. and Puppets in their troop development plan, thus allowing them to continue their attacks and cause difficulties to our base areas.

Concurrently, we failed to fully develop our political capability or heighten the role of political struggles and military proselyting in coordination with the military and diplomatic struggle, to keep up with the favorable development of the situation and to meet the prescribed norms.

2. Even though the coordinated three-pronged attacks against enemy pacification units were persistent and continuous, they ^{still} ~~did~~ lacked strength and aggressiveness. The Winter Campaign was the high point of activities. However, our achievements did not meet the prescribed criteria. Although we succeeded in harassing the enemy, hindering his activities, and increasing our control of the populace in some areas, these victories were not stable. We did not make vigorous efforts in breaking the enemy's oppressive control of the population, eliminating the tyrants, or disrupting the People's Self-Defense Force, and the development of the guerrilla warfare movement in populated hamlets has not progressed significantly. The area under our mastership was not expanded, our personnel still have difficulty holding their positions, and there were many casualties. Friendly activities in enemy pacified hamlets were sporadic because underground agents were both scare and weak. This seriously affected other fields of activity. This was why our encirclement and harassment of the enemy was not effective.

3. The consolidation and development of ^{various} ~~various~~ types of forces in some areas evidenced some initial improvement. However, the bulk of our forces has made no progress. The armed forces, local forces, militia, and guerrilla forces continued to suffer losses and were unable to replenish their strength. Party and [Youth] Group base organizations and people's organizations developed slowly. The quality of available organizations and of the people's organizations was not improved. Thus, the organized forces were not only weak, but small and incompetent. For that reason, the implementation of our guidelines and principles in each area was still loose. We continue to lose cadre and loyal sympathizers, and the development of new cadre did not meet the prescribed criteria. In comparing forces at the base level we realized that we were not superior to the enemy and that we were inferior to him in certain areas, especially...[blank], and in some areas in... [blank]

4. The battlefield situation was in general irregularly developed. Our activities were successful in Thủ Đức, Châu Thành, and Tân Uyên. In Lai Thiêu, the friendly situation was stabilized and consolidated. The revolutionary movement faltered in the province capital, and was unimproved and encountered many difficulties in Dĩ An. It is certain that the enemy activities increased fiercely in some areas, but the main reason for our weakness was the deficiencies of the local authorities, subjective leadership and a lack of determination and thorough

understanding of our guidelines and principles of operations. In every field of activity, for example, military proselyting, we attained some success; however, the general situation was not improved. The situation was the same for civilian proselyting.

5. Organization for implementation of our policy has not moved ahead as was prescribed in the present leadership requirements. It still showed many deficiencies, especially in the dissemination of the Resolution to cadres at lower levels for guidance and implementation of both the resolution and the signal, liaison, and situation assessment tasks. There were many causes for these deficiencies, but the main reason is as follows: Recently the political reorientation session on Resolution 9 of our Party body gained some initial success, but, in some areas, as the dissemination of it to the Party Chapters was too late, cadres did not thoroughly understand the contents and requirements of the Resolution. No basic changes were made in attitude, ideological concepts, political awareness, adoption of guidelines and principles, or conduct and organization for implementation; therefore, our subjective leadership failed to keep pace with the development of the situation or to conform with the content of Resolution 9. Some fields of activity, such as civilian proselyting, the motivation of people, and the consolidation and development of force, did not meet the requirements; this was also a cause of the cited shortcomings and deficiencies which limited our successes in the Winter Campaign and must be overcome in the future.

B. General Situation:

1. Since we disseminated the Resolution ... [blank] , only a short period of time (from early autumn to early winter 1969) has elapsed but the situation has undergone a new step of development. This development is additional evidence which proves that the Resolution is proper. The situation has specifically evolved as follows:

The enemy continued to increase his activities of pacifying, encroaching upon land, constructing more posts, and developing the People's Self-Defense Force. He has striven to build up the ~~Puppet~~ ~~Army~~ and commit the puppet main force to the frontline in order to fight under the control and with the support of the Americans. His purpose is to decrease American casualties and use the puppet main force to gradually replace the U.S. troops which are withdrawing step by step. He has made considerable efforts and has successfully encroached upon land in many areas, causing us many difficulties, especially in holding on to densely populated areas. However, from the beginning, he has displayed many gaps and deficiencies:

We inflicted more casualties on the Americans; the puppet troops being sent to the frontline suffered more casualties. The morale of both ~~the~~ ^{U.S.} and puppet troops deteriorated. Their remote defense system against us became increasingly weak. Their accelerated pacification plan has been stopped on the frontline and defeated in the rear. Our base areas are firmly held; we have worn down much of the enemy's force.

In the lowlands, we have largely frustrated the enemy pacification and encroachment schemes, developed movements, and expanded our control over many of the weak areas and communication lines. Concurrently, in the rural areas surrounding Saigon, we have firmly held the ground and maintained a combat position and the link between the front and the rear. In many cities, our guerrilla warfare has been maintained in the inside and outside areas. We are able to exert pressure on the enemy and attack him by using infantry troops when necessary.

Political and diplomatic fields:

The U.S. imperialists have tried to rally the reactionary factions in order to secure a political backing. Along with this action, they have stepped up espionage and psywar activities and consolidated the ~~Puppet Government and Army~~ in order to preserve legal and constitutional status for Thiệu. They opposed the plan of forming a peace cabinet and a coalition government. At the same time, they were preparing a new plan, trying to win over the uncommitted force, sowing illusions of peace, and smoothing down the ^{anti-war} ~~anti-war~~ movement in Vietnam, the U.S., and the world. But these schemes have been unmasked and frustrated. This has driven the U.S. and ~~Puppets~~ into a more isolated situation. Thiệu's Six-Party Front became divided and disorganized right after it was activated. The replacement of Huong by Khiêm revealed a new weakness of Thiệu. Many personalities in the National Assembly, in the ~~Puppet Government~~, and in the ~~Army~~, who previously had been

more or less associated with Thiệu, have now lost their confidence and are inclined to a third force. The U.S. imperialists are very confused. They are afraid that if they replace the Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm clique, they will not avoid the collapse [of the regime], but if they cling to the reactionary, extremist, rotten, and incompetent clique they will easily fail in their plot to consolidate the Puppets Government and Army and to cope with the attacks launched by the Vietnamese, U.S., and world peoples.

On our side, on the basis of carrying out the reorientation down to the Party Chapters and motivating the people to study President Ho's testament, the people's struggle movement and political prestige have scored a new step of development. This struggle movement is smoothly coordinated with our political and diplomatic struggles and the anti-war movements of the American and world peoples. These movements became increasingly effective, and have weakened the Vietnamization and false peace policy of Nixon. In the rural areas, there has been a new change in our movement. We have countered the enemy's sweep operations and encroachment; led the people back to their abandoned lands and rice-fields; encircled enemy posts; killed tyrants; and broken the enemy's oppressive control in order to regain political power. At the same time, we developed military proselyting activities, causing enemy troops to remain inactive, and inducing more of them to desert. In cities, the people's movement to gain control at the base level and their

struggles demanding necessary rights and improved living conditions have developed strongly. The economic struggle movement demanding social welfare has rallied the forces of the workers and other classes. This is increasingly creating favorable conditions for us to expand the united action front and to coordinate the slogans concerning democratic rights and social welfare with the slogans demanding the restoration of peace, overthrow of the Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm Government, and establishment of a peace cabinet. On the diplomatic front, we continuously unmasked and denounced the stubborn and wily schemes of the U.S. and Puppets and stepped up the U.S. and world peoples' movement demanding that Nixon quickly withdraw troops from VN and abandon the Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm henchmen. The movement has developed more strongly and widely than ever before, attracting many statesmen in the U.S.A. and in Western Europe. Therefore, it has created an increasingly stronger pressure on Nixon and promoted the support of our people's struggles. It is apparent that our popular political and diplomatic struggles have made new developments, driving the U.S. and Puppets into a dangerous situation. Therefore, the more stubborn they are, the more they are thrown into a state of isolation, and the more they meet difficulties in implementing the Vietnamization plan and carrying out the false peace policy.

Economic and financial fields:

Due to the war of aggression and the enemy's policies concerning resettlement of the people, conscription [of youths], robbery [of the

people's property], inflation, and devaluation of the SVN currency... the Puppets' economic and financial situation became more serious. In order to improve their war budget which has greatly increased due to the Vietnamization of the war, the Puppet Government has resorted to unpopular economic measures which seriously disrupted living conditions of the people of all social classes. Recently, the enemy has increased the taxes levied on 1,500 commodities, causing the cost of living to increase manyfold.

At the same time, the enemy has intensified the economic blockade of our liberated areas, worn down our manpower and property, and reduced our combat potential. All of the above unpopular economic measures have raised strong protests and given birth to a struggle movement against him, which is supported by people of all social classes in rural and urban areas, including personnel of the puppet army and administration.

Meanwhile, our economic and financial policies are correct, being based on production activities. We motivated the people to stage struggle movements against the enemy's piratical acts and forcible removal of people from their villages, to maintain [farm] production activities and protect their products and to counter the enemy's economic blockade and robbery. We also motivated the people to purchase and reserve food provisions, and encouraged our agencies and units to increase self-sufficient production activities and practice

economy. We successfully overcame many difficulties to maintain the people's living conditions and serve the Resistance.

The slogans used in economic and welfare struggle opposing the ~~enemy~~ enemy's measures of increasing taxes and robbing [the people's property], and demanding pay raises and lower cost of living have the capacity to rally the people of all social classes into an increasingly broad struggle movement demanding the improvement of living conditions and restoration of peace. At the same time, the struggles for maintaining production activities and protecting life, etc. became daily necessary requirements of the people in rural and urban areas. They were transformed into a great power which is accelerating the collapse of the U.S. /~~P~~uppet regime.

2. Considering the above-mentioned development of the situation and the main spirit of the Resolution... [blank] we should determine the following ~~a~~ main points:

a. As a result of the study of Resolution ... [blank], we have achieved repeated and great victories in all fields; the revolutionary movement and forces and the leadership and guidance of our Party organization have been greatly improved. However, we have not yet succeeded in turning the situation in our favor.

Although having sustained several new defeats, being driven to a deadlock, and facing the failure of their plan of "Vietnamizing the war," the U.S. imperialists still have not lost hopes. They still cling to the

Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, increase pacification activities, strengthen the Puppets troops and Government, and strive to dispute us in order to maintain the situation and create a strong position while withdrawing their troops step by step .

b. We must know in what situation the Americans are showing their obduracy.

They are obdurate , not at a time when they are escalating the war with their troops increased to the maximum level and capable of strong counter-actions, but they are obdurate in a situation where they have sustained heavy defeats caused by our surprise strategic attacks during Tet Mau Than [^{Tet} ~~early~~ 1968] which forced them into a strategic defensive position.

They are obdurate not at a time when they begin deescalating the war, but at a time when they are forced to withdraw their troops, which adversely affects the deployment of troops on the battlefields, the intensification of their pacification program, and the strengthening of the Puppets troops and Puppets Government. ~~This is causing great dangers to the Americans.~~

Presently, the Americans are coming to a strategic deadlock which forces them to continue to de-escalate the war. In addition, their Vietnamization plan has failed ⁱⁿ its initial step. This is causing great dangers to the Americans;

- Indeed, while the Puppets troops and Puppets Government are collapsing and are incapable of recovering from the fall, the Americans must continue to withdraw their troops.

*Indirect
conclusion* →

- The coming phases of U.S. troop withdrawal will considerably decrease the U.S. troop strength. This will inevitably create adverse influences on their military capability on the battlefield.

- This will undermine the morale of the U.S. and satellite troops and discourage and disorganize the Puppets and Government. Desertion will certainly increase, causing a very alarming situation for the Americans.

- If the U.S. continues to pull out its troops, its position will be weakened. But, if it withdraws its troops "drop by drop?" to appease and deceive [public opinion,] the U.S. will face the increasingly fierce opposition of the people in our country, in the U.S., and in the world who vehemently denounce the obstinate policy of the U.S., and compel Nixon to accelerate the withdrawal of U.S. troops and abandon the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique.

c. If the U.S. continues to pull out its troops, the enemy's force will be reduced. Then the military and political weak points of the Americans and Puppets will be clearly exposed. This will be a very favorable time for our people and Army to develop our superiority, take advantage of the enemy's weaknesses, and rapidly overcome our shortcomings and weaknesses.

Therefore, the year of 1970 will afford the most favorable conditions to us and the most unfavorable ones to the enemy. We should leap at opportunities and make tremendous efforts to turn the

situation in our favor. We are provided with the following advantages to make this historical change:

- Our people's position and strength have been consolidated and developed more strongly than in 1968 or 1969 throughout the three strategic zones.

*important
Review this* → - The leadership and guidance of all levels, sections, branches, and associations have been improved after the study of the Resolution.

- Our troops and people are on the road to victory. They have displayed a strong enthusiasm for the fighting and accumulated abundant experiences. They have developed their strengths and capabilities through the studies of, and efforts to carry out, President Ho's testament.

The year of 1970 will be a decisive year to turn the situation in our favor if all echelons of our Party body, ^{all} cadre, and Party members properly assess the situation, fully exploit the advantages, display a high determination, and make tremendous efforts in their work. If our subjective efforts are incomplete, thus allowing the stubborn U.S. imperialists to overcome some difficulties in pursuing the fight against us, we still have won great successes [sic]. On this basis, we should patiently intensify offensive activities for another period of time in order to change the situation in our favor and achieve the decisive victory.

d. The struggle of our troops and people is very complicated and full of hardships, but has very good prospects. The situation

has become ever more favorable for us and unfavorable for the enemy.

The U.S. imperialists remain obstinate, even though they are de-escalating the war and withdrawing troops unconditionally, and the ~~P~~uppet troops and ~~G~~overnment are collapsing more seriously than

ever. We have many difficulties and weaknesses, but we have the

initiative and have obtained great victories and significant successes

in every field. We are rushing forward. This is the basis for future

missions to achieve victories in accordance with the first possibility.

It is also the inspiration to motivate the efforts of the Party body,

the people, and the troops to achieve victories in compliance with

the first possibility. We must make countless efforts during the

coming year since it is the year that will decide the war. In the coming

months, we must counter the enemy in order to achieve great and

overall victories and create favorable conditions for strengthening and

developing our power and position. We must make careful preparations

in order to bring about a great change in the situation in our favor

and to gain the decisive victory as required by the Resolution.