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THE VIETCONG IS LOSING ITS GRIP

HON. CHARLES E. CHAMBERLAIN

OF MICHIGAN

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, December 2, 1969

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN. Mr. Speaker, as we consider today House Resolution 613, affirming the support of the House of Representatives for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, I call the attention of my colleagues to two very timely and related articles appearing in the December 1969 issue of the Reader's Digest.

The first is a fresh assessment of the position of the Vietcong by the well-known columnist, Joseph Alsop, who recently completed his 18th journey through Vietnam since 1953. His report, which contains much encouraging news, concludes as follows:

The real key to the problem . . . is nothing more or less than the degree of resolution that will be shown by the President and the people who chose him as their leader. For the first time, it can be said with some assurance that if we want an honorable peace, we can get it by being resolute, and without over-long delays. But shall we? Who can tell?

At this point I include Mr. Alsop's article, "The Vietcong is Losing Its Grip", together with a succinct and reflective Reader's Digest editorial entitled, "Patience!":

THE VIETCONG IS LOSING ITS GRIP

(By Joseph Alsop)

(NOTE.—Since World War II, when he served under Gen. Claire Chennault in the 14th Air Force in China, Joseph Alsop has covered every war of serious interest to the United States and its allies, ranging from Korea and Malaya to the Middle East. He has visited Vietnam, always for extended periods, no fewer than 18 times, so that he knows the provinces and the people, both Americans and South Vietnamese, with real intimacy. Very few reporters have the background to make the kind of before-and-after comparison that Alsop has equipped himself to make.)

Before many months pass, there should be mighty few communist guerrillas, as well as mighty few people under Vietcong control, in the war against the VC in South Vietnam. The unreported process that is producing this dramatic and unforeseen result is the chief discovery that I made in Vietnam this September. It is an important discovery. For the progressive erosion of the whole Vietcong structure in South Vietnam—which is really what is happening—is bound to aid President Nixon greatly in his patient quest for an honorable peace.

It is simplest to begin with the way I made this discovery, vastly to my own surprise. This was my 18th visit to Vietnam since 1953. I spent most of my long trip going from district to district, quite literally from the DMZ to the Point of Ca Mau, always trying to find out what was happening in the crucial rice-roots war.

I specify the rice-roots war because two quite different, though related, wars are in fact being fought simultaneously in South Vietnam.

The Vietnam resolution which we now consider conveys great nobility of purpose in calling for broad popular support for the President in his efforts to obtain a just peace in Vietnam. The endeavor here undertaken will prove to involve more than a mere confrontation between popular support for the President and the demands for immediate unilateral withdrawal.

As with any question there are always more than two alternatives.

Most Americans support what they understand to be the President's objectives in Vietnam—a termination of the hostilities as speedily as possible, consistent with our national interests. But they do not necessarily agree with the course of the course which has been chosen—that of negotiating with an unrepentant enemy. The best and most certain method to terminate the war promptly and permanently, while discouraging any further such aggressive ventures, is to win it. Hanoi knows this. It should.

Chairman, this is a popular resolution with most. I have not the slightest doubt that it will pass by a great margin. I feel compelled to rise and give voice to the viewpoint of many other dedicated Americans who feel as I do on this victory.

The real question before us is whether enactment of this resolution would be instrumental in regaining peace, or might it have the unintended result of placing our country in an impasse by severely restricting our President's future alternatives.

Approval of this resolution endorses negotiation and can be interpreted by the President and, more importantly, by the enemy as an instruction to pursue only that course. Thus, we can find ourselves bogged down in endless negotiations over trivia while countless Americans continue to be slaughtered unnecessarily.

When former President Lyndon Johnson stopped the bombing, which was actually hurting the enemy, and began negotiating we spent months in Paris negotiating simply to decide the shape of the conference table. How many American lives did this talk cost? Only yesterday, General Westmoreland, Army Chief of Staff and former commander in Vietnam, stated that had the bombing not been stopped the war would have ended last year. How many American lives did stopping the bombing cost? What was accomplished?

This resolution calls for further endless negotiations. How long would it take in negotiations to arrive at agreement over the definition of such terms as "free elections", "open to all", "supervised", "by an impartial international body."

Each word of this resolution is an open invitation to protracted and fruitless discussions in Paris while Americans continue to die in Vietnam and Hanoi's dear American friends escalate operations in the United States.

Have we learned nothing from our recent history in the Korean debacle? In Korea our men fought—and still die—under the UNO flag, in an UNO declared war against Communist China. There has been no peace settlement negotiated—and there is no peace. There

is only an uneasy cease-fire where American men—who were not even born when the Korean war broke out—die as we continue to talk at Panmunjom.

Mr. Chairman, passage of this resolution will find 1970 without peace, more talk-fests, with more American casualties and more Americans yet to be killed, disabled or fall prisoner.

Every American surely recognizes that we have been brought to the present stalemate because we bent over backward to appease, negotiate and talk. Passage of the resolution is tantamount to approval by this body of past failures—policies that have left us 40,000 dead and 300,000 other casualties—policies which were resoundingly repudiated by the American citizens at the polls just last November. We accomplish nothing by attempting to renovate the same bankrupt Johnson policy.

It is time for a change. It is time to pursue a different course. The proven path to peace we have never tried in Vietnam is declaring a positive objective and moving forward to peace through victory.

The American people understand, even if their leaders do not, that you do not end violence by negotiating with criminals. This applies to the international terrorists in Hanoi as well as it does to the domestic type in our cities. Negotiation leads only to appeasement, which leads only to surrender. Surrender invites further violence—making an endless circle.

The people of my district are also opposed to the way this war is being conducted. They did not believe in the namby-pamby UNO diplomacy that got us involved in it in the first place, but now that we are in it, they are strongly opposed to prolonging it. They cannot understand why their sons are sent to fight a dirty little Asian war and are forbidden to win.

It would have been better had this resolution remained in committee. Now that it is before us on a "yes or no" vote, the lesser of the two evils is probably its adoption, if for no other reason than the propaganda value to Hanoi of its defeat. We can well expect the Washington newspapers to claim its adoption as a dove victory because it calls for additional negotiations.

In the long run its effect is to strengthen Hanoi's negotiators, not support our President.

By this instrument we state formally our concessions and severely restrict our flexibility in negotiation. Would it not be of value for us to possess the published instructions given Hanoi's negotiators by their government? We may find to our great regret that this resolution has left us only the formality of surrender.

Yet, this resolution will pass by a lopsided vote. This is not because it has any real meaning, or any intrinsic value. It is simply because Members have been neatly boxed into an impossible position—the same as they were with the former Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Emotion overrules logic.

Many of the Members of this body had voted, in good faith, in favor of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and came to regret it. They found that the resolution was far more encompassing than

they had intended. In voting for this Vietnam resolution, many more Members will find themselves in February making the same apologies, for essentially the same reasons. And it is well to remember that these debates will not be carried in the future newspaper analyses—only selected language from the resolution.

It would be easy to remain silent, vote with the majority, and evade the real issue. I do not propose to do so. I cannot, in conscience, support the present resolution, neither can I cast a vote which will be interpreted by the controlled news media as support for the enemy. I shall, therefore, vote "present."

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR).

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. TAFT).

(Mr. TAFT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TAFT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, in keeping with the unanimous consent previously granted, I would like to insert in the Record preceding the remarks of the gentleman from Ohio a telegram from George Meany, president of the AFL-CIO, and a telegram from Walter H. Judd, a former Member of the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it is so ordered.

There was no objection.

The telegrams referred to are as follows:

WASHINGTON, D.C., December 1, 1969.

HON. JAMES WRIGHT,  
Washington, D.C.:

The policies concerning Vietnam set forth in House Resolution 613 closely parallel those the AFL-CIO has adopted in convention resolutions and executive council statements. We strongly urge its adoption.

GEORGE MEANY,  
President, AFL-CIO.

DENVER, COLO., December 1, 1969.

HON. JAMES WRIGHT,  
House of Representatives,  
Washington, D.C.:

Strongly approve your resolution expressing support of the President's efforts to get justice and freedom for the people of South Vietnam without which no peace can be honorable or lasting for Southeast Asia or for our own country.

Best regards,

WALTER H. JUDD.

Mr. TAFT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution and wish to call the attention of the Committee to some information which I do not believe has come to their attention previously.

First, with regard to the general feeling of the American people on this very difficult problem that we are faced with in Vietnam, I would like to report the results of a questionnaire which I distributed on a postal patron basis in my district, some 140,000 copies in late September, and on which I have now had returned over 20,000 copies with the following results.

The questions which I asked were:

Which statement most accurately describes

your sentiments regarding a Vietnam settlement?

In reply to that the answer was as follows: On the question and on the alternatives that I put:

(a) The United States should apply whatever military pressure is necessary to end the fighting and assure a stable and secure non-Communist government. 33%.

(c) The United States should continue the policy of withdrawal of American troops, begun in June, 1969, relating it to the war's progress and peace negotiations. 36%.

Thus, we find a total of some 69 percent are in support of the President's position, or of a stronger position.

On the other side, we find the next question:

(b) The United States should begin at once a complete withdrawal of American troops to be carried out regardless of the progress of the war. 18%.

This lines up almost directly, I would point out, to the results of a Gallup poll recently, and it seems to verify that finding.

There were other answers in the area of forcing a Communist coalition only with the Communists, only 3 percent.

Others and no answers—in the neighborhood of 10 percent.

This, I think, does indicate a gain from my particular constituency, the general feeling and general support the people which I think we are reaffirming and reexpressing in this resolution.

Also I would like to call the attention of the House to a statement made by Ambassador Lodge on November 13 as his opening statement in the plenary session in Paris on that day.

In part he said as follows:

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis—

Quoting the President—

We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Viet-Nam to determine their own future.

Then he proceeds:

We ask you to join us in serious negotiations because we wish: to see this war ended; to spare the brave people of South Viet-Nam further suffering; to save the lives of our soldiers; and to end this waste of so many North Vietnamese troops, whose courage entitles them to a better fate. If progress at these talks is not possible, we can continue with our plan under which we will withdraw our forces from South Viet-Nam on an orderly scheduled timetable in accordance with the three criteria we have mentioned before.

Then he proceeds with reference to this particular resolution which is before the House today as follows:

Yesterday, a remarkable expression of this support took place—

American people for a just peace. And continuing—

Referring to the wide support of the Members of the House of Representatives co-sponsored and signed a House Resolution. I will read the text of the resolution.

Then Ambassador Lodge read the very text of the resolution before this House and he commented further as follows:

It may interest you to know that this resolution was originated by members of the Democratic Party although, of course, members of both parties have signed it. At first,

the sponsors had planned to have 50 Republican and 50 Democrat signers. But so many wished to co-sponsor that this idea was dropped and instead the resolution went in with 301 co-sponsors.

I think it is significant that this point was made in the negotiations in Paris. I think it indicates the wisdom of our acting favorably upon this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to mention one other area of thought with regard to this resolution because I think it tries to put back into proper context and proper thinking the question as to how American foreign policy is made. While we have a great tradition of freedom of assembly and freedom of speech in this country, that are guaranteed by the Constitution, and while there may be appropriate areas for mass demonstrations and marches to call upon the public conscience or to dramatize to move public opinion, and possibly even governmental action, on domestic issues, I would submit to you that this can be exceeding disruptive to the formation of foreign policy.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

(Mr. OTTINGER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

We are told that we should support this resolution because it is a peace resolution, calling for support of the President only "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace."

In the history of the world, more war has been waged in the name of peace than in any other name, save perhaps in the name of justice. From time immemorial, each side to military conflicts has justified its participation as in pursuit of peace and to right injustice. The United States has been active in employment of this justification, most notably in entering World War I as the quest of a war to end war.

The minority views of this resolution do a fine service in showing clearly how President Johnson used pursuit of peace as a justification for intensifying our Vietnam military involvement. The Johnson peace quotations and the resulting escalations bear repeating:

On August 5, 1964, President Johnson told the Congress that our objective was only to see that "the peace and security of the area will be preserved." By the end of that year there were 23,000 troops in Vietnam.

On April 7, 1965, President Johnson said "the only path . . . is the path of peaceful settlement." By the end of 1965 there were 181,392 troops in Vietnam.

On October 25, 1966, the President joined in a communique saying that "our united purpose is peace . . . whether through discussion and negotiation or through reciprocal actions by both sides to reduce the violence." By the end of 1966 there were 389,000 troops in Vietnam.

On March 15, 1967, President Johnson said that "I think we have all reached broad agreement on our basic objectives in Vietnam. First, an honorable peace, that will leave the people of South Vietnam free to fashion their own political and economic institutions without fear of terror or intimidation from the North." By the end of 1967 there were 485,000 troops in Vietnam.

This last formulation by President

Johnson is almost identical to that in the proposed resolution before us. Its consequence was not progress toward ending the war, but to the contrary, a marked increase in our military commitment.

This is the danger many of us see in supporting the proposed resolution. We will not be euclred into supporting it merely because it calls for a just peace.

Certainly everyone in the country and every Member of Congress is for a just peace in Vietnam. Proponents of the resolution attempt to imply, insidiously, I think, that anyone who opposes the resolution must therefore be opposed to a just peace. This, of course, is nonsense. For the phrase, "just peace" merely the basic questions posed by our participation in the war. It fails to answer even ask, the basic questions: *For whom? How? At what price? When?*

It seems to me that by this resolution, we are endorsing whatever action President Nixon may choose to take in pursuit of his own definition of what may be a just peace—regardless of American and Vietnamese lives that may be sacrificed in this pursuit, regardless of time.

I think many of the sponsors of this resolution will live to regret the day they supported it, just as many later regretted their support of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Let me remind my colleagues of the assurances that were given by our colleague, H. R. Gross, during the debate on that hastily considered resolution, so similar to the assurances now being given by proponents of this resolution:

Mr. Speaker, this resolution neither gives nor takes from the President any authority already delegated to him to act in an emergency or crisis.

Neither is it to declare war and it is in the nature of an after-the-fact sense resolution endorsing an action already taken by the President.

President Johnson used the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as congressional authority to commit a half a million troops and \$100 billion in Vietnam. If President Nixon decides that pursuit of a just peace requires escalation of the war, I assure you that he will be waving this resolution, too, in the faces of those who reported it.

The assurances of the proposed resolution that it endorses no military actions ring hollow, indeed, the face of their rejection in committee of amendments making it clear that the resolution would not afford any authorization for commitment or maintenance of troops in Vietnam or for any enlargement of our military involvement. If this is what they meant, why did they refuse to make it explicit? And why did they insist on a closed rule preventing an amendment on the floor to make these meanings clear? The only conclusion from these refusals is that they wished to leave the resolution open to interpretation as authorizing future military action by the President—as the blankcheck they so vehemently deny is being granted.

Indeed, many are interpreting this resolution as support for the President's policies as enunciated in his speech on November 3, 1969, in which he explicitly anticipated the possibility of a military

escalation in response to any increase in enemy attacks. The President so interpreted it in his unprecedented appearance before the House on November 13 to applaud the resolution's sponsors.

The proponents' principal argument for the resolution appears to be a call for unity to strengthen the President's hand in negotiating a settlement of the war. This resolution will not accomplish that purpose, for it represents a false unity behind a policy on which there is such great disagreement in the country and in Congress.

First of all, more than 300 sponsors of the resolution were obtained only by softening the language so loosely that its meaning can be and has been interpreted as backing everything from pursuit of a military victory to withdrawal of our troops. The use of the phraseology "just peace" permits each Member to interpret as he will what kind of "just peace" he is supporting, and thus renders the unity illusory.

Second, I am convinced that no amount of unity, real or apparent, will persuade the enemy to negotiate its surrender in Vietnam, yet, in my opinion, that is the true import of the Nixon administration's Vietnam policies. The President's November 3 speech continues to offer settlement only on terms satisfactory to the military regime in Saigon which is interested only in perpetuating its power. Those terms can only be won on the battlefield, and so long as we maintain them, we are committing ourselves indefinitely to the battle.

If the President wants unity, he can get it only behind a policy of ending the war, not of continuing it, even in the name of peace.

I do not support precipitate unilateral withdrawal which the President and the proponents of this resolution pose falsely as the only alternative to the President's policy of "Vietnamization" and an indefinite military commitment to the Thieu-Ky regime. Nor do I support the Goodell resolution for a fixed timetable of withdrawal, for that, I think, equally precludes settlement and an orderly resolution of the war.

But there are other alternatives worth serious consideration by the administration and Congress, including settlement on realistic terms of partition or coalition reflecting the division of power now existing in South Vietnam or, failing any formal agreement, permitting the fighting to "fade away" as many of our Vietnam experts have predicted would be the most likely avenue of the war's resolution.

I do not seek to impose a coalition on South Vietnam—neither can I condone continuing to impose the Thieu-Ky tyranny on that beleaguered land.

This resolution fails to encourage the President to take available alternative avenues to end the war. Instead, it encourages whatever measures he may choose to take in the name of a "just peace." It abdicates all congressional responsibility for future Vietnam policies. Despite the enormous pressures to support the President in pursuit of so lofty a goal as a just peace, I am not ready to give the President the kind of blank check endorsement required to permit him to justify whatever action he may decide

is needed to achieve his interpretation of that goal.

I urge defeat of the resolution.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OTTINGER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Does the gentleman feel that we should abandon our efforts to obtain a just peace based upon the will of the people of South Vietnam?

Mr. OTTINGER. Most certainly not. This is exactly what I deplored as the efforts of the sponsors to imply that opposition to the resolution constitutes opposition to a just peace. I favor a just peace but I do not favor approving whatever the President may do in the name of a just peace. I do not feel that we should continue the war indefinitely in order to bolster up the existing Government of South Vietnam. I think that is the course on which the President is now involved, and that it will not lead to a just peace. It will not lead to any peace at all.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from South Dakota (Mr. BERRY).

(Mr. BERRY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BERRY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and the majority of the members on that committee. I rise in support of the Speaker, who placed his country ahead of any political connotation. I also rise in support of the majority and minority leaders who were influential in bringing this resolution to the House floor.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is the most important action this body has taken or will take in a long time. I say this because I believe this action may hasten the day when a peace, although possibly a nervous peace, will mean the end to the killing in Vietnam and will mean the time when all American boys can be brought home.

The thing that so many people fail to realize is that, as the well-known historian Bernard B. Fall, points out in his history of Vietnam, the Communist philosophy is that politics plays an even greater part in revolutionary and guerrilla warfare than does the military itself. Fall quotes from the North Vietnamese historian Long March in his 1947 book entitled "The Resistance Will Win" in which he says:

*Politics and military action.* These two questions are closely related: "War is a continuation of politics." (Marx) . . . Military action is a measure by which politics are executed . . . [there are] those who have a tendency only to rely on military action. They tend to believe that everything can be settled by armed force; they do not apply political mobilization, are unwilling to give explanations and to convince people."

What we are seeing in America today is a replay of the history of the French-Indochina war where Paris and France were made the political battlefield with riots, marches, and demonstrations and the streets of France being made the major political battlefield just as it is being done in America today.

I would call your attention to the transcript of the radio interview which I placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD last

Tuesday in which Maj. Nick Rowe, who had been a Vietcong prisoner for 5½ years before escaping, told how his captors tried to convince him that his Government was wrong and that they were right and how he was told that they would tell him the truth every day until he would finally believe them.

Major Rowe went on to tell about how in the first years of his captivity they relied on their own sources to provide propaganda, but that along in 1967 they dropped all Communist propaganda sources and began to quote from the American news media, magazines, and wire services, UPI and AP. He said:

I think the most devastating was when they began to quote from prominent men within our own government condemning our efforts in Vietnam and calling for withdrawal.

Then he told about how he was at the Washington Monument during the moratorium march and told how his heart sank when he saw the American flag being desecrated and the Vietcong flags being hoisted above the American flag. He also told of how he felt certain that these are the pictures that would be used by the North Vietnamese and by the Vietcong for propaganda purposes to boost the morale of their people.

Then Major Rowe quoted from a Vietcong major by the name of Nuyen G. Kong, one of the political cadre from the Liberation National Front, and quoted the major as saying:

We do not expect a military victory, nor do we expect an immediate political victory, but through the dissension and disorder in the United States the government, this is the American government, will be deprived of the support of the people and forced to withdraw from Vietnam, and at that time, we, speaking of the Liberation National Front, will have total and final victory.

Mr. Chairman, the purpose of this resolution is to prove to that Vietcong officer and every officer in the Communist effort that the American people have not been forced through dissension and disorder to abandon their support of their fighting men and the purpose for which they have been giving their lives.

The purpose of this resolution is to prove to the negotiators in Paris, to Hanoi and to the Vietcong, that the vast majority of the American people, who we in Congress represent, support the President of the United States in his peace efforts.

That is all this resolution does—its purpose is to counteract Communist propaganda by pointing out that the "silent majority" wants peace, peace the American way, peace the President's way, and this is our way of registering that support and doing what we can to bring about peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may require to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. CONYERS).

(Mr. CONYERS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I will vote against this resolution, the first resolution concerning Vietnam this body has considered in 5 years. For the Foreign Affairs Committee to report the resolution without having held hearings is irresponsible. Since

President Nixon has already stated that he will consider passage of this resolution as approval of his past, present, and future policies toward Vietnam, to now consider this grave issue under a closed rule is unconscionable. The effects of this resolution, should it be passed, are only too clear. Both Mr. Nixon and Secretary Laird have stated that the possibility of reescalating the war has not been ruled out. Therefore, approval of this resolution will mean to Mr. Nixon what the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution meant to Mr. Johnson—before-the-fact justification of future actions, whatever they may be. Furthermore, approval will not give a "clear indication" of popular and political support for the President's policies. The closed rule and lack of hearings eliminated that possibility. Besides, the deceptions in this resolution are too transparent. The American people will not be fooled any more than Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. Everyone will know of the manner in which this resolution was considered and the intentionally vague language in which it was written. There is, therefore, no reason to support this resolution. Of course, everyone claims to desire peace in Vietnam. That is not the question. The question remains: How do we end the war?

This resolution does not answer that question nor does it call upon the President to do so. The resolution says nothing about urging or requiring further troop withdrawals. It simply supports Mr. Nixon "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam." The President himself has said that negotiations have not brought progress toward peace. By remaining silent on the matter of troop withdrawals, this resolution, in my judgment, by implication supports the dictatorial Saigon regime of Thieu and Ky whose obdurance in Paris has severely hampered those negotiations. The President claims he has a plan of an orderly, scheduled timetable for complete withdrawal of U.S. combat troops. Yet, this so-called "plan" is riddled with contradictions. He said on November 3 that three factors are conditions for our withdrawal:

First, progress in the negotiations; second, the level of fighting in South Vietnam; and third, the improved capability of the South Vietnamese forces. These are all factors over which the President has little or no control. Vietnamization of the war is a fraud. It is deceptive to think that this policy could have any other result than a prolongation of our involvement. The fundamental error of this resolution is the assumption that we are supporting the principle of self-determination for the Vietnamese people. But, in point of fact, the Thieu-Ky regime has repeatedly opposed any new elections without their supervision. What the President "plans" to do and what Thieu will allow are two different things. Thus, the surest way not to achieve self-determination for the Vietnamese people is for the United States to continue support of the Thieu-Ky regime. The inescapable fact is that as long as we support the Saigon government we can never achieve peace in Vietnam.

Approval of this resolution will only

sanction further travel down the same road to an indefinite commitment of extended fighting in an already discredited war. The bringing of peace must not be considered the exclusive domain of Presidents and diplomats, for they have failed, and are failing, to bring an end to this horrible war. Congress must do more than serve up this vague language to a President who has taken only the most meager steps in the direction of peace. I do not support his past policies. Nor can I support his "plan" for the future which only points toward an indefinite prolongation of this war. This is the Tonkin resolution revisited, and as one Member of this House I will have no part of it.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. BURLISON).

(Mr. BURLISON of Missouri asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BURLISON of Missouri. Mr. Chairman, I intend to vote for House Resolution 613. But it should be understood that this vote is cast only for the clear content of that resolution. Some, including the President, have apparently interpreted support of this resolution to embody endorsement of everything President Nixon has said and done about Vietnam as well as everything he may say or do about this involvement in the future. The purpose of this statement is to divorce my vote from any such interpretation.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY).

(Mr. OBEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. OBEY. Mr. Chairman, because many questions have been raised concerning the implications of the Wright resolution, I would like to put the pending vote on this resolution in correct perspective.

I plan to vote for the resolution because of my recognition of the primacy of the office of the Presidency in the conduct of foreign affairs. But because of the interpretation being placed upon it in some quarters as an endorsement of the President's November 3 speech when the resolution was, in fact, written before that speech was ever delivered, I find it necessary to make clear what passage of this resolution should and should not represent.

First, passage of this resolution should in no way condone the procedures under which this matter was brought before the House. The Foreign Affairs Committee provided no opportunity for a hearing on this resolution. The Rules Committee adopted a closed rule which precluded the offering of amendments to it. Both actions are wrong. A matter of such import should have been open to both hearings in committee and amendment on the House floor.

Second, passage of this resolution should not be interpreted in any quarter as either a blanket endorsement of every facet of the President's November 3 speech or as a pledge of unqualified support for any future Presidential action as yet unknown and undefined.

I support House Resolution 613 with the reservations stated above, because it would misstate my position to imply that I do not endorse the fondest hope:

First, that the President will exert all "his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam";

Second, that the South Vietnamese realize the benefits of a democratic government chosen by them "by means of free elections open to all Vietnamese";

Third, that it would be possible for "an impartial and international body" to aid in securing these benefits; and

Fourth, that the "controversy be peacefully" resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

But regardless of my vote on the resolution itself, I believe that in addition further troop withdrawals, future policy should at least include:

First, efforts to further reduce the level of violence in Vietnam, looking to a cease-fire;

Second, efforts to substantially broaden the South Vietnamese Government; and

Third, the immediate designation high-level replacement for retiring gate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. MIKVA).

(Mr. MIKVA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. MIKVA. I yield to the gentleman from California.

(Mr. MOSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MOSS. Mr. Chairman, my name is listed as one of the sponsors of this resolution, but I am urging the House today to vote against its adoption. This resolution was written before the President's November 3 speech. Its words were intended to reflect events and statements which took place prior to that speech. However, adoption of this resolution now will be interpreted by all the world in terms of the President's November 3 speech and put the House of Representatives on record as supporting that position. Unfortunately, President Nixon's speech narrowed this country's option of the war—whatever that means—and gradual withdrawal, or, using his words, "immediate, precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam." He rejected the latter.

Mr. Chairman, at the time I was asked to be a cosponsor of this resolution, I had no intention of endorsing a future Presidential policy, of which I had no informed knowledge. Yet in this case, we apparently are being asked to act prospectively. I can assure you that no one disclosed to me that this resolution had been carefully cleared in advance by the White House. So it is for these reasons—not because of the hopes expressed in the resolution—but because of the manner in which it is being distorted in its usage that compels me to vote against it.

I personally think there were serious omissions in the President's speech—and

the specific light of that speech—there are serious omissions in this resolution. We should not lock ourselves into a box, or one—believe there are other alternatives. One of them would be to actually let the Government of Vietnam work with the people of Vietnam. President Nixon has proposed to the Vietnamese National Assembly the most ambitious land reform program ever proposed by any government in power in the history of the world. That program would abolish all tenant farming in Vietnam. The landlords could retain only that land which they personally work with their own two hands. Land to the tiller would go to all those who till it—South Vietnamese and Vietcong alike. Studies by our own Government show that what the peasant wants most—above all else, including his own personal security—is ownership of the land.

Adoption of such a program would cut Communists off at the ankles. Right now, they are able to recruit guerrillas by promising land to the tiller. In my opinion, the impact of such a land reform program by South Vietnam would do as much to end the war as any other step that could be taken. It also would give many people in America some logical reason to support the Government of South Vietnam. What is the status of that bold proposal? It is now bogged down in the Vietnamese Senate—that is where it is, that is where it will probably remain.

The South Vietnamese could also do something about inflation and war profiteering. Recently, the Government of South Vietnam increased import taxes on nonessential commodities. Many merchants not only passed this tax increase to the consumer on nonessential commodities but also on the necessities of life, including food. As a result, the cost of living index has gone up another 10 percent. Once again, the little guy in Vietnam is paying through the nose. How can we expect the ordinary man to support a government which permits this to happen is beyond me.

Then there is the matter of free elections, which have never really been permitted in Vietnam. Even the candidates are sanitized. The voting tallies are low and those who are elected are not supported by a majority of the voters. There is suppression of any voice in dissent. The man who secured the next highest number of votes—because he discussed an alternative—has been in prison ever since. There is no evidence yet that the people of South Vietnam even support the Government.

Of course, favor the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam as rapidly as possible consistent with their security. The time to carefully explore our alternatives is now—while we still have some leverage to influence the course of events. The administration should commit itself, with renewed vigor, to such a course.

Mr. Chairman, this resolution should be returned to the Committee on Foreign Affairs for further study and revision. Adoption by the House in its present form would be a disservice, not only to America, but also to South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I also take note of the stringent limitation on time and the fact

a closed rule denies any right of amending to perfect the resolution.

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Chairman, I will vote against House Resolution 613 and would like to take just a few minutes to state why.

If one is guided by the words of the resolution alone, without putting them in the context of recent days and months, they seem innocuous enough. Doubtless the resolution was carefully drafted so that it would be innocuous—at least on its face. After all, who can object to supporting the Nation's President in his efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement to a bloody conflict which has already claimed so many American lives and cast such a shadow over the American spirit.

But, of course, things are not that simple. House Resolution 613 cannot be read out of context, and it cannot be voted for out of context. The resolution has been drafted, promoted, and when it is passed it will be heralded as support for President Nixon's present policy in South Vietnam. I do support efforts to end the war in Vietnam; I do support efforts to stop the killing and to negotiate a peace which will do honor both to this country and to the Americans who have died in South Vietnam. The dispute here is not over ends, it is over the means to achieve those ends. And this is where I believe we must be honest. We cannot obscure the differences over how to end the war in Vietnam by merely agreeing that it should be ended. We cannot avoid taking public positions on what precise steps are necessary to reduce the level of violence and stop the killing by blithely affirming our desire that there be peace on earth and good will toward men. That is why hearings on this resolution would have been so important. That is why an open rule would have been so important. That is why the plea for unity rings a little hollow under such a procedure—like the local union which sent a telegram to the company president wishing him a speedy recovery from an ailment. It concluded the telegram by saying, "the vote on this issue was 18 to 10."

I would have thought that in the case of South Vietnam especially, it would be clear to most Members of this body that casting a vote on the mere words of a resolution is insufficient. If there were any proof needed, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution should certainly have provided that proof for us. The words of that resolution are also innocuous enough. No one could accuse a legislator voting for that resolution of having been a warmonger or a militarist. But it was the context of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution that was important. It was what that resolution signified to a President in whose behalf it was introduced; it was what it has come to mean since it was passed that cannot be ignored when we vote on House Resolution 613 today.

Let there be no mistake about it: voting for this resolution will be construed just as votes for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution were construed 5 years ago. Those votes will be construed as underwriting an indefinite prolongation of American presence in South Vietnam.

They will be interpreted as support for a policy President Nixon has told us will keep American support troops in South Vietnam indefinitely and will keep American combat troops there—he has not told us how long. They will be construed as support of continued spending of billions of dollars in South Vietnam for the foreseeable future. We may tell ourselves that House Resolution 613 means nothing more than the words on the page, but we know that voting for that resolution really means much more.

President Nixon obviously has given up hope that the Paris negotiations will bear fruit. Of his original formula, only the behavior of the enemy on the battlefield and the progress of Vietnamization remain as determining factors in the pace of U.S. withdrawals. Will a slower pace make that withdrawal any more honorable than it would be at a faster pace? Will the world be fooled that we did not make a disastrous miscalculation of American interests when we committed our troops to combat in 1965? Will history judge us as nobler or wiser because we took 3 years to withdraw from South Vietnam after we decided it was a mistake, rather than 1 year? I do not think so. But the question which is really more important than whether we can fool the world is whether we can continue to fool ourselves.

The Gulf of Tonkin resolution passed this Chamber unanimously. George Santayana said that those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. DERWINSKI).

(Mr. DERWINSKI asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DERWINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I regret that, unlike many Members, I have not prepared remarks on this resolution, but I would like to call a few items to the attention of the Members, realizing that they are very properly engrossed in this subject and recognizing that this resolution is one of the more important items that we have taken up for consideration in this session of Congress.

Mr. Chairman, before emphasizing positive arguments in support of the resolution before us, I wish to clarify the reason for my votes when we adopted the rule. Consistent with a personal pattern that I have adopted I support open rules or at least limited open rules in contrast to a closed rule. I follow the same policy when Ways and Means Committee bills have been subject to a closed rule.

There is no doubt in my mind that if we had a complete open rule all amendments would be beaten back. For example, I myself would have vigorously opposed the amendment which would have been offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FROLEY) and those which would have come from the ultraliberals in the House who are more interested in criticizing the President than in supporting any constructive policy for peace.

There is no doubt that the North Vietnamese hierarchy are keen observers of the American scene and that they are misinterpreting the issue involved in the

moratorium performance and the widespread coverage given the so-called peace movement. The so-called antiwar establishment does not have a monopoly on a desire for peace. Certainly no one wants a just peace as much as President Nixon. Our foreign policy goal is to help produce lasting peace with freedom for all peoples of the world.

History shows that peace can be maintained if a nation remains vigilant, strong, and consistent with its legitimate objectives. History further shows that appeasement and compromise of fundamental principles produce failure. The President, fully aware of his responsibility to all people, will continue to pursue an objective policy toward a goal of world peace and freedom. To maintain our national institutions and preserve world stability, he will not be intimidated by street demonstrators nor any other questionable types of organized pressure.

I notice my dear friend from Illinois who just addressed the House was concerned over the language of the resolution. As I read the resolution the very opening sentence states as follows:

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

I do not think this is language which would give the President any unusual authority. We want the President to negotiate a just peace. The emphasis is "negotiate a just peace."

I would also like to read from a letter which has just come to my attention from the Prime Minister of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, to the President of the United States commending him for his speech of November 3, and I quote from that letter, as follows:

The Prime Minister wishes to congratulate the President on his meaningful speech and expresses her hope that he will speedily succeed in bringing about peace in Vietnam.

The President's speech contains much that encourages and strengthens freedom-loving small nations the world over which, striving to maintain their independent existence, look to that great democracy, the United States of America.

I believe it would be fair for us to say that any President of the United States, regardless of party background is a man who supports peace. I do not think there is anyone who wanted peace during his term of office more than President Johnson did. I do not think there is anyone today who wants peace more than President Nixon does.

I think we in the House of Representatives and the gentlemen in the other body all realize that this is an extremely difficult problem that the President has inherited. Peace is the goal of our foreign policy. We certainly in this House of Representatives in supporting this resolution merely let it be known that we want a just peace and that a just peace is our goal.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. In connection with Mrs. Meier's letter which the gentleman from Illinois quoted from, is the gentleman aware that during an explanation in

Parliament shortly thereafter, she gave the explanation that some small countries stand alone on their own, but they cannot stand up to all outside enemies.

Mr. DERWINSKI. I am sure that the gentleman supports the request which Mrs. Meier has made for certain military equipment and which will be purchased here in the United States, and the efforts she is making to keep her country independent. The aggression by the North Vietnamese Communists against South Vietnam is direct but the aggression against Israel by the Arab States would not be taking place without the involvement of the Soviet Union. It is obvious that the Soviet Union's presence in the Middle East is much of the cause for tension there as is their direction and aid to the North Vietnamese in their invasion of South Vietnam.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I do not see the Vietnamese situation in that context, but I shall not take up the gentleman's time to dispute that. However, Secretary of Defense Laird has indicated that although he desires to achieve peace, there is the further indication that we might increase our military efforts if this is not accomplished.

Does the gentleman from Illinois concede that that is a part of the efforts to achieve a just peace?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I think if the gentleman would be objective he would recognize that one of the things that might bring about a just peace is the recognition by the aggressor in Vietnam that they do not have total and permanent sanctuary. In my opinion it would be effective for them to understand that they cannot continue their deliberate non-cooperative attitude with reference to our efforts to achieve peace in Paris and with reference to many other efforts that have been made.

Mr. MIZE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DERWINSKI. I yield to the gentleman from Kansas.

Mr. MIZE. I do not think we can over-emphasize the fact that the resolution very clearly uses the words "to negotiate a just peace." It does not say "achieve a just peace." It says "negotiate a just peace."

Mr. OTTINGER. It says, "efforts to negotiate a just peace."

Mr. MIZE. All right, "efforts to negotiate a just peace."

Mr. OTTINGER. The gentleman just said that there might be an increase in the war effort itself if this is not done. Could the gentleman interpret that?

Mr. DERWINSKI. Just a minute. I want to be sure that the distinguished gentleman from New York is not innocently misinterpreting what I said. I, in effect, said that our negotiators in Paris and our diplomats ought to have the option to communicate to the aggressor the fact that they are not free to continue as they have in the past believing they have total and permanent sanctuary and that for effective negotiations we must maintain logical and legitimate options so that an adjustment in our policies would produce truly effective negotiations.

Mr. OTTINGER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Chairman, amazing to me—simply amazing—there should be any opposition pending resolution which supports President in his efforts to negotiate peace in Vietnam. Let us reexamine contents of the resolution:

RESOLUTION TOWARD PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN VIETNAM

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body, and the United States is willing to abide by results of such elections, and supports President in his call upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

It is understandable that some Americans may have reservations about the wisdom of ever allowing ourselves to become involved in a land war in Asia. But that issue is not involved here. It is equally understandable that some Americans feel very strongly, as I do, that the no-win policy in fighting that war has been a tragic mistake. But, again, that issue is not involved here. It is likewise understandable that many of us opposed the cessation of bombing of the north, in response to pressures from home and abroad. But that is not involved in this resolution.

What is involved here is the matter of an expression of support for the President in his tireless quest for a just peace in Vietnam. If I were opposed to a just peace in Vietnam I would certainly be opposed to this resolution. But being in favor of a peaceful settlement I, of course, strongly support this expression. In fact, I am a cosponsor of the resolution.

What objective can opposition to this lofty purpose serve? It can, and I assume will, be interpreted by Hanoi as a sign of division on the part of the American people. In that respect such opposition can be expected to encourage Communists to prolong the war and more Americans. It is just that simple. Wittingly or unwittingly, opposition expressed here today to a just peace in Vietnam can, to the extent it is expressed, encourage the enemy.

Fortunately, however, resistance to the achievement of a just peace in Vietnam is confined to a relatively small group.

It is unthinkable that any of the Members of this body are really and sincerely opposed to a just peace. Certainly Hanoi is opposed to a just peace. The Communists have consistently opposed everything contained in this resolution. So, let us think this thing through and be realistic about what is really involved here.

will be recalled that only last week, Assistant Commandant of the rifle Corps was quoted in Da Nang as saying that in his judgment the Vietnam would have been over a year ago if administration had had the full support of the American people.

It was Gen. Lewis W. Walt speaking. He went on to say this:

The day the enemy firmly believes we are not going to pull out, that is the day he will start talking in Paris, and not before.

This four-star general spent 2 years in Vietnam as the top marine commander in the war zone. Surely he is more knowledgeable on this subject than any Member of this body. We had better heed his judgment.

General Walt is not alone in this respect. His views are shared by practically all responsible military and civilian leaders in this country, and in my judgment by the overwhelming majority of the American people.

Mr. Chairman, there is much evidence that the war in Vietnam has, in effect, been won. Many of our military authorities have said so. But the enemy continues to mount suicidal attacks, undoubtedly inspired by the eruption of antiwar clamor on the part of a noisy but small minority of our people. Now, of all times, there is need for unity in this country. In that way we can exploit our advantages and save American lives. In pursuance of that objective this resolution should have the unanimous support of this body.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri (Mr. HUNGATE).

(Mr. HUNGATE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Chairman—

The Congress shall have power . . . to declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water (art. I, sec. 8).

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. (art. II, sec. 2).

On October 6, in accordance and harmony with both of the above constitutional requirements, I joined with a bipartisan group of over 100 members in introducing the following resolution:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the substantial reductions in United States ground combat forces in Vietnam already directed are in the national interest and that the President be supported in his expressed determination to withdraw our remaining such forces at the earliest practicable date.

In doing so, I made clear that I support the President in his efforts and proposals to beat the Clark Clifford timetable for withdrawal of ground combat forces from Vietnam.

The Clifford timetable called for removal of 100,000 ground combat troops by January 1, 1970. Current reports are that as of December 15, 60,000 such troops will have been removed. I support the President in his proposal, vigorously pronounced in June 1969, to beat the Clifford timetable. This requires the removal of 40,000 additional troops this

month, Mr. President, and I reiterate my support of your promised intentions to do so.

As Commander in Chief, no resolutions from me are required for the President to meet this commitment. In fact, it might be considered presumptuous of me, or anyone else, to offer such resolutions instructing the President in his duties.

Furthermore, congressional resolutions tend to be irresolutely construed.

The Gulf of Tonkin resolution became a congressional credit card on which over 39,000 lives, over 200,000 casualties and over \$100 billion were expended, with no constitutional sanction. A vote for a simple appropriations measure—which by our own rules cannot contain legislation—is interpreted as approval for the uses that may be made of bombers, strafers, defoliants, and napalm. Unfortunately, in congressional language “viva voce” has been read to mean “carte blanche.”—CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, March 1, 1966, page H4429.

Vietnam contains valuable, although frightfully expensive, lessons for the American people and the world. The most powerful air and missile striking force, complete with a trillion dollar arsenal, cannot defeat peasants with punji sticks, if they are willing to resist to the death. The illusion of national security being obtained through airpower should be thoroughly shattered. Corroboration can be found in the celebrated triumph of Israel airpower over Egypt in the 6-day war, that weeks, months, years later continues, without resolution. Perhaps it is better to be martially unprepared as we were in World Wars I and II, if we can preserve a nation morally united in the causes to which our Constitution commits us.

It seems to shock many that war is a dehumanizing process. It shocks others that while we may commend and promote those who bomb, strafe and burn enemy villages, containing, almost by necessity, the innocent, along with the guilty—the simple child beside the Vietcong cadre—yet their comrades on the ground, who accomplish the same result in a somewhat more personal manner, through the use of rifles, carbines, and knives, must be tried for murder. It requires a high degree of sophistication to appreciate this distinction.

Are draftees to be sent halfway round the world on missions to “search and destroy” then to be tried each time for murder, when, under the strains of combat, they go berserk, killing innocent civilians? Are they to be held fully and legally accountable for their actions under those conditions? What shall we do to those who voluntarily seek the responsibility for running this Government? What is our responsibility to that draftee, his parents, and survivors?

I do not believe that responsibility can be met by passing the buck. Perhaps it cannot even be met by passing resolutions.

In World War II, the infantry school at Fort Benning, Ga., operated a course for reconnaissance patrols in combat areas. In the problem, the purpose of the patrol's mission was to obtain information only. Discovery of the patrol's

existence could imperil the entire body of troops, the battalion or regiment to which the patrol belonged. To instill the lesson that the unit's whereabouts must not be learned from the patrol's activities, in one part of the problem you were to enter an enemy field hospital, complete with nurses, doctors, and patients, and kill everyone in it, with one part involving bayoneting patients in their beds.

Vietnam is not the first war in which acts of brutal inhumanity were perpetrated nor, of course, are we the only side who perpetrated them.

If the Vietnam conflict continues, My Lai will most certainly not be the last atrocity to occur. The question is: Are the goals we seek in Vietnam worth the My Lai's, past, present, and future?

The responsibility for that decision must rest with someone who gets about \$200,000 a year and his 500 or more congressional associates drawing around \$42,500. It is not quite fair to place that responsibility on some poor devil who is drafted and sent to Vietnam at \$188 a month.

A vote for this resolution will be an expression of agreement that My Lai and over 200,000 casualties are an acceptable price to attempt to obtain the goals we seek in Vietnam. There are some who find that price too high.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. COUGHLIN).

(Mr. COUGHLIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COUGHLIN. Mr. Chairman, I am voting in favor of House Resolution 613 as an expression of support for President Nixon's action in reducing U.S. ground combat forces in Vietnam, his expressed determination to withdraw our remaining such forces at the earliest practicable date, and his efforts toward a just peace in that tragic conflict.

My vote should not be misinterpreted as support for renewed escalation, a prolonged delay in the return of our men, or the Thieu-Ky regime. I favor an inexorable and speedy return of our men from Vietnam and believe this can be done most quickly without Congress imposing deadlines that may only delay any activity until the deadline arrives.

With the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on August 7, 1964, the Congress gave, in effect, a blank check to President Johnson to conduct an undeclared war. This was a dangerous precedent, regardless of whom was President. I support President Nixon, but as an elected Member of the legislative branch of the Federal Government, I will not surrender my duties with a blank check to any administration.

From the beginning of our Vietnam involvement, I have expressed serious doubts. I believe our involvement was ill-conceived and that we should bring our men home as fast as is consistent with allowing the “little people” of South Vietnam a fighting chance of survival. I exclude the Thieu-Ky government from my definition, because I feel a critical mistake on our part has been to tie our commitments to a specific regime in Saigon.

In allowing the South Vietnamese people a chance for survival, we either must give them the means to protect their lives or Hanoi must explicitly agree not to conduct a blood bath as we leave.

We Americans may debate the speed of our withdrawal, but the fact is that the President has radically changed our policy in Vietnam. After 6 years of only sending more men over, we are now bringing American men home. After 6 years of Americanizing the war, we are now turning it back to the South Vietnamese. Many of the President's critics now are the ones who failed then.

Therefore, I have sponsored this resolution to back the President as he continues to withdraw our troops from Vietnam and strives for a political settlement of this most unfortunate war. I again emphasize, however, that this support does not include renewed escalation or prolonged delay.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. FARBSTEIN).

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR) for being kind enough to yield me this time, inasmuch as I understand that the remaining time is running very close to the requests he has, so I fully appreciate the thoughtfulness of the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose House Resolution 613.

I do not oppose it because I do not support the President in his efforts to achieve peace in Vietnam. I do not oppose it because I do not support the President in his program to reduce the U.S. military commitment in South Vietnam. In these efforts he has my prayers and my support.

I oppose this resolution on other grounds. It calls upon the Congress to approve a policy that is not only vague but one over which the United States has little control. The President, in his speech of November 3, 1969, stated that the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam would depend upon: First, progress at the Paris peace talks; second, the level of enemy activity; and, third, progress of training programs of the South Vietnamese forces.

Only over the last of these stipulations does the United States have any control and even that influence depends upon the cooperation of the South Vietnamese.

For too long U.S. policy in Vietnam has been dependent upon the attitudes of Saigon and Hanoi. We must change this policy. We must seize the initiative. We must adopt a policy that is in our own national interest. To do this we must begin by convincing the Government of South Vietnam that we intend to be the masters of our policy. We can do this by announcing our intention to withdraw all our forces at the earliest possible moment.

The best way to insure that the Government of South Vietnam will undertake an accelerated program to gain the support of its people and build a military structure capable of maintaining their territorial and political integrity is to convince that Government that the United States does not intend to remain

in Vietnam very long. The Government of South Vietnam must be convinced that the United States intends to withdraw all of her forces as quickly as possible. This will give that Government the impetus and the will to assume the burden of securing their own freedom.

This is one of the glaring weaknesses of the resolution. It does not convey any sense of immediacy or urgency concerning either termination of that war or the withdrawal of American troops. And as long as the South Vietnamese are convinced that the United States will continue to support them, as long as they can rely upon U.S. military forces, there is little likelihood that the Government of South Vietnam will take the action required to reform their political and military structure. By this I mean that the Government of South Vietnam must broaden its base to include all elements of South Vietnamese society. Only in this way will that Government be able to gain the support and confidence necessary to win the peace and to survive as a viable political and economic entity.

There is another weakness in this resolution. The resolution approves and supports the principle that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own Government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial body and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections. It also calls upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results. No such request is made to the Government of South Vietnam where there has already been one "free" election in 1967. It was so free that a number of prominent South Vietnamese were not permitted to run for public office and the man who placed second to Thieu for President was arrested. He is still a prisoner. It seems to me that if this resolution is to be meaningful it should also call upon the Government of South Vietnam to permit free elections without restricting the candidates to those who can be counted on to support the government in power. In a democracy there is strength in diversity.

We are also being asked to support a policy that could result in an increase in U.S. military activity rather than a reduction. Thus the President said in his Vietnam speech of November 3:

If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

Again, our policy will depend upon what South Vietnam does or does not do. If U.S. support, artillery and Air Force troops remain in Vietnam after U.S. ground combat forces have been withdrawn, their safety and well-being will depend upon the actions of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. Their safety may very well be jeopardized. If this were to occur would we respond by again sending U.S. combat infantry divisions back to Vietnam? This aspect of the resolution concerns me very much.

I am aware of the dilemma that the President is facing. The problem of how

to Vietnamize the war and thereby reduce American casualties is dependent upon forces over which the United States has little control. In my opinion, the problem can only be solved by the Vietnamese themselves. If they do not hamper the development of their forces, Vietnamization will take long time indeed. The Government of South Vietnam must win the peace. We cannot do it for them.

We have been in Vietnam long enough and I think it is about time to get out. We have done what we set out to do—prevent the conquest of South Vietnam by the forces of the North.

We have been assured that the Government of South Vietnam is capable of not only governing but also of assuming responsibility for the defense of South Vietnam. So now is the time to withdraw not in defeat but in the knowledge that the mission has been accomplished.

In committee there were efforts made to amend this resolution to make it more meaningful. Efforts to include language which would have expressed congressional desire that the intent of the resolution was not to escalate the war but to support the President in his efforts to secure a just peace were defeated.

Mr. Chairman, I could support this resolution if it contained language suggesting a sense of urgency concerning our withdrawal; if there were an admonition against escalation, and if it called upon the Government of South Vietnam to hold free elections and to abide by the results. Since we have a closed rule it will not be possible to amend the resolution. I, therefore, regretfully must vote against the resolution.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. WRIGHT. Does the gentleman find anything wrong with the principle of free elections open to all of the South Vietnamese including the Vietcong and supervised by an impartial international body?

Mr. FARBSTEIN. None whatsoever.

Mr. WRIGHT. Is not that the thrust of the resolution? Does the gentleman read the resolution properly? The resolution puts that as its central thrust.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. It does not call upon the South Vietnamese to accept that principle and that is the important thing that concerns me.

(Mr. FARBSTEIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. FRIEDEL) for a unanimous-consent request.

(Mr. FRIEDEL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRIEDEL. Mr. Chairman, prior to the President's Vietnam speech of November 3, I joined some 50 of my colleagues in cosponsoring House Resolution 613. I make a point of the fact that my support for this resolution came prior to my knowledge of what the President was going to propose, because I feel

that the resolution should be read on its face value as a non-expression of the sentiment of the majority of this House and that it not be interpreted as either supporting or opposing the specific of the President's November 3

want to make certain that there is question in the minds of my colleagues, as there is none in mine, that we are not rubberstamping any future Presidential actions as we unfortunately did in the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I specifically call attention to page 7 of the report of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, which accompanies the resolution, which states:

The resolution does not give the President any authority whatsoever, either by reference or implication. It is simply a formal expression by the House of Representatives in support of the President's efforts to negotiate a peace in Viet Nam.

My colleagues in this House and the people of the United States want an end to the war in Vietnam, but we do not want peace at any price and I believe one effect of this resolution is that it would lead to North Vietnam and to the Vietnamization program that we are still firmly committed to. A just peace settlement, one which will guarantee the right of all of the people of South Vietnam to participate in free elections.

I am convinced that such a free election would result in a broader based, more democratic Government in South Vietnam and I am also firmly convinced that such an election, supervised by some appropriate international body, as proposed in House Resolution 613, would not, as some seem to fear, result in a Communist takeover, followed by a bloodbath of reprisals after the withdrawal of all American Armed Forces.

I support this resolution because I am convinced its passage strengthens our country's bargaining position and because I believe it expresses the hopes and expectations of most Americans, just as it expresses the hopes and expectations of the vast majority of the Members of the House of Representatives.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield for a unanimous-consent request to the gentleman from California (Mr. ROYBAL).

(Mr. ROYBAL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution before us. I oppose it because neither its meaning nor its intent has been unequivocally stated before this House. Different interpretations have been given the resolution by its proponents and the President has already construed the passage of this resolution as support for his policy on Vietnam. President Nixon told the House and the Nation that the resolution supports a "just peace in Vietnam along the line of the proposals I made in a speech on November 3." He went on to say that "the sponsors of the resolution were well over a majority in the House supporting the policy of the President of the United States."

But the question is—What policy? The policy couched in the vague and gen-

eral language found in the resolution, or the language in part of his speech of November 3 when he said that if "I conclude that the increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with the situation." "This," he said, "is a statement of policy which as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces I am making in meeting my responsibilities."

I am fearful, Mr. Chairman, that because of the resolution's ambiguity, the different interpretations given the resolution by its proponents as well as the meaning already given the resolution by the President, that it could well become a blank check authorization for Presidential action as that which was embodied in the interpretation of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I am afraid, also, that the Vietnamization could mean the retention of 200,000 to 300,000 troops in Vietnam and the indefinite continuation of this war with its huge military spending, more U.S. casualties, and the continued killing of the people of Vietnam. I oppose this resolution, also, because of the fast manner with which it was passed in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, without hearing from the Secretary of Defense or any member of the administration who might have shed some light as to the true intent of the resolution.

My motion to hold hearings was rejected in committee and the closed rule by which this resolution was brought to the House has made it impossible to amend it or add the necessary language to clarify its intent.

I believe that this resolution is most unfortunate primarily because of its vagueness which makes misinterpretation likely. It is unfortunate also because those responsible for establishing and conducting our policy in Vietnam had not been given an opportunity to state their official position. I believe that it is unfortunate because this high-sounding moralistic resolution merely supports a President who has only altered the tactics of the previous administration, while embracing its premise and its objectives, as seasoned argument is almost silenced, and as amendments are forbidden to a small minority in this House who seek to move back to a course of reason.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute for the purpose of making and observation.

I have not spoken on the resolution yet, but I intend to later.

Mr. Chairman, I think it is interesting to point out that all of the people who are speaking against this resolution are calling upon Saigon to do this and Saigon to do that. But I have not heard one of them call upon Hanoi to do anything.

The other observation I want to make is I have 23 people listed to speak today. There was a charge made yesterday by the gentleman from Washington—the inference of which was that the proponents would have most of the time and therefore the opponents would only get theirs by largesse. I have attempted to be fair, and of the 23 who are listed, and I just say this for the record—13 are opponents

and 10 are proponents, and the time is divided about equally between the two. If anything, the opponents have a little more of it.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. ADAMS).

Mr. ADAMS. I thank the chairman for yielding this time to me. I had indicated to the chairman of the committee I wished to ask some questions to clarify the resolution. I would like to propound this question to the sponsors or to anyone on the committee who wishes to answer. On the ticker the following statement appears:

Laird told the committee President Nixon's Vietnam policy is working—and could lead to "a military victory" for the Saigon Government.

But should the process of Vietnamization of the war falter, and North Vietnam step up military aggression, Laird said, the United States is prepared to escalate its war effort.

"I would not rule out that possibility completely," Laird said. He did, however seem to rule out use of nuclear weapons by American forces.

"I would not anticipate the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam," the Defense Chief replied to a question from Representative George Mahon, Democrat-Texas. "I am not, however, ruling out other actions that might be necessary in the event the Vietnamization program does not work, even though I am confident it will work."

In voting for this resolution do we support that policy?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. I would say to the gentleman, as I have said repeatedly before—and I am not sure that any answer is going to satisfy some of the opponents—the resolution merely supports the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace. It does not support him in any escalation. There is nothing implied, direct or otherwise. If the President later makes the decision that he must escalate the war, and any Member wishes to introduce a resolution of support for the President, it will be debated on its merits as this one is being debated. But this is a peace resolution, pure, simple, and unadulterated.

Mr. ADAMS. I thank the gentleman for that statement. I have a second question, which is the other question propounded to the chairman of the committee. Our chief negotiators in Paris have resigned. Apparently there is no present effort or indication that anyone is going to replace them. I want to know whether, if we go forward with this resolution, we are supporting a policy of leaving that negotiating spot open and not engaging in proceedings there further.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. The resolution was, of course, drafted prior to the resignation of our chief negotiator, Mr. Lodge. It does not address itself to that situation. I do not believe the gentleman expected it to address itself to that situation. I believe all of us anticipate that an appointment will be made, and that rather shortly. Mr.

Lodge still is serving in that capacity. I believe the President has clearly stated that he is not in any sense downgrading the effort to negotiate, and that in proper time he will replace Mr. Lodge with another high-level negotiator.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. I have read in the press that it may be in the President's mind not to replace Mr. Lodge for some time because there is dissatisfaction with the course of negotiations. I wonder where the gentleman from Texas is getting his information?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADAMS. I yield to the chairman, who is handling the bill.

Mr. HAYS. I would say to the gentleman I have no knowledge of what the President has in his mind, and I do not generally rely on the press to read his mind. In my opinion if there was one signal that Hanoi was genuinely ready to negotiate, I would call the President and ask him to send the gentleman from Washington (Mr. ADAMS) over there if he would also send me along with him to serve with the gentleman so we would have some balance.

Mr. ADAMS. I would accept the gentleman's offer. If he offers us the opportunity, I am ready to leave this afternoon.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. ERLÉN-BORN).

(Mr. ERLÉN-BORN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. ERLÉN-BORN. Mr. Chairman, once again, it appears that a totalitarian government has misinterpreted how we do things here in the United States.

We are a free country—so free that it is difficult for us to understand that ideas and opinions are restrained in many countries of the world. And, because the totalitarian countries are so accustomed to hearing uniformity of opinion, they tend to expect an imminent breakdown in the United States when they hear of our dissent.

German submarines undertook unrestricted war against American merchant ships in 1917, believing that we would not go to war—not after the angry 1916 presidential election campaign.

The heated debate between the isolationists and the interventionists contributed to decisions by Germany and Japan to attack us at the end of 1941. They thought we were ready to fall apart.

Now we are in a war in Vietnam, and we want out. We want peace, and we are willing to negotiate for it.

Our negotiators have been meeting with those of North Vietnam and of the National Liberation Front for more than a year. Xuan Thuy, the leader of the North Vietnam delegation, must answer to his superiors in Hanoi, and that is all. The people of North Vietnam are not looking over his shoulder nor are a gaggle of Hanoi news reporters. There is not a single North Vietnam editorial writer to second guess him.

How different is the problem of Averell Harriman and, more recently, of Henry

Cabot Lodge. They must, of course, report to our administration—to the President and his advisers. And they have plentiful help from a myriad of enthusiastic Members of Congress, reporters, columnists, pacifists, commentators, professor, editorialists, and ad hoc committees.

While the North Vietnamese play a diplomatic poker game with all their cards close to the vest, we are in it with all our cards face up.

The North Vietnamese know that we have divisions within our country; know that our President is urged to yield a little more; know that some Americans believe we ought to throw the Saigon government to the wolves; know that a quarter of a million young people marched in Washington in mid-November; know that there was a moratorium in mid-October.

They know that these demonstrations demanded that we pull out of Vietnam without delay, but they don't know that no more than 15 or 20 Members of Congress concur in that demand. They may not have read Congressional Quarterly, which listed one Senator and 14 Representatives as favoring instant withdrawal.

Mr. Chairman, I think the American people want out of Vietnam. I want us to get out of Vietnam. But I do not want peace at any price, and I do not believe the American people do.

I want peace with honor, peace with justice; and I believe that is the feeling of an overwhelming majority of Americans.

There is one man who is going to lead us out of war and into peace. He is the President of the United States. At a time such as this, we must give him our hearts and our hands. We must join him in praying for peace and in working for peace.

Therefore, I support this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. CONTE).

Mr. CONTE. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I expressed my strong opposition to the closed rule under which we are theoretically debating House Resolution 613. I would repeat again today that I believe this to be blatantly unfair, improper, and in the worst possible traditions of governmental and legislative process.

This is not the first time debate has been choked off in this body. On the contrary, the sad fact is that we have repeatedly been prevented from working our will.

This is becoming, I regret to say, a Congress of fear—a Congress that is afraid to face up to the monumental issues before it.

Example No. 1: When we were debating the highly controversial and very expensive ABM, the leadership refused to let us vote on the real issue. We were forced to vote on both research and development and deployment, even though most questions were being raised about deployment, and deployment alone.

Fortunately, I was able to get a roll-call that reflected House sentiment on the real issue—deployment. Lo and behold, 140 of my colleagues joined me in speaking out, whereas had we followed

the leadership, we would have silenced.

Example No. 2: When we were debating the agriculture appropriation we voted 224 to 142 to limit farm payments to \$20,000. The other side took this out of the bill. I worked successfully to put it back in conference.

Then I tried to offer a motion to commit the conference bill—but I was prevented from doing so. In other words, this body was kept from voting on the real issue—farm subsidy payments.

And finally, example No. 3: We are now debating a Vietnam resolution, and we are using a closed rule to prevent amendments to legislation affecting the most critical issue facing the Nation today.

I am not proud of what is being done, and I hope many of my colleagues feel the same way.

The fact of the matter is that we, the elected representatives of the American people, are being prevented from working our will on this crucial question—the amendment process.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. BINGHAM).

(Mr. BINGHAM asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, first I should like to say it seems to me the sponsors of this resolution have expressed a great many different views as to what it means, and that is part of the difficulty.

The gentleman managing the bill has taken what one might call a minimum view as to what this resolution means, but other sponsors have interpreted it quite differently. The gentleman from Texas (Mr. WARR) yesterday said "yes" in answer to a question as to whether it did embrace the policy of Vietnamization. "Yes, by inference it does," he said.

Other sponsors, such as the gentleman from Illinois who just spoke, have interpreted it as supporting a policy of possible escalation. Yesterday one of the sponsors indicated that he would interpret the resolution as supporting a very stiff policy, what is often called a hawk-like policy.

It is clear that this resolution, if adopted, will be interpreted in many different ways. It has already been interpreted by the President as representing substantially an endorsement of his position as stated on November 3.

I should like now to turn to a statement made yesterday, which I regret very much. My friend, the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON) saw fit to attribute certain remarks about this resolution to "the former Ambassador who served in Paris under the previous administration." He was obviously referring to Averell Harriman. His statement was taken out of context and did not correctly represent Governor Harriman's views.

The impression he created was that Governor Harriman approves of House Resolution 613 and would vote for it if he were a Member of the House. As my friend knows, Governor Harriman's position on the matter is quite to the contrary.

last week, the Governor was asked to give his views on this resolution. The thrust of his comments during the meeting, which lasted for an hour and a half, was that he thought the resolution was ill-advised. He said it would have no effect on the negotiations, one way or the other. In reply to a direct question, he indicated that if he were a member of Congress he would vote against it.

Mr. Chairman, I regret very much that amendments were not permitted to be submitted in this matter. If permitted, I would have proposed an amendment, for example, urging the President to press for broadening the base of the government in Saigon so as to make it more representative and to include persons capable and willing of making a negotiated settlement. I truly believe that the gentlemen now in charge in Saigon do not want a compromise settlement. Any promise would weaken or lessen their position; therefore, they are opposed to it, whatever they say. There are, however, there, non-Communists, who have a much broader following, who could be brought into the Government, such as Gen. Big Minh, who I believe could achieve a reasonable political settlement. We would achieve our objective of assisting the South Vietnamese the right to determine their own future.

Both sides have come much closer to agreement than they were two years ago. A free election under international supervision might be possible, but not so long as the present Saigon government remains in control.

Other amendments would also have been approved the resolution, including an amendment that would have been offered by the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FROWLEY), approving troop withdrawals to date and supporting the President's announced intention to withdraw all American ground forces as quickly as possible, and another amendment to make clear that the resolution does not imply approval of the President's policies as outlined in his November 3 speech or to substitute a blank check authorizing future actions.

Why will I vote against House Resolution 613, entitled "Resolution Toward Peace With Justice in Vietnam"?

Of course all of us in this House are for "peace with justice in Vietnam," but we have many different views as to how that objective can be achieved. If I thought passage of House Resolution 613 would contribute to the achievement of that objective, I would vote for it and explain that my vote should not be construed as approval of President Nixon's Vietnam policies. Many of my colleagues whose views on Vietnam are not very different from my own will follow that course. However, it is my considered conclusion that passage of House Resolution 613 will not only not advance the objective of "peace with justice in Vietnam," but may well be harmful in the long run. That is so, in my view, because the President may be encouraged by this resolution to follow the sterile and mistaken policies he has been following, which in effect allow Generals Thieu and Ky to exercise a veto over any possibility of settlement.

It is said that overwhelming passage of this resolution will constitute a show of unity behind the President. Again, I believe the result of passage of the resolution, especially by the procedure followed here, will further serve to polarize opinion in this country, and further persuade millions of our young people who loathe this war that our institutions are rigid and undemocratic. As I said yesterday in the debate on the procedure to be followed, it is outrageous—indeed tragic—that this first resolution on our Vietnam policy to come before the House in 5 years should be brought in on a "take it or leave it" basis, with no possibility of amendment.

I cannot vote for this resolution because it will be interpreted by the President and others to represent an endorsement of his Vietnam policies as laid out in his speech of November 3. I am far from satisfied with those policies as I understand them, and I was greatly disturbed by the November 3 speech, as I have previously indicated.

The President's November 3 speech indicated to me that he has no real hope that the war can be brought to an end by peaceful settlement, and that he hopes instead to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese. This policy will not succeed, in my judgment, and the war will drag on and on, with American involvement only slightly reduced.

I believe a peaceful settlement is possible, but only if we insist on a change in the makeup and policies of the Saigon regime. The best way to make clear to Saigon that we mean business about not allowing American boys to go on dying to keep Generals Thieu and Ky in power is to start now on a program of total withdrawal of American forces.

We have made a series of hideous mistakes in Vietnam, going all the way back to 1945. Adoption of House Resolution 613 will only extend the string of mistakes.

I understand that a motion to recommend will be made to add a sentence to the resolution urging the President to press Hanoi to abide by the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners. All of us are appalled by Hanoi's cruelty in this regard, and we will vote for the motion to recommend to add this sentence. But this addition will not change the character of the main part of the resolution or correct its major defects.

The resolution could easily have been made acceptable to practically all of us if two or three reasonable amendments had been adopted. That would have been the way to achieve the greatest degree of unity.

(Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania (at the request of Mr. ADAIR) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, House Resolution 613 is clearly in need of revision on various points. I believe many of the criticisms made on the House floor are justified, and the resolution should have been opened up for amendment and serious extended debate by the House. I voted against the previous question on adopting the rule on House Resolution 613 for this purpose.

House Resolution 613 is clearly defective in omitting and failing even to mention our prisoners of war now held under tragic conditions.

Congress must not forget the continuing heavy sacrifice of these people, military and civilian who now suffer even as we debate. It is intolerable to think of a U.S. pullout of forces from Vietnam either at once or over a period of deescalation, without making sure our prisoners of war are considered as strongly as all other major factors.

I, therefore, recommend that House Resolution 613 be amended to emphasize that the Congress backs the President and our U.S. Paris negotiators, our U.S. Department of State, our Department of Defense, and other Federal agencies, in continuing to press for fair treatment for prisoners of war as adopted by the Red Cross.

I feel so strongly about the present resolution, House Resolution 613, omitting completely the fate of the prisoners of war, that I oppose House Resolution 613 in its present form. This failure is a tragic and major defect.

I hereby give notice of offering again my amendment for our prisoners of war in the form of the motion to recommit House Resolution 613 to the Foreign Affairs Committee at the end of the debate on House Resolution 613.

My motion to recommit House Resolution 613 will direct the House Foreign Affairs Committee to report the resolution back to the House immediately with an amendment as follows:

Requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 on treatment of prisoners of war.

If my motion to recommit House Resolution 613 for the prisoner-of-war amendment, is not adopted, I shall be forced to vote against House Resolution 613 in its present form. This will point out that in this debate and parliamentary procedure, that somebody is thinking of the dire straits of prisoners of war when they are not in a position to speak for themselves.

I consider prisoners of war among the highest urgency factors on past and future negotiations for peace in Vietnam. I voted against reporting House Resolution 613 out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee because of the glaring omission and lack of consideration of prisoners of war. I will move just as strongly by my proposed motion, to recommit House Resolution 613 to the House Foreign Affairs Committee to have my prisoner-of-war amendment added to the provisions of the resolution, forthwith.

In order that the House and the American people, as well as the families of these prisoners, and the prisoners of war themselves, can know of the history of this issue, as well as international Red Cross resolution, and actions of our U.S. Government I am setting out various documents as follows:

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON

We are deeply concerned about the lack of information about our prisoners. Some of them have been held four years and longer with little or no words to their families.

It is hard to see what Hanoi hopes to gain

by denying the prisoners the basic right to communicate with their families. We are using every possible occasion to raise this subject and to bring about the release of prisoners on both sides.

**RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE 21ST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS, ISTANBUL, TURKEY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1969**

**PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR**

The XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross,

Recalling the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the protection of prisoners of war, and the historic role of the Red Cross as a protector of victims of war,

Considering that the Convention applies to each armed conflict between two or more parties to the Convention without regard to how the conflict may be characterized,

Recognizing that, even apart from the Convention, the international community has consistently demanded humane treatment for prisoners of war, including identification and accounting for all prisoners, provision of an adequate diet and medical care, that prisoners be permitted to communicate with each other and with the exterior, that seriously sick or wounded prisoners be promptly repatriated, and that at all times prisoners be protected from physical and mental torture, abuse and reprisals,

Requests each party to the Convention to take all appropriate measures to ensure humane treatment and prevent violations of the Convention,

Calls upon all parties to abide by the obligations set forth in the Convention and upon all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed members of the regular armed forces of another party to the conflict and all other persons entitled to prisoner of war status are treated humanely and given the fullest measure of protection prescribed by the Convention; and further calls upon all parties to provide free access to the prisoners of war and to all places of their detention by a protecting Power or by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Adopted by vote of 114 to 0.

(The International Conference of the Red Cross is held every four years and is the highest governing body of the Red Cross. Its membership consists of governments which have signed the Geneva Conventions of 1949, national Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross and The League of Red Cross Societies.)

**STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MELVIN R. LAIRD**

On numerous occasions I have expressed my deep concern for the welfare of our American servicemen who are prisoners of war or missing in action. In this regard, I have directed Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) G. Warren Nutter, who has been named Chairman of the Department of Defense Prisoner of War Policy Committee, to insure that the families of these servicemen are receiving all assistance to which they are entitled.

The North Vietnamese have claimed that they are treating our men humanely. I am distressed by the fact that there is clear evidence that this is not the case.

The United States Government has urged that the enemy respect the requirements of the Geneva Convention. This they have refused to do.

The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have never identified the names of all the U.S. prisoners whom they hold. For the most part, information on some of these Americans has come in the form of scattered, and often distorted, propaganda films and photographs which the North Vietnamese have chosen to sell or release.

We know that at least several U.S. prison-

ers were injured at the time of their capture and we are concerned about the medical care they are receiving.

The Geneva Convention requires a free exchange of mail between the prisoners and their families and yet very little mail has been received from only a few prisoners in the past five years.

As of next month, more than 200 American servicemen will have been listed either as prisoners of war or as missing in action for more than three and one-half years. This period of time is longer than any U.S. serviceman was held prisoner during World War II.

The Department of Defense continues to hope for meaningful progress on the matter of prisoner release in the Paris discussions. In the meantime, we appeal to North Vietnam and the Viet Cong to respect the humane rights of those whom they hold prisoners of war.

Specifically, we call for adherence to the Geneva Convention which requires:

1. Release of names of prisoners held.
2. Immediate release of sick and wounded prisoners.
3. Impartial inspections of prisoner of war facilities.
4. Proper treatment of all prisoners.
5. Regular flow of mail.

Most importantly, we seek the prompt release of all American prisoners.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird today issued the following statement:

Xuan Thuy, chief of the North Vietnam delegation to the Paris Peace Talks, has declared that Hanoi would not promptly release a list of U.S. prisoners of war held in North Vietnam.

I am deeply shocked and disappointed by this cruel response of Hanoi's representative to such a basic request for humanitarian action.

Hundreds of American wives, children and parents continue to live in a tragic state of uncertainty caused by the lack of information concerning the fate of their loved ones. This needless anxiety is caused by the persistent refusal by North Vietnam to release the names of U.S. prisoners of war.

I want to reaffirm the continuing hope that Hanoi will provide a list of American prisoners and permit a free flow of mail between U.S. prisoners of war and their families.

We continue to urge the immediate release of sick and wounded prisoners, the neutral inspection of prisoner of war facilities and the prompt release of all American prisoners.

**AMBASSADOR LODGE'S STATEMENTS ON PRISONERS OF WAR DURING MAY 22 PARIS TALKS**

Opening statement: I cannot leave this subject (PW's) without protesting the attitude which you have expressed most recently last Tuesday May 20, with respect to the prisoners held in North Vietnam. You have refused to provide a list of these prisoners so that their families might know whether they are living or dead. You have refused to discuss the repatriation of the sick and wounded which is a long-established international practice. You should know that the attitude you have expressed with regard to these basic humanitarian requirements cannot have a favorable effect on our negotiations here.

Additional remarks: Let me add one observation about prisoners. It is difficult to understand how you can claim to be treating our prisoners humanely when you refuse to identify the prisoners you hold so that their families can know the fate of their relatives. You refuse to permit regular mail exchanges. You reject impartial international observation of conditions under which prisoners are held: You refuse to discuss release of sick and wounded prisoners. Yet these are basic elements of humanitarian treatment

under established international standards. We do not see how you can be hurt by merely publishing the names of those who are alive so that the uncertainty which families feel may be ended. To expect for a moment in human terms of the language of diplomacy, what is involved here is the prisoner's wife who does not know whether her husband is alive or whether he is dead. It is really hard to believe that the security of North Vietnam would be threatened if this wife were told the truth about her husband's fate. We hope you will reconsider your attitude on these questions so that it will truly reflect the humane policy which you claim to follow.

**SECRETARY OF STATE ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE OF JUNE 5, 1969**

The following is the State Department's release of Secretary of State William P. Rogers' news conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

Secretary ROGERS. I want to express my serious concern about the Americans who are prisoners of war in Southeast Asia. Most of these prisoners have been held for 3 years or more. There is a long tradition of nations that personnel captured in war be treated humanely. This principle has been expressed in the Geneva Convention and is recognized by more than 120 nations.

A basic requirement of the Convention is that names of prisoners be provided to their families and to an appropriate agency in a neutral country. Communist leaders have failed to observe this simple civilized requirement which would mean so much to wives and families of the men who are living in combat.

North Vietnamese officials have frequently declared that the prisoners are treated humanely. Many seriously question these statements. Assurance could readily be provided if North Viet-Nam would permit visits by impartial observers to the prison camps. For the sake of the prisoners and for their families, we continue to hope for a positive response from North Viet-Nam. We are prepared to discuss this subject and to move quickly toward arrangements for the release of prisoners on both sides, and I believe that any sign of good faith by the other side in this matter would provide encouragement for our negotiations in Paris.

**STATEMENT ON PRISONERS OF WAR BY U.S. AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE AT PARIS MEETINGS ON VIETNAM, 33D PLENARY SESSION, SEPTEMBER 13, 1969**

At the last Plenary Session, I repeated our request for the humane treatment of Americans held prisoner in North Vietnam, stating that international custom, the Geneva Convention, and humanitarian considerations all require that there be impartial inspection of the prisoner of war camps, a guarantee of a regular flow of mail to and from the prisoners, and a release of the sick and wounded prisoners on both sides. In addition, a minimum regard for the peace of mind of the prisoners' next of kin requires that a list of names of the prisoners be made available so that the next of kin—who are assuredly innocent of any warlike act—at least know whether their relative is alive or dead.

To this request, the representative of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at our last session responded—and I quote—"The question of captured American military personnel will be settled at the same time as all the other elements of the overall ten-point solution. It cannot be separated." End of quotation.

Let us now consider this answer.

In the first place, it is unresponsive. Our request at the last meeting was concerned solely with the treatment of prisoners during captivity—not with the broader question of

the repatriation of prisoners. You repeat your statement that you give humanitarian treatment. But you refuse to talk about camp inspection, flow of mail, release of sick and wounded, and lists of prisoners.

In the second place, your answer is not only unresponsive; it also partakes of the irrelevant. I say this for the following reason: You say that you will not discharge your responsibilities regarding prisoner treatment until you are willing to repatriate the prisoners. But, ladies and gentlemen, when that time comes, your policy concerning treatment of prisoners will be largely academic since the prisoners will have either been repatriated or will be awaiting repatriation. The point is that prisoners are entitled to humane treatment under the protection of the Geneva Convention at all times and under all circumstances—and particularly during the period before repatriation. That is the time that counts. The point is so obvious that it should not require any statement. But your declaration at the last Plenary Session requires us to state it.

While I am on the subject, let me add that we have long been concerned by your refusal to permit impartial inspection of your prison camps. Frankly, this refusal inevitably brings up the thought that you fear that an inspection would not confirm your claims of humane treatment.

This concern has now been deepened by statements which have recently been made by two of the Americans recently released from captivity in North Vietnam. One of these Americans, Seaman Douglas B. Hegel, said on September 2nd—and I quote—“was kept in solitary confinement for over a year—7 months and 10 days at a stretch. I was made to stand with my hands over my head for trying to talk with other prisoners in the war.” Seaman Hegdahl said—and I quote—“many of the prisoners of war have been in solitary confinement for years”—end quotation—and he also said—and I quote again—that “many prisoners of war do not write or receive mail.” End of quotation.

Another prisoner of war, Navy Lieutenant Robert Frishman, on the same date, pointed out your failure to make available the best medical treatment and to repatriate immediately the sick and wounded. He said that the removal of his elbow had been done in a professional way, and that he was thankful still to have the right arm. However, he also pointed out—and I quote—“They failed to remove the fragments of the SAM missile in my arm. It took six months just for my incision to heal over.” End of quotation. He also indicated Lieutenant Commander John McCain will require further medical treatment as soon as he returns to the United States. His remarks underline how important it is for sick and wounded prisoners to be repatriated as soon as possible.

Let me also quote what Lieutenant Frishman said about the condition of Lieutenant Commander Richard A. Stratton, another prisoner of war. He said—and I quote—“The North Vietnamese tried to get Lt. Commander Stratton to appear before a press delegation to say that he had received humane and proper treatment. He refused because his treatment hadn't been humane. He's been kept with ropes to such a degree that he has large scars on his arms from ropes which became infected. He was deprived of sleep, beaten, had his fingernails removed and put in solitary, but the North Vietnamese insisted that he make the false ‘humane treatment statement’ and threw him into a dark cell alone for 38 days to think about it.” End of quotation.

Lieutenant Frishman also said—and I quote again—“Stratton knows that I have been released. He told me not to worry about telling the truth about him. He said that if he gets tortured some more, at least he will know why he is getting it and will feel

that it will be worth the sacrifice.” End of quotation. We certainly hope that neither Commander Stratton nor any of the other prisoners will suffer as a result of Lieutenant Frishman's statements.

Lieutenant Frishman further indicated that prisoners of war have been made to sit on a stool for days in a hot room until they make statements conforming to the wishes of their captors.

I can do no better than to repeat the words of Lieutenant Frishman, when he said—and I quote—“I don't think solitary confinement, forced statements, living in a cave for three years, being put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal of fingernails, and not allowing exchange of mail to prisoners of war are humane.” End of quotation. Any impartial observer—and even you yourselves, who do not consider yourselves to be impartial—must agree with this statement.

You should cease this inhuman treatment. You cannot escape the responsibility therefor.

You should also realize that your failure to act in accordance with humane practice flies in the face of world opinion as a whole.

Just this week, 101 Members of the Congress of the United States, including both Democrats and Republicans, have presented in the House of Representatives a resolution condemning your side—and I quote—for “violating the fundamental standards of human decency and grossly deviating from civilized concepts of international accords and agreements on prisoners of war.” End of quotation. In addition, 96 Members of the House of Representatives have signed a statement protesting your—and I quote—“inhumane and inexcusable”—unquote—conduct with regard to the Americans you hold prisoner.

The Twenty-First International Red Cross Conference, composed of the parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, is now meeting in Istanbul, Turkey. The International Humanitarian Law Commission of that Conference has adopted without dissent a resolution calling for humane treatment of prisoners of war. The resolution states that the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention—and I quote—“applies to each armed conflict between two or more parties to the Convention without regard to how the conflict may be characterized.” End of quotation. The resolution also calls up—and I quote—“all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that all uniformed members of the regular armed forces of another party to the conflict and all other persons entitled to prisoner of war status are accorded the humane treatment and the full measure of protection prescribed by the Convention, including free access to the prisoners of war and all places of their detention by a protecting power or by the International Committee of the Red Cross.

If I may, I will depart from my prepared statement for just a moment to say that I have just received word during the recess that the International Red Cross Conference in Istanbul this morning passed this resolution without dissent by a vote of a hundred fourteen to nothing.

In contrast with your treatment of the prisoners whom you hold, consider the many thousands of your military personnel held in prisoner of war camps administered by the Republic of Vietnam. In accordance with the Geneva Convention, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam has provided lists of prisoners' names to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The prisoners are allowed to correspond with their families. These camps conform to the standards established by the Geneva Convention, and they are visited frequently by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who inspect them thoroughly and hold private interviews with prisoners.

A number of sick and wounded prisoners have been released, and our side has expressed willingness to make arrangements for the release of all seriously sick or wounded prisoners.

STATEMENT BY HENRY CABOT LODGE,  
NOVEMBER 24, 1969

I consider it necessary to comment on an article in the press in which Mr. Xuan Thuy, the North Vietnamese representative, is reported to have made certain allegations concerning the United States position at these Paris meetings.

First, it is not true that I have not been willing to meet privately or otherwise, with Mr. Thuy to discuss general problems concerning Viet Nam—and he knows it very well.

Second, it is also not true that in the private meetings which have been held, I have only been willing to talk on only one question—that of mutual troop withdrawal. He knows that, too.

Third, it is not true, as alleged, that the U.S. wishes to continue the war in Viet-Nam and is therefore inflexible.

The facts are that Mr. Thuy has been as intransigent in private meetings as he has been in public meetings. He has avoided engaging in any give and take. Instead his position has been to insist on the U.S. withdrawing completely from South Viet-Nam without any indication of what the North Vietnamese would do. He has also demanded that the U.S. overthrow the present government in South Viet-Nam as we leave.

For our part, we have made it clear that—far from rejecting—we are willing to discuss all questions relevant to peace. We have made every effort to have the parties concerned discuss all the issues. We have made our proposals and we have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals made by the other side. Contrary to the position of the other side, we do not make proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

At one stage we set forth a list of all the subjects—military and political—that needed discussion if there was to be a peaceful settlement of the conflict. We also invited the other side to clarify their own proposals.

We got nowhere because they either refused to consider our proposals—or demanded that we take unilateral actions without any parallel action by them. And they even declined to have any serious discussion in which the government of South Viet-Nam could participate.

Mr. Thuy has tried to make it appear as if he has all along been ready to meet privately for serious discussion. The fact is that every private meeting which we have held has been at the request of the United States. If Mr. Thuy had any desire to meet he managed to conceal that desire very well.

For my part, I sought through every means to engage the other side in genuine negotiations on all issues. The Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has also been willing to talk about any subject without prior conditions.

I shall not speculate on the purposes Mr. Thuy may have in mind in making his allegations. But these allegations are untrue and I believe he knows that they are untrue. There has never been any doubt that the United States has been ready to meet and to negotiate meaningfully at any time and in any meeting place. The same is true of the Republic of Viet-Nam.

That has been true in the past, it is true today, and will be true in the future. But negotiation is not a process by which he can make demands and then only be willing to discuss our acceptance of those demands. I also submit that negotiations are not helped by making false charges which are bound to complicate the problem.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GRAHAM MARTIN,  
CHAIRMAN OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT DELE-  
GATION, XXIST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE  
OF THE RED CROSS, ISTANBUL, TURKEY,  
SEPTEMBER 10, 1969

Those of you who were present at the Twentieth International Conference of the Red Cross in Vienna in October 1965, will recall that the Conference expressed its concern for the treatment of prisoners of war whose confinement removed them from combat and whose presence presented no threat to their captors. The armed conflicts that existed at that time and the conduct of some governments who have acceded to the Geneva Conventions in failing to honor their obligations under the Conventions to provide humane treatment to prisoners of war, showed the need for the resolution which the Conference passed four years ago.

Now four long years have passed since the adoption of that resolution, which called "upon all authorities involved in an armed conflict to ensure that every prisoner of war is given the treatment and full measure of protection prescribed by the Geneva Convention of 1949 . . ." In the case of the Communist authorities in southeast Asia, the solemn appeal of the last conference fell on deaf ears. North Vietnam and the Viet Cong have refused consistently to observe even internationally recognized minimum standards of humanitarian treatment for prisoners they hold as a result of the armed conflict in Vietnam.

The concern of the United States about these prisoners has been expressed by President Nixon and also by Ambassador Lodge at the Paris Peace Talks. Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird also have repeatedly publicly expressed urgent concern about the failure of the Communist authorities in Vietnam to live up to the humanitarian standards of the Convention and to treat humanely personnel who have fallen into their hands.

The concern of these highest officers of the United States is universally shared by all the American people. I am glad to note that we are not alone in our concern. Speaking in London on March 19, Jacques Freymond of the ICRC, said concerning the work of the committee:

"In Vietnam, it has so far had limited success. In fact, in spite of repeated representations, it has not been able to obtain the agreement of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to the installation of a delegation in Hanoi nor even to the visiting of prisoners of war.

"The Hanoi authorities have, it is true, assured the ICRC that these prisoners are treated humanely by them. The committee has therefore had to content itself with sending medicines, medical equipment and, more recently, two field hospitals to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

Mr. Freymond went on to say:

"On the other hand, the ICRC is represented in Saigon and the delegates are able to visit all prisoner of war camps. They also regularly receive nominal rolls of these prisoners."

I might add that the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, in cooperation with its allies, has placed great emphasis on proper treatment of prisoners of war captured by allied forces.

Today, in September 1969, I have the sad duty to report to you that we have seen that the Communist authorities in southeast Asia have refused to cooperate with the ICRC. We also know as a fact that North Vietnam is violating every basic provision of the prisoner of war convention it signed and is in fact seriously mistreating our men it holds as prisoners. We are deeply concerned and outraged by this grave affront to human dignity and international responsibility.

When I said that we know that our men who are captured in Vietnam are being mis-

treated, I spoke with the assurance of unmistakable evidence—a touching witness provided by one who had himself actually been subjected to this savage and inhumane treatment. Since the time of the last conference we have known that North Vietnam was refusing to provide the names of all the men it held as prisoners, and that they have refused to permit impartial inspection of its prisoner facilities by the ICRC or any other impartial intermediary. It has long been obvious that prisoners have been denied or severely restricted in their right to communicate with their families. The hundreds of waiting families who do not even know if their man is alive today are sad witnesses to this fact. We also have seen the North Vietnamese release photographs of seriously sick or wounded prisoners who should be repatriated immediately.

Today we have confirmation of what has been an even greater concern for us—our men are being seriously, physically and mentally mistreated. The men whom North Vietnam recently chose to release have, in spite of threats by their captors, felt duty bound to tell the world how North Vietnam treats its prisoners. Their story is not a pleasant one and it pleads for prompt and strong action by this Conference. North Vietnam denies universally accepted standards of humanitarian treatment for prisoners and violates the provisions of the Geneva Convention to which it acceded by:

(1) Refusing to identify the prisoners it holds and account for those missing in North Vietnam.

(2) Torturing prisoners both physically and mentally.

(3) Keeping prisoners in isolation cut off from their fellow prisoners and from the outside world.

(4) Failing to provide an adequate diet.

(5) Failing to repatriate the seriously sick or wounded.

(6) Refusing to permit impartial inspection of prisoner facilities by the ICRC or another appropriate intermediary.

(7) Using prisoners for propaganda purposes.

(8) Denying regular exchange of mail between all prisoners and their families.

(9) Failing to provide adequate medical care to all prisoners in need of treatment. May I ask you to hear the actual words of Lt. Robert F. Frishman, USN, one of the prisoners recently released by North Vietnam. On September 2, 1969, less than a fortnight ago, from our Naval hospital in Bethesda where he is recovering from his ordeal, he had this to say:

"My intentions are not to scare wives and families but Hanoi has given false impressions that all is wine and roses and it isn't so. All I'm interested in is for Hanoi to live up to their claims of humane and lenient treatment of prisoners of war. I don't think solitary confinement, forced statements, living in a cage for three years, being put in straps, not being allowed to sleep or eat, removal of fingernails, being hung from a ceiling, having an infected arm which was almost lost, not receiving medical care, being dragged along the ground with a broken leg, or not allowing an exchange of mail to prisoners of war are humane.

"Why don't they send out a list of their prisoners of war? Why do they try to keep us from even seeing each other? Certain prisoners of war have received publicity. Others are kept silent. Why aren't their names officially released? If they don't have any secondary alternatives or motives in mind, then release the names of the prisoners of war so their families will know their loved ones' status. I feel as if I am speaking not only for myself, but for my buddies back in camp to whom I promised I would tell the truth. I feel it is time people are aware of the facts."

Lt. Frishman was addressing his own people in America. But it is time for the world to

know these facts. Therefore, I share Lt. Frishman's words with you gathered here in this Conference.

In the most recent provisional activity report submitted to this Conference by the ICRC, it is stated that "on 3 June 1969 the ICRC again wrote the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam reminding it of the obligations incumbent on it in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the protection of war victims." And at our opening session the distinguished new President of the ICRC reported to us that North Vietnam had not yet allowed any representative of the ICRC to enter its territory.

Each of us has a moral duty to see that signers of the Convention honor the internationally accepted principles of humane treatment of prisoners of war. We trust that this conference, which has a fundamental and abiding interest in the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention will declare itself clearly and unequivocally concerning the humane treatment of prisoners—all prisoners in all parts of the world. The resolution before us was carefully drafted by the co-sponsors to insure the universality of its coverage to all prisoners of war wherever held, by whatever nation, great or small. We hope, therefore, that all national delegations and all national societies will join those nations and national societies which have already sponsored this resolution. We believe, Mr. Chairman, it should be supported unanimously.

#### TEXT OF IDENTICAL HOUSE RESOLUTIONS U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

Including: H. Con. Res. 3558-H. Con. Res. 365; H. Con. Res. 373, H. Con. Res. 385, H. Con. Res. 414, H. Con. Res. 431.

Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam coming with the requirements of the Geneva Convention.

Whereas the United States Government and the Republic of Vietnam have continuously honored the requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war; and

Whereas the United States Government has repeatedly appealed to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to respect the requirements of the Geneva Convention, which North Vietnam has endorsed; and

Whereas the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam have disregarded the provisions of the Geneva Convention and refused to release the names of prisoners of war who are members of the Armed Forces of the United States, to permit the regular flow of mail to or from those prisoners, and otherwise to accord humane treatment to those prisoners, and to permit inspection of the facilities in which those prisoners are held: Now, therefore be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate Concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that the President, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and all other concerned departments or agencies of the United States Government, the United Nations, and the peoples of the world should appeal to North Vietnam, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam to comply with the requirements of the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war and to take such steps as may be appropriate to obtain the humane treatment and prompt release of all members of the Armed Forces of the United States so held as prisoners of war.

#### TEXT OF IDENTICAL HOUSE RESOLUTIONS ON U.S. PRISONERS OF WAR IN NORTH VIETNAM

Including: H. Con. Res. 332-H. Con. Res. 337; H. Con. Res. 339, 349-350, 352, 370, 383-384, 389, 413.

Condemning the treatment of American prisoners of war by the Government of North Vietnam and urging the President to initiate appropriate action for the purpose of insuring that American prisoners are accorded humane treatment.

Whereas there are at least three hundred and forty and possibly one thousand two hundred American servicemen interned as prisoners of war by the Government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam; and

Whereas some of these American prisoners have been held captive for as long as five years; and

Whereas intelligence reports and reports from American servicemen who have been released or escaped from such imprisonment indicate that American servicemen, while so imprisoned, are subjected to unusual, cruel and inhumane treatment, to wit: physical torture, psychological terror, public display, insufficient medical care and treatment, neglect of health, dietary and sanitary necessities, prohibition of correspondence with relatives, and forced compliance with propaganda and political exploitation; and

Whereas by inflicting such treatment on American prisoners of war the Government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam have violated the fundamental standards of human decency and have grossly deviated from civilized concepts of international accords and agreements on prisoners of war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That the Congress condemns the treatment of American prisoners of war by the Government of North Vietnam and its allies in South Vietnam, and hereby urges the President to initiate, diligently through diplomatic, military, and any other available channels, such action as may be necessary to insure that the tenets of the Geneva Convention of 1949, which was signed by the Government of North Vietnam in 1967, are accorded to American servicemen held as prisoners of war in North and South Vietnam and especially to require the Government of North Vietnam and its allies to (1) identify prisoners whom they hold, (2) release seriously sick or injured prisoners, (3) permit impartial inspections of all prisoner of war facilities, and (4) permit the free exchange of mail between families and prisoners.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. KEITH).

(Mr. KEITH asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. KEITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do not anticipate using but a moment of the 4 minutes I am allotted.

Chairman, at the time of the Gulf resolution the rules under which the House operated did not permit extensive exploration of the end result of the course of action which we voted at that time. Had we more debated it, we might have anticipated some of the events that history has revealed.

I feel the resolution before us today might very well have had a more open rule. I feel the extrication of our forces from Vietnam, now that we are committed there, is just as serious in its long range implications as was the initial commitment of our troops to the mainland of Asia.

So I simply want to advise my colleagues in the House and my constituents that I feel the long-range results of the withdrawal anticipated by our

President need to have fuller debate than they have had and that much more light could have been shed on the subject if we had had an open rule.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield so that I may propound a question to the chairman of the subcommittee?

Mr. KEITH. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time to the minority side.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma (Mr. EDMONDSON).

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from Oklahoma 2 additional minutes.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I support the resolution which has as its principal objective the construction of a base of national unity in support of the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

At the beginning of my brief time in this debate, let me say a word about the origin of this resolution.

It did not originate in the White House and it did not originate with the leadership on either side of this House.

This resolution is the product of a Member of this House—the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT). Ninety-nine percent of its language is the language of JIM WRIGHT. The two or three changes in that language suggested to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) were all suggested by other Democrats in this House—and were matters of form and not substance.

As a Democrat, I am proud of the origin of this resolution, proud of the spirit which motivates it, and proud of its objectives.

It has been conceived in the highest tradition of our party—a party which has always contended that partisan politics should stop at the water's edge—and I am proud that a majority of Democrats joined in cosponsoring this resolution.

There are some who have criticized it by saying it will strengthen the President domestically—and who say this is not desirable, since the President belongs to another party.

I have campaigned against the man who is our President three times in national elections. I have been cochairman of our national party's speakers' bureau three times in the last 14 years, and I enjoy partisan politics as much as anyone I know. I have no doubt that our President, as leader of his party, will be out in Oklahoma next November urging Second District voters—as he has done twice before—to send a Republican to Congress.

Nonetheless, Mr. Chairman, I believe with all my heart that this resolution should be adopted, and adopted overwhelmingly by this House. Its adoption, in my judgment, will be the most important step our Nation has taken in a long time toward a united approach toward solution of the Vietnam problem.

It is a constitutional fact that only one public official can negotiate with full authority for the Nation to conclude a settlement of that problem. No Senator or Congressman—however wise or well-intentioned—can perform that duty

which is placed constitutionally in the President.

The resolution we debate does not increase or diminish that constitutional authority and duty—but it does place this House formerly on record in support of our Chief Executive's efforts to get the job done.

In taking that position, the resolution "approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body."

Is there anything unacceptable or divisive about that statement?

The right of the people of South Vietnam to decide their own fate in free elections was firmly stated in the 1968 Democratic national platform—and without such a guarantee I do not believe it is possible to withdraw from Vietnam without dishonor to the memory of 40,000 Americans who have fallen there.

President Nixon, like President Eisenhower and President Kennedy and President Johnson, shares that conviction and publicly supports that principle. The right of a free people to self-determination is a right which Americans have treasured since the Declaration of Independence. The President and the resolution honor our finest heritage by restating that principle.

At the same time, the President has firmly stated his intention to withdraw our troops from Vietnam at the earliest time possible, and more than 60,000 already have been withdrawn ahead of the President's announced schedule.

I believe withdrawal of these troops is strong evidence at this time of the President's good faith in bringing an end to American involvement in Vietnam. At the same time, I am convinced that the President commands the support of most American citizens in his determination to conclude a peaceful and just settlement in the process of withdrawal—a settlement, in final analysis, that does not abandon an elected, anti-Communist South Vietnamese Government fighting for survival against invading Communist forces, without assurance that the aggression has been ended and peaceful elections agreed to, or, on the other hand, that the South Vietnamese Government is ready to deal with that aggression with its own combat forces.

Evidence is increasing daily of South Vietnamese ability to do just that, and not many months ago a number of us had lunch with a group of South Vietnamese Congressmen who were confident of their government's ability to assume that full burden during the year 1970.

I hope and pray their confidence proves fully justified, but I share the view of the President and leaders of our Committee on Foreign Affairs that the course of peaceful negotiations in Vietnam will not be served well by enactment of a legislative timetable in this resolution.

The resolution speaks for itself and stands on its own merits.

Throughout this debate I have heard very little criticism of the terms of this resolution. I believe it has been demonstrated that the resolution is understand-

able and acceptable to a great majority of the membership of this House—and that it can serve as a foundation for national unity both understandable and acceptable to a great majority of our constituents.

Trial lawyers in this body will remember the old saying about the trial of a lawsuit: "When the facts are against you, talk about the law. When the law is against you, talk about the facts. And, when both the facts and the law are against you, talk about the court."

Opponents of this resolution have largely "talked about the court" in this debate. They have been critical of procedure in committee, critical of the rule, and critical of programing of the resolution. They have had very little to say about the resolution itself, and the unifying purpose it serves.

Reference has already been made in this debate to the fact that former Ambassador Harriman, speaking to a group of Democrats last week, had stated that he would not vote for this resolution.

Ambassador Harriman's political advice is always appreciated, but it was far more significant to me that Ambassador Harriman, at the same meeting and in response to a direct question, said he would have liked to have had such a resolution passed by the House while he was negotiating on the Vietnam question in Paris.

Obviously, the Ambassador would have considered such a resolution helpful in 1968.

Just as obviously—and notwithstanding the Ambassador's political advice—the resolution will prove helpful to our negotiators in Paris in 1969.

The President, in an unprecedented visit to this Chamber, has expressed to this entire House his personal appreciation for the resolution and the assistance which it is sure to afford in negotiations.

If this resolution is helpful to our Paris negotiators, and is helpful to our President in concluding a just peace in Vietnam—then surely it is a resolution which is deserving of overwhelming support in this House.

Regardless of whether you agree or not with the President's domestic policies—and I disagree with him on many of those policies—and regardless of whether you approve or disapprove of the speech on November 3—and I found the speech unnecessarily partisan on some points—the fact remains that this resolution states firmly what needs to be said by this Nation's elected representatives at this time.

"We support the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam."

Let us enact the resolution, and on this base, let us do all in our power to unite the country.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDMONDSON. I am pleased to yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wright).

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Oklahoma and to express my personal appreciation to the gentleman not only for the very excellent statement which he is making, the very sensible and very timely

statement that he is making at this moment, but also for the dedicated help and assistance and cooperation that he gave to the other sponsors and proponents of this resolution. The gentleman from Oklahoma was the very first person with whom I discussed the original draft, and he assisted in perfecting the language of the resolution.

Without the unerringly good counsel, the advice and the energetic, imaginative, and effective help of the gentleman from Oklahoma from its very inception, this resolution would not have reached this point of progression today.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman from Oklahoma for his dedicated, patriotic and deeply sincere efforts.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. EDMONDSON. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. I want to commend the gentleman for his very good statement.

However, is there anything contained in this resolution which is different from the objectives which were stated by President Johnson as to our involvement in Vietnam? In other words, does this resolution contain an objective different from that as stated by President Johnson during his tenure in office?

Mr. EDMONDSON. In terms of Presidential statements with regard to policies in Vietnam I, personally, do not see any difference of any magnitude in the position consistently taken by President Johnson and the position that has been asserted by the present President of the United States in the November 3 speech with regard to his policy.

Mr. FRASER. The view of the gentleman then would be that this resolution in effect is a continuation of the objectives that President Johnson had?

Mr. EDMONDSON. With this substantial difference—that President Nixon has not only announced a policy of withdrawal at the earliest practical time, but has begun this withdrawal and has accomplished the withdrawal of 60,000 troops. I believe this action represents a rather significant and important difference, and I believe when we support the President in what he is doing in this regard that we help the position of the President in negotiating a just settlement.

Mr. FRASER. The gentleman would agree that the resolution is silent as to the policy of withdrawal, and that efforts to amend the resolution to include a statement on withdrawal were defeated both in committee and through the attempt to change the rule?

Mr. EDMONDSON. The resolution is silent on a good many points that have been stated as principles, by President Johnson, President Kennedy, and President Nixon. On the other hand, one can go back to President Kennedy's statements and find support for practically everything that is stated in this resolution.

Mr. FRASER. The only thing I want to do, and I do not want to take the time of the gentleman, is to indicate that on the one change in policy from President Johnson the resolution is silent.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oklahoma has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Eckhardt).

Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield briefly?

Mr. ECKHARDT. Mr. Chairman, I will yield briefly to the gentleman in just one moment.

First, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that I was also present at the time when Ambassador Harriman was speaking, and I did not understand in his answers any the connotations favoring the resolution which have been indicated here.

Now I will yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BINGHAM. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, since I anticipated that the gentleman from Oklahoma might again quote Governor Harriman, I have discussed the matter today with Governor Harriman and am authorized to quote him as follows:

Asking me whether I would have liked to have such a resolution is like asking me whether I would have liked applause for a speech or a word of approval for something I was doing. But I do not believe the adoption of the resolution will have any effect on the Paris negotiations.

Mr. ECKHARDT. I recall that. And recall that Ambassador Harriman said that he thought it was most improvident to offer a resolution at this time.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ECKHARDT. I will yield to the gentleman if the gentleman can get me a little more time, as I believe I am nearly running my time out as of now.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I will certainly attempt to get additional time for the gentleman.

Mr. ECKHARDT. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Chairman, I hope the gentleman will agree that I have never at any time stated that Ambassador Harriman favored the passage of this resolution today. I think it is very clear he does not, but it is equally clear on the record, without any misunderstanding, that Ambassador Harriman said as a negotiator he would have liked to have had it passed.

Mr. ECKHARDT. Had he been following the same course of negotiation assume, but he most assuredly disagreed with the approach taken.

However, I am prepared to support House Resolution 613 upon the lines made by its proponents yesterday and today that it does not in any title the sense of Congress to the President's speech of November 3 as ultimate policy decisions with respect to war or peace, and does not purport to shirk the duty of the Congress to maintain at all times its oversight and review of such policies and decisions.

Mr. Chairman, I have prepared a statement signed by a few other Members and myself, which I shall ask leave in the House to add at the end of this statement to the same effect.

I would like to say though, as to the provisions and the watering down of this resolution in debate, that it is most

difficult for me to see that this resolution adds anything to the present approach toward peace. In fact, approximately the same thing was said by Dean Rusk in 1967.

When I first received a copy of this resolution, I started to write to my good friend, the gentleman from Texas, saying that I had left, laying in my box, a resolution that must have been received in 1967 and must have been wrongly dated—because the resolution would have been meaningful at that time. I will see how we bring Hanoi closer to a bargaining table by a resolution that does for almost the same things that were called for in 1967.

I realize that we can have but one president at a time, but why must we have a presidential learning process that operates in tandem?

The only way we are going to resolve this situation, it seems to me, is by regular and measured withdrawals, forthwith, of sufficient troops from the field in order to bring about a broadening of the Saigon government—a government which can bring about and maintain peace, not act as a proxy to continue the war.

Mr. Chairman, the statement to which referred, signed by myself and 10 others, appears below:

**STATEMENT QUALIFYING VOTE ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 613—HOW THE PRESIDENT COMMANDEERED A DEMOCRATIC RESOLUTION**

On November 4, H. Res. 612 by Mr. Wright of Texas, and H. Res. 613 by Mr. Hays of Texas were introduced in the House. Three hundred ten Members of the House in these identical resolutions affirmed "support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam," approved and supported "the principles enunciated by the President," and supported the President "in his call upon the government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness" to honor elections and resolve controversies in accordance with the President's proposals. Mr. Wright has said that the resolutions were intended as general, non-partisan support of the Presidency in his "efforts to negotiate peace." (Also see Committee Report, p. 1.)

But since the resolutions were introduced on the day after the President addressed the Nation, they were vulnerable to interpretation as a sweeping, prior endorsement of such policies, programs, and demands as might unfold in the present and future conduct of the foreign policy of the Nation. Plotting such vulnerability, the President on November 18, in what he himself called "an unprecedented procedure," appeared before the House and embraced what was to be called the Wright-Hays Resolution (H. Res. 613). He stated that it went to the lines of a proposal made in a speech on November 3, and he characterized it as "a majority [were] supporting the policy of the President of the United States."

Therefore the posture of the Resolution in its political context is now changed. Members who had co-sponsored it, along with those who had refrained from doing so, feel that certain basic points must be made to clarify a common position taken by the undersigned. This is particularly true in view of the fact that within about 48 hours after H. Res. 613's introduction, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, in an executive session, reported it out and the Rules Committee has submitted it to the floor under a closed rule.

**WHY THE UNDERSIGNED MUST QUALIFY A VOTE OF "AYE" OR "NO"**

All of the undersigned entertain the fondest hope that the President will exert all "his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam," all hope that "free election open to all Vietnamese" will ultimately determine political control there, as it should in the rest of the world, and all favor, generally, the influence of "impartial and international" bodies in seeking such ends in Vietnam, as elsewhere in the world. Above all, the undersigned fervently desire that the "controversy—be peacefully—resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace be restored at last in Southeast Asia." Therefore many of the undersigned will vote "aye" but with deep concern about the process by which it has come to the House and with the same reservations as those voting "No."

But additionally, all the undersigned strongly believe that ultimate policy decisions respecting war and peace must continue to be the function of Congress, and it is the duty of Congress to maintain at all times its oversight and review of such policy decisions without delegating the same to any other authority. It is not appropriate nor is it consonant with the authority and dignity of Congress to give any general affirmation to an existing and continuing course of action of the Presidency so as to erode such role of Congress.

Because many feel that the Resolution has an element of such "general affirmation" of an ill-formed policy of the President, a large number of the undersigned are voting against the Resolution.

All of us feel that the Resolution is without much real substance and that it has been employed largely as a political gambit. We feel that Congress should take a more affirmative stand in its proper role as formulator of U.S. policy, both domestic and foreign. In this respect we affirmatively urge—

- (1) Efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam;
- (2) The broadening of the political base of the Saigon government; and
- (3) The immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Bob Eckhardt, George Brown, Henry Helstoski, James Howard, Edward Koch, Peter Kyros, John Moss, Lucien Nedzi, James Scheuer, Morris Udall, and Jerome Waldie.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY).

(Mr. FINDLEY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FINDLEY. I yield to the gentleman.

(Mr. HARSHA asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HARSHA. Mr. Chairman, I support this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, as a cosponsor of this resolution I urge its overwhelming approval. Once we had a saying in this country that "politics stops at the water's edge."

It was a pretty good saying and went right along with the theory of the times that U.S. foreign policy ought to be bipartisan, that our Nation's best interests in the world community of nations were served best when members

and leaders of both parties united behind the President.

Neither the first saying nor the second theory prevented or were meant to prevent honest differences of opinion or legitimate debate on world issues.

But they did serve as guidelines for responsible Congressmen in both parties during times of international crisis involving our country.

Thus we pretty generally united behind President Wilson in World War I. We generally stood behind President Roosevelt in World War II. And we united behind President Truman in the undeclared Korean war.

But, Mr. Chairman, somewhere since then we have lost the feeling of being a unified nation, even as we fight to honor our commitments in South Vietnam.

Today there are those among us who not only disagree with the President, but who also seek to provoke active dissent and in some cases violence. Their purpose is not only to show their disagreement, but actually to force the President into taking actions he knows are contrary to the best interests of our nation.

Unfortunately, in the recent past the so-called "silent majority" and many who represent them have stood by and let this happen.

Because they have done so, the world has been given a totally false picture. Too often others now see us as a nation torn by dissent, split into factions and hardly able any more to govern ourselves.

Fortunately this is not true.

Those who seek to destroy the President, those who seek unconditional surrender for the United States and a corollary victory for the Communists of North Vietnam make up only a small percentage of our country.

And those in the Congress who profess to speak for the dissenters and who join with them in their retreat from reality make up a very small percentage of the Congress. They not only have misled themselves they have misled the rest of the world.

What these countries fail to understand, however, is that the right of dissent is part of the peculiar nature of our democratic traditions. The success of this democracy in every crisis in the past has hinged on our ability to unite in spite of our differences. In the case of the war in South Vietnam, it has endured one of its most severe tests.

As a proponent of the Vietnam resolution, I believe that passage of this statement will clarify any doubts these nations may have as to our intentions, our unity, and significantly enhance the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Southeast Asia.

Therefore, the ramifications of this measure, should it receive congressional consent are most important both nationally and internationally. Besides formally vocalizing House support for the President's policy, ratification of the Vietnam resolution will be an indicative action to the nations of the world on where the American people stand on this issue.

The image of American unity that would be projected by the passage of the Vietnam resolution is not one that is trumped up or intended to whitewash American sentiment on the Vietnam war. I believe that it would be a true reflection of the feelings of the bulk of the American people who have paid dearly for this war and want peace not only for themselves but also for the people of Southeast Asia.

Extensive bipartisan support of this resolution would indicate that it is not merely an exercise in party politics nor a simple rubberstamp approval of the President's policy. Instead, passage of the Vietnam resolution would manifest that my colleagues in the House and their constituents believe that politics, even today, should stop at the water's edge.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Chairman, we have learned from experience—I would say grim experience—that resolutions of the House sometimes are used as justification for measures never contemplated by those who voted for them. The Tonkin resolution of 1964 is an example. It was often cited by President Johnson as a congressional mandate for war measures in Vietnam.

Several speakers yesterday asserted, I was glad to note, that House Resolution 613 conveys absolutely no authority to the President beyond that he already possesses, and does not authorize the employment of military measure in any form.

The author of the resolution, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), would do us all a great favor, I feel, if he would clarify the intent of some of the words by answering a few questions.

On line seven are the words "approves and supports." The word "approves" is easily understood, but the word "supports" is something else. Support can take many forms—military action, diplomatic initiatives, public statements.

It is my belief that the use of the word "supports" does not contemplate the use of the military measures in any form whatsoever, and therefore is totally related to nonmilitary measures. Am I correct?

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, the verb "supports" must be read in context with the object of the predicate. The Congress by this resolution approves and supports "the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections."

It might be said that American troops are presently engaged in supporting that principle by military means. However, this resolution affirms our support for the President's efforts to negotiate a peace embodying that cardinal principle. In one sense, this principle is what the war is all about. President Nixon has indicated his conviction that it is the one indispensable basis for a just peace. This resolution declares that the House of Representatives approves and supports that principle and shares that conviction.

Mr. FINDLEY. This response confirms my belief that this use of the word "sup-

ports" is totally related to nonmilitary measures. For further clarification of that same point, in regard to the section the gentleman just read. "supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government, government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body," do not represent an endorsement of U.S. military measures to accomplish and sustain those conditions. Am I correct?

Mr. WRIGHT. The resolution makes no comment on military measures. It does not constitute military advice.

Mr. FINDLEY. Is there any implication that it is an endorsement of military measures to accomplish and to sustain those conditions, that is the conditions of free elections and the possibility of an impartial international body supervising such?

Mr. WRIGHT. The resolution deals only in the most indirect and inferential manner with any use of military force, simply in the sense that what we are attempting to find is the means of stopping the war on a basis of a settlement which would be worthy of the sacrifices already made and in harmony with our own most cherished convictions.

We believe that the avenue to a peaceful settlement lies through free elections and that is what the resolution addresses itself to.

Mr. FINDLEY. Would it be fair to make this assumption—that the resolution cannot properly be construed to deal in any way, direct or indirect, with the use of military force by the United States. Is that a fair assumption?

Mr. WRIGHT. My answer is the same as it has been to the two previous questions asked by the gentleman. It supports the principle that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections.

That is what the resolution says; that is what the resolution means.

Mr. FINDLEY. But it is not intended to justify the use of military force to accomplish that objective; am I correct in that statement?

Mr. WRIGHT. It says nothing about the use of military force. Whether that basic, cardinal principle which the resolution supports could initially have been vouchsafed and protected without the use of any military force is at this point, it seems to me, a moot question. The resolution states that the House agrees with the President in his efforts to secure a negotiated settlement which will embrace the principle of free and fair elections. By "efforts" we refer in the resolution to nonmilitary efforts. We speak of negotiating efforts. The words are "efforts to negotiate a just peace." That is all the resolution speaks of.

Mr. FINDLEY. The language of the resolution has caused the gentleman from California (Mr. McCloskey) to raise what I believe to be an important point. The inference could be made from the language of the resolution that the House wishes South Vietnam to be permanently separated from North Viet-

nam. I do not believe the gentleman from Texas, or any of the sponsors of the resolution, intended to leave that impression. A clearly stated objective of the Geneva Accords of 1954 was the eventual unification of Vietnam, and to the best of my knowledge and belief the United States is unequivocally pledged to that objective. Am I correct that the language of the resolution should not be interpreted as an attempt to modify U.S. support for eventual unification of Vietnam?

Mr. WRIGHT. There is nothing in the resolution which insists upon a permanent separation of the two Vietnam. There is nothing in the resolution which precludes the possibility of eventual unification. I can speak only as one Member. My hope is that any such possible future unification would be based upon a manifest willingness of the majority of the people of both North Vietnam and South Vietnam to determine their own future by the electoral process. If unification is to come, it should come through elections, not through military force.

Mr. FINDLEY. Shortly after introducing the resolution before us, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) sent around a series of questions and answers to allay any apprehensions which Members might have over the wording of the intention of this resolution on Vietnam policy. In the absence of hearing on this resolution, this discussion provided by the gentleman is helpful and appreciated, and I would like to have Mr. WRIGHT's questions and answers cluded in my remarks at this point:

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON H. RES. 613  
TOWARD PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN VIETNAM

Q: Why is this resolution necessary at this time?

A: News from Paris makes it increasingly more clear by the day that there must be an affirmative statement expressing some basic unity of purpose in the United States if there is to be any progress toward genuine negotiation.

It takes two to negotiate. Obviously Hanoi's leaders think they can simply wait us out. Their statements in Paris repeatedly bristle with references to dissent and disunity on the American home front and gratuitous conclusions that the American people do not support the President. Apparently they really believe that we are on the verge of actual internal collapse—and that therefore they shouldn't even try to negotiate, but merely wait for us to give in on all of their demands. This attitude clearly is stalling negotiations and prolonging the war.

Who but the Congress—and part of the House which most directly represent the people—can clearly and credibly that misimpression? Only when the Vietcong understand that there is an underlying sense of unity in the States will they take seriously anything negotiators say. Only then can there be progress toward a negotiated settlement.

Q: Now, really, didn't the White House initiate the request for this resolution?

A: Absolutely not. This resolution, from its very inception, has been a Congressional initiative. Interestingly enough, the idea originated among Democratic members. The initial draft was drawn up by a Democrat. Minor changes were made at the suggestions of Congressmen Hollifield, Hays and Speaker McCormack. It then was discussed with Jerry Ford and Ross Adair. A copy was sent to the White House for comment, and the White House responded with an expression of deep

and sincere appreciation. But no person in the Executive Branch suggested one single word in the resolution or asked for one single change! It is wholly the work of the House.

**Q: Is this another "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution? Could it be so interpreted?**

**A:** Absolutely not. It is clearly distinguishable from the Gulf of Tonkin resolution on at least three counts: (1) Its thrust is entirely toward peace, not war. The Tonkin resolution specifically refers to acts of military reprisal ("all necessary steps, including the use of armed force"). The present resolution explicitly supports and encourages the President in his efforts to negotiate peace.

(2) The Tonkin resolution, by inference at least, seemed to broaden Presidential powers of the United States is prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps. Nothing in the present resolution could be in any way so construed. (3) The Tonkin resolution implied approval for future acts by the Executive ("... all necessary measures"). This resolution, by contrast, explicitly refers to actions already taken and positions already expressed. It is not "open ended."

**Q: Does this amount to a whitewash of the Saigon regime?**

**A:** Not at all. While demonstrating to Hanoi that we are not on the verge of collapse, it also reminds Saigon that we are committed to solution by truly fair and free elections open to all South Vietnamese.

**Q: Shouldn't we include some expression urging the President to withdraw American troops more rapidly?**

**A:** It would seriously dilute the message to so. As Commander-in-Chief, the President must make those decisions on the basis of the best information available to him on a day-to-day basis. The House cannot presume knowledge of future military possibilities. The resolution does make approving reference to "numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith." These obviously include the cessation of bombing ordered by President Johnson and the systematic troop reductions initiated by President Nixon. The House is not attempting herein to advise the President on military matters. It is expressing support for his efforts to negotiate peace.

**Q: Shouldn't there have been lengthy hearings in the Foreign Affairs Committee?**

**A:** This is an expression of the House. There is no reason why we should seek advice or testimony from outside sources. Among the resolution's cosponsors are 25 members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. After all the months of our concern with this issue and the literally millions of words that have been spoken on the floor of the House, surely every member knows he feels on a question so basic as this. Any member of the House still has no doubt, it is doubtful that lengthy hearings would help him arrive at one.

**Q: Why did the Rules Committee report this resolution under a closed rule?**

**A:** The Rules Committee examined all the resolutions and apparently concluded that resolutions of this type have always come under a closed rule. This was the case with the Panama Resolution, the Middle East Resolution, the Hungary Resolution, the Berlin Resolution, the Cuban Resolution, the Southeast Asia (Tonkin Gulf) Resolution, and the United Nations Resolution. Significantly, the four hours of general debate exceeds the length of general debate permitted in any of the foregoing cases.

Undoubtedly numerous members would like to change a word here or add a phrase there. To open it up for amendments would require at least a week of debate. It is believed important to make such a statement as this at the earliest practicable time, and scheduling of other legislation apparently did not permit allotting an entire week at

this time. The rule requests four hours of general debate.

**Q: Can passage of such a resolution be expected really to make a substantial contribution to the search for peace?**

**A:** President Nixon thinks so. Ambassador Lodge thinks so. The Democratic and Republican leadership of the House think so. A substantial majority of the Foreign Affairs Committee members think so. Apparently 315 co-sponsors in the House think so. Particularly if we can pass it by an overwhelming majority, the resolution should make a realistic impact. It should help to induce genuine and fruitful negotiation. I earnestly pray that it will.

The answers circulated by Mr. WRIGHT raise some additional questions to which I would like to seek answers. First, Mr. WRIGHT states:

The resolution does make approving reference to "numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith." These obviously include the cessation of bombing ordered by President Johnson and the systematic troop reductions initiated by President Nixon.

In his November 3 statement, the President spoke of his "plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front." He said:

We have adopted a plan which we have worked out in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all United States combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.

Clearly, then, the President does not limit the importance of his troop withdrawals—the "systematic troop reductions"—to diplomatic initiatives. Rather, his troop reductions are an initiative on "another front."

I am sure that the House does not mean to so limit to its diplomatic effect the significance of troop withdrawals. At some later date, if all hope for a negotiated settlement has been abandoned, this resolution must not be used as a justification to cancel troop withdrawal plans. The resolution could not properly be used to support such a proposition. Am I correct?

**Mr. WRIGHT.** The gentleman predicates that upon an assumption that there might be at some time arise the moment when we would abandon the hope of negotiation?

**Mr. FINDLEY.** Exactly.

**Mr. WRIGHT.** At that point this resolution, it seems to me, would be utterly moot, because this resolution addresses itself to the hope that a just settlement may be negotiated and, indeed, is prompted by an earnest desire to assist in the negotiation of such a settlement which would embody the freedom of the people of that country.

**Mr. FINDLEY.** I am very gratified to have that clarification. I assume the same answer would apply to the following question: If it should occur that fair and free elections are out of the question and not in prospect at all—if we should reach that conclusion as a government—under such circumstances am I correct that this resolution could not be a proper point of reference to justify continued U.S. military measures in Vietnam?

**Mr. WRIGHT.** I am not prepared to speculate on such a contingency. I am

not prepared to acknowledge that we are going to reach any such point and say that free elections are impossible. This resolution addresses itself to the hope that there may be settled a just peace which will be fair to both sides and ascertained by free elections.

**Mr. FINDLEY.** We have to consider contingencies. Who would have dreamed in 1964, at the time of the Tonkin resolution, that events would come to pass putting hundreds of thousands of our men under arms in Vietnam? When the gentleman's splendid resolution was telephoned to Paris, our then Chief Negotiator, Ambassador Lodge, must have been in the process of packing his suitcase, because he was soon to announce his intention to resign in despair, and I think we must face the possibility that fair and free elections may not be in the picture in the foreseeable future.

**Mr. WRIGHT.** If the gentleman will yield further, I must say I consider this question of the gentleman in the nature of a question asked by a prospective bride before repeating "I do," when she might ask the minister, "Now, is there anything in this ceremony which would permit my husband to mistreat me if later we were to get divorced?"

The question would not be timely at that moment. It has nothing to do with the ceremony.

I believe the gentleman's question is not really timely in connection with this. Of course this resolution says nothing with respect to what might happen if its announced goals and ardent hopes were rendered impossible of achievement. I believe and earnestly hope that those goals are capable of fulfillment. That is the purpose of this resolution.

**Mr. FINDLEY.** I hope none of us has to hold his breath until the time occurs when fair and free elections are next held throughout South Vietnam.

I thank the gentleman.

#### Vietnam Roll of Honor

**Mr. Chairman,** at intervals this year beginning on March 25, I have placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD the names of American military personnel killed by hostile action in Vietnam. The second list was printed on April 3 and the most recent one was printed July 22.

The 2,999 names I am listing today cover the period from June through September 1969, as compiled by the Directorate of Statistical Services, Department of Defense.

The first listing, which required 122 pages of the RECORD, and consisted of 31,379 names, was of those killed prior to President Nixon's inauguration.

The subsequent listings, including the one today, consist of 8,013 names bringing the total to 39,392. Those killed since October 1, including 130 killed last week, are not listed.

Taken together they represent the Vietnam Roll of Honor. The list speaks eloquently in measuring the sacrifice the war has required of our young men.

That measurement has special importance today.

First, because this is the season when we give thanks for our blessings as a nation and rejoice in our Judeo-Christian heritage. It is a time for deep reflection,

penitence and resolve—especially crucial this year because of our common determination to keep the Vietnam Roll of Honor from growing one name longer than necessary.

Second, because this is a moment when the decency America has always sought to exalt is clouded by the charge of U.S. massacre of Vietnamese civilians. As never before we need to comprehend the totality of what has developed in Vietnam and the circumstances which may have led some of our soldiers to acts of unspeakable barbarism. The lengthening list of Americans who have suffered violent death there suggests, at least, the bloodshed, agony and, no doubt, brutality that our men have experienced. Last week, for example, 130 Americans died in Vietnam from hostile actions—more than the total allegedly massacred. Is a person less innocent because he wears a uniform? This is a question we may consider as we ponder the innocence of war victims and the total agony of the conflict.

Third, because this is a day when the House of Representatives—for the first time since 1964—makes an official expression about Vietnam war policy.

It is, therefore, a day of grave responsibility for each of us in this Chamber. In my view, nothing can so well convey its gravity as the list of war dead, classified as it is by States and hometowns. Each name must weigh heavily upon us, because of the war decision responsibility which the Constitution places exclusively upon the Congress.

Through protracted neglect of this responsibility, we permitted a small involvement to grow into a major war. Now our President has not only halted the growth but turned it around. He has begun the withdrawal of our ground combat forces and announced a plan for the complete withdrawal of the remaining such forces.

At this juncture the House of Representatives should speak clearly in support of this plan. Official silence on the plan to end our combat involvement is neglect of the same grave order and magnitude as our silence when, step by step, the combat involvement was established.

Silence denies our President and our military forces, as well as the entire Nation, a measure of support which we alone can provide.

Today's RECORD will be filled with statements of support for the President's diplomatic efforts to end the war. This support is easy to extend. Few will hesitate to vote for peace with justice, the concept of free elections, the principle of self-determination, an appeal to Hanoi to let South Vietnam alone. To do so is natural, like saluting the flag.

Apparently, it is not so easy for the House of Representatives to come to grips with the fundamental decision to withdraw our remaining ground combat forces at the earliest practicable date. The President has made this decision. Secretary of State Rogers has said it is "irreversible," yet the House so far has refused to consider it.

It is not natural to grasp the nettle of basic decision if that chore can be left to

others. The Congress shrank from the question of declaring war on Hanoi—we never faced up to it—and now we seem to shrink from the decision to terminate our ground combat involvement. It is more comfortable—easier—to relax in the relatively passive role of supply sergeant to our Nation's military needs and speak only to noncontroversial diplomatic initiatives, leaving the tough basic questions to be handled exclusively by the executive branch.

This is a time for testing of our constitutional system, testing the very mettle of representative government. This is a time for us to rise to a difficult occasion with a clear expression of support for President Nixon's plan for the complete withdrawal of our ground combat forces.

Yesterday the House rejected such an opportunity by refusing to open this resolution to amendment. Another opportunity comes on the motion to recommit. Perhaps other opportunities will follow when hearings on other Vietnam resolutions begin. I say the sooner the better.

By supporting the President's plan for troop withdrawal, we will act in the tradition of others who have served their country's interest with nobility and courage, especially those whose names are listed below:

#### DEATHS RESULTING FROM HOSTILE ACTION IN VIETNAM IN JUNE 1969

##### ALABAMA

###### Army

Brooks, William Lee, Montgomery.  
Crowe, Ronald Gary, Prattville.  
Enfinger, Kenneth Earl, Ozark.  
Graham, Roger Lee, Aliceville.  
Gregory, William Robert, Dothan.  
Harris, Benjamin, Hillsboro.  
Jones, Albert Junior, Rogersville.  
Kannev, Joseph Hayden, Opelika.  
Lyle, John Bruce, Athens.  
Owens, Thomas Earl, Wetumpka.  
Willis, Larry Wayne, Russellville.

###### Marine Corps

Copeland, Samuel Champlon, Birmingham.  
Davis, Emmett Lee, Vincent.  
Lovett, Terry Wayne, Clanton.  
Palmieri, David Harold, Hudson.  
Traylor, Fred Edward, Heflin.  
Williams, Robert Cleven, Greensboro.

##### ALASKA

###### Army

Hibbshman, William Earl, Anchorage.  
Paulsen, Warren, Valdes.

##### ARIZONA

###### Army

Daniel, Fred Jacobo, Mesa.  
Figueroa, Anthony K., Jr., Temple.  
Hughes, John Howard, Phoenix.  
Romero, Robert Luis, Superior.  
White, Samuel Marial, Jr., Tucson.

###### Marine Corps

Montijo, Michael, Tombstone.  
Pearson, Bruce Fuller, Williams.  
Skaggs, Harold Alonzo, Phoenix.

##### ARKANSAS

###### Army

Baker, Danny Ray, Atkins.  
Blevins, Hiris Wayne, Little Rock.  
Davis, Johnny F., Waldron.  
Hampton, Michael Dewayne, North Little Rock.  
Holloway, Freddy Lee, North Little Rock.  
Rucks, Otis James, Stamps.

Teeter, Norman Wade, Russellville.  
Wiles, Johnny, Hardy.  
Williams, Lee Arthur, West Helena.

###### Marine Corps

Charles, Edward William, Gillett.  
Green, William Herschell, Corning.

##### CALIFORNIA

Adams, Leon Henry, El Monte.  
Alaniz, Federico, Jr., Watsonville.  
Alderson, Benjamin Robert, Redding.  
Alvarez, Alex Jim, Compton.  
Arton, Edwin Everette, Santa Cruz.  
Baca, Richard David, Ventura.  
Baker, Ronald Ray, Concord.  
Barnes, Richard Leigh, Bellflower.  
Barnett, Steven Paul, Burbank.  
Baumgardner, Duane Roy, Cloverdale.  
Beaman, Ronald Ralph, Oildale.  
Bellamy, John Michael, Van Nuys.  
Bowen, John Lewis, Monterey.  
Burfoot, Phillip Duane, Barstow.  
Caraway, Johnnie J., Los Angeles.  
Carrasco, Arthuro, Santa Maria.  
Christensen, Harold Roy, West Covina.  
Carr, Paul, Jr., Anaheim.  
de la Torre, Jose Manuel, Fullerton.  
Deltrick, George Douglas, Antioch.  
Diehl, Harry G., Oceanide.  
Evans, Michael John, Maywood.  
Freitas, Robert Edwin, Merced.  
Frost, Herbert Cornelius, Alhambra.  
Goeller, Michael Dennis, Nevada City.  
Gonzales, Carlos M., El Monte.  
Greenlaw, Alan Heald, Redding.  
Guenther, John Carl, Jr., Fair Oaks.  
Henry, Frederick John, Van Nuys.  
Hensley, John, North Forks.  
Herring, Steven Wayne, Freedom.  
Horal, Thomas Glen, Sunnyvale.  
Horn, Alan Murray, Lakewood.  
Howard, David Terrell, La Habra.  
Hunt, Calvin Gene, Bakersfield.  
Ingulio, John Deogracias, Watsonville.  
Kunkel, Alfred Henry, Jr., Lakewood.  
Larimer, Keith Wayne, Tulare.  
Layton, Ronald Dean, Sacramento.  
Lewis, John Stephen, California Hot Springs.  
Mardis, James Arnold, Jr., Vandenberg Air Force Base.  
Miller, Marvin Ray, Riverside.  
Miller, Paul Wayne, San Diego.  
Moss, Charles Lee, Jr., San Diego.  
Peebler, Christy Albert, Tustin.  
Randall, Lynn Murray, San Jose.

###### Army

Richardson, Donald Harold, Redwood City.  
Roberts, Stephen Lord, Redlands.  
Ross, Paul R., Huntington Beach.  
Rubio, Peter Paul, La Puente.  
Russell, Wayne, Los Angeles.  
Savage, Douglas Paul, Covina.  
Sekva, Robert Glenn, Hayward.  
Sellers, Richard Taylor, Jr., Palos Verdes Estate.  
Shaughnessy, Edward Jerome, Hawthorn.  
Smith Donald Ray, Placerville.  
Smith, John Calvin, San Jose.  
Strickland, Douglas Lee, Port Chica.  
Taylor, John Raymond, Taft.  
Teal, Fred Thomas, Cucamonga.  
Tenorio, Rafael Gabriel, Santa Rosa.  
Valadez, Richard Paul, Los Angeles.  
Valencia, Clement, Jr., Los Angeles.  
Villalobos Ignacio L., Pico Rivera.  
Walker, James Daniel, Santa Maria.  
Weber, Paul Frederick, Lemon Grove.  
White, Marvin Charles, Ramona.  
Williams, Robert Alwyn, Napa.  
Wimer, Robert Arnold, Eureka.  
Young, Samuel Lee, Los Angeles.

###### Marine Corps

Abeyta, Ernest, Los Angeles.  
Britton, Murry Lawrence, San Francisco.  
Burke, William Davidson, Jr., Oxnard.  
Cincotta, Thomas Antone, San Rafael.  
Costa, William Carl, Los Molinos.  
Council, Arthur Coby, III, Hawthorne.

Mr. REES. Mr. Chairman, I am going to vote "no" on House Resolution 613. I really do not see why we have to bring a resolution, with so many ramifications, to the floor under a closed rule.

In fact, sometimes I wonder why we even have a closed rule in the House of Representatives, as it certainly does limit debate and it certainly does prohibit amendments many Members wish to discuss as concerning the complicated negotiations in Paris.

There are two areas which worry me, which are not mentioned in the resolution.

One is the nature of the South Vietnamese Government. This is a military dictatorship. I believe it is a minority Government that does not represent the people of South Vietnam. The election they had last year, I believe, was a fraud, because the most qualified candidates or president were not allowed to run, and many of the qualified politicians in South Vietnam are political prisoners. There is nothing in this resolution about broadening the participation in the Government of South Vietnam. There is nothing in this resolution concerning democracy in a country where we say we are supposedly fighting for democracy.

There is something else that worries me and that is the troop withdrawal. If we withdraw the troops, what are we going to find happening? If we withdraw, say, 200,000 troops and the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong seem to be on the edge of a military victory, are we going to send the troops back to bail out the South Vietnamese government or not? What is our policy in this area?

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. REES. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. YATES. Secretary Laird said in a hearing made available this morning that if the Vietnamization policy did not work, escalation of the war was a distinct possibility.

Mr. REES. This is the dilemma in which we find ourselves with this resolution. We find ourselves almost with a minor Gulf of Tonkin resolution giving our support to the administration's future policies in the peace negotiations in Paris.

Mr. HAYS. I have heard the gentleman talk about the Government of South Vietnam. If he would care to express his opinion of the Government of North Vietnam I would be glad to yield him another minute.

Mr. REES. I would be happy to.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman another minute.

Mr. REES. I do not approve of the actions of the Government of North Vietnam. I do not approve of their tactics. I do not approve of the terrorism they have unleashed in the south.

But they are a major factor in these negotiations, they must be contended with at the Paris peace talks.

A very important factor is the Vietcong. How major a factor are they in the peace talks? Perhaps they are a more important factor than the Government of North Vietnam. Do we have a firm policy

in negotiating with the National Liberation Front?

To negotiate, one does not have to love him, his adversary. But one has to recognize who he is and what his motives are.

Mr. HAYS. If the gentleman will look at the resolution, it says "free elections" for all the people of South Vietnam. That would include everybody, and those who call themselves the Vietcong and otherwise.

I just point out that the government of North Vietnam was never elected by anyone. The government of South Vietnam was elected by somebody. There is a difference.

Mr. REES. There is nothing in this resolution which refers to a meaningful coalition government of the various factions within South Vietnam. Unfortunately, we find most of the groups either in the prisons or without political rights.

I believe that whole concept of government in South Vietnam should be broadened along a complete political spectrum, if we are ever to deescalate the terror and to have a meaningful peace.

I will be one of those Members of Congress who will be issuing the following statement:

We do not endorse everything said by the President in his statement of November 3.

We specifically do not give advance approval of future decisions on Vietnam.

We affirmatively urge:

First, efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam; second, the broadening of the political base of the Saigon government, and third, the immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York (Mr. SCHEUER).

(Mr. SCHEUER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to address myself, as my distinguished colleague from Ohio has suggested to the government of North Vietnam. All of us who oppose this resolution are horrified at the gross immorality and inhumanity of the North Vietnamese Government. We are appalled at government by terror, blackmail, and assassination, yes, including the murder of innocent women and children. There is nothing good that we can say about the government of North Vietnam. The only significant thing we can say about them is that we are faced with a condition and not a theory. They are there, they exist, and if we are going to bring this war to an end, then the enemy, no matter how repugnant their conduct, must be talked to, and negotiated with. It is apparent that the government of South Vietnam is not willing to communicate with the north in a meaningful way and to extend their roots and broaden their base to include respected, moderate, non-Communist leaders like General Minh, with whom the North Vietnamese might be willing to enter into negotiations. Until the government of South Vietnam comes to the point of being willing to broaden its base and include within its

ranks, spokesman like big Minh who can communicate with the North Vietnamese, we will be involved indefinitely in this expensive and devastating war. And if we continue the process of Vietnamization by continuing the supply of air power, arms, and equipment to the South Vietnamese Government, we will find that the very size, scope, and scale of our intervention will continue to frustrate the very process of self-determination which we are pledged to support, and, likewise, prevent the process of accommodation and coalition formation, which is an indispensable precondition to commencing meaningful talks with the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong.

I thank my colleague from Ohio for his courtesy in yielding this time to me.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama (Mr. BUCHANAN).

(Mr. BUCHANAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. BUCHANAN. Mr. Chairman, I would join my distinguished colleague from Oklahoma who was in the well a few moments ago in praising the gentleman from Texas for his authorship of this resolution and commend both of these gentlemen for their distinguished work leading toward its passage.

When the President of the United States came to this House a few weeks ago to express his appreciation to that large number of Members of the House who had introduced such resolutions, he indicated that he was speaking to us as Americans and not as Democrats or Republicans, and he pointed out when it came to the important issues of foreign policy that we had always responded as Americans.

I am deeply appreciative of the majority of the Members on the Democratic side of this House as well as on the Republican side who have introduced these resolutions and who are standing up for their country in so doing. We are here acting as Americans and as representatives of the people. There has been a good deal of controversy as to who speaks for the people of the United States. We do. In the Federal Government, in the entire judicial branch, all are appointed. In the executive branch all are civil service or appointed people, except for the President and the Vice President, who are elected, although not directly by the people. It is only in the Congress at the Federal level that there is direct representation of the people, and this is most purely true in the House of Representatives. This is where the voice of the people is heard and their influence is directly felt at the Federal level of government. If we are going to have government of the people, by the people, and for the people, this must be the case. Therefore, the voice of the people of this country cannot be more clearly or purely heard than through the passage of a resolution such as this one which has been introduced by more than 300 Members of the House of Representatives. Through us, the silent majority has found its voice, and speaks out on this issue loud and clear in the passage of this resolution.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Gladly.

Mr. WALDIE. Is it the gentleman's understanding that in the description used in the resolution, to negotiate a just peace, that a Communist government in South Vietnam which came into power by election would result in a just peace?

Mr. BUCHANAN. It is my understanding that the policy of the President—and I will yield to the gentleman from Texas, as the author of the resolution—is to abide by the results of a full and free election, whatever those results may be. I think I must say to the gentleman that such an outcome as he describes is beyond the realm of possibility, in my considered judgment.

I yield to the gentleman from Texas for a more complete response.

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. BUCHANAN. I refuse to yield further until I yield to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT).

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Alabama for yielding. I do agree with the response given by the gentleman from Alabama. I do believe that the gentleman from Alabama has correctly interpreted the position of the President of the United States.

In response to the question propounded by the gentleman from California, based upon a hypothetical possibility that if free elections were held and most of the people of South Vietnam voted to embrace a Communist government, the question propounded was, would this constitute a just settlement or a just peace?

In my opinion, whatever responds fairly to the freely expressed will of the people of that or any other country is just. We are not in South Vietnam to impose upon those people a government of our choice. We are there to defend their right to a government of their choice.

Mr. WALDIE. Now, Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield further briefly?

Mr. BUCHANAN. Yes, briefly.

Mr. WALDIE. I want to quote to the gentleman President Nixon's statement in 1960 during the Kennedy-Nixon debate:

We cannot tolerate a Communist government in South Vietnam.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. BUCHANAN. May I say in response that I am confident and I suspect Mr. Nixon is confident that there is no possibility of such a result from his present policy. I think it is an honest policy, a policy based upon reason and knowledgeability concerning this problem. A free election simply would not result in a Communist government in Vietnam.

There is apparently great misunderstanding in our country both of the strength and the virtue of the government now in power in South Vietnam. I think, perhaps, there are many who fail to understand the situation. The President's present policy of Vietnamization and of step-by-step withdrawal has an excellent chance of success. A basic reason is the growing strength and popularity of the government of the Republic of Vietnam.

Unlike any Communist government in the world today, the present government in Saigon is an expression of the self-determination of the people of that country and exists as the result of a free election. Within the past 2 years a constitution has been drafted for the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and ratified by a referendum of the people. It established a tripartite system with an elected executive branch, an elected legislative branch, and an independent judiciary. Elections were held which American observers on the scene at the time characterized as fair and free elections. A higher percentage of the people of the Republic of Vietnam participated in voting than is the case with our own elections in the United States.

It has been my privilege to meet many members of the legislative branch of that Government and a number in responsible positions in the executive branch. I am impressed with the high caliber of these officials and their determination to create a stable, viable, non-Communist government responsive to the needs of the people of that troubled land. It is not by any means a perfect government. Neither is our own. To dismiss this government, created and elected by the people of Vietnam, as just another dictatorship, however, is libelous in the extreme. It is something of a miracle that in a place wracked for a generation by war this infant Republic could even be born while the heat of the conflict continues. Yet this has not only happened, but the strength of that government continues to increase and its base of popular support continues to broaden.

The Tet offensive of 1968, so misunderstood in the United States, was a disaster for the Communists. It was an abortive effort to bring about the collapse of the Saigon government which resulted instead in the loss of much of the military leadership of the Vietcong, substantial loss of their political infrastructure, plus the bulk of Vietcong manpower. Most of the troops against which we now fight are North Vietnamese regulars. The rate of defections to the Republic of Vietnam has dramatically increased. In the pacification program the Vietcong infrastructure has been continually ferreted out, while on the positive side the government, assisted by our Agency for International Development and the civic action programs of our military, has continued to build a better society for the people of Vietnam in the midst of war and has received increasing support from the population at the grassroots level.

Militarily, the Republic of Vietnam's forces have also grown stronger and with the present intensified training program and the continued supply of adequate weaponry, should be able on a step-by-step basis to take over the combat assignments successfully.

The President's policy of Vietnamization of the conflict can succeed with or without progress at the negotiating table in Paris. It is indeed possible that the resolution which we are about to pass will not result in any visible improvement in these negotiations. In my judgment, the North Vietnamese, who have

never admitted their leadership of the Vietcong and other Communist forces in South Vietnam and who have tended to deny the very presence of North Vietnamese regular forces there, may well never make open concessions at the conference table. It would seem to me more likely that when the decision is made to withdraw from South Vietnam they will simply do so without ever making any admissions or public concession.

This resolution does, even so, serve a very important purpose in that it makes clear to the Communists and to the world that the American people do stand behind their President in his effort to ward a just peace in Vietnam and in his determination that the people of the troubled land shall be guaranteed the right of self-determination. This would logically strengthen the hand of our negotiators in Paris, but whether or not this is the case, it will certainly be a benefit to our troops in Vietnam. The clear expression of our Nation's resolve and commitment cannot but be of benefit to the people of South Vietnam in the struggle for freedom against a Communist aggression which would impose upon them by force a totalitarian government.

It is my profound hope that this message from the people of the United States will be factually reported by news media here and elsewhere clearly understood by the Communists. If this is the case, it will in fact serve to shorten the conflict and help to bring a real and lasting peace in South Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. WOLFF).

(Mr. WOLFF asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WOLFF. Mr. Chairman, debate on this resolution has brought forth many definitions of the crucial phrase "just peace," so once again I must wonder what, really, is a just peace?

Have not all the answers given only proved the ambiguity of this phrase?

After all, did not President Johnson seek a just peace when he escalated the conflict?

In fact, whenever our country has gone to war has not a just peace been our goal?

Are we going to use our definition of this ambiguous phrase? Or Saigon's? Or Hanoi's?

To put all this in perspective, is not this one of the most important—perhaps the most important—issue to come before the House this year?

Then, why were no hearings held on this measure?

Why was it closed to amendments in committee and on the floor?

What are the supporters of this resolution afraid of?

Why, on the paramount issue of Vietnam, are we again going to write a blank check that holds the potential of bankrupting this country?

Are not the answers given to this pivotal question really specious?

Why is the House again ready to abdi-

take its proper role in the determination of policy?

When will we stop being a rubber-stamp for the executive branch?

Could not we just as well fold up and go home if all we are going to do is give blanket, blind support to the President?

Is not this resolution, like the ill-fated Tonkin Gulf resolution, open to whatever interpretation the President may choose to give it?

Did the authors and all who signed this resolution really mean to give a blanket endorsement?

Is it not understood that a vote against this resolution is not a vote against the President or national unity, but a vote against a poorly worded, ambiguous resolution? The fact that the President views the resolution as support for his November 3 speech, even though it was written before then, raises the question—Are not the sponsors' motives already being distorted?

When the President came here, he still did not answer the question: "What is his policy?"

Why do we support an ephemeral policy that has never been explained to

is that policy reflected in the following headline from today's Washington Post: "Laird Sees Escalation Possible Nixon Plan Fails To Win War."

But then has not the President said do not seek a military victory?

What about those of you who want to fight in Vietnam—Does an aye vote bind you to a no-win policy? An ultimate communist takeover.

Will not this resolution undermine and make a sham of the Paris negotiations?

How long can we tolerate this ambiguity?

And does not this resolution really compound that ambiguity?

Can not this resolution really pave the way for escalation, surrender or anything in between?

Are the sponsors prepared to accept any of these alternatives?

In another direction, Mr. Chairman, what does Vietnamization mean?

How long do we stay in Vietnam during Vietnamization? 10 years? 50 years? indefinitely?

To those who claim foreign aid is a giveaway, How long do we continue this biggest giveaway?

How long will we let Vietnam play havoc with our economy?

How do we justify to the American people—to our constituents—the higher taxes, prohibitive interest rates and inflation that Vietnam has caused?

How do we resolve the Vietnamization of the war with our goal of peace?

Is is war or peace that we want?

Or are we committed to the endless financing of corruption? Handouts? Give-aways?

This is supposed to be a resolution to help achieve the worthy goal of "bringing us together"—is not it?

But would not it aggravate the divisiveness rather than helping to ease the great stress and tension in this country. Would not passage of the resolution unleash new waves of discontent among Americans of varying views?

For I ask those who have supported the war, do you realize this resolution opens the door for participation in the electoral process of the very Vietcong we have been fighting?

Is this the reason we have given 45,000 American lives and more than \$100 billion?

Will you who have supported the war be satisfied with the Communist takeover that this resolution is ready to accept?

Will those who have been able to justify our policy in Vietnam, be able to justify to their constituents a Communist government in Saigon?

President Nixon says he has adopted a new policy in Vietnam, so to those who supported President Johnson and now President Nixon I ask: Which policy do you really favor?

And to those sponsoring this resolution who have otherwise questioned policy, are you ready to repeat the error of Tonkin Gulf and possibly prolong the war?

Why did not the author of this resolution offer a similar resolution when President Johnson desired national unity?

These, Mr. Chairman, are the questions that have not been answered. How can we possibly vote "aye" when instead of unity this resolution only brings about confusion?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. SISK).

(By unanimous consent, Mr. SISK was granted permission to speak out of order.)

#### FOR A FAIRER FLYING FINGER

(Mr. SISK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, I understand, although I did not have the pleasure of observing it, that I made national television last night, not necessarily in a commendable fashion, but as a result of what has been reported to me I have sent the following telegram today, dispatched to Rowing and Martian, National Boobcasting Co., Beautiful Downtown Burbank, Calif.:

Laugh-In's decision to give me Flying Finger Award is consistent with standards of performance vigorously defended in recent weeks by executives of major networks and NBC. For prodigious feat of getting my name correct and everything else wrong you are hereby awarded the Spiro T. Agnew Flying Greek citation for outstanding achievement in electronic journalism. Honorable mention certificates go to print media for publishing erroneous information originally and to your research staff (laughter) for not troubling to verify accuracy of published reports. This exceptional accomplishment in broadcast reportage should be of assistance to television industry in fending off charges of irresponsibility and lack of objectivity. At the very least it will be of material help to our congressional reorganization subcommittee, which is currently deliberating whether to open House of Representatives to television coverage. For the record I am not now and never have been a member of any congressional committee or subcommittee contemplating a trip to Africa to inspect roads or for any other purpose.

Since you are now properly informed, and with an affectionate genuflection toward the Federal Communications Commission and

its fairness doctrine, I trust your fierce determination to speak the truth will lead you to take time at the earliest possible moment on a network laugh-in broadcast to make an appropriate correction. Unfortunately, in my humble judgment, a press release acknowledging the error will not do. Yours for a fairer flying finger.

B. F. SISK.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say that if this does not produce the proper results I am going to contact Vice President AGNEW and solicit his assistance in this matter.

Back on the subject of the resolution at hand—and seriously, Mr. Chairman—I do support House Resolution 613. I signed this resolution as a cosponsor of the original resolution 612, because I do pludge my full support to the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Since we can have only one President at a time, I have confidence that this President vigorously, sincerely, and with dedication seeks a just peace in Vietnam, just as the previous Presidents have sought it, and I support him in it. I see no earthly reason why anyone today would have any hesitation in supporting the President of the United States, the present one, the past ones, or one in the future, in seeking peace in any area of the world.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. FOUNTAIN).

Mr. FOUNTAIN. Mr. Chairman, as one of the original cosponsors of House Resolution 613 I rise to support it.

I think it might be appropriate to report at this point at least one passage from the President's own remarks—a passage that should be read again and again by the war's more intelligent and responsible critics:

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its Allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest. This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere. Ultimately this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace. It would bring more war.

This, I am convinced, is the central issue of Vietnam. It is the major reason for our being there. It is the reason we can only get out in an honorable and responsible manner. It is why cries for unilateral, unconditional, total, and immediate American withdrawal are incompatible with this Nation's spirit and ideals—and why such a withdrawal would collapse the confidence which countless millions all over the world have in this country, and thus precipitate eventual disaster for the cause of freedom everywhere.

Mr. Chairman, surely we all want peace with justice in Vietnam. An overwhelming majority of Americans would like to see an early end to the war. In a world torn by violence, every human heart longs for peace.

However, it is apparent, especially after the recent demonstrations in Washington, that there is a sharp division of opinion about how to achieve the desired peace.

I fear there is a serious misunderstanding abroad, and particularly in North Vietnam, Russia and Communist China, as to the degree of support which exists for the President's attempts to end the war with justice and honor through negotiations.

The Communist representatives in Paris have repeatedly thrown up to our negotiators the fact of individual and group dissent within the United States.

Let me make it clear that I strongly support the right of responsible dissent. I also support just as strongly the right to dissent from dissent. Regrettably the Communists do not understand that this is democracy in action under our system.

However, the impression being spread abroad in the world, stemming from selected quotes by prominent Americans, including Members of Congress, is that America is almost wholly unwilling to do anything but precipitately withdraw from South Vietnam, that America is on the verge of internal political collapse.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Americans are still willing to pay any price to further the cause of freedom in the world. The President does have the substantial backing of the American people and of Members of the Congress. In fact, one of the latest polls indicates that 73 percent of our people are behind him.

This resolution would effectively rebut such allegations and show that an overwhelming majority of the American people want a just and responsible peace in Vietnam through negotiations, if humanly possible.

To demonstrate that support in a meaningful way, this resolution, if passed, will affirm the support of the House of Representatives for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just and honorable peace in Vietnam.

Whether right or wrong, the United States has declared it is not seeking a military victory in Vietnam. That is now the declared policy of the United States. It was the policy of the previous administration.

I personally think we were wrong in saying this and in not seeking a military victory which I believe we could have already won by now, especially if we had not halted the bombing and if we had put the proper military pressure upon North Vietnam. But our Government chose rather to fight a defensive war—to fight back, so to speak, in response to attacks from the enemy, and even then our troops were seriously restricted as to what they could do.

Unless we are willing, therefore, to endorse and accept a military and diplomatic defeat—which I am not—either announced or tacitly implied in any hasty withdrawal—then the only remaining alternative is a responsible and honorable withdrawal. This means, of course, protecting our own men and enabling those who have relied on us, to protect themselves after we leave.

That is the course the President outlined to the Nation on November 3. I believe he is earnestly trying to end the war and achieve an honorable peace. He needs our unlimited support in this effort. In fact, he must have it if even a semblance of stability and peace in Asia is to be achieved.

But, in order for a negotiated peace to be achieved, there must be some give and take on both sides. If the U.S. position is misunderstood in the world, then the other side will never participate in meaningful negotiations. They have already demonstrated this fact time and time again.

I believe this House resolution, cosponsored by over 300 other Members will help in this regard. At least, it will help set the record straight.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. BURKE).

Mr. BURKE of Florida, Mr. Chairman, I rise today in support of the House Resolution 613 supporting the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Why? Because I believe that the President, since assuming office on January 20, has pointed the direction, for the American people, the way to a peace with honor that hopefully would discourage the Communists from starting other wars of aggression.

If we will now support the President in his efforts to achieve such a peace, this will be at least one kind of victory and perhaps this is the best we can hope for at this point in time.

Certainly no one can deny that it will be a victory if, when we leave South Vietnam as the President plans, we leave it fully able to defend itself if it has the will to do so.

We will not have run out on our allies as some have proposed, and we will not as a country have run out on our honor.

Instead, we will have taken a major step in implementing the President's plan for the security of all of Southeast Asia.

The plan that says: The United States will keep all of her treaty commitments.

That we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

That in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested, in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

Mr. Chairman, it is clear to me that our support of this resolution will help the President to follow this plan in Vietnam and to achieve a just and a fair peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. PUCINSKI).

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution which in my judgment would help the President get us out of Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I support this resolu-

tion without reservation. I am not going to try to read anything into it or to read anything out of it. It simply states that the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. That is exactly what we are doing here.

We can talk all around this resolution. The fact remains that when you reduce this debate to its lowest common denominator you come up with only one answer: There is only one man in this country who has the awesome responsibility of bringing peace and that man is the Commander in Chief, under our Constitution, the President of the United States.

I want to affirm my support of the Commander in Chief. The President has spoken forcefully and clearly about his plans to withdraw American troops from Vietnam. I think some of his critics have failed to read his message on November 3. The President has made a commitment—a national commitment—to troop withdrawal. He has a plan for such withdrawal and I think he is wise in not announcing a specific timetable for the removal of these troops from Vietnam.

But certainly the situation is such today that such a troop withdrawal is possible.

President Johnson has said right also that if we can endure—if we can hold the line, the time will come when the tide will shift in Vietnam and we can start withdrawing our troops. That tide has now come.

When we went into South Vietnam there was no government; there was no economy; and South Vietnam had no army. They were on the brink of total collapse to the Communists. They were on the very brink of being completely taken over by the Communists.

Today, whether you like this government or not, there is a stable government. It is a government that has endured longer than any other government in the last 20 years. It is a de facto government in that country. There is a strong healthy economy in South Vietnam.

Just the other day they dedicated a new steel mill outside of Saigon which will produce 20 percent of the steel needs of all of Southeast Asia.

There is an army of a million South Vietnamese in South Vietnam—well trained. I saw those soldiers. I saw them in action.

So the President has properly stated that we can now assume a new posture—a new policy in Vietnam, of a gradual and orderly withdrawal of troops. For South Vietnam is now for the first time ready to assume the major role in its own defense.

I do not pretend to speak for the President or for the administration, but I have every reason to believe that by the end of 1970 there will be less than 200,000 American troops left in Vietnam and these will be mostly service-support troops.

President Nixon has set down a policy of disengagement of combat troops. And even if the war should turn and if there should be a new escalation of the war by the enemy, the President now has

many options. He does not have to return American troops to Vietnam nor does he have to limit our help to South Vietnam only to renewed use of American troops.

So what we are saying here today in effect is that the situation has changed. The President has developed a series of new options and is using those options. He has committed this country to troop withdrawal. It would be my hope that we would look at this situation. In the long, hard, costly, difficult war, one that has cost us 40,000 American lives, 300,000 casualties, and countless billions of dollars, there is for the first time hope for American disengagement, and I would hope that this Congress, with the support of Members on both sides of the aisle, will get behind this President. He is our President—not as a Democrat or a Republican. He is our constitutional Commander in Chief. Let us serve notice on Vietnam that under his leadership, we will work our way out of this thing and have the just and honorable peace that this resolution calls for.

Mr. Chairman, I hope we can all see our way clear to join in unanimous support of this very important tool the President needs so urgently at this critical time to bring this tragic conflict to an end, or at least our own involvement in this conflict to an end.

I urge the unanimous support of President Nixon's plan for peace in Vietnam voting for this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. McCLORY).

(Mr. McCLORY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. McCLORY. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to express my support today of House Resolution 613 indicating approval by the Members of this body of the President's efforts to bring an early and honorable peace in Vietnam.

It is intended as no reflection on the aims and objectives of the previous administrations to note here unqualifiedly that the President has taken new initiatives and, indeed, has articulated a new Asian policy which is being carried out in Vietnam and elsewhere in the Far East.

This policy which contemplates a reduction in American manpower—yes, and the complete withdrawal of American combat ground forces from Vietnam at the earliest practicable date—gives assurances also that our long held objectives for the people of South Vietnam continue to be in support of self-determination through operation of democratic processes—free elections supervised by an impartial international body.

Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the President's determination to delegate primary responsibility for conducting the Vietnam war to the Vietnamese themselves, and to limit our role to that of a supplier of military and economic assistance and the assigning of military advisers—this, in my opinion, should always have been our role and this should always be our role. Indeed, this appears to me to be a position consistent with a long-range policy which was developed following World War II. The President's

statement in Guam and elsewhere make clear his determination that we should return to that policy.

In addition to the overwhelming support which the President's policy appears to have among the American people, I was impressed during recent brief visits to India, Thailand, South Korea, and Japan, to note the substantial support of the political leaders of those countries in behalf of the Nixon doctrine.

I was particularly impressed in a conversation with the top career officer in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for India when he expressed concern for the plight of India in the event of a precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam. While the Indians have been critical of our presence in Vietnam, they are aware also, as the result of being attacked by the Red Chinese, that any thoughtless and precipitate conduct on our part would endanger their own welfare. The leaders of Thailand, South Korea and Japan, with whom I spoke, praised both the determination of the President to scale down our involvement in the Far East as well as his declaration that the Asian nations themselves must assume the major responsibility for their own defense. It is heartening to know of this support since these nations of the Far East face the Red Chinese literally at gunpoint.

Mr. Chairman, the resolution, House Resolution 613 recognizes the appropriate role of the President in the conduct of the foreign affairs of our Government and particularly in connection with the war in Vietnam. It supports the President's policy for peace and is an honorable and meaningful expression of this body in behalf of the American people whom we represent.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. BURROW).

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, time and procedural limitations make it difficult for the individual Members to express precisely our respective positions on this important question. My own opposition to the war I must assume is well known.

Just as the Tonkin Bay resolution has been interpreted as a blank check to conduct a war, so this resolution lends itself to the interpretation of providing carte blanche approval—before the fact—as to future negotiations.

The primary thrust of the resolution, in my view, whether intended or not, is to inhibit dissent. This thrust, in my view, will prove to be of little or no avail.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, among others, I intend to oppose the pending matter.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to my distinguished colleague from New York (Mr. OTTINGER).

Mr. OTTINGER. I should like to ask the chairman of the committee or the author of the resolution, if as they contend the resolution encompasses no authorization for increased military activity, why, then, did the committee reject amendments that would have made that clear?

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. The answer to that is that this resolution addresses itself to the subject of our negotiating posture, not our military posture?

I should like to make one comment, if I may—

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to the gentleman from New York for another question.

Mr. OTTINGER. The fear of many of us is that, as previous resolutions and previous statements in behalf of peace have been interpreted to support increased military activity in the name of peace, this resolution may well be construed by the President and used by him, as congressional support for military escalation in the name of promoting a just peace in the future. Certainly, if he decides to escalate he will use this as justification, despite the ambiguous protestation of the sponsors.

Mr. BURTON of California. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. The purpose of the resolution, contrary to the earlier comment, is not to inhibit dissent. The purpose is to affirm assent. We affirm our assent for the efforts of the President to negotiate a just peace.

Any Member of the House might speculate ad infinitum as to some conceivable decision the President might in the future make. This does not address itself to that. This addresses itself to the announced goal of the President to negotiate a peace based on free elections.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 1 minute to answer to the gentleman's question.

I suppose the fair answer to it is that it was because nobody offered such an amendment, so therefore it was not put in the bill.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. The minority views say there were two amendments offered. One was to make it clear that this resolution did not mean approval of any enlargement or escalation of involvement in Vietnam, and the other was to make it clear the resolution did not afford an independent authorization for the commitment or maintenance of troops in Vietnam.

I read from page 16 of the minority views. It says both amendments were offered in the committee and rejected.

Mr. HAYS. I will say to the gentleman, on reading the minutes, there was such an amendment offered. I did not remember it. I thought the gentleman was talking about the resolution to continue troop withdrawal, which was turned down.

The reason I voted against it, and I do not mind telling the gentleman, was to prevent the very things which are being said today, as to giving carte blanche authority to the President to move troops around.

I have said over and over again I do

not want to tie the President's hands as to meaningful negotiations. But I have said over and over again this resolution is expressing support for him to negotiate peace—not to make war, not to escalate, not to move in more troops.

I do not know how much more clear we can make it.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. COLLIER).

(Mr. COLLIER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. COLLIER. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that there is a Member of this body who is not fully aware of the fact that the North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris have used street protests and pronouncements of certain elected public officials against U.S. policy as an effective propaganda tool. I happen to believe that it has been a deterrent to any progress or success in the peace talks up to this time. However, because we enjoy, thank God, the right of free people in a democracy, no one should question the right of orderly or peaceful dissent. Regrettably, though, the dissent of a vocal minority of Americans both in and out of public office has been incorrectly assessed by our adversary. The idea that the expressed attitude of the most vocal and ardent dissenters reflects a consensus of the sentiment of the people of this country both in and out of Congress is lamentable. If we were able to get every adult citizen of this country into this Chamber and read to them the clear and concise language of House Resolution 613 and if it were further possible to have them vote for or against the resolution, can there be any doubt in anyone's mind in this Chamber as to what the outcome would be? I do not think so.

I, like many other Members of this body and many people throughout the country, have had frustrations about the war in Vietnam. I, like many of you, hope and pray for the day when we can extricate ourselves from the quagmire in which we find ourselves in Southeast Asia. Why and how we got there is at this juncture of no consequence in the discussion of this resolution. Certainly these frustrations do not justify the reading into it all of the things that are just not there or setting up of straw men, if you please, based upon what is not in the language. What can possibly be contrary to the hopes and desires of every citizen in this resolution to seek a just peace and to give the people of South Vietnam the right to choose its leaders, to determine its own fate by its own choice.

I have heard so often Members of this body espouse their deep belief in the right of every man everywhere in the world to human dignity. Essential to human dignity is the right of the people to free elections rather than to be placed under the heel of a totalitarian system. Our belief in this principle twice saved the world from disaster since the turn of this century. This principle has shaped the course of this Nation. Can we ask anything less than that for others anywhere in the world? We are today merely reaffirming our belief in this principle and supporting at the same time an ef-

fort to achieve peace on this basis. If we pass this resolution by an overwhelming vote today, it seems to me we will be announcing to the world and to the peace conferees in Paris that we still believe in these ideals. I hope that this House does just that before this day is over.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLLIER. I am delighted to yield to my colleague.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Our colleague from New York (Mr. OTTINGER) asked a question as to why this resolution does not carry a proviso in it that the President cannot increase our troop strength in Vietnam. Would my colleague from Illinois agree with me that if such a proviso were included in the resolution, it would have the same adverse effect that the President's announcement of a timetable would? The President quite wisely said, "I have a timetable, but I will not announce it and tell the enemy how long they will have to wait." Would this not have the same effect if we were to say in here that the President cannot increase troop strength?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman from Illinois 1 additional minute.

Mr. COLLIER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I thank the gentleman.

We would in effect be saying in this resolution that this House is saying to the President that he cannot use whatever resources are available to bring this conflict to a just peace.

Mr. COLLIER. Yes; I agree with the gentleman. There is certainly no intent—and the gentleman should understand this from the nature of the resolution—that we are not trying to write tactical military policy during the consideration of this resolution.

And, Mr. Chairman, I must go to this point: When you attempt to spell out to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the President of the United States, a blueprint by which the Members of this House think he ought to follow with reference to both policy and the conduct of the war, in my opinion that would be ridiculous. We have never done it before and God forbid we never do it.

Mr. OTTINGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COLLIER. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. OTTINGER. I do not support the Goodell resolution for a fixed timetable, nor was that the intent of the question. The question was whether this resolution authorizes the President to increase our military activity in South Vietnam—whether we are giving advance blanket approval, abdicating our future congressional prerogatives, to whatever military action the President may decide is needed to produce his definition of a just peace. The amendments rejected in committee would not have tied the President's hands, as indicated by the gentleman from Illinois, but would have merely made it clear—as the resolution sponsors now assert—that the resolution does not involve approval of any enlarge-

ment or escalation of military activity in Vietnam and does not give any authorization for the commitment or maintenance of troops in Vietnam. The rejection of these amendments—and the closed rule prohibiting such amendments from being considered on the floor—leave the resolution open to interpretation that it is a blank check to the President to take any military action he deems appropriate in pursuit of a just peace, as he sees it. The chairman of the subcommittee admitted the rejection of these amendments. In the face of this admission, it is hard to believe later statements that the resolution encompasses the rejected amendments anyway.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Illinois has again expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Minnesota (Mr. FRASER) is recognized for 6 minutes.

(Mr. FRASER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, months after the fateful loss of President Kennedy this House passed a resolution known as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution giving certain authority to the President of the United States with respect to Southeastern Asia. Perhaps it is more than a coincidence that 11 months after President Nixon takes office we are now considering a resolution to express to the President our support for his efforts to achieve a just peace in Vietnam.

I would judge that once this resolution is passed, just as after the Gulf of Tonkin resolution, it will probably be another 5 years before this House acts again.

Mr. Chairman, the problem with this resolution is, as the gentleman from Oklahoma so candidly stated, that it simply reiterates the goals that President Johnson stated again and again, which was that all the United States wanted was for the people of South Vietnam to have the freedom to choose their own future. In the name of that objective we first had some 20,000 troops and then several hundred thousand troops and then over one-half million troops in South Vietnam. I wish that in South Vietnam we could have elections for the people of that beleaguered country. But when the question was put even to those who are advocating the resolution, "do you really want a Communist government in South Vietnam, assuming the people voted for it?" the answer was that it really is not going to happen; it is very unlikely. But, if it happens that is all right.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. Yes, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. Do you want a Communist government in South Vietnam?

Mr. FRASER. No.

Mr. HAYS. All right.

Mr. FRASER. In other words, what the proponents of the resolution are telling this House is that they want a settlement of this war under a procedure which they, themselves, claim would mean that the Communists would gain no political power.

Now the Communists today and the North Vietnamese forces control certain territory and a certain part of the population of South Vietnam. But the sponsors are, in effect, urging that we hold out for a solution to the conflict in Vietnam, which by their own statement would put the Liberation Front and the North Vietnamese forces further behind than they are today. Do you settle a war using diplomacy or procedures of elections which are going to basically change the relative status of the parties held by them while they are in conflict? I think that any student of international affairs would have to acknowledge that you cannot reasonably expect to settle a war in terms that are substantially different than those reflected in the actual conditions on the battlefield.

What does this mean? It means if we persist in the same goals that President Johnson persisted in for 4 long years, since early 1965, we will fight on and on and on.

And we are going to be fighting harder, I regret to say, than the South Vietnamese themselves are fighting. This is one of the tragedies of that war. If there is any one lesson one can draw from South Vietnam, and I think you can draw many, it is that you do not go in to help people when your forces are going to have to fight harder than the forces of the people you are trying to help.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRASER. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman from Minnesota suggest that we should abandon and forsake the idea of a government in South Vietnam based upon the will of the people as ascertained in an election, a free election in which all the people will be privileged to vote?

Mr. FRASER. I know the gentleman asks the question in all seriousness, and in all seriousness I simply have to tell the gentleman that the choice which faces the United States is either to change our objective or to fight on indefinitely.

Let me ask the gentleman a question: Is the gentleman prepared to stay on in South Vietnam indefinitely in order to pursue this objective? Is the gentleman prepared to say that we should stay for another 10 or 20 years in order to see the objective sought come into being?

Mr. WRIGHT. I would answer the gentleman by saying that I do not think it would be necessary to stay there indefinitely.

Mr. FRASER. It may not be necessary to stay there indefinitely, but if it were would you be willing to stay there?

Mr. WRIGHT. I would not be here with this resolution if that were the only alternative. I believe a peaceful settlement can be made.

I apologize to the gentleman for taking up too much of his time, but does the gentleman from Minnesota believe that

we ought to engage in forcing on the South Vietnamese a coalition government from the outside that would not necessarily be ratified by the will of the people?

Mr. FRASER. My own thought is this: that the United States should not seek to impose on the Saigon government anything. It is my view that the United States has done enough. It has done too much. We should proceed to disengage from the war and let the Vietnamese settle the conflict themselves.

Mr. WRIGHT. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. FRASER. I yield further to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Does the gentleman think that is a satisfactory settlement if a way can be seen that will end the conflict?

Mr. FRASER. I think this war is an unmitigated tragedy. It is as bad a tragedy as I know of anywhere in the world. It is the kind of tragedy that we saw in the civil war in China. It is the kind of tragedy that is found in the Nigeria disaster, by what has occurred in Greece. It is the kind of tragedy that is as bad as any that we have seen around the world. I can only say to the gentleman that there are some problems we cannot solve by ourselves.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. STEIGER).

(Mr. STEIGER of Arizona asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STEIGER of Arizona. Mr. Chairman, I think as everybody else must have observed from listening to the arguments this afternoon, that we have seen a rather interesting development. We have seen what appears to me to be politicians who have painted themselves into a corner by previous rhetoric who are really afraid to vote for this, politicians who are willing to lend themselves to an interpretation that is as far-fetched as an interpretation can be. They have tried to make appear ambiguous that which is relatively free from ambiguity. They say that those who support this particular document are enforcing or endorsing a Communist government in South Vietnam, and they have tried to tell that it is asking for a decrease in the rate of withdrawal of troops.

Mr. Chairman, I think they are embarrassed because they are in a position of having to vote against a just peace in Vietnam, and against free elections in Vietnam.

It would seem to me that if they do feel that they are unable to vote for that, then their embarrassment is genuine, and I share it with them.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate the author of the resolution, and the committee for bringing it out.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Maine (Mr. HATHAWAY).

Mr. HATHAWAY. Mr. Chairman, peace in Vietnam is one of the most urgent tasks facing our Nation, and I support President Nixon in his efforts to

achieve that peace. This does not mean, however, that I feel this House should serve as a "rubberstamp" for Presidential policies in the field of foreign affairs. The people of our district did not elect us to sit up here on the Hill flashing green lights to the Executive down the Avenue. It represents no lack of confidence in the President to urge that a resolution of such import as House Resolution 613 be given our most careful study and consideration. We would be defaulting our constitutional obligations if we did otherwise. It is the purpose of our system of checks and balances to bring a balanced judgment to the issues we face. Vietnam, the subject of the resolution before us today, is the most burning issue of our times.

The initiative in the field of foreign relations is with the President, but the Constitution provides for the participation of Congress in foreign affairs both directly and indirectly. It is the responsibility of the Congress to determine national spending priorities, to raise armies, and to initiate revenue measures which support armies. Most importantly the Constitution grants to the Congress the power to declare war.

The Congress can perform a valuable function by assuming responsibility for the careful scrutiny and critical discussion of foreign policies and programs. In this way it can contribute to the clarification of basic policy issues, and help keep the executive agencies more alert, more efficient, and sharper in their own intellectual processes. Legislative hearings and debate on major foreign policy issues can contribute to public understanding and discussion of the issues.

The danger of security leaks during such public hearings and debate can be minimized, and the risk of such leaks is outweighed by the advantages of enlightened debate on the facts. The people should have a proper channel for a critical analysis and evaluation of foreign policy decisions, and, through their representatives in Congress, they should share with the President in framing broad national objectives in the field of foreign affairs.

Let us play our constitutional role in contributing toward the formulation of foreign policy. I urge the Members of this House to defeat the resolution before us today and send the measure back to the Foreign Affairs Committee for hearings where we can have the opportunity to question officials and experts regarding the implications of this resolution and the many other resolutions on this subject. We are supposed to be a deliberative body. Let us deliberate and study and question before voting on such an important matter.

Mr. Chairman, I have observed the debate for 2 days now and I have been here most of the time.

Many issues have been raised. I think the most important and overriding one is that there are many disputes on the factual basis upon which this resolution is based and that these disputes could be resolved if proper hearings were held before the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN).

(Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Mr. Chairman, the debate on this resolution should have clarified a number of issues for many of us.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to support the resolution. It is my hope, which I believe most of us share, that this resolution in a modest way can be helpful in bringing the war in Vietnam to an early and honorable settlement.

I believe this is a modest contribution. And I pay tribute to the author of the resolution because it does not attempt to take a position on, or to resolve some of the knotty questions with respect to Vietnam. Its basic purpose is simply to support the President in his efforts, which are still continuing, to begin successful negotiations in Vietnam. It takes nothing away from the President in the exercise of his prerogatives and it gives nothing to him. But a public statement of support for his efforts.

The language, of course, could be different. As a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, I pointed out in committee that there were certain changes I might consider advisable. There were major changes offered in the form of amendments in the committee; all these were defeated, in some cases by relatively small margins.

I personally felt that it would not have been inappropriate for our committee to have modified this resolution so as to include some reference to troop withdrawals, those which have taken place or which may take place in the future. At the same time I voted against an open rule on this resolution because without some restriction on debate in the House we could, in an attempt to write legislation in this area, perhaps take until Christmas. I doubt if much would be gained if the House should have been given that opportunity.

However, I personally hope that our Committee on Foreign Affairs does hold hearings on other resolutions in this general area, both with respect to troop withdrawals and other subjects. This will allow both Members of the Congress and members of the executive branch to come and discuss these questions.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. PUCINSKI. I am glad the gentleman made the point about voting for the motion to order the previous question. So did I. It seems to me that those who now raise that point most loudly were the first ones to call for bringing the student loan program before the House under suspension so no amendments could be offered, and similarly on the tax bill they voted to bring it before the House under a closed rule. This is not the first time that an important measure has come before the House under this procedure.

Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

One of the advantages of this resolution, in my opinion, is that it avoids the big policy questions.

For example, except for calling for free elections, it does not go into the difficult question of the kind of government there should be either in Hanoi or in Saigon, or in what ways it might be desirable to strengthen the local government. Nor does it discuss the character and nature of the troop support which we are supplying, and I think this is perhaps just as well.

We recognize that there is some sensitivity about the advisability of a resolution of this character; indeed, that feeling has been expressed by a number of speakers during this debate. This sensitivity is primarily the result of recent history.

As one Democrat pointed out, President Johnson vastly increased our military involvement in Vietnam in his search for peace. The inference was clear that President Nixon might do the same in the months ahead, relying on the resolution now under consideration as President Johnson made use of the Tonkin Gulf resolution.

Many of us were serving in Congress in 1964 when the Tonkin Gulf resolution was approved. Some fear that with the passage of this resolution it might be used to justify an escalation of our military involvement in Vietnam, or at least to continue our military support there indefinitely.

In this case of this resolution, however, as I have already pointed out, Congress as a body is taking no action—it will be an expression of the feeling of the House only.

Critics of this resolution have charged that approval would represent a blank check for future action, as well as a specific indorsement of what President Nixon has already done. Of course a reading of the language shows that there is no blanket approval of what the President has done or what he may do. I might point out also that the resolution carefully avoids any criticism, direct or indirect, of actions taken up to this point. This is no criticism of actions taken by former President Johnson even though several Members have expressed such views during debate.

Likewise there is no praise for actions already taken by President Nixon to reduce the extent of our commitment in Vietnam. As a Republican perhaps I should regret that such language was not included, but actually I am thankful that partisanship was avoided in the language used.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I hope that the President succeeds in his efforts to end this war. This job will not be easy. To secure a just peace will be even more difficult, yet it is an objective which we must pursue.

In a recent statement to a group of American Governors visiting in Rome Pope Paul VI expressed his fervent wish for an early end to the war in Vietnam. The Pope recognized, however, that:

An appropriate means of putting an end to the conflict requires, in present circumstances, a well-meditated and responsible procedure, not only to assure that international obligations are not neglected, that honor and the need not to betray the trust of allies should be fulfilled, but also for the

cause and the ideal held by your fellow citizens for which many have sacrificed their lives: aiding people weak and needy of assistance in defense of their right of self-determination and the free promotion of their peaceful development. This cause and this ideal should not be negated. We nourish faith and hope that all who have a part in the Vietnam war will contribute to rendering the (peace) negotiations easier and more expeditious and that these negotiations will very soon lead, not only to end of the conflict, but to peace, a true and lasting peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. LOWENSTEIN).

(Mr. LOWENSTEIN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LOWENSTEIN. Mr. Chairman, the one thing that this discussion has made clear is that this resolution means all things to all men. Since it means all things to all men, one might assume it really, in the end, means nothing to anyone. Unfortunately, that is not the case.

Clearly, it means something to the President, or we would not have been treated to the special pressures that have assured its passage in this dubious manner. He has told us what it means to him: a blanket endorsement of his speech of November 3, with all its vagaries, inconsistencies, threats and bad history. Members may say what they wish about their intent if they vote "Aye"; the President will act on his version of what they meant. If Tonkin Gulf taught us nothing else, it surely has taught us that.

To the Saigon government it will mean that we are committed to stay in Vietnam until what are called free elections are held. This can only be a renewed announcement to that government—a government which never has believed in free elections—that as long as it can avoid free elections it can count on our continued military presence.

But the very use of the phrase "free elections" in this situation has to be self-deluding, since the Saigon government, over and over again, has told everyone who will listen that it will never allow a government it regards as pro-Communist to take power. So if we are to take this resolution seriously, we must assume that people the Saigon government calls pro-Communist will agree to take part in elections knowing they cannot win; or, alternatively, we must understand that we are committed to staying in Vietnam until a process has occurred which, by definition, cannot occur. That means that we will have to stay in Vietnam for the foreseeable—and unforeseeable—future, in hot pursuit of something which does not and cannot exist.

The procedure we are using to consider this resolution will not help matters much either. That procedure will add to the bitter and growing disunion in this country that distresses some of us so deeply. For whatever the purposes and protests of its sponsors, this is not a unifying resolution to begin with, and to approach its adoption in this way is to make of it a positive force for further dissension. The unifying of free men

cannot take place at the cost of their integrity, or of the democratic process.

For one thing, we are told to take it or leave it. Discuss it for 3 minutes each—it and the vast, endless war it concerns—then vote for it or be damned as helping Hanoi. If you do not know what it means, if there is no legislative history, if you are denied the chance to ask questions, or to answer questions, or even to answer innuendoes—forget all that and vote aye, or be accused of opposing and obstructing national unity.

But unity of free men in a divided nation is achieved by people counseling together in good faith and with good will. Discussions—and concessions—must seek common denominators, and procedures must be followed that will minimize resentments and encourage a spirit of trust and genuine effort. Then, tensions and division may ease, feelings of unity may be maximized, and some points of agreement may be found or worked out.

None of that can occur in this atmosphere, or on behalf of this resolution. What facade of agreement may be created by this misleading vote will not survive the most cursory glance through the statements even of those who have voted aye, so many of whom are doing so only after specifically noting that they did so because they do not know what the resolution means and so cannot see how voting for it can do any harm.

And that is certainly an understandable position. But while the meaning of the resolution is unclear, what is clear is that passing it in this fashion is a further abdication of the constitutional obligation of the Congress to declare wars if they are to be fought, and to concern itself with the peace and security of the Nation when they are imperiled.

There is, furthermore, something especially objectionable about passing high-sounding moralistic resolutions about American purposes in Vietnam at this particular moment. To pass this resolution as if the world were not still reeling from the relations about Song My shows all the sensitivity of a stone wall.

In short, you do not unify by shutting off the words of those who do not agree with you. You do not further the quest for a "just peace" in Vietnam by passing resolutions that blunder from incorrect historical recitations to the reiterations of high-sounding, unobtainable, and inconsistent—and, therefore, hypocritical and misleading—goals.

If the goal is really free elections, why do we not help the people of Spain and Greece to get free elections? Are we only for "free elections" where they cannot be obtained even at the price of half a million American troops and vast expenditures of lives and resources? There are places where we can support the principle of free elections and actually save some of our money, by refusing to continue to subsidize governments that spend so much of it and still are not willing to allow their people to vote.

If, on the other hand, the goal is a negotiated peace, surely it is clear by now that that goal cannot be achieved

while the Thieu-Ky government is in power, since there is no way that government can stay in power without our military presence and no way the other side can be induced to make peace while Thieu and Ky are in power. Given these facts, one might as well expect the wife of the Attorney General of the United States to lead a peace parade as to expect the Saigon government to let us leave or to negotiate itself out of power.

But it cannot be in the best interests of America to allow our foreign policy—especially on questions of war or peace and life or death—to be determined by foreign governments, least of all, perhaps, by the governments now in power in Saigon and Hanoi.

The national interest of this country requires us to begin immediately the withdrawal of all our Armed Forces from Vietnam on a stated schedule. If, after 7 years of American assistance, after 300,000 U.S. casualties and \$115 billion, if the Saigon government cannot now take care of itself against a ruthless and presumably despised Communist dictatorship ruling a smaller country, then perhaps it is time to face the fact squarely that it is not going to be able to do so if we simply keep propping it up for a few more months or years.

Nor is beginning the total withdrawal of all American servicemen going to encourage Hanoi to "wait things out." Does anyone really think Hanoi needs encouragement to "wait things out"? And if they did need such encouragement could we do anything here that would come close to rivaling the encouragement they must have obtained from the President's announcement of the decision of this Government to withdraw our combat troops as soon as practicable? What beginning the total withdrawal of our forces might do is to stop encouraging Saigon to wait things out. For the Saigon government would at last be put on notice that either it must negotiate a political settlement, or it must take over the fighting.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose this resolution, so innocent at first glance, so deceptive after analysis, so dangerous in the long run, it can only create further illusion in Saigon and further disillusion in this country. For, however cleverly it confuses the options now available, and no matter how many Members vote for it, nothing can long obscure the determination of the American people to get their troops out of Vietnam. We do no one a service by muddying that central fact with archaic rhetoric about equivocal resolutions.

As Mr. Townsend Hoopes, former Under Secretary of the Air Force, puts it in his brilliant book, "The Limits of Intervention":

Should the U.S. government pursue a course of partial withdrawal in Vietnam, while leading the American public to believe all will end well, I am afraid a number of unpleasant shocks, surprises, and politically dangerous consequences would arise to confront us. For at best, such a course is a prescription for an interminable war; partially disguised by the declining level of U.S. participation, it would in fact require our country to sustain a continuing burden of war casualties and heavy dollar costs that would

become explicitly open-ended as we leveled off our forces at 100,000 men or thereabouts. Sooner or later, and probably sooner, the American people would reawaken to the fact that they were still committed to the endless support of a group of men in Saigon who represented nobody but themselves, preferred war to the risks of a political settlement, and could not remain in power for more than a few months without our large-scale presence.

I include in the RECORD at this point an especially valuable article and editorial from LOOK, one of America's most distinguished and widely read magazines:

Vietnam: GET OUT NOW

(By J. Robert Moskine)

We have also failed to create a Vietnamese Army that can carry on its own struggle. To try to achieve that long shot will cost more tens of thousands of American lives.

And we have failed to help build a popular or democratic or cohesive government in Saigon. The current regime is a military dictatorship that depends wholly on our presence.

I have never been a Vietnam hawk either, but I respected the judgment of four U.S. administrations that called the fate of South Vietnam vital to our national interest.

Now, President Nixon has reversed this judgment, for which 39,000 Americans have died, 250,000 have suffered wounds and about \$100 billion have been spent. In his policy-setting May 14 speech, he said, "We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves." This means our Government no longer believes that it is in our vital national interest to keep South Vietnam free from Communism.

It is a fair standard that young Americans should not be ordered to die unless their sacrifice is vital to their country.

We have absolutely no sane reason left for killing more than 1,000 young Americans before the end of this year. Our present course—spooning out American lives in an infinitely complex, inscrutable Asian game—is inexcusable.

It is difficult to conceive that the present South Vietnamese Government can survive the end of the hostilities or that South Vietnam, even if we go on fighting, will not be Communist-dominated soon after we leave. It really doesn't seem to matter whether we march to the transports today or dribble out before the 1970 U.S. elections or over the next three years. The results will be the same—except in the number of the dead.

In 1967, I traveled for LOOK along the frontier of American power on the western edge of the Pacific Ocean, and came home convinced that our involvement in the future of Asia is irreversible. That conviction remains. We are not about to scurry back into a Fortress America. Our presence across the Pacific is too massive, our interest too deep. But on this latest trip to Vietnam, I saw that we have overreached ourselves. America's historic westward-driving wave has crested.

No one I talked with—certainly no Vietnamese—believes we should stay in Vietnam. Everyone said we should get out. They differed only on the speed with which we should do so. The most militant—sometimes those most scared for their own skins—said in three years. At a conservative estimate of 100 U.S. dead per week, that means 15,800 more coffins.

Why is South Vietnam's political self-determination still worth dying for? Because, I was told in Washington and Saigon, we have committed out word, and if we leave precipitously, our word will be dishonored. We will lose face. Three years ago, Secretary of State Dean Rusk gave me the same reason for continuing this war. He called it "the credibility of the American commitment."

The Nixon Administration believes we will be "severely hurt" if we "bug out." It wants "a reasonable solution," praying for reasonableness from Hanoi while recognizing that it is against the Communists' interest to be "reasonable."

But by staying, are we telling Thailand, for example, that if it gets into trouble with Thai or North Vietnamese guerrillas, we would help? No one expects, I was told, that we would then send an expeditionary force to Thailand.

The outcome of this "war of national liberation" has no relevance to the chances of having more such wars in the future. Just about every Asian leader knows we have had enough in Vietnam.

Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew told me, "Vietnam was a bad place to draw the line."

Why then are Americans dying today in Vietnam? To give the South Vietnamese time to prepare to govern themselves and defend themselves. Are these reasonable goals?

We thought they were. We thought the South Vietnamese leaders would use the time we helped buy for them—with American lives and money—to good advantage. But they have not.

You need only go out in the countryside to see the failure of the succession of South Vietnamese governments to win the people's loyalty. Go to the upriver village of Dien Ban, about ten miles south of Danang, our great northern base in Quang Nam Province. You can get in safely only by helicopter. Here, American marines have to wear their flak vests in the road just outside their walled compound. This area has been fought over for years; there is still fighting every day. If the refugees were resettled in the countryside, officials fear, they would join the Vietcong.

I visited Dien Ban with the chief of the pacification program, Ambassador William G. Colby, who ranks Quang Nam 38th out of the 44 provinces in security. Terrorist attacks are heavy: government officials and ordinary civilians are being assassinated, wounded, kidnapped. The province chief, an Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) colonel, figures that the Vietcong have 900 officials of their own in the province. Our side sends out "Political Recon Units" to terrorize and kill VC leaders.

Destruction in Quang Nam Province has been massive. Five years ago, the province had 557 hamlets; only 308 are left. The number of refugees has jumped in five years from 35,000 to 124,000. (One of every 12 people in South Vietnam is a refugee today.) Less than half of the province's rice land is cultivated. Fishermen may not return to shore after 6 p.m. Anyone walking about in the countryside after dusk without a light is shot automatically. In this province of 540,000 people, only one Vietnamese doctor remains, and while I was there, he was vacationing in West Germany. The people in the villages know nothing about the peace negotiations in Paris.

"Ninety percent of the people would cut our throats if they had the chance," a top American in Quang Nam told me.

Ambassador Colby says, "It's been a war between two apparatus, and the people wish they would both go away."

Warren E. Parker, senior U.S. adviser in the province, describes the situation today: "It's like a Cadillac pushing a Model T through a muddy road with four flat tires with a driver who doesn't know where he's going and doesn't really care."

On an island in the river below the provincial capital of Hoi An sits the Xyuen Long Refugee Camp. It vividly tells part of the story of Vietnam's hopelessness. Here live 3,125 refugees. Only 240 are men. Until this summer, these people all lived on another nearby island that was regarded as a VC stronghold. A swift military sweep scooped up the women and children and

a few of the men and transferred them to this desolate sand-dune camp. The rest of the men still are hiding with the VC in the tall grass. Moving their families in this manner made no converts, won no friends.

Yet President Nixon found himself able to tell U.S. troops in Vietnam this summer: "I think history may record this as one of America's finest hours."

In Paris, the diplomats debate semantics over whether troop withdrawals should be called "mutual" or "simultaneous." In Saigon, the politicians, fragmented in dozens of parties, struggle for a piece of the spoils. And out in the countryside—where there is firing every night, assassinations repeatedly, where 12-year-old girls carry rifles—you feel that whatever happens in Paris or Saigon, the word will never get down to the bitter, frightened peasants in the fields and the thatch huts. The struggle, the terror, the dying of this desperate 23-year war—in which more than a million people have been killed and wounded—will go on and on. Says a wise American official there, "You can't negotiate an end of this war. We can only negotiate our way out of it."

In a lovely house in the handsome Paris suburb of Verrières-le-Buisson, Mrs. Nguyen Thi Binh, foreign minister of the National Liberation Front's self-appointed Provisional Revolutionary Government, told me much the same thing in more dogmatic terms. An attractive woman, she left a husband, a boy, 13, and a girl, 9, in Vietnam to head the VC delegation in Paris. Wearing a pale pink *ao dai* and black silk trousers, she sat in a sunny upstairs parlor next to a vase of red roses. Her eyes were hard, but she smiled as she talked: "I am, politically, a woman who resists American aggression for national independence. I am not a Marxist or a bourgeois. I love my country. I long for peace to come back so I can lead a normal life with my children."

But there is no hint of compromise: "If the American Government realizes its erroneous policy of aggression and is willing to end the war of aggression, we are ready to discuss with the American Government putting an end to the conflict. . . . If the American Government obstinately pursues its policy of aggression, the South Vietnamese people are resolved to struggle to victory."

Both sides claim they want elections in South Vietnam, and Mrs. Binh says, "The question is how to organize genuinely free, democratic general elections. The first condition is there must be no presence of American troops of aggression—and without foreign interference."

"I consider the Saigon administration has no competence to organize these elections because if the Saigon administration would organize these elections, they would only give birth to another puppet government."

"The Provisional Revolutionary Government has not asked to organize these elections or put forth election laws, and we [advocate] the formation of a provisional government that will organize the election."

That same day, Nguyen Thanh Le, the thin bespectacled spokesman for the North Vietnamese Government, sat in a room behind a heavily guarded stone wall in the Paris suburb of Cholsy-le-Roi, puffed English State Express cigarettes, sipped amber tea from a signet cup and said, "There can be no genuine free election while 500,000 American troops and 60,000 satellite troops remain in Vietnam." He asked if there could have been free elections in France when it was occupied by Hitler's troops.

I ask him why his government, if its objective is to get the United States out, doesn't agree to a cease-fire and simultaneous withdrawal of U.S. and North Vietnamese troops—and then the Americans would be gone.

Le tapped his right forefinger emphatically on his yellow cigarette box and said slowly, "Let me make it simple. Suppose there is a house, and a robber broke in and wrecks the property and killed the wife and children. The master of the house has the obligation to fight back. Simultaneous mutual withdrawal equates the bandit and the master of the house." He added, "The Johnson war is now becoming the Nixon war. Mr. Nixon is even more cunning, more perfidious."

I asked Le about the fear of many that when U.S. forces get out, there would be a bloodbath, especially of anti-Communist Catholics. He called this propaganda of the ruling class. "There are now in South Vietnam many Catholic patriots and many Catholics and people of other religions who participate in the advisory council of South Vietnam and in the leadership of the NLF and the PRG."

"We have no discrimination against any religion. We unite with every patriot to defend the country. So far, those who previously participated in the puppet administration or army, no matter how their pasts were, if they favor the independence, peace and neutrality of South Vietnam, we will cooperate with them and we welcome them."

In Saigon, Sen. Nguyen Gia Hien, who heads South Vietnam's largest Catholic party and who studied at the University of Montana and Iowa State for six years, disagrees. He foresees a massacre. "I'm sure of it. We are not scared of it. The killing is going on now already, not only soldiers but civilians. They will attack anyone who is not working with them—not only Catholics."

The truth is somewhere between a massacre and a welcome. Certainly, the Communists will try to eliminate their most ardent opponents, and asylum will have to be provided for thousands. But this is a problem that will have to be met whether we get out now or later.

Hien's party, a member of President Nguyen Van Thieu's six-party coalition, the so-called National Social Democratic Front, is strongly anti-Communist and consists mostly of refugees from the North. Hien says it was originally subsidized by the late Francis Cardinal Spellman of New York, and Hien had a three-hour meeting last winter with Terence Cardinal Cooke in New York. Today, Hien accepts the eventual withdrawal of U.S. troops. "Withdrawal of the main American force should take about three years. It was a period of three years. Two years is too quick for us. If after three years we cannot take care of ourselves, we have nobody else to blame. If the Communists take over, some people will fly off, and we will be guerrillas. And it will go on again."

Meanwhile, he presses Thieu for social and land reforms. "We can do more for peace by being more liberal, being better organized, less corrupt."

Truong Dinh Dzu, who ran second to the Thieu-Ky ticket in the 1967 presidential elections and who favored talking peace with the Vietcong and creating a coalition government, was thrown into jail. But there are still some political figures in Saigon who advocate what Le and Mrs. Binh call "independence, peace and neutrality." One such group of intellectuals calls itself the Progressive Nationalist Force. Its chairman is Tran Ngoc Lieng, a 46-year-old lawyer. He told me, "We advocate a complete and immediate cease-fire. We call for a government of reconciliation that will have the responsibility for holding elections in Vietnam." Such a government, he says, would be composed of non-Communist nationalists of both sides, and all its members would have to be acceptable to both sides. This rather idealistic plan would naturally exclude members of the Thieu government as well as the Communists in PRG.

Although Lieng will not admit it, he is reportedly close to Gen. Duong Van "Big" Minh, who is perhaps the nearest thing

South Vietnam has to a popular politician and who has now been allowed to return from exile in Thailand.

Salon politics is atomized among north-ers, southerners, several factions of Buddhists, Catholics, religious sects like the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao, neutralists and anti-Communists. Splitting these groups are layers upon layers of individual feuds and historical animosities that go back to the period of French rule. And, above all, most of the politicians are out for their own gain.

Says retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale, who knows Vietnamese politics. "It's a family quarrel, and a very savage one, as a family quarrel can be."

The feuding factions seem no longer able to get together before it is too late. But if these anti-Communist and non-Communist nationalists do not unite, there is no chance that they can survive in the postwar political turmoil.

Sen. Tran Van Don, a former general who led the 1963 overthrow of President Ngo Dinh Diem, says, "The problem is not with the NLF. The problem is inside ourselves . . .

"I don't believe President Thieu can lead the country alone. He needs to rally the army and the people. It is not enough to rally the United States. But he is very proud. He is very jealous of his power. He wants to keep power for himself. I think he would like to become a dictator."

Responsible estimates of the number of political prisoners being held by the Thieu government range as high as 30,000. Many politicians, editors, intellectuals have been jailed by military courts or by "administrative procedures" at the government's whim. They are held for arbitrary lengths of time. The secretary general of the House of Deputies of the National Assembly, Tran Ngoc Chau, says, "Many times people get kidnapped in the streets and taken to places no one knows about."

A woman secretary in the National Assembly was jailed for a month because she has a relative in the Vietcong. A neutralist politician was given a year in prison for calling an illegal meeting—a press conference. A Saigon University professor's two-year sentence for criticizing U.S. policy was suspended; but ten months later, he was still held on the prison island of Poulo Condore. Publisher Nguyen Lau of the Saigon *Daily News* was sentenced to five years because he talked with a Vietcong agent. (Thirty newspapers have been closed down.) Such cases do not increase confidence in the possibility of free elections.

U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker does not condone these actions, but he says, "We have to remember they are at war. The war is right on their own soil—right in Saigon."

A courageous lawyer, Tran Van Truyen, 66, who has represented a number of such political defendants, says, "We have a national assembly, the president of the republic elected by a general election. But I tell you we have a seeming democracy. . . . This government permits no criticism."

Sen. Tran Van Lam, a leader of Thieu's National Social Democratic Front who became South Vietnam's foreign minister in the recent cabinet shuffle, wants the military courts eliminated and all cases tried in civil courts.

Of an American withdrawal, Lam says: "Personally, I think it would be a very good thing. This must be a Vietnamese war."

The government in Saigon is not a popular government. It is basically an army regime, and the people universally fear the army—any army. Hopes that the cabinet changes in September would bring into the government a broader range of civilian views were dashed by the appointment of a right-wing general as prime minister.

The real power behind this government is in the hands of the generals, and Thieu has constantly resisted American pressure to

democratize his methods and broaden his political base. What little has been achieved is mainly the result of American persuasion and arm-twisting. Ambassador Bunker, Thieu's confidant, has by all accounts been superb at this. But it has not been enough. A knowledgeable American in Saigon says of Thieu, "He wouldn't have a chance in hell if the Communists weren't pounding at the gates."

The Vietcong obviously want to avoid an election, even if internationally supervised, that would be managed on the rice-roots level by province chiefs, district chiefs, soldiers and police beholden to Thieu. The common guess in Saigon is that the Vietcong's Provisional Revolutionary Government would win 30 to 25 percent of the vote. But since Thieu won in 1967 with only 25 percent, and a major part of that came from the army and the bureaucracy, he has little margin of safety. With the ras putting up a common front and the Saigon politicians divided, the political struggle threatens to be as hopeless as the military one has been.

Since a political solution that will leave South Vietnam non-Communist is so iffy, it's up to the army, the Arvin, to hold off the Communists. Crucial is the speed with which the Arvin can replace the GI's. The process of preparing the Arvin to take over the fighting is what we mean by "Vietnamization."

U.S. officers now admit that one of the great failures of our military effort has been our neglect of the Arvin. The result of this—plus the Arvin's war weariness, corruption, low pay and the killing off of many of the best officers—is an army that is incapable of defending its country, even if given all the benefits of the United States technology.

Says one American general in a position to judge, "They'll be reasonably self-sufficient in time—three years from now." The question is, can we wait?

When Vietnamization started, no one expected to prepare the Arvin to handle the North Vietnamese Army. The hope was that, in time, it could stand up to the Vietcong. Now, the Nixon Administration dreams of preparing the Arvin to cope with the NVA, too, as a possible alternative to mutual withdrawal.

Of course, even if a cease-fire or peace were arranged and/or American forces withdrawn, there is no way to insure against reinvansion from the North in overwhelming force months after we go.

Ironically, the greatest American hero of the war, Gen. William C. Westmoreland, who commanded our forces there and now is the U.S. Army's Chief of Staff, has become a scapegoat in Vietnam. Some American officers who want to keep fighting today claim that Westmoreland fought the war all wrong, "clobbering everything in sight" in World War II style with big unit battles and massive air support, while the enemy was fighting a semi-guerrilla war.

The military public relations people's new hero is Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the able current U.S. military commander, whom they love to call "The Spook." Abrams' approach is not to wait until the enemy has massed but to hit him as he is preparing his battlefield and gathering his forces from his headquarters safely out of reach in Cambodia.

Abrams told me, "There is a limit to what the United States can do. The solution here has to be Vietnamese." He adds, "I'm in favor of taking out some American troops. There is such a thing as helping too much."

Yet, the fact remains that the Arvin continues to need a great deal of help. It has three main problems. First, it is hated and feared by its own people. One American official in the field tells how a Vietnamese Ranger battalion, supposedly an elite unit,

recently went through a village, stealing chickens and belongings. He says with disgust, "You don't make friends that way."

Second, a tremendous effort is needed to train the Arvin's officers and men to handle complex weapons and communications systems, from radios to helicopters. As an American officer told me sardonically, "We'll know we're making progress when we can get a phone call to the Arvin straight."

Third—and most urgent of all—is the problem of leadership. American observers say the Vietnamese, when properly motivated and led, can be excellent soldiers. But the Arvin's officers and even noncoms are too often personally overambitious and corrupt.

All in all, I return from Vietnam this time with a sense of hopelessness, deeper perhaps than the personal despair expressed by Look correspondent Sam Castan before he was killed in combat there in 1966.

Politically and militarily, the South Vietnamese are still, after all these years, not yet prepared to take care of themselves. It would cost more thousands of American lives to give them any chance to do so. Now that our Government no longer judges it vital to our security that South Vietnam not go Communist, what justification is there for further American sacrifices?

The simple truth is that the price of keeping South Vietnam non-Communist has been raised to a level the American people are no longer willing to pay. That is a realistic definition of defeat.

If we learn the lesson of Vietnam—that American power has its limitations—this war may at least mark the end of an era and the beginning of a new, less punitive and more imaginative role in the world for the United States.

#### AN EDITORIAL: A VICTORY WE CAN WIN

LOOK's May 14, 1968, issue carried an editorial which concluded that "the most important national business before us in this year of political debate is to wind up our involvement in the Vietnam war as quickly and as honorably as possible, and to go on from there to the creation of a world order in which America's ingenuity will truly serve the cause of peace."

Eighteen months, scores of meetings, hundreds of speeches, thousands of deaths, millions of tears and billions of wasted dollars later, we think these words are worth repeating—here at the end of Bob Moskine's eloquent report—in the hope that someday soon, someone in Washington will have the courage to say: "We made a mistake. This is not our war. Let's stop it—now."

Simple? Yes. Politically risky? Perhaps. Humiliating? No—because that would be a new kind of American victory—a victory won over our own willful and self-defeating pride. A victory the whole world would applaud.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. SCHADEBERG).

(Mr. SCHADEBERG asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCHADEBERG. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613. One of the reasons we do not yet enjoy peace in Vietnam is that the military junta government in North Vietnam, which is not in power by the expressed will of the people, who have not enjoyed the right of free elections, has interpreted the division in this Nation created over our participation in Vietnam to mean a loss of confidence not only in the leadership of this country, but in our ability to win a military victory in Vietnam. It is not my desire to impugn the loyalty or

patriotism of any citizen who chooses to oppose verbally and/or by demonstration the policy of our Government but the fact remains that the prime movers of the organized opposition to our Vietnam policy have intentionally or unintentionally given aid and comfort to the enemy. How else can we interpret it when the Hanoi government openly praises the efforts of the demonstrators that keep the wounds of disunity festering.

Be that as it may the time has come for this House to be about its business of closing ranks to give the President the broad base of support necessary in his negotiations to bring our participation in this war to its earliest honorable conclusion. Without closing ranks there can be only two alternatives open to us: (a) outright surrender or (b) escalation of the war. To escalate the war in Vietnam would be, I believe, to break faith with the American people. It would put this Nation in the untenable situation of being the aggressors in Vietnam. This is the label, false to be sure, that is pinned on us by an enemy expert, as it is unprincipled, in its propaganda efforts. What is needed is not an escalation but a definite deescalation of the military activities. Our President is committed to a policy of deescalation and he deserves our support.

It would be most unwise to accept outright surrender in Vietnam not only because of the loss of honor for this Nation; or because it would result in having our young men who have served in Vietnam to have made their sacrifices in vain—but because it would open the door for the next world war which must be avoided if at all possible. It would be an admission that we cannot win the war or at least be interpreted by the Communist world as our inability to win. I heard on this floor a statement by one of my colleagues that the war in Vietnam is "a war we cannot win." Nothing could be further from the truth.

To repudiate our responsibility as the leader of the free world would be an admission to the world, friend or foe alike, that we are so weak we cannot cope with a third or fourth rate government like Hanoi.

Worst yet, it would be interpreted as a moral weakness that indicated not only that we did not really believe in freedom but that we lack the moral fibre to meet tyranny face to face and oppose it.

This, Mr. Chairman, is an invitation at appeasement that would merely delay the final confrontation and bring the world to a total war just as appeasement of the Kaiser led to World War II and appeasement of the Communists in Korea to the Korean police action. Because of our appeasement of the North Korean Government the Korean war deteriorated to a point at which our hands were tied. We secured a truce in warfare but could no longer pursue our efforts to bring to Korea a just or even a lasting peace.

If you have any doubts about what the intention of the supporters of Communist tyranny have toward further aggression, or if you have any doubts as to

why the supporters of Communist tyranny chose to bog us down in the battlefield, you should read the official report by the Government of China giving its assessment of the United States following the temporary settlement of the Korean war in which we did not demand a victory. In this report the Chinese interpreted our failure to win not only as a lack of will to win, born out of ignorance of our political system and our loyalty to the cause of freedom, but as a lack of military means. It is no wonder the small communistic group of tyrants have chosen to meet us on the battlefields of Vietnam. No one knowledgeable of our military strength could honestly question our military capacity to wipe the whole of Vietnam off the map in 1 week if we chose to release our full capabilities.

Our leadership, committed to responsible action in this nuclear age, has felt there is another way to solve our differences besides all-out war which might well engulf the world in its clutches. It has chosen the more difficult and painful solution—limited war. After great sacrifices in a limited war policy designed to remove the threat of an all-out war, we are on the verge of bringing the enemy to its knees. But we are being denied victory because some chose to give Hanoi the spark of hope that our will—not our ability, but our will—to preserve freedom for others will soon break and we will turn tail, repudiate our sense of honor, and abandon those who look to us for help.

I want this war to come to an end now, but I do not want peace at the price of honor, or the future of freedom for anyone, including our own loved ones. I believe that this generation would not knowingly want to avoid this confrontation if it means that in a few years their brothers or their children could be faced with the necessity of conflict on the battlefields, either within the continental limits or one of the States separated from our shores, or any other area critical to the division of this Nation.

Mr. Chairman, I support this resolution and urge my colleagues to give to the President a helping hand in his efforts with honor.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. DENNIS).

(Mr. DENNIS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DENNIS. Mr. Chairman, I support House Resolution 613 for a number of reasons but chiefly because, under the circumstances in which we now find ourselves, support for the resolution is to be equated with support for the policy of the President of the United States in regard to Vietnam; and I believe that today it is of the first importance to our country to have an overwhelming expression of such support, and that this resolution is the best vehicle available by which to obtain such an expression.

The resolution itself, like most human efforts, is imperfect, and there is at least one point contained therein which I believe requires interpretation and understanding—I refer to the reference to free

elections in South Vietnam and the willingness of the United States to abide by the results thereof. It should be emphasized, I think, that free election mean election's truly free, and consequently that any participation therein by the Vietcong must necessarily be by a reformed and peaceful Vietcong, which has renounced the use of force, and which has itself resolved to abide by the results of a free election. Such a development would seem to be unlikely.

Again while the resolution is a resolution for peace and, as such, properly confines itself basically, and in terms, to that field, it in no sense rules out a peace brought about in part by United States military action or assistance, if that proves to be necessary, nor does it mandate the President to commit our country to any hasty or ill considered military withdrawal, or to a withdrawal by a date certain to be announced in advance.

On the contrary this resolution, at the time and under the circumstances of its adoption, is and must be preeminently an endorsement of the Vietnam policies of the President; and it is with that understanding that I support and vote for this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield minutes to the gentleman from Michigan (Mr. RIEGLE).

(Mr. RIEGLE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I cosponsored this resolution, and I want to make it clear I did so on the basis of an understanding that the President was specifically requesting my support.

While I believe this resolution is sadly deficient in many ways, I will support a diplomatic initiative which the President judges to serve the cause of ending the war and achieving peace.

I did pose a question to the sponsor of this resolution, the gentleman from Texas, earlier. I asked him if this resolution authorized or delegated any war-making powers to the President in any way.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RIEGLE. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. I am a cosponsor of the resolution, and I have answered that question at least six or seven times during the course of the debate. The answer is categorically "No."

Mr. RIEGLE. I am glad to have it there again.

I believe this resolution in no way repeats the tragedy of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Let me assure the Members that I intend to continue to press for the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution effective December 31, 1970.

Now I am not bothered by what is contained in this resolution, but I am deeply distressed about what is not there.

Let me catalog the major weaknesses in this resolution.

First, it fails to say anything about American troop withdrawals or the Vietnamization program.

Second, it fails to address the question of stopping American combat deaths.

Third, it fails to call on the South Vietnamese regime to end political repression, broaden its base, carry out meaningful land reform, improve the quality of life for the villagers, end government corruption and inefficiency, solve the refugee problem, and take over all combat responsibility—among other things.

But the most discouraging thing about this proceeding has been the total destruction of meaningful legislative process by the power structure of this House.

To ram this resolution through committee—without hearings—to bring it to the floor under a closed rule—to limit debate—and to purposely gut the motion to recommit—is a disappointing use of arbitrary power.

What is it that the leadership in both parties is so afraid of? Why is open debate and an open amendment process so dangerous? Perhaps what we are afraid of is the truth.

We have experienced 8 years of undeclared war. We threw the Constitution of the United States out of the window on this war.

Over 40,000 Americans are dead.

Over 300,000 Americans wounded.

We have dropped more bombs than in all of World War II.

I believe the leadership of both parties condemns itself when, by token actions like these, it shows so little respect for the massive sacrifices and agonies this war has already afflicted on America. The procedures used on this resolution are an act of fear by this House. We are ducking the issue; we are not facing up to it.

If this body had courage equal to our soaring rhetoric and artful dodging on this issue of war, we would go into continuous session, around the clock, 7 days a week, either to require an orderly withdrawal from Vietnam consistent with the safety of our troops—or declare outright war.

I support what is contained in this resolution, but feel a great sadness for what is not contained there.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. RYAN).

(Mr. RYAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RYAN. Mr. Chairman, while House Resolution 613 may appear rather innocuous on its face, it must be viewed in the context of the President's November 3 address to the Nation, its introduction in the House of Representatives on November 4, and the interpretation placed upon it by the President himself in his unprecedented visit to the House on November 13.

The President in thanking the co-sponsors said:

Yesterday I was informed by a bipartisan group from the House of Representatives that over 300 Members of the House had joined in sponsoring a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3.

The President went on to observe:

But I do not know when the great issues are involved, that in this House, that what happened yesterday with that announcement on the part of Members of both sides of the

aisle of well over a majority supporting the policy of the President of the United States, I realize that that was in the great tradition of this country.

So, in the words of the President, this is a "resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3." It will be used as an endorsement of his policy. In fact, Ambassador Lodge has already used the fact that over 300 Members of Congress support this resolution as evidence of overwhelming support in America for the President's position.

If the House feels that an endorsement of the President's plan of November 3 is justified, then House Resolution 613 should be supported. However, let us not deceive ourselves as to how approval of the resolution will be construed.

This is the first time, except for supplemental Vietnam and other military authorization and appropriation bills, that the House has had the opportunity to deal with U.S. policy in Vietnam since 1964.

There should be a full scale debate with the opportunity to offer amendments and to consider alternatives to the administration's policy in Vietnam. Instead, the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the House Rules Committee have done their utmost to see that the resolution should not be disregarded. mum of debate.

The fact that House Resolution 613 has been brought before the House under a parliamentary procedure which forecloses such a debate on the most crucial issue before the Nation is sufficient reason to oppose it.

The language of the resolution is vague. The phrase "a just peace" is not defined, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee held no hearings to help establish a legislative history.

The lesson of the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution should not be disregarded. That resolution was completely distorted and used by President Johnson to justify committing half a million American servicemen to a land war in Asia without a declaration of war. House Resolution 613, as already interpreted by the President, is broad enough to give him a free hand to take whatever action he feels is necessary to achieve "a just peace"—however he may define the term.

Although the resolution speaks of the President's efforts in negotiations, the President's emphasis upon Vietnamization of the conflict and the resignations of Ambassador Lodge and his deputy suggest that the administration is not vigorously pursuing a negotiated settlement.

The Paris talks are not stalled because of domestic criticism of the administration's policy.

Sponsors of the resolution have put together a compilation of statements made by critics of our Vietnam policy which have been used by the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris. This compilation is used to show "how statements and actions by a few Members of the U.S. Congress have given grist to the enemy propaganda mills—and how they are used to delay progress toward a settlement." The effect is to attempt to stifle dissent.

Do the sponsors of the resolution really

believe that approval of this resolution will improve our negotiating position in Paris by showing that the Nation is united behind presidential policy on Vietnam?

Approval of this resolution will in no way change the fact that this country is divided over our course in Vietnam. Nor will it be of any assistance to our negotiating position in Paris. The Paris talks are not stalled because of statements made by Members of Congress and other Americans who do not agree with present policy.

One reason that the talks are stalled is because this administration, as did the previous administration, refuses to accept the political reality that the National Liberation Front or the Vietcong has a role in the political future of South Vietnam. Another reason is the administration's failure to seize possible openings for new initiatives.

For instance, in his November 3 speech President Nixon referred to his letter of July 15 to Ho Chi Minh in which he said that he was willing to discuss specifically the 10-point program of the National Liberation Front.

The response which came back from Ho Chi Minh said clearly that the 10 points of the National Liberation Front were a "logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem."

That letter was dismissed in the President's speech, as showing Hanoi's unwillingness to negotiate, but I suggest that it was dismissed either without a critical analysis of the import of its meaning or else simply in an effort to persuade the American people that a meaningful initiative had been rejected.

Since the night of his speech, the President's interpretation of that letter has been challenged by many Americans, who viewed the letter as an invitation to pursue negotiations.

Ambassador Averell Harriman suggested that the letter's last paragraph was a "wide open invitation."

Senator EDWARD MUSKIE also saw the paragraph as "an invitation" to pursue negotiations. Senator MUSKIE further questioned why the White House not only took the letter as a rejection of the President's negotiating offer, but also why it did not use the letter to discuss the matter further with Ho's successors.

The criteria for the withdrawal of ground combat forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces as stated by the President in his speech are progress at the Paris talks, the level of enemy activity, and the progress of the training program of South Vietnamese forces. These factors are not within our control but will be determined by the Governments of North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

The concept of Vietnamization goes back to our original involvement in Vietnam. Then the policy was to train and provide military assistance to Vietnamese forces. It did not work, and in 1965 the war was Americanized. Throughout the Johnson administration, the concept of Vietnamization was still a basis of our policy.

Now, in 1969, this administration is again talking about Vietnamizing the

war. If the quality of the South Vietnamese forces could not be improved in 15 years to the point where they can fight for themselves, how do we expect it to be accomplished in the near future?

The last of the criteria is the level of enemy action. This war has been going on for over 25 years. How can we base our withdrawal on enemy activity when it has ebbed and flowed for over a quarter of a century. The President's unspecified timetable for withdrawal is based upon factors over which we really have little or no control.

In addition, the President stated that, if enemy activity increases, he will not hesitate to react accordingly. Here, he committed the United States to win the peace—and left the door open to possible escalation.

The President has stated that we no longer expect a military victory, but in his speech he spoke in terms of winning, which could mean an indefinite military presence in South Vietnam. Since the start of the Paris talks in May 1968, more than 17,000 Americans have sacrificed their lives in Vietnam. We cannot afford to let more young men die in order to soothe the national pride.

The supporters of the resolution have ignored the problem of the Saigon regime. Although the resolution supports the concept of free elections open to all South Vietnamese, the resolution does not face the problem of the undemocratic, corrupt regime in Saigon.

President Thieu promised a broad-based government and then jalled his opposition. Over 75 percent of the population of South Vietnam, according to Ambassador Averell Harriman, are anti-Communist. However, they do not participate in the government in Saigon. The resolution does not insist upon the broadening of the government of South Vietnam.

At a time when millions of Americans want the United States to withdraw from Vietnam the resolution does not even mention troop withdrawals. Supporters of the resolution argue that the House should not advise the President about a timetable in that it does not know what the future military possibilities are. By not including any reference to withdrawals, this resolution will not impress upon the President that Americans want a withdrawal of troops as soon as possible.

If the House is serious about advising the President upon policy, and not simply giving him a blank check, then it should set forth its views on troop withdrawals.

The House has every right to demand that troop withdrawal continue on a regular basis. I am a cosponsor along with 13 other Members of the House of House Concurrent Resolution 403 which expresses the sense of the Congress that all U.S. forces should now be withdrawn from Vietnam, the pace of the withdrawal to be limited only by steps to insure the safety of our forces, and that the United States should assist in the provision of asylum in friendly countries for those Vietnamese who might be endangered by our disengagement. The sponsors of our resolution feel that the

House must heed the concern which was shown throughout the country on October 15 and in Washington on November 15.

Only the U.S. Congress has the constitutional power to declare war. Yet 40,000 American lives have been lost in a war that is undeclared. Certainly the House should let the President know whether or not the war should be continued.

Mr. Chairman, I am not willing to vote for a resolution which will be construed as support for a policy which is perpetuating the tragic war in Vietnam which I have consistently opposed from its inception. The time has come for the House of Representatives to face squarely the consequences both at home and abroad of this disastrous chapter in American history.

I include at this point in the RECORD a very well-reasoned editorial from the New York Times of November 7, 1969, which discusses the administration's open-ended commitment to Saigon which this resolution supports:

#### COMMITMENT TO SAIGON

The House Foreign Affairs Committee's approval yesterday of President Nixon's efforts "to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam" implies an endorsement of his policies hardly justified by the President's address to the nation earlier this week. Mr. Nixon's long-heralded "plan for peace" has emerged, in fact, as a familiar program that contains nothing new and is founded on old premises and policies that have mired the United States in a debilitating conflict of indeterminate duration in Southeast Asia.

Many Americans, including even some of the strongest former supporters of the war, long ago concluded that Vietnam is not so vital to United States interests as they once thought it was and therefore is not worth the terrible price in American and Vietnamese lives and resources the war is exacting. This tardy public awakening would be a powerful argument in support of a President determined to unite the nation for a compromise peace.

Mr. Nixon instead has chosen to resurrect by implication, the old concept of a Communist monolith poised to conquer the world, which does not conform to the political reality of the present day. He has revived and expanded the thesis of former Secretary Rusk that a row of tottering dominoes stretching from Bangkok to Berlin to Buenos Aires has only the American-backed regime in Saigon standing in the way of worldwide disaster. If the President really believes his own rhetoric, how could he possibly settle for less than the "victory" in South Vietnam that even Lyndon Johnson finally despaired of winning?

Mr. Nixon's plan for victory—to "win America's peace," is the way he put it—depends upon a continuing military effort, but with South Vietnamese troops increasingly relieving American troops of the main burden of fighting. This program of "Vietnamization" is based on assumptions repeatedly advanced in the past and repeatedly discredited; that is, that the present Saigon Government is growing stronger and will soon be able to stand on its own feet, and that the enemy is growing weaker and will fade away.

If during the course of a prolonged American withdrawal enemy forces should strike hard again; as they are likely to do, and if South Vietnamese troops should fail to meet the test, as they have failed in the past, President Nixon has vowed "to take strong and effective measures to deal with the situation." He has thus again committed the United States to protect the present

regime in Saigon as long as that regime is unable to protect itself.

This open-ended commitment to Saigon is, in fact, inconsistent with the Asian Doctrine the President wisely enunciated at Guam. It means that the level of American participation in Southeast Asia, and therefore the limits of American capacity to deal with other problems at home and abroad, will be determined not by Washington but by the actions of Saigon and the reactions of Hanoi and its allies.

President Nixon says the only alternative to his strategy is "precipitate withdrawal of all Americans from Vietnam without regard to the effects of that action." This is not the only alternative. Nor is it the position of the sober majority of Vietnam war critics, despite the President's implication that it is. Most critics of Vietnam policies, old and new, believe that what is required is steady, orderly withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam under conditions that offer maximum safeguards against the massacres and other calamities Mr. Nixon predicts.

It is conceivable that this kind of determined, deliberate withdrawal is what Mr. Nixon really has in mind. There are passages in his speech that encourage such an interpretation, as do predictions from Saigon that all American combat troops will be out of South Vietnam by the end of next year. If this is the case, it is most unfortunate that the President chose to confuse his true purpose with rhetoric reminiscent of the disastrous past, rhetoric which is not likely to deter the enemy or his critics but which could seriously limit his options in the difficult days ahead.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. VIGORITO).

(Mr. VIGORITO asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. VIGORITO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I have been very pessimistic with respect to our entire involvement in Vietnam ever since the campaign of 1964. I am still pessimistic about it. I am also pessimistic with regard to the negotiations. I do not believe anything final will come of the negotiations in Paris. The Vietcong and the North Vietnamese will stay in Paris until hell freezes over. We cannot force them to negotiate. They will not fight until they are defeated; they will quit and come back to fight another day. However, let me say that I am in favor of negotiations. I wish the President luck in negotiations, and from the bottom of my heart I wish the President success.

Our country surely needs peace. The world needs peace. I am definitely against escalating the war. No matter what we do, we cannot dictate to the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong. Again, I repeat, I wish the President all the luck in the world in his attempts to bring us peace.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Washington (Mr. PELLY).

(Mr. PELLY asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. PELLY. Mr. Chairman, as a cosponsor of House Resolution 613, I fully support it. I want to support President Nixon in his attempt to obtain a just peace in Vietnam.

This resolution expresses a hope for

peace, and it approves the principles expressed by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to their own Government determined by free elections, impartially supervised by an international body.

It states that this Nation is willing to abide by the results of such an election, and it supports the President's call upon North Vietnam to state its willingness to honor such an election and to allow the issues to be peacefully resolved in order that we may end this war and that peace may be restored.

It is my conviction, Mr. Chairman, that the President is best able to make decisions on this war on the basis of facts immediately available to him and not available to the Members of Congress.

I stand behind President Nixon in his efforts to end this war in Vietnam, and I fully support House Resolution 613.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. CARTER).

(Mr. CARTER asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

[Mr. CARTER addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.]

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from North Carolina (Mr. LENNON).

(Mr. LENNON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. LENNON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613. I am very proud to announce that I am a cosponsor of an identical resolution, House Resolution 682.

I might say, Mr. Chairman it is my considered opinion that the language contained in this resolution represents, I honestly believe, the sentiments of at least 90 or 95 percent of the more than one-half million people that I have the honor to represent in this House of Representatives. They have already indicated that fact to me in a number of petitions which have been signed by tens of thousands of them.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California (Mr. WALDIE).

(Mr. WALDIE asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. WALDIE. Mr. Chairman, I again refer to the President's statement made in 1960 during the Kennedy-Nixon debates—

We cannot tolerate a Communist government in South Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, the authors of this resolution concede that a Communist government would be tolerated and accepted by this House if such government comes into power by reason of elections called for in this resolution.

That brings into contention an awful lot of problems. If the domino theory that the President announced on November 3 and extended to West Berlin has any relevance, a Communist government in South Vietnam, no matter how it comes into being, will bring into play the domino theory and all its catastrophic consequences.

Supporting this resolution is support for the possibility and acceptability of a Communist government in South Vietnam and the acceptability then of the domino theory coming into play.

The other obvious defect with this resolution is that the President's hands are tied as a result of the resolution and if in the opinion of the negotiators in Paris, a coalition government should be established in South Vietnam it places both the President and the negotiators in a very awkward position in an effort to reach such an agreement with the parties at the peace conference, because this resolution precludes such a result.

The only way you can arrive at a government in South Vietnam, if this resolution is passed, is by free elections. I do not think it is in the best interest of our negotiators in Paris nor the President to bind them in any way from considering the proposition of a coalition government by agreement of all parties. This resolution would not permit that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California has expired.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. REID).

(Mr. REID of New York asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. REID of New York. I thank the distinguished gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution.

First of all, I think that the procedure in the House, both in committee and on the floor, regarding this resolution, has been regrettable.

For instance, I know of no major foreign policy resolution going through the Senate with no hearings and with no possibility for amendment. Indeed, previous resolutions—the Formosa resolution, the Middle East resolution, the Berlin resolution and the Cuban resolution—have at least had hearings, scant as they may have been at times. Surely the House can make no serious pretense to being a thoughtful deliberative body if on great questions such as Vietnam it refuses to hold hearings or provide for amendments. This proceeding degrades the House.

It is sadly apparent that the House has learned little from the intense feelings that this question of Vietnam is the paramount issue facing America. To be denied an opportunity to amend this resolution in the first formal opportunity that has been given us since August of 1964 is to make this debate largely meaningless and to make a mockery of the democratic process.

There are few who would question that any President of the United States is strengthened by strong support in the Congress and in the country for a particular position. The fundamental point, however, one which Winston Churchill well understood, is that a policy, to be truly meaningful, must be clearly and precisely understood. The people must participate in the decision relative to it, and only if this process is carried forward will any policy have national sanction at home or be respected abroad. The procedure followed here today, let alone the substance of the resolution we are dis-

cussing, are not calculated to achieve that objective.

This resolution, I believe, must be read in conjunction with President Nixon's speech of November 3. Specifically, as the President said on the floor of this House:

The resolution for a just peace in Vietnam is along the lines of the proposals that I made in a speech on November 3.

The speech stressed the importance of Vietnamization, a policy which has been largely discredited in the past, implicitly committed this action to defend the present Government of South Vietnam until it can defend itself, and raised the possibility, should there be an increase in violence jeopardizing our remaining forces, that the United States would take "strong and effective measures" to deal with that situation. Moreover, the rate of U.S. withdrawal was posited on the progress at the Paris talks, the level of enemy activity, and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces.

The problem with this formulation, as I see it, is that it could leave the initiative largely to Hanoi, the NLF, and Saigon, none of whom have shown a total sense of urgency to end the war, rather than with the United States where the initiatives should be.

No one would question the desirability of achieving a just peace. The problem occurs over what this phrase means and whether it implies, directly or indirectly, the perpetuation of a Thieu-Ky regime which to date has narrowed its Cabinet base and refused to change its constitution to permit free elections and self-determination for all South Vietnamese. Moreover a continuation of this regime may make any negotiations impossible. Certainly giving Saigon a veto over the peace talks or U.S. policy is a mistake.

Hence, the danger of this resolution is clear. We can all find phrases in it with which we agree; equally, we can find phrases which are vague and which could represent unspecified commitments for the future. The difficulty, then, is the interpretation given to it, or to be more precise, the numerous interpretations which could be given to it.

Prior to any action, the simple introduction of the resolution was assigned importance by the President, and by the press, and by the President's negotiators in Paris. As reported by Drew Middleton from Paris in the November 14th New York Times, Ambassador Lodge took the unusual step of introducing into his formal statement at the peace talks the text of the resolution as an indication of support for the policies enunciated in the President's November 3 speech. And this, we recall, was before the House as a body had even begun consideration of the resolution, with signatures collected prior to the President's speech. This presumed on the action the House and Senate might take in a context where the Congress has been derelict in its responsibilities. This did not heighten the credibility of congressional action, nor enhance respect for the resolution—particularly as it coincided with some half a million Americans arriving in Washington to protest these very policies.

As this is a simple House resolution

and not a joint resolution, and as it cannot be signed into law, it will not enjoy the importance of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. Moreover, the minority leader in the Senate, along with the majority leader, have suggested a significant amendment calling for a mutual cease-fire; hence, whatever action the other body takes will not parallel the action we take in the House today.

Nonetheless, I am constrained to vote against the resolution as the subject is just too important for hasty action, and too significant in its potential implications not to enjoy the degree of national sanction that comes only from full debate, amendments, and the deep conviction of hopefully all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. REID of New York. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I know that my friend, the gentleman from New York, is a fair-minded Member and a constructive Member, and that he would not intentionally cast unfair criticism upon the Committee on Foreign Affairs or upon the Committee on Rules as to the manner in which this resolution has come to the floor.

But the gentleman is aware, I am sure, that on seven occasions in the past 15 years, foreign policy resolutions have come to the House, in all cases under what amounts to a closed rule. It is not accurate either to say that on all of those occasions there were more or longer committee hearings than on this. In one case, in fact, on the resolution which was introduced on Hungary, a resolution in the 85th Congress, it as passed by the House on the same day of its introduction. So there were not any hearings there.

Then on the Cuban resolution, there were executive sessions, but no hearings.

On the United Nations resolution in the 88th Congress, there were no hearings or calling of witnesses.

In fact, only one of the seven resolutions had printed hearings available for the Members of the House. I am not saying that is always the procedure which should be followed. But I just believe the gentleman from New York in all fairness would want to take note of the fact that this is not an altogether unusual procedure, and that the Committee on Foreign Affairs did consider it and felt that, this being an initiative on the part of the House, they needed no outside advice.

Mr. REID of New York. Let me tell the gentleman that I very much appreciate his comments. Let me say, however, that the precedents the gentleman cites are precisely the reason why there must be changes in our procedures for the future. I would say to him, and this is a point I am trying to make, that the House ought to be coequal with the other body in foreign policy resolutions, and will be only when this House accepts its responsibilities.

In short, what is essential is full hearings, a longer time for debate than 4 hours every 5 years, and an end to closed

rules in general. Only as a legislative body truly reflects the commitments and convictions of all American people will its resolutions command the respect and credibility that bespeaks a national purpose and hopefully unity.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida (Mr. GIBBONS).

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I am not a sponsor of this resolution.

But I am going to vote for it here today because I sincerely hope that by voting for it, it may help the cause of peace and that it may in some way—some way that is, frankly, vague to me—help to disengage us from this most unfortunate experience that we have had in this war.

I regret, as have many Members here today, that this House has not taken a more vigorous position in the Vietnam war; that it has not had a more definite position on what should be done about it. I hope though that the leaders of this body will have learned from all these circumstances that it really is impossible to get something very meaningful from this Congress or from the House of Representatives unless the Congress is able to work its will. Procedures that do not allow for committee do not provide for adequate committee hearings and do not allow amendment of resolutions on the floor, really amount to naught.

I come from a part of the country where we have broad beaches and where the tide ebbs and flows every day. Sometimes sitting here and listening to this debate here reminds me of those Florida beaches that I see. Oftentimes you will see very earnest people working down on the beaches building beautiful sand castles. They work all day. When the tide comes in at night, those same castles are washed away and the beach the next day looks as if it had never been disturbed. I hope this resolution will just not turn out to be just another sand castle. But I am afraid it might.

Mr. Chairman, I am impressed with the discussion here today.

There certainly has not been any of the emotionalism which I remember at the time of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. The only reasons I am going to vote for this resolution is because I think it is a peace resolution.

I had some misgivings when the debate first began, but most of the debate and the answers by the sponsors and the answers by the people controlling the time on the debate have convinced me that this resolution is designed to achieve a quick and just peace.

I am going to vote for it on that basis and on that basis alone.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida has expired.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. CLARK).

Mr. CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I support this resolution. First, I would like to congratulate the Speaker for bringing up this resolution at this time.

Mr. Chairman, I congratulate Mr. HAYS, of Ohio, who has done such an excellent job on the chairing of this resolution today. He is a forthright, honest, hardworking Congressman who knows

how important it is to be American first, Democrat second.

I cannot understand why we have these few Members in Congress who oppose this resolution. To me they give promise and hope to the Vietcong and Hanoi.

They talk about the thousands killed. Yet they do not say that it was the Vietcong and North Vietnamese Government who has done it. They talk, instead, about those, our American soldiers have killed. They forget that every time one of our Presidents has called a cessation of bombing or ground attacks that the enemy brought in their artillery and rockets—indiscriminately bombing civilians.

I clearly recognize the constitutional right of any citizen, or group of citizens, to make their views known to their public officials. It is not only their right, but their duty. I also recognize the right of other citizens to disagree. But, I cannot fathom how it is stupid of SPIRO AGNEW to support his President—your President—but it is sublime to attack that same President.

Why is it suddenly more American to raise a Vietcong flag at the Washington Monument than to defend the President of the United States? It clearly is not—now, yesterday, or tomorrow.

Relentless, roaring mobs marching through the streets of Washington throwing rocks and flaming bombs were a predictable offshoot of an otherwise peaceful demonstration, but nonetheless one in which the demonstration leadership was unable to control all of the elements that joined it.

Well, things have reached the point where a vast majority of the American people—silent or otherwise—have about had it with mob rule and protestors who offer no constructive alternative other than the wholesale slaughter of millions of South Vietnamese. And God forbid the day that any American President makes that choice at the insistence of churning, chaotic mobs.

I truly believe that the American people have a deep moral commitment to the people of South Vietnam. I respect those who do not agree. I expect them to say so in the same orderly way that I publicly express my views. And I expect them to respect my views as well.

President Nathan Pusey of Harvard has put the entire subject of demonstrations in proper perspective with his comment that the right to dissent does not include the right to force assent.

There is no question in my mind that the majority of Americans support President Nixon. I am equally convinced they will become more and more vocal and then perhaps we can get a clearer view of what the American people really want.

(Mr. CLARK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from Hawaii (Mrs. MINK).

(Mrs. MINK asked and was given permission to revise and extend her remarks.)

Mrs. MINK. Mr. Chairman, President Nixon said on November 3 that he be-

lieved "that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy." He went on to say:

The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

I wholeheartedly concur with this statement. This House should heed his admonition. It is precisely this reason which has forced me to conclude that it is equally illegitimate to expect this House to support a policy of such magnitude as the life or death of our American men unless we know the whole truth about that policy.

It is pretended that by the November 3 speech the Nixon policy regarding Vietnam became an established fact. Try to walk through its maze.

The President starting by saying that, "The great question is: How can we win America's peace?"

Yet he offered the traditional challenge of why we should continue the war. He said:

A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends. Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam would without question promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

He said he was opposed to "immediate withdrawal of all American forces." He qualified this later in his speech by saying he was opposed to "the precipitate withdrawal of American forces."

But then he said:

We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within one year.

So one concludes that he only opposes precipitate withdrawal, and that 1 year is not precipitate.

He said:

I choose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and the battlefield.

But on the negotiating front he said that no progress whatever in the negotiation "has been made except agreement on the shape of the bargaining table." He stated:

There can now be no longer any question that progress in negotiations depend *only* on Hanoi's deciding to negotiate.

He said that he has "put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front."

He described this plan which he called the Nixon Doctrine, and said that—

When you are trying to assist another nation to defend its freedom, U.S. policy should be to help them fight the war but not fight the war for them.

This is his plan for the battlefield; not peace but more war, waged by the Vietnamese with our arms, our material and our money. He has evidently all but abandoned the negotiating table as futile; and his peace plan called "Vietnamization" only means more war, not peace.

The only remaining consolation is that his plan could mean the return of all American combat forces. He said he has

a plan worked out "in cooperation with the South Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. combat ground forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled timetable."

He stated that the "rate of withdrawal will depend on developments on three fronts. One—progress which can be, or might be made in the Paris talks, the other two factors—are the level of enemy activity and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces."

I hope you have all noted that none of these three factors which will determine our rate of withdrawal is in our control. Hanoi could decide this issue by continuing to stall the Paris talks, and by accelerating the level of enemy activity. Or South Vietnam could prevent our early withdrawal by falling down on the training program. I hardly call any of these prospects as positive affirmative action for peace on our part. Withdrawal on this basis is not our policy but someone else's.

The November 3 speech is full of so many contradictions in and of itself without even trying to compare it to the May 14 speech of the President, which others have done to their great consternation.

I take this time to analyze the President's speech because it has been noted as the justification for adopting House Resolution 613. A quick reading of House Resolution 613 will reveal that it contains nothing on the central issues discussed by the President in his November 3 speech as I have outlined.

House Resolution 613 states no new positions taken by President Nixon. It merely restates the Johnson policy in effect since 1966. What function is served to adopt a resolution which is purely historical, without any new steps for peace?

The President is correct when he says that American confidence is harmed when we do not speak the truth. The truth today is that withdrawal, like "stop the bombing of North Vietnam" of a few years ago, is controversial and therefore we are asked to blind ourselves to its reality.

I happen to support the President's offer of complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year. I would vote for House Resolution 613 only if it embodied this principal of withdrawal. Such a resolution would be meaningful and would contribute to the unity which the President wants by confirming our new initiatives for peace. Without facing this truth House Resolution 613 is but an empty gesture and will further exacerbate our lack of specific national goals in our pursuit for peace.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Montana (Mr. MELCHER).

Mr. MELCHER. Mr. Chairman, I am the coauthor of House Resolution 684, which is identical with House Resolution 613, and I shall certainly vote for the resolution in seeking a just peace in Vietnam.

I also coauthored House Resolution 568 backing the President on his troop withdrawal policy. If in the future the President should decide to change his policy from withdrawal of our troops and

the rapid pursuit of peace, I believe it is mandatory that he should first consult with the Congress so that we may express ourselves with full knowledge of any change in the Vietnam situation justifying an alteration of our course.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. SCOTT) for a unanimous-consent request.

(Mr. SCOTT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613 and to urge each Member of the House to indicate his support of the President's efforts to bring about a just and honorable peace in Vietnam by voting in favor of this resolution.

Regardless of who is President of the United States or his party affiliation, when he is dealing with foreign nations the country benefits by the strongest possible bipartisan support of his efforts.

As you know, Ambassador Lodge recently announced his resignation as Chief Negotiator with the North Vietnamese and stated that his Government had made every reasonable concession without any agreement except as to the shape of the negotiation table. In my opinion, the North Vietnamese will not make any concession as long as they feel that this Nation is divided and that they can obtain their objective by stubborn refusal to negotiate peace in Vietnam.

President Nixon won renewed respect of the American People, in my opinion, by reasonableness and the frankness of this discussion of the Vietnamese conflict a few weeks ago. In essence, he indicated a willingness of this Nation to continue to attempt to negotiate but, at the same time, having an alternate plan to substitute the South Vietnamese combat soldier for the American soldier and to withdraw our combat forces as early as circumstances would permit.

I do not believe that other nations of the world can expect any more than this. The President has carried out his promise of reducing our troop strength and I understand that we have less troops in Vietnam today than we have had at any time during the last 2 years.

Certainly, I hope that all combat troops can be withdrawn soon but I hesitate for this Congress to suggest to the President when complete withdrawal should take place, and believe it is in the interests of the country to permit latitude for the exercise of judgment by the Commander in Chief based upon circumstances as they develop in Vietnam.

Let us show to the Communist world that America is united in our quest for peace and justice in the world by an overwhelming vote of confidence in the President and his efforts on behalf of the people in the country.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Oregon (Mr. DELLENBACK) for a unanimous-consent request.

(Mr. DELLENBACK asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. DELLENBACK. Mr. Chairman, a careful reading of the provisions of H.R. 613 makes clear that its primary thrust

is for peace in Vietnam. Not peace "at any price," but a "just peace." It expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace. It affirms the support of the House of Representatives for the President of the United States in his efforts to negotiate such a peace. It supports the principle of free elections for the South Vietnamese. These are the heart of this resolution.

This is a short resolution. Like any short comment on a large and complex subject it must be looked at very carefully to see what it does say and what it does not say. I personally feel that we should have added some additional language to cover certain points which are not covered therein and to make certain some points therein which are subject to possible misinterpretation. I voted in favor of an attempt to open the resolution up to amendments which would accomplish those results, but we were unsuccessful. So we must now vote on the resolution as it stands.

This resolution does not say that the House of Representatives gives the President any *carte blanche* authority in connection with Vietnam. It has been made repeatedly clear during the course of this debate that this resolution does not give to the President any authority of a warmaking nature. This is a peace resolution. There are many other things that this resolution does not say. Some, like the points above, it should not say, and other perhaps it should say. I personally regret that it does not expressly indicate that we approve the President's demonstrated policy of continued deescalation of American involvement in Vietnam. It should have. But any careful examination of the record shows that the President initiated such a policy almost immediately after taking office and that he is definitely following such a policy, and I am convinced that he is committed to the continuation of such a policy. I read into this resolution's support of the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, a steady continuation of such policy of deescalation of American involvement. So long as that policy is continued and followed, I feel that both this House and the American people will continue to support the President's efforts as he seeks to guide this Nation toward a just and early peace.

Because I am convinced that the clear thrust of this resolution is in the direction of such just and early peace, I intend to support it and I urge my colleagues to do likewise.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I now yield such time as he may consume to the distinguished minority leader (Mr. GERALD R. FORD).

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. Mr. Chairman, first I wish to express my appreciation to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), who has so ably handled the resolution and to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), chairman of the committee for their tremendously effective help in making certain that the proposal went through the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the House as a whole.

I want to express to the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) my deep appreci-

ation for his initiation on original sponsorship of this resolution.

I believe the action of the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. MORGAN, and the able gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS), in working on and for this resolution, have exhibited statesmanship of the highest order, I want the RECORD to clearly indicate my appreciation and indebtedness to them for their help and assistance.

Mr. Chairman, I should like to announce what the motion to recommit will be. The motion to recommit will be a proposal to insert new language on page 1 of the resolution, line 7. The added language will be as follows:

Requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war.

In other words, the resolution would read as follows:

*Resolved*, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war—

And then it would continue as it was reported by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

The decision as to the author of the motion to recommit will depend upon some uncertainties at the moment, but the author will be either the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. GROSS) or the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FULRON).

I personally hope and trust that this motion to recommit will receive the support of the membership as a whole. Certainly all Members do want the President, on our behalf as a country, to press for the North Vietnamese Government to abide by the Geneva Accords of 1949 in reference to the treatment of prisoners of war.

I believe this is a strengthening and beneficial change in the resolution as recommended by the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FRASER. I want to say to the gentleman that while I support the objectives of the amendment on the recommitment motion, I want to observe again that the real minority in a question of this kind is denied access to the motion to recommit. I am sorry about that. This is another instance of an effort to confine and limit the options of this House in expressing its will on this resolution. I understand what is going on. I have seen it happen on other resolutions and on other bills. I am sorry that this is the procedure that is being followed.

Mr. GERALD R. FORD. I am sorry that the gentleman from Minnesota can-

not support this motion to recommit. I think it is a very desirable and beneficial change in the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York (Mr. STRATTON).

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me for 10 seconds?

Mr. STRATTON. Yes.

Mr. FRASER. I just want to correct the misapprehension of the gentleman from Michigan.

I did not say that I was opposed to the motion to recommit. I said that I favored its provisions. I was objecting to the abuse of the rules of the House that denied the right—

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, I cannot yield any further.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to a good deal of debate here. I have not listened to it all. But I have been impressed with the fact that most of the debate, at least what I have heard, seems to have been centered around rather technical matters, interpretations of language, and the question as to whether we should or should not have passed the Gulf of Tonkin resolution; the question as to whether we should or should not be in Vietnam; or the rate of the withdrawal of troops and so on. I am a little disturbed that we seem to have lost sight in this debate this afternoon of what is, after all, the fundamental issue that surrounds our commitment in Vietnam, just as it has surrounded other American military and political commitments, that is, the basic struggle between freedom and tyranny in the world.

We may complain as to whether we should be in Vietnam or not and whether we should have fought the war in one way or another. But there is no question, I think, in the mind of anyone that the reason why America is in Vietnam today is because of our commitment to freedom and because of our determination to protect ever a small and a relatively weak country against attack and against an attempt to impose tyranny on it from the outside. This is clearly what our Vietnam commitment is all about. We are not there for any personal gain for ourselves or for our country. This is what America has always done. This has been the record, whether foolishly or otherwise, of our involvement in every war.

Today the basic issues with respect to Vietnam, which is still up in the air, is not an issue of American military strength. It is a matter of American will and determination. No one, not even the Communist leaders, has any doubt about the ability of American arms to achieve any objective that they set out to achieve. But the one thing that is still in doubt in the Communist world is the will and the determination of the American people. The Communists still think that this country does not have the stuff to stay until that objective of freedom is

achieved, we are, they say, a "paper tiger."

The other day a number of members of the Committee on Armed Services had the privilege of hearing a personal, firsthand report from Maj. James N. Rowe, who was a captive of the Vietcong for 5 years in the delta area of Vietnam. The one thing that most impressed all of us was the fact that Major Rowe—a remarkable young man with much more intestinal fortitude than I am sure most of us have or ever hope to have—the one thing that impressed us most was when Major Rowe told us that the low point of his captivity came when the Vietcong showed him the statements of leading officials, leading members of the other body, and leading newspapers around the country, saying that America had no business being in Vietnam and that we ought to get out, lock, stock, and barrel. Those statements, Major Rowe told us really shook his morale. This was the only time he doubted his own convictions. The Communists really believe these dissenters speak for America.

Mr. Chairman, the press of the Nation has played up all of the opposing views on the Vietnam war. We had 250,000 demonstrators in Washington the other day. Two or three pages of the Washington Post and the New York Times were devoted the next day to their activities. But the day before 300 Members of this House, representing an overwhelming majority of the 200 million people of the entire country, had joined in cosponsoring this resolution which is before us today.

And that rather remarkable event got only a very small notice in the Washington Post and none at all in the New York Times, except that the publisher says they did put it in a small box in one edition, but somehow it just was not important enough to get in the edition that came to the Capital of this Nation.

Mr. Chairman, what we are being asked to decide this afternoon is whether this country is solidly in support of our Nation's policy in Vietnam, whether on this vital issue we are going to back up our President, whether we are united in this effort to back up the forces who are fighting for the principle of free, self-determination for the people of South Vietnam. The important thing before us here today on this floor is whether this Nation of ours does have the will and the determination to see their commitment through.

It is not a question of technique we are concerned with today. It is not a question of battle strategy. It is simply a question of whether the greatest nation in the world, with the greatest armed forces in the world, also has the necessary intestinal fortitude to back up the President of the United States and to stick with our commitment long enough to achieve peace, not at any price, but peace with justice in Vietnam.

Mr. Chairman, I think we do have that determination and it is my sincere hope that this resolution will receive an overwhelming vote here today as a manifestation of that determination.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to express my personal gratitude and appreciation to the distinguished gentleman from New York for his ardent endeavors, his advice, counsel, and assistance throughout the time that this question has been under consideration. He has been one of the original and one of the most effective champions of this resolution.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. BARRETT).

(By unanimous consent, Mr. BARRETT was allowed to speak out of order.)

(Mr. BARRETT asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

#### RETAIN RAY LAPIN AS PRESIDENT OF FNMA

Mr. BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, about a week ago, I brought to the attention of the House what I considered to be a failure on the part of the administration to heed the expressed mandate of the Congress.

At that time I raised the question as to whether the Federal National Mortgage Association would, as the Committee on Banking and Currency had contemplated, be the first to issue mortgage-backed securities.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have an even more blatant case of where the administration has refused to follow the will of Congress.

According to newspaper reports, which I have verified with Fannie Mae, its President will ask the Board of Directors to determine formally that one-third of Fannie Mae's common stock is owned by persons or institutions in the mortgage lending, home building, real estate or related business. This, Mr. Chairman, is the key test which the Congress set out for determining the point when control of the FNMA should pass from the Board of Directors appointed by the President to a new Board elected by the public stockholders. I am delighted that the public, mortgage lenders, builders, and others, have moved so rapidly to acquire the FNMA stock. Their purchase of this stock has been related to their use of FNMA's secondary market facilities, which has been responsible for almost all of the financing of the FHA and VA market, notwithstanding the decline in home building due to the severe credit crunch.

Coupled with this announcement, there now seems to be a powerplay afoot. I am disturbed to learn that the present administration is trying to force the resignation of Ray Lapin, the incumbent president of Fannie Mae. Mr. Chairman, the success of FNMA is due in large part if not entirely to the efforts, actions, and management of Ray Lapin and the respect and confidence he enjoys among all those concerned with homebuilding and financing. We must recognize but for the date included in the statute, the private stockholders could now elect a new Board of Directors and in turn this Board of Directors could elect a president; thus

bringing to a close Fannie Mae's so-called transitional period.

Last year when the legislation was before the Banking and Currency Committee, we specifically provided that the president of the Federal National Mortgage Association, during the transitional period, could be removed from that office only for "good cause."

Mr. Chairman, this was done deliberately because the committee and the Congress felt that the transition period of Fannie Mae should be wholly divorced from partisan politics.

Mr. Chairman, we knew then the power the President has to remove from office and by our actions we sought to limit that power.

I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if the present administration's plan is to succeed, the will of the Congress will be subverted. Further, Mr. Speaker, this attempt by the administration to remove Mr. Lapin could very well undermine the confidence presently enjoyed by FNMA and handicap its purpose and function, which is so greatly needed at this time when there is a serious shortage of funds for housing, particularly for low- and moderate-income families which has received the bulk of FNMA assistance.

Mr. Chairman, I sincerely hope and most strongly urge the President to reconsider his letter requesting the resignation of Mr. Lapin.

I submit for the RECORD a statement of Mr. Lapin issued today:

#### STATEMENT OF RAYMOND H. LAPIN, PRESIDENT OF FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, DECEMBER 2, 1969

I have today received a letter dated November 26, 1969, from the President of the United States purporting to remove me as president of the Federal National Mortgage Association. The President's letter does not set forth any specific ground for my removal.

The fact is, as representatives of the Administration have now made clear to me, the President wishes to fill my position with a person of his own choosing. I do not intend to bow to this unlawful desire.

My own attorneys have advised me that, as a matter of law, I am removable by the President only "for good cause." That I was not appointed by the Administration is not the kind of "cause" which Congress referred to in 1968 when it sought to establish FNMA's independence from government control. And the Supreme Court of the United States has unequivocally held that the desire of one Administration to replace members of independent bodies with persons of their own choosing is not a valid basis for action.

Moreover, like any other citizen, I am entitled to due process of law. I am entitled, like any other citizen, to written notice of the charges against me, if any, and a fair opportunity to respond to them. The letter from the President affords me neither of these crucial constitutional rights.

Of course, the President would like to put a person of his own choice in my place. Although I have declined to accept the substantial raise in pay which was scheduled for the president of FNMA when the agency became a private corporation wholly owned by its stockholders, my successor would be entitled to receive a salary of at least \$85,000. This is the juiciest plum at the President's disposal.

The President may have another, but related, motive for his sudden move. Under the statutory formula, it now appears that the time has come for FNMA's private share-

holders to take complete control of the corporation. Under present law, the shareholders could elect a new board, and through them a president, to take office as early as next May. I can understand why the President wishes quickly to place his own man in my job so that he might be able to prepare himself to run for office on a management slate.

Because FNMA has now reached this important milestone, time is running out on the Administration. If they are to control the results of the next shareholders' election, they must move now, and at my expense.

But FNMA is not part of the spoils system, to be plucked by a President at will. In 1968, Congress legislated that FNMA was to become a private corporation, free from control by any Administration. In order to insure this independence, Congress provided job security for the person who was to serve as president until the shareholders could select their own. I can be removed from my office only for good cause, and only in accordance with the procedures mandated by the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution.

Since the President's letter neither reveals good cause for my removal from office nor adheres to the procedural guarantees afforded every American, I shall take every action necessary to vindicate my rights and the purpose of Congress, and have retained private counsel for this purpose. In short, I intend to fight.

During my presidency, FNMA has been responsible for almost all of the financing of the FHA and VA market, notwithstanding the severe credit crunch. In fact, if it had not been for FNMA, the entire FHA/VA market would have been at a complete standstill. While conventional housing starts have declined sharply in the last nine months, FHA and VA-insured housing starts have actually increased thanks to the activity of FNMA. This is particularly significant since the construction supported by FNMA is concentrated in lower and middle income housing.

All of this has been done despite a substantial reduction in FNMA's payroll.

Even the stock market has reflected the high caliber of our performance, tripling the value of an investment in FNMA in just over one year.

Until their decision to obtain my post for another, the Administration was lavish in its praise both for me personally and for FNMA. And well they might, for only through our efforts has it been possible for the Administration to maintain a high level of FHA and VA housing activity, and to keep FHA and VA mortgage rates within reason.

I should note that I have made no secret of my desire eventually to return to private life. But I will not be party to a lawless exercise of raw power, or to the subjection of FNMA to complete control by the Executive Branch. Congress in 1968 provided that FNMA was to be a private corporation, not a patronage pudding. In resisting the President's will, I help carry out that congressional purpose. This is a cause which all men of good will should join.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Mr. MORGAN asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613. I have listened for 2 days now to the debate and the accusations made against the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I have here a history of all the close resolutions which have come out of the Foreign Affairs Committee since the 84th

Congress, including the Formosa resolution, the Middle East resolution, the Hungarian resolution, the Berlin resolution, the Cuban resolution, the Southeast Asia resolution, and the United Nations resolution. They all came out of the Committee on Foreign Affairs under the same rule under which we are operating today and all with less time. However, I never heard a single word of criticism on any of those resolutions.

Let us take for example the Formosa resolution that was introduced on January 24, 1955. Here was a brandnew Democratic Congress coming in at that time with a Republican President. When he asked for the Formosa resolution, it was introduced on January 24 and referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. It was reported out the same day. It was taken to the floor of the House the next day and passed in the House of Representatives under the same kind of rule that we are operating under here today.

So, those who have been berating the Committee on Foreign Affairs to death about the lack of hearings in the committee, I just want to say that the committee has operated in the same manner for the last 25 years since I have been a member.

We did not try to rush this resolution through. The committee was called that morning at 10 o'clock to meet—those mostly who are objecting to the length of time were the ones not there to establish a quorum at 10 o'clock—so as a result we had only an hour and 22 minutes to debate the resolution.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. HAYS. As I pointed out yesterday, Mr. Chairman, one reason we did not have the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense before the committee was because this is a unique resolution. It was a resolution that was written by Members of the House, and it was not sent up to the House from downtown, so there would have been nothing they could have contributed to it.

Mr. MORGAN. I thank the gentleman for his statement, and that is what I also wish to say.

The Formosa resolution was a House joint resolution that had to pass both Houses of the Congress and then go to the President for his signature.

The Middle East resolution was a House joint resolution.

The Hungarian resolution was a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.

The Berlin resolution was a concurrent resolution of the two Houses.

The Cuban resolution was a Senate joint resolution, and had to pass both Houses and be signed by the President.

The Southeast Asia and Bay of Tonkin resolution was a House joint resolution.

The United Nations resolution was a concurrent resolution.

All we are considering in this measure before us today is just that text of a simple House resolution. It does not give the President any power or authority, nor does it make any commitments. It does not have the force of law as would a

joint resolution. It requires neither the consent of nor the approval of the President.

This, however, does not detract from its timely purpose.

Now, there are 170 simple words—and that is all the words that there are in this resolution, just 170 simple words—and they merely affirm the support of the House of Representatives in a most critical period in the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Southeast Asia. That is all it says. It is the House of Representatives hoping that the President can negotiate a just peace in Southeast Asia.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, I hope very much to vote for this resolution. Of course, I was one of its cosponsors, but one of the arguments against this resolution has been that this is kind of a blank check, and therefore it does in a sense underwrite future Presidential policy. I would like to have the chairman make this explicit for the legislative history.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I will assure the gentleman from Maryland that if this could be a blank check to escalate the war, that the chairman of the committee, a cosponsor of the resolution, would not be among the sponsors of the resolution.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. I thank the gentleman very much for his statement.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the chairman of the committee, the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. MORGAN), 3 additional minutes.

Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for the additional time.

Mr. Chairman, as the gentleman from Maryland knows, there was an editorial in the distinguished paper from the State of the gentleman from Maryland, the Baltimore Sun, about sense resolutions, not more than 10 days ago. That editorial expressed much of my own views as well as others, about sense resolutions.

Mr. Chairman, however, in view of all this circumstances, I am very much in favor of this resolution. I congratulate the gentleman for giving us his support.

The President's endeavors have, to a very serious extent, been negated by a fallacy which the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong have deluded themselves into believing. Because this delusion is prolonging the war and is a significant factor in blocking genuine, honest peace negotiations by Hanoi, it is essential that we dispel the misunderstanding. This resolution offers the best means of doing it.

The North Vietnamese have been broadcasting by radio, and repeating in Paris, statements by individual Americans, some of them elective officials, purporting to show that we are a nation deeply divided, almost wholly unwilling to continue the effort in Vietnam, with some of us up in arms against our own Government, and virtually on the point of internal political collapse. Of course,

we here all know that outspoken dissent is a right inherent in our free and democratic society, but it is so alien to Communist concepts that it is little wonder they deceive themselves into believing in the validity of their wishful acceptance of what we recognize as minority dissent.

We cannot underestimate the seriousness of their misconception, because as long as it leads to their refusal to negotiate and a prolongation of the war, it will add to the cost in American lives. The passage of House Resolution 613 may result in significant progress toward peace, but if it should only lead to the saving of a single American life, it will be more than worth the time we spend on it.

Over three-fourths of the membership of the House have joined in cosponsoring a resolution affirming support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. Its formal adoption should clinch the evidence convincingly to the North Vietnamese that they are mistaken in their confidence that time and delay will bring about a liquidation of the entire U.S. effort. Our approval will show that our tolerance of protest and dissent does not mitigate or detract from the support of the great majority of the American people for our President's efforts to negotiate a just peace. As strongly and as emphatically as I can, I urge the adoption of this resolution.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I would like to underscore what the chairman of the committee has said. There is nothing hidden and nothing concealed in this resolution. It simply says what it means, and means what it says. It is an effort to show support for the President of the United States, and hopefully to bring to a just conclusion more quickly than might otherwise be the case in the war in Vietnam.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. FRASER. Mr. Chairman, the chairman, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, would acknowledge, I am sure, that in the case of these other resolutions there was testimony taken by the committee before they were reported to the House?

Mr. MORGAN. I remember the gentleman from Minnesota coming on the committee in, I believe it was 1963, so that he was a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on August 5, 1964, when the Bay of Tonkin resolution was introduced in the House.

On August 6 it was considered in executive session.

Mr. FRASER. But we did hear testimony.

Mr. MORGAN. If the gentleman will let me finish—that morning we had the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State there. We finished the testimony that morning and we discussed the resolution. We voted it out before the

committee adjourned and before the House went into session—all in one morning.

Mr. FRASER. I recognize that we had testimony from three different people, from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the testimony of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. MORGAN. Also General Wheeler.

Mr. FRASER. You are right. But I do not know that anybody now advocates the Gulf of Tonkin resolution as an example that this House should follow.

Mr. MORGAN. All I am saying in view of all the criticism and all the argument about procedure here about resolutions coming from the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the procedure is no different on this resolution than on previous resolutions.

Mr. FRASER. But we took testimony in those cases.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MORGAN. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HAYS. The gentleman from Minnesota makes a great fetish of taking testimony, which is absurd and means nothing. We spent as much time on this resolution as we did on the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and we let every member of the committee, including the gentleman from Minnesota, say their piece.

So we had a lot of testimony.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Iowa (Mr. Gross).

(Mr. GROSS asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I will vote for passage of House Resolution 613 even though it falls far short of the action which I think the House of Representatives ought to take at this time.

In my opinion the time has come to fix a deadline on the so-called peace negotiations in Paris—a deadline for the representatives of the Government of North Vietnam to sit down and launch meaningful negotiations for peace. If the North Vietnamese failed to meet that deadline then the U.S. Government should make the prompt decision to either fight the war to bring about a military decision or get out of Vietnam—lock, stock, and barrel. The United States cannot fight a war of attrition in Asia nor should American forces be expected to do so.

I want peace as badly as any other citizen of this country. For whatever it is worth I will support this resolution to that end as well as provide a further demonstration of unity in support of the President. But patience is wearing thin. This war cannot be permitted to go on interminably and unless the North Vietnamese quickly demonstrate a willingness to negotiate and a desire for peace, U.S. military forces should be unshackled and given the opportunity for the first time since our involvement in Vietnam to force a decision. As I have previously stated, the alternative is to withdraw.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, I yield the time remaining on this side to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Hays).

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Indiana (Mr. ADAIR) yields 8 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS).

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count. One hundred four Members are present, a quorum.

The gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) is recognized for 15 minutes to close debate.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman. (Mr. RANDALL asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 613. The resolution is identical to House Resolution 671 which I introduced at about the same time frame as House Resolution 612 and House Resolution 613.

It should be clear to anyone who reads the resolution that its entire purpose is toward peace. I introduced House Resolution 671 because I was convinced that this kind of a resolution expresses the views of the majority of the Members of the House of Representatives and also a substantial majority of the American people.

This resolution deserves the support of every Member of this House because it is in the best tradition of responsible bipartisan congressional support for the foreign policies of the United States. Who can deny that under our Constitution the President is charged with the responsibility of speaking for our country in international situations? As to Southeast Asia, he alone can negotiate peace. On the other hand, if a substantial number of individual Members of Congress should undermine this authority to speak for the Nation, or cause doubts to be raised whether the President speaks for the Nation, then his task becomes much more complex and the goal of a peaceful settlement is made more remote.

After a careful study of the resolution, I became convinced the resolution may not give the President any greater authority that he now possesses. It is a formal expression by the House of Representatives in support of the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. All of us have heard a lot about escalation of the war. Certainly the intention of all of us who introduced identical resolutions was that this effort would result in an escalation of the peace effort.

It is my appraisal that those who argue this resolution could be a blank check to escalate the war are completely wrong. There is nothing hidden here, there is nothing concealed. The resolution says what it means and means what it says. True, it does not have the force of law, but it is a clear expression of the views of the Members of this House.

There are those who say they are concerned that the resolution, by endorsing free elections in South Vietnam, could mean a Communist takeover. Well, the answer to that is that if the elections are truly free and the South should vote communistic, then they will have to suf-

fer themselves under that form of government. But the best answer is that if there are really free elections, there has never been a single instance anywhere in the world that a people who were given the privilege of free elections ever voted themselves under communism.

For those who argue that this resolution is nothing more than a pat on the back for Mr. Nixon, I would caution that we should not fall into the error of regarding this resolution as anything of that kind. I, for one, could not find it possible to vote against this resolution just because it might help Mr. Nixon. If it does help the administration, while at the same time we achieve the goal of honorable peace, then I fail to see how any Member can complain.

All that this resolution says is that the Congress supports the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace. It says that we all want to get the war over with and peace restored in Southeast Asia; and that we are for free elections in South Vietnam and we will abide by the results of such elections. That is what this resolution is all about and that is all there is to it.

If the President fails in his present endeavor there will be time enough for all of us to register our disapproval by one of several means. Certainly we can do so through the appropriation process and even through the authorization process. As I have suggested both on and off the floor, there is always the opportunity to consider again the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

The present occupant of the White House is not of my political persuasion. I did not support his campaign. But a sufficient number of Americans expressed their choice as Mr. Nixon. I recognize he now has the most difficult job in the world. He is now my President. There is no reason that this resolution should be considered as political. It is my strong belief that the American people are much more knowledgeable than many of those with leftist leanings believe. The people are very competent to figure out whether a move is partisan and political or not. On that point it would seem to me that it would be a political mistake for Members to oppose this resolution. Opposition could very well be construed as an effort to hinder the efforts of the President toward peace with justice in Vietnam.

As I understand the present course of the administration, it is that pending an armistice there shall be no degree of military activity in any measure greater than is necessary to meet the aggression of the enemy. The alternatives would be either full-scale war or peace at any price, which means surrender of our honor and the abandonment to a blood bath of a people who have placed their trust in us. If we support an honorable and just peace in Vietnam, no one is looking to the next election. We are looking to the next generation.

(Mr. HULL (at the request of Mr. RANDALL) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.)

(Mr. HULL addressed the Committee. His remarks will appear hereafter in the Extensions of Remarks.)

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Ohio yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman.

(Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts. Mr. Chairman, we have here today a situation that is really a paradox. It is both extremely meaningful and meaningless. For the first time in 5 years the House is considering a resolution concerned with Vietnam. In that sense it is very meaningful. But on the other hand we are dealing with a resolution that is unclear, ambiguous, that is being interpreted by each member in a different way, that has not the force of law and therefore is meaningless.

We have a closed rule, which I opposed, on this resolution and only 4 hours of debate. If we consider Vietnam as important, then that is a disgrace to this body. We have a choice of voting for the resolution or voting against it. A vote for it can be construed in many ways, and a vote against it is equally unclear in intention. There have been speakers, both yesterday and today, who have taken the resolution apart phrase by phrase and have posted the question "what is wrong with that?" or uttered the phrase "who can object to that?" But it is the meaning of the words with which I find fault. Everyone says, and I am sure, believes, that he is for a just peace, but in statements on the floor both yesterday and today, we see that just peace means something different to each man. Everyone is for free elections, but the resolution does not define that phrase. We have seen in the past 2 days that a legislative history is being accumulated. Every man who speaks either tries to define the resolution or explain his interpretation of the resolution. I think this is fair and that it is right—for since there were no hearings held and because the resolution is being ramrodded through the House, there is no legislative history and some must be created at this time.

I greatly fear how this resolution will be interpreted—not so much abroad but here at home. The President, in an unprecedented visit to this body, thanked the Members for their support, through this resolution, of his policies as described on November 3. I do not support that policy. I support the President. I supported the previous President, and yet I did not support his policy. There are two ways to support a President—as an institution, and I do support the Office of the President and the man who now holds that office. But one can also support an individual man in that office by supporting all of his policies. I do not support this President's policies. The President has put a great deal of pressure on the House by interpreting this resolution, which was conceived and written before his speech, as an endorsement of the policies described in that speech. I use the term describe advisedly, for I listened to that speech very carefully. I read it again many times and I do not know what his policy is. He spoke of Vietnam, he spoke of troop with-

drawals, he spoke of negotiations, but I do not know the order in which he places these things. I do not know the priority he gives these things, and I doubt whether many Members of this House would agree on what that policy is and what he says it would be.

This resolution is much too subject to interpretation for my liking. Instead of a simple statement, like that proposed by the gentleman from California (Mr. TUNNEY) supporting the President's efforts for peace, we have many words. Is agreement through negotiations, on free elections and a just peace necessary before we withdraw troops so, I cannot support this resolution. We merely saying we would like a negotiated peace and free elections, but continue to withdraw our remaining troops? If so, I could support this resolution.

Are the negotiations and free election preconditions to our withdrawals? That is the President's policy, I do not support it. I disagreed with President Johnson's policies in Vietnam, but I continued to support him as the President of the United States and I supported his other policies. I disagree with President Nixon's policies on the war because I think they will not work, but I continue to support him as President.

I firmly believe that the pressure of announced gradual troop withdrawals will force the generals in Saigon to broaden their political base and institute reforms as nothing else will.

We have seen yesterday and today many Members who have said they will vote for this resolution, but only after they explain their ideas of it and their explanation of the resolution's intent. If one will only read yesterday's RECORD, he can see that the views differs with each man as does the interpretation of the resolution. I could make a statement of my thoughts of this resolution as a simple support for peace, hope for negotiations and free elections, but not an endorsement of past, present, and future policies. I can describe what I would have preferred in a resolution, that would have urged and supported further troop withdrawals regardless of what happens in the field or in Paris. But I cannot in good conscience vote for this resolution. I support the President's search for peace, but I think his methods are wrong; that he has made and is making a great mistake, that his policies will not lead any more quickly to peace nor the end of hostilities than did the policies of the former administration.

However, I am even more greatly concerned about this resolution, and feel that it is a mistake, because I can see how it will be used by the way it has been used already. The President calls this resolution a support for his policy. Yet even its authors say it is not. The President says it indicates unity behind his program. Yet we all know that it does not. More frightening, however, is the fact that it is being used to squash dissent. Again, read yesterday's RECORD, and we see that many say that those who oppose this resolution do not support the President. Yet this is patently false and misleading. We find those who dissent and criticize these policies are equated

with traitors and extremists. Yet we all know of honorable, patriotic, loyal, intelligent Americans that oppose this policy because they believe it is not in the best interest of the United States nor of the American people and that it will not help save American lives.

I am sorry to say that it appears to me that this is just another attempt on the part of the administration and its supporters to make dissent impossible. The Vice President, the President's director of communications, his Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission and other in his administration have called dissent dishonest and unpatriotic. It is the highest form of patriotism to attempt to prevent self-censorship on the part of the country. False unity and silence are not approval, although the President chooses to interpret them that way, and dissent is not condemnation although some choose to interpret it that way.

I oppose these policies because I think they will harm America and our people. What I propose is what I believe will be best for the United States and all Americans.

Where do we end up with this resolution? In the beginning of my remarks, I said that this was a rather meaningless resolution and innocuous if it only does what its sponsors say it does.

We all support our President: We all support a just peace: We all support free elections. It would be easy to vote for this resolution, preceded by a statement explaining my position on Vietnam and what I hope this resolution will do and what it will not do.

But—and this is too important a condition to be ignored—if negotiations fail or do not go anywhere, that is if all substantive issues continue to be ignored as they have been until this date, what will happen?

The President has said that if in his opinion the conditions in Vietnam necessitate escalation, he will escalate the war. In that case, I am afraid House Resolution 613 will be a mere repeat of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. I am quite happy to learn from previous mistakes, and I do not choose to repeat them. This resolution can be used just as the Tonkin resolution was used.

That may not be the intention of its sponsors. But the President has already interpreted this resolution as support for his policy as declared on November 3. That policy allows for escalation of the war, a return to previous policy. I did not support it in the past, and certainly will not give my approval in advance.

Mr. PURCELL. Mr. Chairman, once again I would like to express my utmost desire to see this great Nation find peace in Southeast Asia. When the people of South Vietnam are given the opportunity to choose for themselves the direction which their government will take, and the men who will lead them, the United States will have fulfilled its obligation to this beleaguered country.

It is essential that we here today give strength to this quest. It is plain now that so long as the Communists feel they can wait us out, there will be no peace. The adoption of this resolution today should

convince them that our disagreements are strictly within the United States' family and not a cause for continued delay by the Communists in negotiating a peace in Vietnam.

I am convinced, Mr. Chairman, that our voice must be heard—not just here in this Chamber, but across the world in Paris and Hanoi. The louder that voice, the sooner will North Vietnam accept and recognize our determination to see that South Vietnam dictates her own future.

Mr. NEDZI. Mr. Chairman, all of us in this House, I am sure, share a desire for early peace in Vietnam.

Whatever our political affiliations, we would like to see the President succeed in making peace on the best possible terms. If he succeeds, we all succeed. If he fails, we all fail.

We can generally applaud the general idea of a negotiated just peace contained in H.R. 613, the Wright resolution. Furthermore, we could have generally applauded many of the Vietnam-related resolutions which came across our desks in the interim between the October 15 and November 15 marches.

Nevertheless, there are aspects of this resolution which are troublesome.

I am troubled less by the resolution's own words than by the administration's seeming eagerness to embrace the resolution as evidence of a sort of open-ended endorsement of the Nixon Vietnam policy. This resolution must be read together with the President's November 3 speech, and I am troubled by a number of statements in that speech.

Let me set forth three particularly troublesome statements:

First. The President said:

At the time we launched our search for peace, I recognized we might not succeed in bringing an end to the war through negotiation. I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.

The President's "other plan to bring peace" is not clear, really, since the "Vietnamization" he talks about literally means continuing and prolonging the war without U.S. combat troops but with U.S. support troops backing up the South Vietnamese. We presently have over 400,000 support troops in Vietnam.

The President's speech also tended to downgrade the negotiation front, yet the Wright resolution is devoted almost entirely to approving our negotiation stance.

Second. The President further said:

The previous Administration policy not only resulted in our assuming the primary responsibility for fighting the war but even more significantly it did not adequately stress the goal of strengthening the South Vietnamese so that they could defend themselves when we left. The Vietnamization Plan was launched following Secretary Laird's visit to Vietnam in March.

The fact is that we assumed the primary responsibility of the fighting for the very obvious reason that in 1965 the South Vietnamese Army was on the verge of collapse. Before, during, and since the 1965 change in roles we have attempted to train, equip, and motivate the South Vietnamese Army. The process is old; only the slogan—Vietnamization—is new.

It is also a fact that President Nixon inherited a situation of deescalation when he assumed the Presidency in January 1969. Under President Johnson the bombing of North Vietnam had ended, at least two North Vietnamese divisions had moved out of the DMZ and the infiltration rates had been reduced. There was already a turning down of the war. Indeed, President Nixon may have wasted time and lives by waiting until August to end search and destroy missions.

Third. The President also said:

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed; for the more divided we are at home, the less likely the enemy is to negotiate in Paris.

In recalling his political campaign it seems the President was enraptured by campaign rhetoric. How else to explain the phrase "end the war in a way that we could win the peace." Having forgone the thought of military victory, it is difficult to see how we can "win" the peace either at the bargaining table or by the exclusive use of South Vietnamese troops.

As for division at home, it does exist. While most Americans want an honorable settlement of the war, all Americans are sick and tired of this war. Vietnam is tearing at the social, political, and spiritual fabric of this Nation and no resolution can hide that. While the My Lai incident is, I trust, an isolated example of the worst aspects of war, our national ethic has been damaged, our regard for human life pounded by the brutalization inherent in such a conflict.

The following is from the November issue of the Air Force/Space Digest, which did not endorse the article but noted it was written by "a longtime student of military affairs currently employed in the Department of Defense."

The article said, in part:

In a democratic republic like the United States it has never been possible to unify the country behind a misconceived, controversial, and ill-managed conflict like Vietnam. And let it be added that for too long has the myth persisted that if only this country were united on the war, then the North Vietnamese would immediately begin to negotiate. This does not follow at all—indeed, it never has—and has had a debilitating effect on rational discourse in this country concerning the war.

The higher road of patriotism is to think, to make searching inquiry, to follow one's conscience. The easy way is to respond to the superficial patriotic passion of the moment.

Fourth. Finally, when Vice President AGNEW flew to Montgomery, Ala., a town where the same company owns both newspapers, and attacked the Washington Post and the New York Times, which operate in cities with three competing papers, he used the Wright resolution as a weapon.

He said:

If a theology student in Iowa should get up at a P.T.A. luncheon in Sioux City and attack the President's Vietnam policy, my guess is that you would probably find it re-

ported somewhere the next morning in *The New York Times*. But when 300 congressmen endorse the President's Vietnam policy, the next morning it is apparently not considered news fit to print. (Emphasis supplied.)

Ironically, the *New York Times* did print the report in all but one edition, but the more interesting thing is the Vice President's statement that the Congressmen endorsed the President's Vietnam policy. He was referring to the signers of the Wright resolution.

We should be troubled by this, for the Nixon administration is trying to have it both ways. It is playing the tune of national unity on the one hand while turning loose its partisan political gunners on the other. We do not know to what further use this increasingly political administration will put this resolution.

Let us not walk into a trap. While JIM WRIGHT, I am sure, acted out of patriotic and high-minded motives in presenting his resolution, that resolution was booby-trapped during the night.

In our democratic society, asking questions is a vital part of avoiding error. By asking the right questions you can usually arrive at the truth. The Nixon "plan" for ending the war leaves too many questions unanswered.

Finally, I must object to this resolution on procedural grounds.

H.R. 613 comes to the floor under a closed rule, with no amendments permitted. We are told that under the precedents, a closed rule is called for on foreign policy resolutions. However, in the precedents cited, there were committee hearings before the resolutions came to the floor. No hearings whatsoever were held in this case. Aside from this, however, I believe that regardless of the precedents, we should permit amendments on this first House resolution in 5 years dealing with the open wound of Vietnam policy.

I cannot support a resolution, however high minded, which has been interpreted by this administration as a flat endorsement of a policy that is shrouded in uncertainty and vagueness. I am for peace with justice in Vietnam. I am also for the justice of the House of Representatives meeting its responsibilities by searching inquiry rather than mere acceptance.

Mr. HOWARD. Mr. Chairman, today the House of Representatives is going to vote on one of the most important pieces of legislation in its history, House Resolution 613, "Toward Peace with Justice in Vietnam."

First, I think it is fair to say that every single Member of the House is for peace with justice in Vietnam. There is disagreement in the House as to how we can best achieve peace with justice in Vietnam, but the overriding factor is that we are all searching for an honorable peace in Vietnam as soon as humanly possible.

I think it is a fair question to ask those who disagree with our present policies if they have a better alternative. Some possibly do. Some, I am sure, do not.

The author of the resolution, the distinguished Representative from Texas, JIM WRIGHT, is one of my best friends and has gone out of his way to help me

since I came to the House in January 1965.

I have discussed the resolution with JIM WRIGHT in depth. He says flatly that the resolution is not an endorsement of the President's speech of November 3.

But on November 13, 1969, the President, in an address to the House, said:

Yesterday I was informed by a bi-partisan group from the House of Representatives that over 300 members of the House had joined in sponsoring a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposals that I made in a speech on November 3, 1969.

President Nixon went on to say:

But I do know that when the great issues are involved that in this House, that what happened yesterday with the announcement on the part of Members on both sides of the aisle are well over a majority supporting the policy of the President of the United States, I realized that this was in the great tradition of this country.

Mr. Chairman, Mr. WRIGHT's statement that his resolution is not an endorsement of the President's speech, seems to collide head on with what the President said. I mention this fact because I feel it points out the air of confusion that this resolution seems to have brought about.

Since the introduction of this resolution, I have agonized daily over its possible impact on the House and on the country.

I am for peace with justice in Vietnam. I have supported the President's announced plans of troop withdrawals. But this does not mean that by voting in favor of this amendment I am approving any future course of action which might be taken by the President in regard to Vietnam.

This resolution is anything but perfect and for that reason, I have signed the following statement:

Confusion exists with respect to the meaning and intent of the resolution relating to the Vietnam policy. Introduced on November 4, it was widely reported to be an endorsement of President Nixon's statement of November 3. However, the resolution was drafted and signatures collected prior to November 3.

We regret that no hearings were held on the resolution by the House Foreign Affairs Committee so that some of the confusion and uncertainty could have been resolved.

We hope that during the floor discussion on the resolution its meaning will be clarified. Some of us will decide how our vote will be cast after listening to that discussion.

No matter how we may finally vote, however, we are in agreement on the following:

"We do not endorse everything said by the President in his statement of November 3rd.

"We specifically do not give advance approval of future decisions on Vietnam.

"We affirmatively urge efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam; the broadening of the political base of the Saigon government, and the immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

It is important to look briefly at the history of this resolution before deciding if it is in the best interests of the United States.

The resolution was approved in committee without the benefit of a hearing.

It was then brought to the floor under a closed rule prohibiting any of us from suggesting minor amendments.

I do agree that the President deserves strong bipartisan support for his efforts to negotiate peace in Vietnam. But amendments—or at least a hearing on this resolution—would have given all of us the opportunity to decide what we mean by a "just peace" as the wording appears in the resolution. When we talk about free elections in the resolution, do we mean that everyone in South Vietnam should be able to participate, or would certain groups and individuals be barred?

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I want say that I hope that in the future a such important legislation is first given the benefit of extensive public hearing and that everyone can be very clear exactly what the intent of the resolution is.

Mr. HAGAN. Mr. Chairman, on November 5 I joined a large number of my colleagues in cosponsoring a House resolution affirming support of the President, in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. This resolution calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures the United States has made in good faith toward the government of North Vietnam and approves the principle of free elections for the people of South Vietnam.

Because of the recent demonstrations here in Washington and in other cities across the country regarding Vietnam, it has not been hard for Hanoi to misconstrue these demonstrations and take encouragement from them in the hope of more concessions and having negotiations in Paris go their way. It is very important that we, here in Congress, take steps to correct this misinterpretation of opinion. We must let it be known that basically there is a strong sense of unity among our people and that the dissent so loudly proclaimed in our news media is not necessarily the majority speaking. We need to impress the leaders in Hanoi with the unity of purpose underlying this resolution. They seem to believe that our country is about to cave in and surrender to the vocal minority that is presently "making the scene," so to speak. They are hoping this will be true and are perfectly willing to sit back and wait it out. In the meantime, the fighting continues and they refuse to honor cease-fire rules or even show interest in reciprocating while negotiations are going on in Paris.

There are two other points worthy of mention today, one is that this is not another "Gulf of Tonkin" resolution and it is clearly distinguishable on at least three counts: One, its thrust is entirely toward peace not war; two, the Tonkin resolution, by inference at least, seemed to broaden presidential powers whereas nothing in this Vietnam resolution would suggest this; three, the Tonkin resolution implies approval for future acts by the executive while today's resolution has reference to actions already taken and positions already on record. This is not an open-ended resolution.

My second point is that while this resolution demonstrates to Hanoi that we are standing together in support of the

President's efforts, it also lets Saigon know that we are committed to freedom of self-government for South Vietnam through free and fair elections for all the South Vietnamese people.

I strongly urge passage of this resolution because of the tremendous impact it can have in bringing out a more realistic view of our stand on peace in Vietnam. Who does not want peace in Vietnam in this country and an end to the war? On this we can all agree but let it be known that it must be an honorable and fairly negotiated peace. We will not settle for less.

Mr. SKUBITZ. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613, "Towards Peace with Justice in Vietnam." I support President Nixon in his effort to end the Vietnam war. We can have only one President of the United States. I strongly believe he has the willingness and the knowledge to conclude this war expeditiously.

The language of the resolution is clear. It simply "affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam." We are not going to end the war in Vietnam with a divided Nation. This resolution is the best way to show Hanoi that we stand behind our President. I strongly urge its passage.

Mr. Chairman, I also submit another resolution we should pass this resolution by a large vote is that we should remember the most important man of all—our servicemen in Vietnam. The passage of this resolution is going to make his job a lot easier for him.

We are all anxious to end this war as soon as possible. Passing this resolution would be a giant step in the right direction. We should remember this is a peace resolution not a war resolution.

Mr. MOORHEAD. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we sent combat troops to Vietnam in 1965 to prevent an overthrow of the south by the north and to give the elected government of South Vietnam time to build so that it could become strong enough to defend itself from the north or make a political arrangement with the north.

I believe that we have accomplished that objective.

I believe that we did not enter Vietnam to inflict a defeat on North Vietnam but to prevent a defeat of South Vietnam.

I believe that we have accomplished that objective and that we can begin to withdraw our troops, not in a precipitous manner but in an orderly and systematic fashion. This position has been embodied in a resolution which I have cosponsored which provides that American troops should be withdrawn as quickly as possible contingent with the necessity to:

First, provide for the safety of U.S. forces; second, secure the release of American prisoners of war; third, assist any Vietnamese desiring asylum, and fourth, enable the United States to make an orderly disposition of its facilities in South Vietnam.

I believe that this is also President Nixon's policy and if it is, he, of course, has my support.

The difficulty is that I am not sure that this is Mr. Nixon's policy.

During the last year and a half he has made inconsistent statements about Vietnam and, therefore, I am reluctant to give a blanket endorsement of all his policies past, present, and future on Vietnam.

This would not be the first time the Congress was asked to give a blank check on Vietnam.

On August 2 and 4 of 1964 U.S. destroyers on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin were apparently attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.

On August 5 the Congress was asked to adopt and on August 7 did adopt a resolution supporting the President of the United States in his determination—

To take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

I do not believe that any Member of this House ever dreamed that that resolution would be used as the legal basis for a force of over 500,000 U.S. ground forces in Vietnam.

We did not realize that we were giving the President of the United States a blank check.

We are being asked to do the same thing today.

There is a saying:

You fool me once, shame on you, You fool me twice, shame on me.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to vote another Vietnam blank check.

I call this resolution a blank check because I do not understand what it means.

It states that—

The House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Which efforts?

During the campaign Mr. Nixon said he had a "plan" for ending the war. He has not revealed that "plan." Does this resolution endorse that secret plan?

On March 4, 1969, Mr. Nixon said:\*

There are no plans to withdraw any troops at this time or in the near future.

On March 14 Mr. Nixon said:\*

There is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.

Does this resolution endorse these statements?

On August 25, Ho Chi Minh wrote a letter to Mr. Nixon and concluded with the following paragraph:

With goodwill on both sides we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem.

On November 3, 1969, Mr. Nixon said that Ho's letter "flatly rejected my initiative."

Does this resolution endorse that interpretation of Ho's letter?

For good and understandable reasons Mr. Nixon refused on November 3 to announce a timetable for withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam.

\* On March 26, 1969 I introduced with 33 co-sponsors a Resolution which read: "Resolved that it is the sense of Congress that the United States should begin to reduce its military involvement in Vietnam".

Does this resolution endorse Mr. Nixon's future rate of troop withdrawal however fast or slow that may be?

In his speech on November 3, Mr. Nixon twice used the words "win the peace."

Does this resolution endorse those words and if so, what do they mean? Does it mean that we will not settle unless the treaty nails the coonskin to the wall?

In his speech on November 3, Mr. Nixon warned Hanoi that increased violence might lead to reescalation of the war.

Does this resolution endorse reescalation?

During Secretary of Defense Laird's testimony before the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee on November 17, 1969, two weeks after President Nixon's November 3 speech, the following exchanges took place:

Mr. MAHON. If Vietnamization does not work, and if the North Vietnamese escalate the war, and if agreements cannot be reached in the Paris peace talks or otherwise, do you foresee the possibility of an escalation of the war in Vietnam?

Secretary LAIRD. I would not rule out that possibility completely, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MINSHALL. You say you are not ruling out any course of action. You mean by that conventional warfare only or would that also include nuclear weapons?

Secretary LAIRD. I would not anticipate the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam. I am not, however, ruling out other actions that might be necessary in the event the Vietnamization program does not work, even though I am confident it will work.

Does this resolution endorse that testimony? According to an article by Harrison Salisbury in the New York Times:

Xuan Thuy, North Vietnam's delegate to the peace talks here, contends that Hanoi is and has been ready at any time to meet the United States in private talks aimed at ending the war.

and

That Mr. Lodge had rejected this proposal, insisting that the only question he was prepared to discuss was that of "mutual withdrawal."

Does this resolution endorse this position?

In his speech on November 3, Mr. Nixon said:

The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

I honestly do not know the truth of that policy and, therefore, I cannot vote for a resolution that blindly endorses it.

I could support this resolution if seven words were changed so that the first few lines would read as follows:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives urges the President to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

Mr. POFF. Mr. Chairman, what is America's Vietnam policy? What are our objectives there? What specifically can be done to achieve those objectives and resolve the conflict?

Everybody in Washington can give a different answer to those questions. It seems to me, so far as official American policy is concerned, the best answers can be found in the words of the President of the United States. Defining what he

called "our essential objective in Vietnam," President Nixon has said:

We seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference.

We seek bases in Vietnam.

We seek no military ties.

We are willing to agree to neutrality for South Vietnam if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose.

We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam by all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation.

We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

We have no intention of imposing any form of government upon the people of South Vietnam, nor will be a party to such coercion.

We have no objection to reunification, if that turns out to be what the people of North Vietnam and the people of South Vietnam want; we ask only that the decision reflect the free choice of the people concerned.

The President has also articulated specific proposals which have the full approval of President Thieu and which he believes to be "consistent with the principles of all parties." Here in his own words are the specific proposals the President has recommended:

As soon as agreement can be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam.

Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all U.S., allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., allied and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

The remaining U.S. and allied forces would complete their withdrawal as the remaining North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be created for the purpose of verifying withdrawals, and for any other purposes agreed upon between the two sides.

This international supervisory body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised cease-fires in Vietnam.

As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body.

Arrangements would be made for the release of prisoners of war on both sides at the earliest possible time.

All parties would agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1962.

Let me be quite blunt. Our fighting men are not going to be worn down; our mediators are not going to be talked down; and our allies are not going to be let down.

I frequently have letters from constituents who are earnestly and honestly seeking peace but who are critical of the policies and procedures which are being followed. Unfortunately, few of these letters reflect a familiarity with the generous dimensions of the proposals the President has made. Very few offer any specific alternatives.

It is my earnest conviction that a vast majority of the American people sup-

port the President's policy for peace in Vietnam. House Resolution 613 gives voice to and documents that fact. It adds nothing to the President's constitutional reservoir of power, and it subtracts nothing from the congressional reservoir of power. It is not a mandate; it is an affirmation. It is not an injunction; it is an endorsement. At this critical juncture in the struggle for peace, it is the least we can do; it is the most we can do.

As a cosponsor of the legislation, I urge the largest possible affirmative vote.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, the conflict in Vietnam is a bitter and tragic one and we must bring it to a speedy end. It has taken a terrible toll in lives and resources and has created a frightening division among Americans.

I am sure few doubt that President Nixon is sincerely following a course of action which he firmly believes to be correct. And as a Member of Congress responsible both to my constituents and to the best interests of the country I believe he deserves our support as he endeavors to fulfill his stated commitment to bring peace.

For this reason only, I joined as one of the original cosponsors of House Resolution 613 when it was first proposed prior to President Nixon's speech to the Nation on November 3. The President, alone under our constitutional system, can speak for the Nation in negotiating peace and it was my hope that our expression of unity and resolve will help in this crucial effort.

Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, I must clearly state my firm conviction that adoption of this resolution will in no way constitute an absolute endorsement of the President's November 3 statement on Vietnam policy or his still undisclosed plan for peace.

While supporting House Resolution 613, therefore, I also reserve my right to disagree and to criticize specific issues or actions. I was, for example, very disappointed that there was no opportunity for more careful consideration of the resolution and, particularly, the possibility of amending it to express support for the withdrawal of troops at the earliest practicable date. The resolution in fact is one sided, for while it expresses support for negotiating a just peace in Vietnam it is silent about the President's proclaimed policy of troop withdrawal and Vietnamization of the war.

Mr. Chairman, like war, the quest for peace is often tortuous and agonizing, and the kind of peace that will finally come to Vietnam is already a matter of great concern. However, although I have some serious doubts and questions about the President's unspecified plan, I am prepared at this time to give him my support in his expressed efforts to negotiate a just peace and to Vietnamize the war.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, we are engaged today in an exercise in futility, an exercise in fantasy, an exercise in rhetoric, ignoring realities.

With all due respect to the honorable gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), and to all the Members of this House who have signed his resolution, I must dis-

agree with that resolution and its purpose. I believe that it ignores what is happening in Vietnam and what is happening in the United States. In the United States we have a great division over what is happening in Vietnam, and this division cannot be cured by words strung together without meaning. We, of course, support the President when he seeks peace. The question is: Will his plans for peace produce peace? I do not believe they will, and thus I cannot support the principles "enunciated" by the President.

For 8 years we have heard three Presidents speak of their hopes and prayers for peace in Vietnam, yet there is no peace. Mistakes have been compounded on mistakes. President Nixon is repeating those mistakes.

We have 500,000 men in Vietnam. They are there in support of the South Vietnamese Government, a corrupt, and cruel government which would have fallen if we had not sent 500,000 men in Vietnam. Our support of that Government has cost us more than \$100 billion and almost 40,000 American lives. It survives only because of our sacrifices. It will fall as soon as we withdraw. If the United States joined with South Vietnamese Government in refusing to hold elections there, in defying the Geneva accords, President Eisenhower was honest enough to admit the reason.

South Vietnamese Government would have lost the election. I would wish that we could be wise enough to admit what would happen if free elections were held tomorrow in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese Government would lose that election. As a matter of fact, the present South Vietnamese Government would not allow free elections in Vietnam. It must fall before such elections can be held.

The record of the governments of South Vietnam, our creature-governments, is clear. They are corrupt, and they are not supported by the people of South Vietnam. In the area of corruption, I would like to quote the distinguished Senator from Georgia, HERMAN E. TALMADGE:

The Department of State concedes that there is corruption in Vietnam, but gives no indication of its extent or cost to the taxpayers, or to the war effort. It holds out no real hope for doing anything about it.

The State Department on June 1, 1968, said:

The United States recognizes that there is corruption in Vietnam, and we are pressing in every way that we can to help the South Vietnamese find ways to deal with it. . . . Much greater results are needed if the problem of corruption is to be resolved.

We know the cost in American lives in Vietnam, but we do not know the cost of corruption both in lives and in dollars.

William Lederer in his book "Our Worst Enemy," quoted a North Vietnamese officer as saying:

Without American money, guns, food, medicine and supplies, we of the National Liberation Front would have a hard time surviving.

Where did the North Vietnamese obtain American money, guns, food, medicine, and supplies? They obtained the

from corrupt South Vietnamese officers and government officials.

Conditions in South Vietnam have not changed. On July 7, 1969, Robert G. Kaiser reported in the Washington Post:

Not long ago the Vietnamese maid of a Frenchman living in Saigon heard that her son, a South Vietnamese soldier had been wounded and was in a Saigon hospital. She tried to find him, but the authorities at each hospital she visited would not tell her if they had the boy as a patient.

They all demanded a bribe to answer the question, and the woman could not afford pay.

And so the South Vietnamese Government tries to win the minds and hearts of its people.

The same report points out that a pro-Vietnam bloc in the National Assembly's war house was created by paying each congressman, \$2,500.

We know of the money stolen by past Saigon regimes, of the French banks tight with American funds, of the parades, the girls and the estates. We know that American dollars are going into Saigon banks to care for South Vietnamese politicians who realistically know their country are numbered in Vietnam. The United States will not have to care for South Vietnamese politicians who will flee a new government. They have already taken care of themselves, at our expense.

How much has corruption cost the United States? It cannot be estimated, but it at least equals \$1,000 for every American life lost in Vietnam—40,000 lives, \$40 million.

Corruption is not the only failure of the South Vietnamese Government. We say we are fighting for freedom in South Vietnam. Is South Vietnam free? A man may run against the present regime, but when he loses, where does he go? He is jailed. There is no viable government in South Vietnam, because the present government rules through force, American force. It cannot stand by itself, because the Vietnamese people do not support it.

The realities in Vietnam, realities not recognized in this resolution, are:

First. The war will continue as long as American troops remain in South Vietnam;

Second. The South Vietnamese Government is a corrupt dictatorship.

Third. U.S. forces, despite our use of massive military force, have not "won" the Vietnam war and cannot win it.

Fourth. Until the United States recognizes and acts on these realities, there cannot be any hope of peace in Vietnam. Vietnamization of the war is a sham. The President's "plan for peace" will not work.

Therefore, I oppose this resolution, because it is not a solution to the problem, but it is part of the problem. I support the President's hopes and prayers for peace. I do not support the President's present course in Vietnam, because it will not lead to peace.

On November 13, 28 Members of Congress, myself included, offered a resolution which does recognize the realities of Vietnam. It read:

The resolution calls for withdrawal of U.S. forces in South Vietnam on an orderly and fixed schedule—neither pre-

cipitate nor contingent on factors beyond U.S. control—to extend only over a period of time as would be necessary to provide for the safety of U.S. forces, secure the release of American prisoners of war, assist any Vietnamese desiring asylum, and enable the United States to make an orderly disposition of its facilities in South Vietnam.

I urge that this House support this resolution or a similar one. I urge this House to act in a constructive manner, to take action which will produce results, and to respond to what is happening. The challenge today is not to support a wrong course, but to change that course.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613 which says very clearly that the Members of the U.S. House of Representatives support President Nixon in his efforts to bring the Vietnam war to an honorable and just conclusion. Since this body represents the American people more closely than any other elected group, I feel this resolution will dispel any misconceptions that the people of other countries might have about America not being a united people. We are united and we do want peace in Southeast Asia. But in expressing our support for peace, we are also expressing our firm desire that the people of South Vietnam will be allowed to choose their leaders in free and democratic elections. I would urge all of my colleagues to give a vote of approval for House Resolution 613.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, the effect of passage of this resolution will not end the war one minute earlier. It may in fact prolong it.

For 11 months the President of the United States has been able to carry on foreign policy affecting, among other areas, Vietnam.

It was felt, I believe justifiably, that an appropriate period of time should be given to the incoming administration to work out their expressed policy aims of concluding the war in Vietnam.

But the President's November 3 speech, which the resolution now before the House endorses, contained no new delineations of policy, contained no series of proposals which would be the basis for total American disengagement, and was notably lacking in specifics regarding American intentions in South Vietnam. It was a speech barren of policy worth endorsing.

The resolution which does endorse this major policy statement by the President on the most critical issue facing our Nation today, comes before this body under unusual circumstances. The House has not been afforded the means to participate in public hearings on the resolution before the Foreign Affairs Committee. Nor has the House been offered the opportunity to amend the resolution on the floor. In sum, the House has been asked to endorse unequivocally the administration's foreign policy on Vietnam and the customary channels of open debate, of free deliberation, of weighing diverse views, have been abruptly curtailed.

The choice therefore before this body is either yes or no, up or down, and while the administration is the architect of our foreign policy the Congress of the United

States has a major responsibility in expressing its position.

Though the parallels are not entirely similar, I think reference must be made to earlier congressional action involving this same area of the world. I refer chiefly to the Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

For my part I have no desire—however laudatory the expressed purpose, however innocent the choice of language, however sincere the intentions—to participate by giving my formal endorsement of the war aims of the President as set forth in his November 3 speech.

I believe that to join with others in Congress in endorsing this policy as it has been defined will not and cannot result in shortening the war.

The apparent intent of the resolution is to present to the world a facade of unity. But you cannot make what is false true by congressional resolution.

The apparent hope of the resolution is to reduce to simple terms the complexities of our Vietnam policies. But such a broadly worded resolution recalls too clearly the innocuous language of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and reminds us of the dangers inherent when congressional authority is used by a President for aims not originally conceived.

The apparent design of the resolution is to give painless approbation to our Vietnam policy. But no congressional resolution can, despite studied effort, conceal the staggering dilemma faced by Americans viewing the horror of My Lai.

Support for this resolution will only continue the freeze of attitudes on the part of the National Liberation Front, the North Vietnamese, and, their allies, will result in increased cynicism and increased criticism of U.S. foreign policy by the rest of the world, and will result most importantly, in a heightening of the divisiveness, the frustration and the anger which already besets the Nation.

To join therefore in support of this resolution so disarmingly entitled "Peace With Justice," would serve no useful purpose but would, to the contrary, contribute to an entirely unjustified feeling of comfort which suggests the American Nation is satisfied with the conduct of American policy in Vietnam.

Accordingly I will vote against the resolution.

Mr. SEBELIUS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to strongly support House Resolution 613, a resolution that I am hopeful will better enable the President to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

It seems to me, and it has been eloquently stated by many Members of this body, that the main point of this resolution is to make sure Hanoi understands the simple fact the people of South Vietnam have a right to a government of their own choosing.

I think the President has made it abundantly clear that our Nation is now in Vietnam with one basic, limited purpose—to protect the right of self-government for the people of South Vietnam. I am extremely hopeful that through this resolution the government of Hanoi, which came to power through violence, terror, and military might, will clearly understand this fundamental

American conviction. Once Hanoi clearly understands this point, I think we can expect to see real progress in the President's efforts to achieve a just peace.

Mr. SHRIVER. Mr. Chairman, as one of the original sponsors of this resolution I rise to urge its adoption. It is a resolution which has strong bipartisan support. The entire thrust of this resolution is in the direction of peace. The statement rattles no sabers. It makes no threats. It is positive in tone and conciliatory rather than belligerent.

This resolution confers no secret powers upon the President. Under our Constitution, the President is charged with the responsibility for speaking for the Nation in critical international situations. His is the responsibility to conduct negotiations in the name of this country. He alone can negotiate peace.

Since becoming President last January, Richard Nixon has worked to bring an end to the war in Vietnam through negotiations with the other side in Paris. Under his leadership, we have seen American troops returning from Vietnam. The program of Vietnamization is working, and I personally hope the President will soon announce further planned troop withdrawals.

The adoption of this resolution at this time can be helpful to the President as he attempts to end the war with justice and honor. It will tell the Government of North Vietnam and the Vietcong that the membership of the U.S. House of Representatives is closely united with the President in his efforts to negotiate peace.

Unity, understanding, and support for the President and our servicemen in Vietnam will contribute to the success of the Nixon plan for peace. We can help deliver a message to Hanoi that will tell the Communists that now is the time to sit down at the bargaining table and negotiate an end to this war. This is the message which this resolution will carry. I urge its passage.

Mr. ULLMAN. Mr. Chairman, when I agreed to cosponsor the resolution before us today, I did so in the belief that President Nixon and his administration were committed to peace and the disengagement of the United States from its involvement in the Vietnam war.

The President's speech of November 3 emphasized his commitment to peace. He said:

I pledged in my campaign for the Presidency to end the war in a way that we could win the peace. I have initiated a plan of action which will enable me to keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the American people, the sooner that pledge can be redeemed.

Mr. Chairman, for more than 2 years I have urged a systematic withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam at a pace that would get us out of Vietnam as rapidly as reasonably possible. This appeared to be the basic message of President Nixon's speech and the fundamental policy of his administration. I was thus prepared to extend my support for what seemed to be a real effort to achieve an early peace.

Nevertheless, I had misgivings. The President's failure to spell out the details of his Vietnam peace plan disturbed me.

He said the administration has adopted a plan for the complete withdrawal of all U.S. ground combat forces and their replacement by South Vietnamese forces. But he declined to announce this timetable.

This omission, I felt, would have several negative effects. It would most likely weaken the incentive for the South Vietnamese to accept their full responsibility in the defense of their country and the determination of their future economic and political structure.

Second, this failure to commit ourselves publicly to a withdrawal timetable leaves the door wide open to a renewed buildup of U.S. forces. Indeed, the President qualified his peace plan by saying it hinged on the level of enemy activity as well as the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces.

The resolution itself is also somewhat ambiguous. It affirms the House's support "for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam." No mention is made of disengagement or withdrawal on any timetable, public or private.

The simplicity of the resolution is appealing in its expressed desire for peace. But this simplicity also gives rise to the dangers of misinterpretation. The 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution was also a simply stated document that gave basic support to a President's policy. Little did the Congress realize how this resolution would be used by President Johnson as legal justification for the massive escalation of American involvement in Vietnam that followed.

My doubts were deepened when this resolution came before the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I had anticipated a public debate during hearings that would allow the administration an opportunity to fill in the blanks of its peace plan. The quiet and precipitate treatment of the resolution by the committee was hardly reassuring, and I thus voted with the minority of my colleagues against a closed rule that shut off debate on the House floor.

Nevertheless, until today I have remained ready to vote for the resolution, believing that President Nixon's search for a just peace was predicated on an irreversible disengagement from the war. This, in my judgment, must be the essence of our Vietnam policy if we are to find peace.

Thus I was shocked to learn today that the administration may not be committed to irreversible withdrawal. In testimony before a House Appropriations Subcommittee released yesterday, Defense Secretary Melvin Laird says that he would "not rule out" the possibility of reescalation of the Vietnam war if the President's policy of Vietnamization does not "lead the way to a military victory."

Secretary Laird's statements place a new interpretation on our Vietnam policy. The emphasis shifts back from a determination to win a just peace to the old game of American willingness in Vietnam to keep all the options open. It is now virtually impossible to believe that the administration is committed to a policy of irreversible withdrawal.

If it is not, it would appear that this

resolution can be used to sanction any kind of Presidential policy change in Vietnam, including a new escalation of fighting.

In this light, the resolution takes on the same dangerous coloring as the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. I cannot and will not support a resolution that would condone, and perhaps be used to justify, an expanded American combat effort in Vietnam. Until the administration makes completely clear its intention to withdraw irreversibly from Vietnam, I will withhold my support of its policies, a vote against this resolution today.

Mr. HELSTOSKI. Mr. Chairman, in my opinion the House of Representatives is acting with undue haste in approving House Resolution 613.

There are unresolved serious doubts about some sections of the resolution. Some of us believe it contains details which could commit the United States of America to an indefinite continuation of the undeclared war in Vietnam and the power of decision resting in only one person—the President.

We who feel this way thought we were afforded the opportunity of amending the resolution to remove or correct sections, but we could not even try because of the procedures under which it was debated and voted upon. There were no committee hearings and the resolution was taken up in the House unopposed and unopposed.

We may well have given another identical blank check.

It should be evident to everyone that all thinking Americans want military operations and confrontations brought to an end in Vietnam as rapidly as possible—overnight if it were possible.

We, as Members of the House of Representatives, should be in the forefront of efforts to bring an end to the killing and maiming in Vietnam, but are we?

We all know that we are not.

The passage of House Resolution 613 does not place us in such a position. In fact, it drives us further away from the actions that result in the decisionmaking of the President.

If House Resolution 613, which we consider under the muzzle of a closed rule, does give another blank check to the Chief Executive then it is apparent we have not learned. We know what earlier blank checks brought about. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution of 1964 is cited as one example. Such resolutions are an effect a circumventing of the Constitution.

We all support the President's effort to bring an honorable end and, I hope, lasting peace to Vietnam and its surrounding areas, but I could not in good conscience vote to give him a blank check. To have done so would not have been in accordance with my beliefs of democratic form of government or responsibilities to the people I represent.

The President actively seeks our support for his efforts. I repeat, I give him my support but not by voting for the questionable resolution that was brought before us.

But I do believe that the President owes something in return to Member of the House of Representatives and the people they represent.