

First, I believe that he must explain to all what happened to his 1968 New Hampshire announced but unexplained plan for ending the undeclared war in Vietnam. He held out high hopes for all of us.

What was the plan? What happened to it? The public has a right to know. The President's failure to explain this promise or utterance has disturbed me for many months. I was just as disturbed about being asked to blindly vote for House Resolution 613.

It is not clear what the administration is doing about the Vietnam situation except that it is slowly withdrawing American troops. That is important and good, but it is not enough. I expect and hope that there is much more of a constructive nature than can be done, but how many Members know what is exactly taking place. We should not play a game of blindly following the leader. It is my humble opinion that the President should place all of the facts about the Vietnam situation before us. He should appear before a joint session of Congress to set forth all of the facts and terms. If necessary it could be an open or closed session. He could ask a stated number of questions to be asked of him. He might keep us apprised of developments by appearing before a joint session every 30 days. Although such a procedure, he would be helpful to us and we might be helpful to him.

It is my hope that the leadership on both sides of the House will extend an invitation to the President to appear before us for a series of in-depth discussions of the Vietnam situation.

Mr. VANIK, Mr. Chairman, the issue with which we are confronted today is whether the House of Representatives should endorse the Vietnam peace plan submitted by President Nixon.

Up to the present time, the only plan for peace submitted by the President was in his speech to the Nation on November 3—and the secret plan for peace which he discussed in the presidential press conferences of last year. The only other clue to the plan of the President includes his proposal for Vietnamization of the war.

Like the fable of the emperor's clothes, there appears to be no plan to end the war. The withdrawal of some troops may increase the relationship of combatant to noncombatant forces and result in increased combat forces. The Vietnamization of the war is nothing new. I thought it was the American goal when the first technicians and military advisers were sent to Vietnam in 1964. Vietnamization of the war was American policy when we had 15,000 advisers in Vietnam. Vietnamization of the war is a slow, cruel process which has taken a toll of 44,000 lives and 106.9 billion taxpayer dollars. How much more will Vietnamization of the war cost in lives? How much more in American spirit? How much more will it sap from American morale? How much more in taxpayer expenditures?

The resolution before us authorizes the President to proceed for a "just peace" in Vietnam. The definition of either of

these terms is not made in the resolution, nor can it be found in the legislative history. Therefore the term "just peace" can mean whatever the executive decides it should mean at the time it may serve his purpose. The resolution does not preclude escalation, temporary or permanent.

The resolution does not preclude an increased commitment of men or materiel if this should be necessary to obtain a "just peace." The resolution does not prohibit a resumption of a bombing of the north or the use of nuclear weapons if this is necessary to obtain a "just peace." The resolution does not require any further troop withdrawals or prohibit further exposure of American troops if they are needed to obtain a "just peace." The resolution, therefore, authorizes any further commitment of men, materiel and casualties which the executive may deem necessary to win a "just peace."

Then, further—for whom must peace be just—for those who presently control the government of South Vietnam, the people of South Vietnam, the Liberation Front, the Vietcong, the North Vietnamese, the American people, or the citizens of the remainder of the world. Is America to be a separate party to the peace—or is the peace to be achieved in conjunction with the present South Vietnamese government? It is possible for the United States to achieve peace terms with the present government of Saigon?

Will the conditions for a "just peace" include concessions for American capital and enterprise to be invested in Vietnam? Will the conditions for a "just peace" insure the integrity of American property rights in Vietnam? Is this why 44,000 lives were spent?

Will a "just peace" demand conditions of a better life for those who are left to live in South Vietnam? Will a "just peace" insure land reform and protect the people from exploitation by either the central government or the military strong men who are left in control of military power and property? Will a "just peace" provide for a redemption of the people and the land for a pursuit of a decent, acceptable life for the Vietnamese?

It is incredible to expect that a "just peace" can be achieved for all the parties to the conflict. What is "just" to one—will be of necessity "unjust" to the other. The attainment of a "just peace" could be interpreted to mean through victory by an overwhelming and conclusive defeat of the enemy. Does the President's proposals—whatever it is—contemplate less than a full and complete military settlement of the conflict?

The resolution further supports the doctrine of free elections to determine the future Government of South Vietnam. Can America enforce this commitment on a government presently in control in Vietnam which it recognizes as the lawful Government of South Vietnam? Is this offer to the enemy enforceable? Can we force a free election upon South Vietnam short of making a military enemy of the present government we sought to befriend?

And who will set the rules of the free

election? What will be the qualifications of electors? Will the residency requirements permit those who immigrated to South Vietnam to vote on proof of residency after 1, 3, 5, or 10 years? Will former South Vietnamese residents who immigrated to North Vietnam be permitted to return and cast their ballots? Who will determine the difference between citizen and intruder?

The resolution before us today leaves these questions and many others without answers. In the orderly course of legislative events, interrogation of government witnesses would have provided a legislative history which would have included the administration's policy with respect to these questions and others that may be deemed important. A resolution which is adopted without this kind of clarification provides the administration with authority to do anything which it chooses within the framework of the words of the resolution.

The adoption of this undefined resolution will allow the creation of a false impression that these Vietnam policies have the overwhelming and unqualified approval of the American people. This resolution could be a disservice to the American people who are entitled to be better informed of the administration's intentions with respect to Vietnam. The patience of the American people has been temporarily extended but it has been stretched thin. The American desire for an end to the killing and a disengagement from the conflict.

This resolution is designed to meet a confrontation with dissent in America on the continuation of the war in Vietnam. Words, however artful, cannot substitute for the deeds and actions which can bring peace. The semantics of peace which could endorse a prolongation of the war are not acceptable.

This resolution could be easily made acceptable if it were to specify a program for peace and disengagement. In its present form, it is a blank check which could be construed to mean peace through more war. I cannot in good conscience endorse such a resolution.

Mr. FRASER, Mr. Chairman, many Members have expressed their concern about the interpretation which has been placed on House Resolution 613. This concern has been more formally set forth in a statement signed by 82 Members. The statement with the names of the signers follows:

STATEMENT ON HOUSE RESOLUTION 613

Confusion exists with respect to the meaning and intent of H. Res. 613 relating to Vietnam policy. Introduced in November 4th, it was widely reported to be an endorsement of President Nixon's statement on November 3rd and was so construed by the President when he visited the House. However, the resolution was drafted and signatures collected prior to November 3rd.

We regret that no hearings were held on the resolution by the House Foreign Affairs Committee so that some of the confusion and uncertainty could have been resolved.

We hope that during the floor discussion on the resolution its meaning will be clarified. Among us are sponsors of the resolution. Some of us will decide how our vote will be cast after listening to that discussion.

No matter how we may finally vote, however, we are in agreement on the following:

We do not endorse everything said by the President in his statement of November 3rd. We specifically do not give advance approval of future decisions on Vietnam.

We affirmatively urge efforts to reduce the level of violence in Vietnam, the broadening of the political base of the Saigon government, and the immediate designation of a high-level replacement for retiring delegate Henry Cabot Lodge.

Brock Adams, Joseph Addabbo, Glenn Anderson, Thomas Ludlow Ashley, Jonathan Bingham, John Blatnik, Edward Boland, John Brademas, Frank Brasca, Jack Brooks, George Brown, Hugh Carey, Shirley Chisholm, William Clay, Jeffery Cohelan, James Corman, John Culver, Emilio Daddario, Charles Diggs, John Dingell, Thaddeus Dulski, Bob Eckhardt, Don Edwards, Frank Evans, Leonard Farbstein, Thomas Foley, William Ford, Don Fraser, Joseph Gaydos, Sam Gibbons, Jacob Gilbert, Henry Gonzalez, William Green, Michael Harrington, Augustus Hawkins, Ken Hechler, Henry Helstoski, Floyd Hicks, James Howard, Andy Jacobs, Joseph Karth.

Edward Koch, Peter Kyros, Robert Leggett, Allard Lowenstein, Richard McCarthy, Paul McCloskey, Ray Madden, Spark Matsunaga, Lloyd Meeds, Abner Mikva, Joseph Minish, Patsy Mink, William Moorhead, John Moss, Lucien Nedzi, Robert Nix, David Obey, James O'Hara, Arnold Oisen, Thomas O'Neill, Richard Ottinger.

Bertram Podell, Thomas Rees, Ogden Reid, Peter Rodino, Robert Roe, Benjamin Rosenthal, Edward Roybal, Fernand St Germain, William St. Onge, James Scheuer, George Shipley, Frank Thompson, John Tunney, Morris Udall, Charles Vanik, Joseph Vigorito, Jerome Waldie, Charles Wilson, Lester Wolf, Sidney Yates.

Mr. ESCH, Mr. Chairman, I will support House Resolution 613 with my vote today. However, I am disappointed that the form of the resolution and the closed rule make it difficult for the House to give full expression to its views on this complex issue. I therefore want to take this opportunity to detail my views on the war in Vietnam more specifically than the broad outlines of the resolution allow.

Since taking office, I have had as a major concern our disengagement from Vietnam. You may recall that in July of 1967 I proposed, along with eight of my colleagues a plan for a mutual disengagement of the war and of the bombing that was underway at that time. The essence of that proposal was gradual, reciprocal, identifiable disengagement of hostilities and of the establishment of a government in which the people of South Vietnam realize true self determination. I believe the most important factor of our proposals was the flexibility which it allowed for both sides. The lack of this flexibility in many current proposals which set public deadlines is their major weakness.

While I believe that President Nixon has made significant progress toward disengagement in Vietnam, I feel that he should accelerate the rate of withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, investigate the feasibility of a deescalatory unilateral cease-fire, and assist in bringing a more responsive and representative government to South Vietnam.

To argue that the President has not changed the posture of the U.S. in South

Vietnam is without logic or fact and weakens the cause of those who argue for further disengagement. To gain perspective, it is interesting to reexamine what the "peace" candidate for President, EUGENE MCCARTHY, was proposing as a means to get out of Vietnam 1 year ago—and the similarity of his proposals to the action which the President has undertaken.

1. Stop the bombing and seek negotiations.
2. Halt the escalation and freeze troop strength.
3. Cease "search and destroy" missions.
4. Cease attempts to uproot the Viet Cong from areas they have controlled for many years.
5. Conduct a gradual disengagement in the South and a cease-fire on a trial basis in some areas while pressing for negotiation.
6. Insist that the South Vietnamese take on greater military responsibilities.
7. Reexamine military policy.
8. Press the authorities in Saigon to broaden their own political base. (Congressional Record, March 26, 1968.)

One who analytically reviews the steps taken by the current administration in the light of these suggestions will admit that significant progress has been made toward disengagement. This administration does not insist, as did its predecessor, that the result of free elections be favorable to the United States. This Administration has forced the South Vietnamese government to publicly agree to NLF political participation in a coalition supervisory election commission. Our orders are no longer for "maximum pressure" but for "protective reaction." Troops are no longer being increased, but are being brought home.

As Senator FULBRIGHT has said:

I am opposed to an unconditional American withdrawal from South Vietnam because such action would betray our obligation to people we have promised to defend, because it would weaken or destroy the credibility of American guarantees to other countries, and because such a withdrawal would encourage the view in Peiping and elsewhere that guerrilla wars supported from outside are a relatively safe and inexpensive way of expanding communist power.

Nonetheless, I believe that major additional efforts must be made. Specifically, I have recommended that we immediately announce new combat troop reductions as a further indication, both to the North Vietnamese and to the world, that we are sincere in our efforts to disengage from the war. We should also take the initiative in a unilateral cease fire.

Even more important is overt action on our part to meet our commitment to full self-determination for the South Vietnamese. Our goals, as stated by the President in his May 14 speech, are laudatory:

We seek no bases in Vietnam. We insist on no military ties. We are willing to agree to neutrality if that is what the South Vietnamese people freely choose. We believe there should be an opportunity for full participation in the political life of South Vietnam for all political elements that are prepared to do so without the use of force or intimidation. We are prepared to accept any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves.

Unfortunately, we have seemed to veer from this commitment through indications of continued support for the Thieu-

ky government. It is imperative that we press the government in the South, in every way possible, to broaden the political participation of opposition groups in the nation, and make the government more representative. Our commitment must not be to the present government but to a government based on the free choice of all the people. I will continue to express my displeasure with our failure in this area and urge prompt action to correct them. It is vital that we must absolutely clear our commitment self-determination is not to the Thieu government but to the people as a whole.

Coupled with our insistence on self-determination must come a commitment for the rebuilding of Vietnam both socially and economically. The havoc which war has wrought on the nation must be repaired—preferably through an international organization where the aid can be free of corrupt or hint of political pressure.

There is one other major aspect which I believe needs to be emphasized: complete prisoner exchange by the parties. It behooves those who speak and demonstrate for peace in the name of humanity, also to express open concern about prisoners held by both sides. The peace movement would be greatly enhanced if it would directly encourage the Vietcong and North Vietnamese at least to release names of prisoners they hold and for exchange of mail and inspection by the International Red Cross, as provided for in the Geneva agreements.

The essence of democracy is the right of dissent and the necessity for dialogue among those who dissent and those in position of power and responsibility. We must respect the right of petition to the government and to elected officials and have therefore taken every effort to talk with people from my district who are concerned about the war on every side of the issue.

Mr. UDALL, Mr. Chairman, the debate and vote this week on House Resolution 613 is a frustrating and disappointing experience for me. For 5 years, the House of Representatives—the part of our Government designed to be closest to the people—has almost completely failed to debate or to endeavor to influence the central event of our times: the war in Vietnam. Now, when we finally undertake such debate, we are forced to conduct it under circumstances which make a near mockery of the whole proceeding. Debate is under a closed rule, with even the most minor amendments being out of order, including some which might clarify the ambiguous, vague wording of the resolution.

In addition, House Resolution 613 best deals only with the peripheral aspects of the Vietnam problem and fails to come to grips with the basic issue. Couched in pious generalities, it is concerned only with negotiated peace, which today is the least likely avenue for ending the war. The President himself places little reliance on the negotiation as a viable way of halting the war. I doubt that Hanoi's intransigent position in the Paris peace negotiations will be changed one iota by this resolution. House Resolution 613 does not take

the most vital decision which the President has made concerning the Vietnam war—his secret plan for troop withdrawals. Nor does it consider any other military issues involved in the war.

For these reasons I voted yesterday against the closed rule. By its vote yesterday, the House of Representatives has almost abdicated its right and its obligation to submit the Administration's Vietnam policy to a hard scrutiny and to offer policy alternatives.

Now I am faced with a yes or no vote on the passage of House Resolution 613, when neither vote really reflects my feelings. I share in part many of the apprehensions expressed by some of my colleagues yesterday. My vote for the resolution may possibly be interpreted as:

First, advance approval of future escalation of the war if Hanoi resumes its offensive, as the President has warned he might do in his November 3 speech;

Second, complete approval of the President's policy in Vietnam and support of every aspect of his November 3 speech, which mentioned a plan for peace completely unknown to us.

If we say "yes" to House Resolution this vote may be interpreted by the Administration, the press and the American people as support of the President's timetable for withdrawing troops, no matter how drawn out a procedure that turns out to be.

Third, support for the present Saigon government which definitely does not represent the people of South Vietnam and which has in the past thwarted our attempts at meaningful negotiations in Paris.

I have good reasons for feeling uneasy about approving this measure. Five years ago I voted for the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and subsequently found that it was greatly distorted by the Johnson administration to suit its own purposes. So I am definitely apprehensive about what the results of this similar resolution will turn out to be.

On the other hand, a vote against the resolution is almost equally misleading as to my position:

First. This vote would make me appear to be opposed to a "just peace," although the record clearly shows that I have been fighting for peace in Vietnam, long before it was fashionable or politically popular to do so.

Second. It would suggest that I do not support the President in a difficult time. This suggestion could not be further from the truth. I applaud and support the President's first steps toward extricating us from this horrible mistake in Vietnam. While I have some misgivings about several aspects of his policy, I am sure that he is doing what he thinks is best in trying to end the conflict. Thus, though I do support his efforts, I think should have the option to reserve judgment on any of the President's actions in Vietnam.

For all these reasons, the decision on this vote is not easy. But I have reluctantly concluded that I should vote for passage. In doing so I rely heavily on the repeated assurances of the sponsors of House Resolution 613 that approval of

the resolution is to be taken as agreement only on the literal meaning of the words used. I do not object to—surely no one can object to—the actual wording of the resolution which is as follows:

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body, and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections, and supports the President in his call upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce its willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

Let me at the same time make clear what I am not saying by my affirmative vote. I am not voting for:

Any open-ended blank check endorsing any action which the President may take regarding Vietnam;

Escalation of the war, in retaliation to a new offensive by Hanoi; and

Blanket support of the present Saigon government or giving that government veto power over our actions.

One strong consideration in my decision is the distinction made by its main author, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT) between House Resolution 613 and the Gulf of Tonkin resolution. His letter to Representative BROCK ADAMS, which was printed in the December 1 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—H11498—pointed out three differences. He said this resolution is oriented toward peace, not war as was the Tonkin resolution. According to Mr. WRIGHT, House Resolution 613 is also different in that it neither broadens Presidential powers nor implies approval for future decisions by the President.

As I interpret the ambiguities of the resolution, House Resolution 613 emphasizes the importance of making peace and the right of all the people of South Vietnam, including the Communists, to participate in free elections. This is in sharp contrast to the Tonkin resolution which gave the President the mandate to take "all necessary steps" to punish the enemy, to bomb, and to send American troops to Vietnam.

I interpret House passage of the resolution as an endorsement of democracy in Vietnam—democracy which is still opposed by the leaders in Saigon. I view it as a clear signal to the South Vietnamese Government that the U.S. Congress believes this war is being prolonged by the intransigence of Saigon to endorse openly the resolution of Vietnam's political differences by the democratic elective process.

Mr. Chairman, as I said earlier, this debate does not deal with the really tough questions on the war. For this reason, I want to digress for a few minutes and

say a few things about where we are and where we may be heading.

It was just 2 years ago when I stood before a Tucson audience to express for the first time publicly my dissent on the conduct of the Vietnam war. What moved me to make that speech was my concern about the dangerous direction in which the country was moving, the pursuit of a military victory in a war whose only solution could be political. That night 2 years ago I saw the United States mounting a treadmill that goes even faster, a treadmill called escalation, leading not to victory over communism but rather to a steady increase in the loss of American prestige, property and, most important, lives in the jungles of Southeast Asia.

That night in 1967 I gave the President what was thought by many to be pretty radical counsel. "Mr. President," I said, "you are going to have to extricate us from this war by ending the bombing of North Vietnam and ordering a gradual de-escalation of our entire war effort, starting with the removal of American troops from those areas of South Vietnam which can most easily be defended, and leading to the total withdrawal of U.S. troops." Within a reasonable time, I counseled, we should turn over the balance of this war to the South Vietnamese. In keeping with our commitments, we should continue to supply whatever is needed to maintain the South Vietnamese while the threat continues and as long as we are convinced the Saigon Government is working in the interest of its own people.

Mr. Chairman, the "radical" plan I have just described is policy today. Many of the proposals I made in 1967 have been adopted by Presidents Johnson and Nixon. The present administration must be credited for making the first steps toward peace, steps which I suggested. It has publicly rejected a military victory as a goal, it has started troop withdrawals, and it has shifted our military posture in Vietnam from "maximum pressure" to "protective reaction."

In the last 2 years, we have experienced one of the most remarkable turnabouts in American history. When I first spoke out, escalation was our policy and most favored it. Today our policy is one of getting out, and according to a recent Gallup poll, 55 percent of the American people agree that the war was a mistake.

This is not to say that my advice or the advice of others opposing the war has always been correct. Stopping the bombing, many of us claimed, would lead to negotiations in good faith and perhaps even an end to the fighting. By now it is clear that we were wrong.

If the doves have made mistakes in this war it must be argued that the hawks have made some tragically costly blunders, too. There has seemingly been a complete disregard of economics by those, particularly in the last administration, who used the public treasury in an effort to fabricate a picture of wide allied support for the Vietnam war. Thus, we are beginning to see questions raised like these: Did we "buy" the use of 12,000 Thai troops for a billion dollars? Did we pay off the Philippines in the amount

of \$38 million for, at most, 2,200 non-combatants? What price have we paid and are we paying for South Korean troops fighting beside American?

Nevertheless, we are now committed to bringing about peaceful settlement of the Vietnam war or, failing that, an end to America's role in it. That is the real meaning of the resolution we are debating today.

The time then has come for us to stop shouting slogans at each other, to quit arguing about peripheral issues, and to get on with the tough, unpleasant job of working out an early end to the war. "Support the President" is not a policy or program, it is simply a slogan. How are we to give the President total support for a policy he has not yet disclosed? By the same token, what does the phrase "immediate withdrawal" have to offer other than frustration and confusion? The process of leaving, even when that final commitment is made, will take months perhaps even a year.

Of course, all Americans want to end the war and all of us want to support the President as much as we possibly can. But we must continue to debate the crucial questions: Will the President's policy end or prolong the war? Will an orderly pullout, such as I advocate, bring about a bloodbath of innocents or drastically effect U.S. influence and commitments elsewhere?

So there is honest and intelligent dispute over the tactics for bringing America's role in Vietnam to an end. In resolving this dispute, we get no help from those who claim it is, "Nixon's war" or those who would label as snobs or question the patriotism of sincere people advocating a different plan of withdrawal.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the President now has a plan which he firmly believes will lead to peace. A majority of Americans seem inclined to give the President additional time to try it. For the sake of the country, I really hope it does work, but I feel compelled to register my honest judgment that it will only lead to a new military and diplomatic stalemate at a lower level of violence continuing well into the 1970's. The plan I think is now being contemplated involves a continuation of U.S. logistic and air support with perhaps 200,000 Americans remaining in Vietnam while Asians continue to kill Asians. The fatal defect of this policy is that it apparently leaves the final decisions about America's future in the hands of the ruthless dictatorship in Hanoi and/or a repressive, corrupt and unrepresentative semidictatorship in Saigon.

My own view is that troop withdrawals should be continued at an orderly rate, and on a predetermined schedule, leading to substantially complete disengagement of American troops by the end of 1970. Such predetermined and orderly withdrawals are the only instruments we have for pressuring badly needed reforms on the Saigon government, a regime which still refuses to admit broader participation in the processes of Government, while continuing to censor and close newspapers and jail political opponents.

While we are now going through an acrimonious and troubling time, I believe we are in the process of winding down this war and groping our way toward its termination. Just how it will end I can't really predict, but the process is underway and most probably will not be reversed. If we all keep our heads and our tempers, the country can come through this frustrating and unsettling experience without being torn apart.

Mr. PRICE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, as one of the many sponsors of the resolution "toward peace with justice in Vietnam," I urge all my colleagues to add their support to the proposal. Since this resolution was first introduced, almost three-fourths of the House membership have cosponsored the resolution or introduced similar ones. These duly-elected Members represent a great majority of the American people, and I am confident they are expressing the overwhelming wishes of their constituents on this matter.

In my view, the resolution before the House is simple, straightforward, and direct. It affirms the support of the House of Representatives for the President of the United States in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. It expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for an honorable negotiated settlement of the war. It calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures the United States has made in good faith to the Government of North Vietnam. It approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese, supervised by an impartial international body. It declares that the United States will abide by the election results, and it calls upon the Government of North Vietnam to do likewise so that the war in Vietnam can be resolved and peace can be restored to Southeast Asia.

Mr. Chairman, there has been much debate about both the terms of the resolution and the supposed policy implications that flow from the terms. This debate, although well intentioned, misses the basic thrust and purpose of the resolution. The House of Representatives, through the resolution, is not attempting to hammer out a Congressional policy position with respect to Vietnam, it is merely attempting to express our feeling of support for the efforts of the President of the United States to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam.

This is a laudable goal, a goal whose noble purpose should be affirmed, and affirmed now. The Communist overlords of North Vietnam think they have the United States on the run. They think the people of the United States are bitterly divided over the war and will not support the President in his quest for peace. They fail to realize that the rumblings of discontent they hear and the demonstrations they see are merely the voices and actions of some, but by no means a majority of the American people. Some of the protestors are dedicated anarchists, others are admitted hard-core Commun-

ists. Some are misguided social reformers, others are everyday people trying to express their sense of frustration at a war which has dragged on and on without appearing to have an end in sight.

I disagree with the protestors. I think they are betraying the bloody sacrifices that our American soldiers have made to bring freedom to the struggling people of South Vietnam. In addition, their actions are creating false illusions in the minds of the North Vietnamese that the American will to see the cause of freedom triumph in Southeast Asia is waning away. As a direct result of the delusions about our national state mind, the Communists have stalled the Paris peace talks, and are presently waiting in a confident pose for the American forces to depart from Vietnam.

As far as I am concerned, and I am confident that my views are shared by an overwhelming majority of American the United States has no intention deserting the valiant people of South Vietnam and leaving them to the bloody hands of the Communists. President Nixon has stated that the United States not settle for anything less than peace with honor in Vietnam. The House resolution Toward Peace with Justice Vietnam voices congressional support his efforts for peace. Both the President's efforts and the House resolution are our total and undivided approval.

Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania. Chairman, today I will vote "no" on House Resolution 613, relating to Vietnam policy with great regret because is my desire to applaud and encourage every initiative of the President toward peace as I have done in the past.

Is it possible, that, after 15 years of involvement, 4½ years of overt military action, the efforts of more than a million men, the deaths of 40,000 servicemen, the wounding of more than 300,000 American young men, the expenditure of billions of dollars, the divisions created here at home, the destruction wrought on Vietnam and the diplomatic effort engaged in by ourselves and other around the globe—is it possible that, after all this tragic experience, the best that the House of Representatives of the United States of America can produce is a 17-line resolution which vaguely commits us to a peaceful settlement through measures largely unexplained in the resolution itself or omitted entirely?

Surely, we have learned enough in the past few years to come up with something better than this.

And yet, it seems we have not. Having been speedily rushed to the floor without hearings before the Foreign Affairs Committee, under a closed rule which forbids amendment, at a time when we clearly have the concern and the knowledge to conduct a truly meaningful debate on Vietnam, we are asked to approve a amorphous resolution which will become almost certainly, a constitutional sanction for just about anything the administration desires.

I think we are shirking our responsibility, as elected representatives, to legislate creatively.

And I believe we are blindly taking the same path we took in August of 1968

when we handed the previous administration a similar resolution on the Tonkin Gulf incident which, time and again, was cited as justification for the limitless American involvement in Vietnam, although few Members of this body would have believed so when they voted for it.

Have not we in the legislative branch learned our lesson?

Who here today would defend the Tonkin resolution in terms of what followed? Who would admit that he knew then the implications of his vote?

And yet, this House is doing precisely the same thing today and, in the process, abdication its responsibility to the American people.

I think the American people deserve better from us than a single page statement of 169 words in a single sentence.

And I believe this body had better start standing up, under this system of checks and balances, and stop acting like a rubber stamp.

What this resolution offers is vague and harmless. It was meant to be vague and harmless so that we in Congress could not make any waves and so that thoughtful people in this body would be trapped in the seeming dilemma of voting "yes" for the President or "no" against peace.

This is no time for political games, played by the administration or by anyone else, in a diplomatic arena whose only foundation is the stark tragedy of Vietnam.

I do not believe there is a thoughtful person left in this country who, after the experience of this decade, cannot see through such an attempt.

What this resolution does not offer is even more significant than what it states. We should be seeking a clear formula for peace, not a vague resolution which seems to support every specific of administration policy by implication but which fails to enunciate it.

Nor does this resolution commit us for I minute to future troop withdrawals. It does not spell out our negotiating position and yet it asks us to support the President's efforts.

But most seriously, this resolution—and by extension, this kind of legislative maneuver—asks us to surrender our legislative prerogatives and blindly follow the President, regardless of our convictions and without taking the time even to spell out our position.

I am voting "no" and I look forward to a better alternative, a genuine debate, and a creative legislative discussion more worthy of this body and more worthy of the American people.

I do not intend to vote for any resolution on the vital issue of peace and war which does not spell out our policy clearly and which does not permit the Congress its prerogative to debate, discuss, amend, and thereby check Executive authority.

In the instance of Vietnam, my own position and my differences with the administration are clearly spelled out in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of October 15. I am submitting that speech again today to make my position on this vital issue clear in detail. I wish the sponsor of this resolution and the administration had done likewise with H.R. 613.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Oct. 15, 1969]

PEACE IN VIETNAM

Mr. GREEN of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, this is a very difficult time for our country.

Perhaps, after so many years of involvement and frustration, we have finally arrived at the moment of truth in Vietnam.

It seems as if the point has been reached where we either stay indefinitely or disengage ourselves from a tragic experience for America and the world.

The other alternative—once thought of as possible—military victory and a reasonably speedy compromise negotiated settlement—have all but vanished.

The choice we have left is not easy.

The consequences of either course of action can be far reaching for ourselves, for the Vietnamese and for the rest of the world.

If we stay, it means the sacrifice of more American lives, the expenditure of more billions of dollars, deeper division at home and the neglect of many other national priorities, both foreign and domestic.

If we leave, the future will be largely uncertain. Some contend that South Vietnam will go Communist and that Southeast Asia will follow suit. They warn that America's commitments will be placed in doubt and we shall be left to fight a larger war somewhere else.

Others, casting aside these warnings, believe that withdrawal offers more possibilities and greater opportunities.

Because these are the alternatives, it is, indeed, a very difficult time for our country.

And all of us—regardless of our politics, our way of looking at the world or our past position in Vietnam—must, if we truly love this country, approach these choices without prejudice and without rancor for those with whom we disagree.

Motives on all sides may be good. But what we seek is a solution which will do justice to our good motivations.

Today, there is no room for those who would attempt to make this Nixon's war.

Nor is there room for those who would continue to make it Johnson's war.

There is no room for those who lash out at critics, equating patriotism with mindless unquestioning of the facts in Vietnam.

Nor is there room for those who believe that Vietnam has proven America to be sick, and dominated by military-industrial forces beyond our control.

Young and old, Democrat and Republican: All of us had better recognize the enormity of what faces us. And all of us had better act with reason and wisdom larger than ourselves.

As the moment of truth arrives, all of our preconceptions must give way to a single concern: What is the right thing for our country and how will our decision affect the peace of the world.

It is unfortunate that these are the only alternatives.

But they are.

Virtually no one any longer believes that military victory is a possible alternative.

President Johnson ruled that out as early as March of 1968.

And President Nixon specifically so stated in May 1969 when he addressed the Nation with the following words: "We have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield."

Yet, there is another alternative which still seems possible to some and that is the alternative of a compromise settlement, a negotiated peace which would salvage a non-Communist South Vietnam or a partially non-Communist South Vietnam or, at the very least, a neutralized South Vietnam.

The search for a compromise settlement has been the true issue of the past few years. It was the initial thrust of the antiadministration forces during the 1968 presidential campaign.

Then, the question was: Which candidate was flexible enough, in contrast to the inflexibility of President Johnson, to offer compromise terms sufficiently attractive to the North Vietnamese.

Proposals for a coalition government were followed by suggestions for mutual troop withdrawal. And, finally, late in the campaign, we had a total bombing halt which Vice President Humphrey endorsed as an acceptable risk for peace.

All of these suggestions, sincere and well-intentioned, were made in the hope that, by throwing another bone, we would tempt the North Vietnamese to give and take in the traditional manner of western diplomacy.

Finally, in May of 1969, determined as were his predecessor and his competitors in 1968, a new President spoke of "neutrality for South Vietnam," "acceptance of any government in South Vietnam that results from the free choice of the South Vietnamese people themselves," and "reunification."

All of these proposals have spanned the course of the past few years. And, as each was proposed, there was renewed hope of a breakthrough on the diplomatic front.

Recall, if you will, the wave of hope which swept the country and the world when President Johnson announced that the enemy was prepared to negotiate in Paris.

And then recall the renewed hope when he announced the total bombing halt a year ago.

And finally, recall the optimism with which we greeted President Nixon's first major address on Vietnam last May.

Yet, today, the deadlock remains in Paris and the stalemate continues on the battlefield.

After nearly 2 years of specific concessions, the latest reports from Paris, according to Time magazine of October 17, tell of "The dispiriting sense of tedium and pessimism that envelops the talks and the American delegation."

In asking ourselves why the deadlock remains, I think we must honestly face the possibility that North Vietnam will not negotiate seriously as long as there is dissent here in America.

A few years ago, the same argument appeared in different colors.

At that time, those in favor of ending the war cried out for negotiations. And the supporters of the war replied that, we would, in effect, be inviting the North Vietnamese to win at the conference table what they could not win on the battlefield.

Well, today we are negotiating.

And today, those same people are now saying that, in dissenting here at home, we are, in effect, inviting the North Vietnamese to win in America what they cannot win at the conference table.

Where does this downward spiral end? Where do we go next?

The fact is that there has been virtually no criticism for 9 months.

The voices which echoed through 1968 have been largely still.

Republicans, Democrats and concerned Americans everywhere have sat back, waiting for a break in Paris, hoping that a new President, untied, as he said, to the mistake of the past, would extricate us from the quicksand.

Yet, during the time we have remained silent, the North Vietnamese have remained inscrutable.

And today, because the question of Vietnam is once again raised publicly, some of our policymakers recoil from the renewed debate and warn that the only thing which will defeat us is ourselves.

They equate patriotism with mindless acquiescence and unquestioning support.

They suggest that those who are unhappy with our policy "tell it to Hanoi." But this is our country and it is our policy we are deeply concerned about. It is not inconsistent to discuss our policy while at the same time repudiating Hanoi and its methods.

The deadlock has remained at Paris, through protest and through silence, and that fact alone tells us that we must look somewhere else for the root cause of the lack of movement.

In fact, the deadlock remains because the other side continues to say what it has said for years. There is no room for a compromise, they say because this is a Vietnamese affair. It is a civil dispute. It is a matter to be settled—not by concession of an American President or the force of American arms—but by the Vietnamese themselves.

And that settlement will come when the Americans go home and stop interfering in the affairs of their country.

How simple that fact is.

And yet, how often have we overlooked it in our endless search for a formula and, indeed, in our initial rationale for entering this war.

Dean Rusk, the former Secretary of State, was fond of saying that the war will end when the North Vietnamese leave their neighbors alone. The implication was clear: America, in the role of policeman, intends to keep peace in the neighborhood.

To the other side, this is not the case.

In the eyes of the Vietnamese, the North and South are not two neighbors who happen to live on the same block. They are residents of the same house and the American policeman is guilty of invasion of privacy.

Whether one agrees with this viewpoint or not, in fact, whether one wishes to face it or not, it is nonetheless, what the other side has been saying for years.

And today, after we cut away the agony and complexity of the past, we must come face to face with that central fact. In the eyes of the Vietnamese, the war is a civil conflict which will be settled, if at all, only by the Vietnamese.

Misunderstanding of the facts of history has led to misunderstanding here at home.

Those who took the time and made the effort to understand what was happening in Vietnam, sooner or later came to the conclusion that this is, indeed, a civil conflict.

And because they believed this, they felt that our involvement was immoral. This feeling, in turn, led to a crisis of conscience among many of our own people and often to civil disobedience, particularly by the younger generation, not merely because the younger generation had to fight the war but because the younger generation began to understand the war.

All of the debate of the past few years sprang, not from the question of whether the war was winnable or unwinnable, but from the growing conviction that the war was unjust.

On the other hand, those who did not take the time to understand the war—and its complexity is so deep that this position is understandable too—those particularly who fought other wars for America, could not see where this war was any different.

"We of an older generation fought to keep this nation free in Europe and the Pacific," they say. "We gave our lives in Korea. What makes you so special that you take it upon yourself to judge this war. Maybe you're just afraid to go and fight like we did. Maybe you're getting too soft."

Thus does the division deepen and the misunderstanding grow. The tragic flaw of recent American leadership has been its inability to understand the moral implications of Vietnam.

It is hardly surprising, then, that the average American, who depends on his leaders for enlightenment, cannot fully comprehend today the notion of an unjust war and cannot understand why we do not win and, therefore, cannot accept dissent at home.

And yet, as I said in the beginning, what is needed now is not censure and division but the calm and enlightened determination to choose one of only two alternatives which we

have left: An indefinite American presence in Vietnam or the liquidation of a tragic situation.

The consequences of the first alternative are clear—more fighting, more killing, greater cost, deeper division here at home, neglect of our other priorities and all of this with little likelihood of a diplomatic settlement. The only concrete achievement would be the continued propping up of an artificial, unrepresentative, corrupt and unreformable military dictatorship in Saigon.

Our willingness in word to accept the free choice of the South Vietnamese does not correspond to our over-willingness indeed to prop up the Saigon regime and that fact alone presents an insurmountable barrier to peace.

And so, I have come to believe, with many other Americans and with many other elected officials and government servants, that the United States must simply extricate itself from Vietnam by beginning now an orderly, total, relentless and publicly announced withdrawal and disengagement.

In suggesting such a course of action, I do not believe that we can set a specific timetable. Withdrawal is not going to occur overnight. Nor is it likely to occur within the artificial limits of an arbitrary deadline.

I do believe that the orderly and systematic withdrawal must allow for adjustments, not only in Vietnam but here at home.

In Vietnam, withdrawal should be accompanied by efforts on our part to encourage the development of the many and diversified political forces within the country to take on renewed life, a life ruthlessly and thoughtlessly suppressed by Saigon, in behalf of their own future.

The key question—indeed, the realistic question—is not when the last man will leave Vietnam. It is whether or not we, as a nation, are committed to the inevitable and total withdrawal of all forces as soon as possible as a matter of policy. The chief need is to be publicly and irrevocably committed to disengagement.

There are voices which say we simply cannot withdraw, as if this were a simple decision.

It is not a simple decision.

It challenges the American people to face up to the facts and we have been notoriously unwilling to do so throughout this war.

It demands of our leaders the courage, the leadership and the persuasive powers to make such a decision acceptable to many who believe withdrawal to be unthinkable.

Such things are never easy.

They are agonizingly difficult.

But the time has come. Mr. Nixon must simply summon up the will to think the unthinkable and face the inevitable. It will be better if he does so now because sooner or later, he will inevitably be forced to do so anyway.

I believe the President wants to end this war.

And I believe that his recent actions—particularly the withdrawal of 60,000 American troops—are steps in the right direction.

But the difference between his position and that of his critics is an essential difference.

On the one hand, Mr. Nixon hints at further reductions in troops during 1970.

But, on the other, he solemnly warns against a "disguised American defeat" and hopes to "Vietnamize" the war.

Those who disagree with his policies, while they support the moves he has already taken, want a commitment to complete withdrawal based on a firm Executive decision to extricate this country from Vietnam.

In reality, he reserves the option to stay indefinitely or to go back in with additional force, presumably at the point where Vietnamization does not work and at the point where the Saigon government begins to fall apart.

The Saigon government knows that.

As long as they know that the United States is not totally and publicly committed to a planned withdrawal, we can expect nothing from them except further dependence.

They have no intention of letting us go.

And, at times, it seems as if Mr. Nixon has no intention of letting them go.

Therefore, what seems at first glance to be the beginning of withdrawal is on the other side of the coin a formula for an indefinite stay.

And that is the point at which we disagree—not on the desire to end the war, nor on the desire to get out, and not even on the common agreement that the Vietnamese must solve their own problems. Mr. Nixon is reluctant to commit us to a final decision. And his critics suspect that, as long as this his policy we probably are committed to staying indefinitely.

I have not come to the decision to support a committed withdrawal without considering all of the possible dire consequences lurking in the dark recesses of the cold war mind.

Nor can I totally censure those who believe based on the assumptions of their own experience immediately after World War II.

At that time the world was in dire need of American help.

The military hardware of Stalinist communism was locking up the gates of Eastern Europe and Russia's Asian partner had just seized the most populated nation in the world.

We soon found ourselves in a bloody conflict of naked aggression in Korea, and movement at home which saw a Communist behind every State Department file box.

I suspect that that era has passed.

But two Presidents seem to tell me differently.

And many policymakers in Washington agree with them.

They warn us sternly of the consequence if we take the unheard of step and leave Vietnam.

They point to Czechoslovakia and say "See, the Russians have not changed." At this should rightfully cause us concern.

And, although Russia and China have come to the brink of war, we are still asked to live under the shadow of the international monolithic and single-minded Communist conspiracy.

For a moment, let us have an end to the glowing, muttering, and warning of dire consequences and let us look at the possible results of withdrawal.

Let us examine the contention that South Vietnam will go Communist.

And before we rent our garments, let us also admit that this possibility is precisely admitted by President Nixon. In saying that he would have no objection to a united Vietnam and in admitting the necessity of free election, he is admitting the possibility of Communist victory.

But there are other possibilities and the other possibilities are just as likely to occur when we announce withdrawal.

At present, literally hundreds of non-Communist political factions in the South, in the least of which is the Buddhist, are inactive due to resentment of our presence in jail due to the repression of the Saigon regime.

Is it not just as likely that, with our steady departure, non-Communist South Vietnam will begin to exercise its own freedom within the country.

I am not sure. But, in any event, I suggest that the viability of political life in South Vietnam will be encouraged more by our departure than by our consistent propping up of the military dictatorship with our power and prestige.

And what of the million South Vietnamese in the armed forces. Like all armies, they

certainly are not going to do the job as long as America is so willing to shed its blood in their place.

Perhaps, if the Saigon government is worth saving, its million men just may fight for it. Or perhaps they might overthrow it.

Or perhaps the regime itself, no longer shielded by American military strength, may, in its desperation, grant the freedoms and give the inspiration which the nation needs.

At any rate, if the million man army cannot do any of these things, then the question again arises whether we ever could do so or whether that million man army is worth being shielded by American soldiers.

Disregarding the other possibilities, however, opponents of withdrawal, convinced of an imminent Communist takeover, have deduced another dire consequence and that is the possibility of mass slaughter in the north.

We do not know if this will happen. There seems to be no evidence that it will any more than there is evidence that it will not.

America has proven itself a generous nation in the past. Provision can be made for relief, asylum, and even additional economic aid to South Vietnam. Certainly, these are legitimate accommodations to make in return for the liquidation of the war.

And what of the rest of Southeast Asia. If one accepts the domino theory, one believes that all or most of Southeast Asia will fall into Communist hands once American troops leave South Vietnam.

And yet, one of the most compelling sections of Defense Secretary Clifford's narrative, which documents his own change in thinking, concerns the other countries of Southeast Asia.

Returning from South Vietnam in 1967, Clifford said:

"It was strikingly apparent that the other troop contributing countries no longer shared our degree of concern about the war."

Thailand, he said "Was in no hurry to allocate more troops."

He continued:

"The President of the Philippines advised President Johnson that he preferred we not stop there because of possible adverse public reaction."

Australia's Prime Minister, Clifford continues, "presented a long list of reasons why Australia was already close to its maximum effort."

New Zealand "made it clear that any appreciable increase was out of the question" and the Prime Minister of Singapore, when asked to help with troops, said he "saw no possibility of that taking place because of the adverse political effect in Singapore."

Finally, Clifford looks at the situation in Southeast Asia in this way:

"The security of the Pacific region will depend upon the ability of the countries there to meet the legitimate growing demands of their own people. No military strength we can bring to bear can give them internal stability or popular acceptance. In Southeast Asia, and elsewhere in the less developed regions of the world, our ability to understand and to control the basic forces that are at play is a very limited one. We can advise, we can urge, we can furnish economic aid, but American military power cannot build nations, any more than it can solve the social and economic problems that face us here at home."

And again, a few months ago, President Nixon, in his Pacific doctrine, told the Asians that America's vital interests are no longer concerned with sending massive numbers of Americans to the mainland of Asia.

As in South Vietnam itself, withdrawal opens as many possibilities as it does pitfalls for Southeast Asia. The possibility of increased economic activity, greater concentration by America itself on broad programs to improve the social and economic life of the region and the development of indigenous democratic governments—all these things are

just as possible as the facile, automatic response that says, take away American troops and the inevitable answer is communism.

Such an answer is not only narrow. It is far too simplistic for a complex world. And it betrays a defeatism which ill befits American leadership. In place of our single-minded obsession with Vietnam, we could today be using our technology and resources to create a better world.

One other question about America's role in the world comes up whenever withdrawal from Vietnam is suggested. What about America's commitments. Will our word ever be heeded again. Because we show lack of faith, will not our relative role, vis-a-vis the Communists, begin to decline in world affairs.

In the first place, no nation in the history of the world has ever committed so much for so long a period in so many places throughout the world and stuck by its treaties and agreements with such tenacity. In Vietnam alone, that commitment has amounted to 40,000 dead Americans and more than \$100 billion over the course of 8 years. And all this despite the fact that there is considerable debate about the genuineness of that commitment in the first place. The question is not whether we honor our commitments because our activity has certainly been some commitment. The question is whether we alone in the world are being asked to do the impossible. Our own leaders who pose this question evidently believe that the rest of the world sees us as the superhuman, transcendental force which dares not to put a ceiling on how far it is prepared to go lest the rest of the world react with utter dismay.

And yet, the rest of the world's powers can go blithely ahead doing just as they please—abandoning allies, subverting countries and waging war.

Only America is put to the impossible test. If we dare waver for a moment—regardless of the merits—then the world itself will shake with concern.

I suspect that we judge ourselves too harshly.

I believe that we demand a standard from ourselves that few others expect and that fewer others are prepared to live up to.

We are not superhuman.

We do not by ourselves control the destiny of the world.

And a change of policy in Vietnam will be greeted throughout the world more with relief than dismay anyhow.

Here at home, it is another matter.

It is said the President fears, privately, that a systematic withdrawal from Vietnam will not only cause us to lose our leadership position in the world but will, as Stewart Alsop said last week, turn the nation "angrily in upon itself."

This need not be and it should not be. It hardly does justice to us as a people. At any rate, such a situation remains a leadership problem. If the President and other leaders of our Nation choose to permit us to turn angrily upon ourselves, it may well happen. But, if they lead us out of the quagmire in Vietnam into a constructive and hopeful future, no such conclusion need be drawn.

None of these thoughts are comfortable.

And nothing is sure.

Choosing the alternative of withdrawal has its uncertainties.

But the ambiguity of present policy presents more.

I am suggesting that such a decision, articulated by enlightened leadership, opens up more possibilities for America than pitfalls.

It opens the possibility for a country united once again with this burden lifted from our minds.

It opens the possibility for greater attention to our domestic problems.

It may give us the chance to chart a new foreign policy, concerned with turning our technology and compassion to human needs and to the great problems of bringing peace and stability among all nations.

Emerson—and other distinguished American thinkers after him—have spoken about two distinct strains in the American spirit. One is the party of hope. The other is the party of despair.

I believe we have, in the recent past, been too often concerned with the inhibitions of the party of despair.

We have been generous. We have been great. Perhaps we have saved the world.

But we have also largely conducted ourselves in the world as if the most dire consequences were also the most real and immediate. And feeling this way, we have been very reluctant to test new directions.

Today, I think it is time for all Americans not to join the partisan interests of either Republicans or Democrats but to join the party of hope.

Let us end this war in Vietnam.

And let us use that decision as a departure point for shaping a more stable and hopeful society here at home and peace around the world.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, I have read this resolution many many times. It is a short resolution and apparently almost nobody disagrees with any one clause in the resolution. About all it says is that we hope peace can be secured in South Vietnam. Of course, everyone is for peace; but what concerns me the most is that almost everyone, including President Nixon, seem to read things into this resolution which it simply does not say.

For almost 2 years, our Government has been pursuing what might be called the Clark Clifford plan. Under that plan, it was determined that we will Vietnamize the war and withdraw our troops if the South Vietnamese can be trained to defend themselves and protect their citizens against mass slaughter for mere political and religious reasons. Under this plan, troops have been in training and a major effort has been made in that direction for about 2 years. Under the plan, it reached the place about 6 months ago where our withdrawals could start and be coincided with the South Vietnamese troops replacing our troops. In other words, this has been the plan for about 2 years and it has been gradually executed over that period of time. I do not see where there has been any change of policy whatsoever.

This resolution merely says that we endorse and support efforts to secure peace in Vietnam. The claims that this is some kind of a resolution to endorse a "new" plan or that it is some kind of an endorsement in blank for further action simply cannot be justified by reading the resolution. In fact I tend to agree with those who say the resolution itself does nothing other than to afford a vehicle for further debate in the House on our overall policies.

What this resolution does not do and what neither "doves" or "hawks" are not talking about is a study and complete review of our treaty obligations with Japan. Following World War II, we negotiated a treaty with Japan under which we prohibited them from rearming and in return we agreed to furnish the balance of power in that area. We did this on the theory that there would

be less risk of another all-out war if we furnished the balance of power instead of letting them become strong enough militarily to defend themselves against potential enemies. Due to their development and industrial capacity, Japan would be a real prize for China or Russia and an armed force sufficient to defend themselves would also have the capacity to wage war. Our policy under this treaty may have been partly the reason why we have not had a nuclear war in the past 25 years and an all-out mobilization with millions being killed; but no one can prove what would have happened. I do think it is time that we faced all of the facts involved in Southeast Asia and meet new decisions concerning our alliances both with Japan and other countries.

My vote on the resolution will not indicate that I think that the resolution is an endorsement of any particular type of action and I believe that is one point upon which the vast majority can agree.

Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. Chairman, let us assume at the outset that the universal desire among our people is to end the tragedy in Vietnam by achieving a just peace. How could it be otherwise? Who is there among us who seeks an unjust peace? To ask the question is to answer it. But while men may agree as to the goal of a just peace in Vietnam, reasonable men may differ as to how peace is to be achieved, or indeed, what the definition of just peace is.

Five years ago, this House, in near unanimity, passed another resolution to support executive policy in Vietnam. I venture to think few of us who voted for the Tonkin Gulf resolution conceived at that time that our action would be utilized to justify the sending of 500,000 American troops into combat. This House has received a good deal of criticism since that time for abdicating our responsibility to give adequate consideration to the contents or ramifications of the Tonkin resolution.

Now, we are presented with another resolution calling for support of executive policy in Vietnam—a resolution whose contents received but cursory review in the Foreign Affairs Committee and which was brought before us under a rule which bars all amendatory language, no matter how pertinent to the issue. As our able and distinguished Republican colleague from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY), has said—the resolution does not even incorporate the most significant aspect of the President's policy—his decision to withdraw American combat troops from Vietnam.

But there is an even more serious flaw in this resolution—an ambiguity which has been alluded to in the debate on the rule. The flaw lies in the fact that the resolution was drafted prior to the President's speech of November 3. In that speech the President holds out the prospect of our indefinite presence in Vietnam at some undefined level of involvement. Moreover, he does not foreclose the possibility of some future escalation of that involvement. But there is nothing whatever in the body of this resolution alluding to a possible escalation of the American presence.

Mr. Chairman, the stated rationale for adoption of this resolution is to present a united front to North Vietnam—to convince the adversary that the President speaks for all the American people. If that is indeed the purpose of the resolution, why was it deemed necessary to stifle any measured consideration of its contents in committee? Why was it brought here under a gag rule in defiance of all democratic principles? Would it not have been the better part of wisdom to have the contents of this resolution receive the most thorough and reasoned consideration of which this House is capable?

Mr. Chairman, we would all like to see an expression emerge from this House which would at once sustain the President and express the deepest hopes of the American people in their desire for a just peace in Vietnam. Such an expression could have emerged had consideration been given to the amendatory language advanced by the gentleman from Illinois and if the resolution could have incorporated the terminology suggested by the distinguished gentle lady from Hawaii.

Mr. Chairman, I shall vote against the resolution, for the subject matter is infinitely too important and complex to be properly disposed of by 435 Members of the House in such circumstances and with so little consideration.

Mr. MANN. Mr. Chairman, the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States recently initiated and promoted a patriotic project known as "Operation Speak Out." This project was designed to promote national unity and to encourage the American people to show their support of their Government in its efforts to achieve a just peace in Vietnam. Many civic and patriotic groups and organizations across our Nation saw the merit in "Operation Speak Out" and have given it their support. The action of the House of Representatives today in overwhelmingly adopting the "Peace with Justice in Vietnam" resolution can in some measure be attributed to the great support of the American people awakened by the speech of President Nixon on November 3 and expressed by the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the many other patriotic organizations and individuals who felt that the time had come for patriots to be heard.

The message of the true patriot is a simple one. "My country, right or wrong." A patriot will not give aid and comfort to the enemy, by word or deed. A patriot will not jeopardize the lives of his countrymen, our troops on the battlefields of Vietnam, by seeking to undermine his country before world opinion. Patriotism does not mean that one's country is always without fault, but it does mean that one has enough love and respect for his homeland to try to correct its errors within the framework of its laws. Patriotism does not mean that one must refrain from debate or dissent, but it does mean that one viewing this Nation from beyond its boundaries should see only unity of purpose, the national purpose, arrived at by the processes of government as we, the people have designed them. One would hope that the world could see us, as a country, as the psalmist of the Scrip-

tures envisioned when in Psalm 133, he wrote:

Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.

There are those today who believe in the brotherhood of all mankind. I am one of them. However, there are those who are under the mistaken belief that patriotic love of one's country is inconsistent with love of all mankind. How would these exercise their love of mankind? What better mechanism to serve mankind is there than the United States of America? If they are not prepared to love America first, one has reason to doubt that their professed love of mankind is sincere. Certainly it is not practical. Rudyard Kipling helped us with this dilemma when he wrote:

God gave all men all earth to love,
But since our hearts are small,
Ordained for each one spot should prove
Beloved over all.

Let us show our capacity to love by loving our neighbor first, by loving America first. If we are to make the world a better place in which to live, let us stay at home. And let our effort be in peace, in tolerance, and in appreciation of the rights of our fellow man. Let no one think that he has a monopoly on desire for peace. Let no one of us set ourselves up as judge, because to do so is perhaps cause another American to die in Vietnam. Let us go forward in unity and harmony, toward a common goal, peace and justice in all the world. If you doubt that this is America's goal, then you reject the lessons of history and the sacrifices of American patriots whose lives have made it possible for you to have the freedom to reject or to dissent with impunity.

Today I want to reaffirm my belief in the American patriot, patriots like the members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars, who to a man, believe that the blows which their country called upon them to strike, were struck for all mankind.

Mr. O'HARA. Mr. Chairman, this resolution, House Resolution 613, on its face, would seem to do no more than to express the hope of the American people for a just peace, approve South Vietnamese self-determination through free and open elections and support the President's efforts to negotiate a just peace. Certainly I support the negotiation of a just peace in Vietnam and Vietnamese self-determination through free and open elections.

My vote in favor of this resolution is simply an expression of support for the objectives and for all reasonable and responsible efforts by the President to achieve such objectives.

It has also been suggested that adoption of the resolution will enhance the possibilities for a peaceful settlement in Vietnam. I hope that this is the case but I doubt it. In any event, the President has the responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs. If a peaceful settlement is to be negotiated, it is the President who must negotiate it. In such an effort, I repeat, he certainly has my support.

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, some apparently believe that the resolution he

a broader significance. The President himself appears to be one of those who would give this resolution such significance. On his visit to the House last month, he embraced the resolution as "a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal I made in a speech on November 3."

But, Mr. Chairman, the resolution was drafted and circulated before, not after, he President's November 3 speech. The rafters of the resolution, the gentleman from Texas (Mr. WRIGHT), and its floor manager, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. WYBURN), have now both denied that the resolution was intended to or that it does constitute an endorsement of the contents of the President's November 3 speech or that it gives advance approval to any action the President might take. This will improve prospects for a just peace.

Their action in doing so has helped me resolve my own doubts about this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, when I came to Congress in 1959 a Republican President occupied the White House. I supported his policies when I thought they were right and opposed them when I thought they were wrong. In doing so I ended up supporting his foreign policies more often than most Republican Members. But as much as I respected President Eisenhower I did not agree with everything he did nor did I ever give him a blank check for any policy he might adopt.

I shall try to follow the same policy with respect to President Nixon, reserving judgment on his policies until I know what they are, supporting him when I think he is right and opposing him when I think he is wrong.

Mr. STOKES. Mr. Chairman, I rise to oppose the resolution. I suppose I must do so not because I oppose peace, or self-determination in Vietnam, or because I secretly hope for Communist victory. One would think this kind of unctuous explanation would be unnecessary in a body of this stature, but, unfortunately, some of my recent mail and a few of the statements of my more hawkish colleagues indicate the contrary.

No, Mr. Chairman, I do not even oppose the language of the resolution. While much of importance is omitted, on its face the measure is really quite innocuous. Nevertheless, despite all the talking and filling that has pervaded this Chamber today, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that this resolution is being offered for one, and only one, purpose—to give a total endorsement to President Nixon's Vietnam policy as delineated in his November 3 speech. That, in my mind, is far from innocuous, and the sole reason I shall vote "no" on House Resolution 613.

When I think of some of Mr. Nixon's recent handiwork: the appointment of Clement Haynsworth; the attempt to delay desegregation of southern schools; the abandonment of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission hearings; the decision to let the Voting Rights Act die; and the general unconcern for pressing domestic problems, I would have a difficult time supporting the President's war

policies even if I thought they were sound—which I do not. I would be much more inclined to support a resolution that we turn our attention back to America.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, yesterday I voted against the closed-rule procedure under which this resolution is now being considered. I voted against the closed rule with the hope and the purpose of permitting a thorough discussion and promoting a definite understanding of the precise meaning, extent, and application of the resolution. Let us remember that no committee hearings were held on this resolution and I think every Member here will recall that the Congress and the country has suffered, in the past, some sad experiences and unfortunate misunderstandings about the exact meaning and application of this type of resolution.

However, since the majority approved the closed-rule procedure, I intend to vote in favor of the resolution, on the patriotic and practical principle that we cannot afford, in our agonizing pursuit of the earliest possible peace in Vietnam, to give any further ammunition to the Communist propaganda machine to strengthen the determination of their people or provide any additional grounds for the Hanoi leaders to possibly misunderstand the general willingness of Congress to cooperate with our Commander in Chief to honorably end the Vietnam war at the earliest possible moment.

The resolution, as it stands, in simple language and substance, proposes only to support the President of the United States in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, proclaims the peaceful overtures this Government has already made, again advocates the principles of free elections by the people of South Vietnam and this country's willingness to abide by them, and further exhorts the Government of North Vietnam to do likewise.

I would like to emphasize what has, I hope, already been made very clear here; namely, that this resolution is not meant or intended and should not be construed to pre-endorse and preapprove every and any future specific action that the Commander in Chief may see fit to take in his plans and desire to bring the earliest possible ending to the Vietnam war. With that understanding, House Resolution 613 is a simple and summary reaffirmation of our common desire for speedy peace in Vietnam which I shall support, rather than take a chance of strengthening obvious Communist strategy to prolong the war in order to gain the most advantageous terms for peaceful agreement.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Chairman, two unrelated events—one occurring last evening and the other this morning—that touched my life and my thoughts concerning our terrible dilemma in Vietnam, gave added meaning to the action we are about to take.

As we all know, last evening the lottery system was again brought into play as a method for helping us select, as a nation, those young men who might in the future be called upon for service in the

Armed Forces and, possibly, even in Vietnam if our involvement in the conflict there is to continue.

My own 19-year-old son, Howard, Jr., was one of those millions of young Americans whose life and future—with the outcome yet to be determined—was affected by the proceedings last evening at selective service headquarters.

Then, this morning, I was invited to attend a ceremony at the White House at which time Vice President AGNEW was to award, posthumously, a Medal of Honor—the Nation's highest military decoration—to Mr. and Mrs. Leslie C. Graves, of Groton, N.Y., in my congressional district, the parents of Marine Corps 2d Lt. Terrence C. Graves who was killed in action, in Vietnam, on February 16, 1968.

Unhappily, my attendance to other duties here this morning prevented my attendance at that ceremony, but the packet of information relating thereto—including a photograph of Lieutenant Graves—has since been delivered to my office.

Mr. Chairman, I have spent some long moments in the quiet of my office this afternoon looking at Lieutenant Graves' photo—and in reading and rereading the bare statistics of his short life as well as the terse words of the citation describing his heroism above and beyond the call of all duty in the action near Con Thien, in Vietnam, a year ago last February 16 when, as it is written, "He gallantly gave his life for his country."

It seems to me, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, that Lieutenant Graves epitomizes all the brave and gallant young Americans who have served—and died—in far-off Vietnam, even as my son epitomizes those other young Americans who may yet be called to such duty, all in pursuit of something we are discussing here which is called a just peace in Vietnam."

I have been listening, as time required by other duties has permitted, to much of the debate we have had on yesterday and today concerning the resolution before us. It has been an interesting and, I think, a useful debate. I would have preferred—as my vote on the previous question on the rule yesterday indicates—that it was not as narrowly focused as it now necessarily is by virtue of the closed rule that was adopted. But I believe those of us who felt that way—and sought by our votes to open this resolution up to constructive amendments—can now accept House Resolution 613, at face value, for what it actually says and what most of us understand it to mean.

The words of the resolution before us stand on their own two feet—if words can ever be considered as doing so. They are words expressing the American peoples' desire for peace in Vietnam in accordance with principles that none of us could think of in any terms other than just. They are words, too, reaffirming our long-held national commitment to the concept of self-determination for all peoples, everywhere; and they are words declaring our traditional conviction that all disputes between nations or between disputing citizens within a na-

tion might better be settled by ballots rather than bullets. In short, they are words defining an idea for a just peace in Vietnam—or, for that matter, any other trouble spot in a sadly troubled world—to which we can all subscribe.

I shall vote for that idea—as expressed by this resolution of which I am a cosponsor—and I shall do so gladly and without reservations because I can find no real merit in the semantical questions or occasionally semipartisan charges that have here been raised about its true meaning or purpose.

But, after all, House Resolution 613 is but a collection of words—and almost any other combination thereof could have served the same purpose so there is nothing magic about these. And though our acceptance of House Resolution 613, by whatever margin of support it eventually garners, will, I think, be a helpful thing for the Nation and, perhaps, for the cause of a just peace in Vietnam, its enactment, alone, will not produce that peace we all so ardently desire. Its enactment, alone, will not forestall the future selection of still more young Americans to be sent to Vietnam nor end, for at least a time, such tragic but, somehow, uplifting award ceremonies as took place at the White House this morning.

Only our actions from now on with respect to our dilemma in Vietnam can do that—actions that, largely, will have to be of the President's determination and for the direction of which he will need all the courage and wisdom any man, even with God's help, can summon forth.

In that effort—an effort in which all of us, as citizens, will at least indirectly participate—President Nixon shall have my continuing support and prayers.

For I believe him to be now on the right track toward a just peace in Vietnam.

His actions in that respect speak louder, it seems to me, than the words he has addressed to us on this subject—knowing, as he must, that every time he speaks to us he is also speaking to Hanoi and to those other nations who have, unfortunately, assisted Hanoi in her support of the efforts of the Vietcong.

The most significant action President Nixon has yet taken with respect to redirecting our Vietnam policy is, as the gentleman from Illinois (Mr. FINDLEY) pointed out on yesterday, to begin the withdrawal of at least our ground troops from the conflict. As we now know, our total forces in Vietnam are now down to their lowest point in some 2 years, and I strongly hope that there will soon be further announcements from the White House regarding still further force reductions.

Such troop withdrawals—made in concert with our success in Vietnamizing such actual ground combat as may still go on—lies at the heart, as Mr. FINDLEY has noted, of what I understand to be the plan by which the President, in his own words, hopes to “bring the war to an end regardless of what happens on the negotiating front.”

I believe the American people—or a substantial majority of them—appreciate and support Mr. Nixon's action in

this respect, for a winding down of the war insofar as we are concerned, and that they also understand, given the nature of the problem, that deescalation in this fashion can only properly be directed by the President and that, given the hazards it may call into play for both our remaining forces in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese people themselves, this process cannot be hurried too much, will take some time to work out even from the logistical standpoint, and that a stated deadline for the completion of such withdrawals—whether self-imposed by the President and so publicly announced or whether imposed upon him by action of the Congress—would not be helpful and might, indeed, even be counterproductive insofar as any hope of useful negotiations may remain.

Believing, as I have said, that there is a substantial majority of popular support for such a policy, along with an understanding of its complications, I had also hoped—if the previous question on the rule had been voted down on yesterday—that then Mr. FINDLEY could have been recognized, as had been his purpose, to offer an amendment to the resolution before us inserting therein the thrust of his own separate resolution—House Resolution 564—of which I am a cosponsor, endorsing this withdrawal policy and urging its continuation by the President. The additional words that would have thus been added to House Resolution 613 were these:

“and supports the President's expressed determination to withdraw our remaining ground combat forces at the earliest practicable date”.

Reference being had, of course, to House of Representatives support of that policy and emphasis being given, to reflect popular opinion, on that phrase “at the earliest practicable date.”

For it would be my opinion, Mr. Chairman, that the average American believes we have, by now, more than fulfilled whatever commitment we may once have had to the people of South Vietnam in pursuit of helping them preserve their freedoms, and that it is past time for them, in their developing strength, albeit with some continuing assistance from us for some months yet to come, to take over “their war” once again and to go on to win it, if they possibly can, for we have long since learned the hard way that we cannot win it for them.

I would like it to be noted, for the record, then, Mr. Chairman, that my support of House Resolution 613, specifically includes—though this, unfortunately, cannot now formally be made a part of that resolution's wording—my support of our withdrawal policy, and of the “Vietnamization” of whatever remains of the conflict, and should be taken to indicate my urging of the President to complete the withdrawal of at least all our ground forces from Vietnam at the earliest practicable date.

In so saying, I am not purposely ignoring the opinions of a solid and vocal minority viewpoint within my own congressional district—at least, I believe it to be a minority viewpoint—that worries about the timing of such a withdrawal process, wants it speeded up even further by the

President, or at the direction of the Congress, if necessary, and even beyond that point worries about the ultimate meaning of our attempt to “Vietnamize” the war with its possible connotations of an intent on our part to go on prolonging the conflict, with its death and destruction, through our support of the present Saigon regime, though the burden of that death and destruction would shortly be carried less and less by us and more and more by the people of South Vietnam.

Those who subscribe to this minority viewpoint ask, in truth, some legitimate policy questions—questions to which we have not, in our consideration of House Resolution 613, really addressed ourselves.

To them, permit me merely to say, the debate go on—as it will in a event—but let it go on through constructive channels, not in the streets where foreign policy cannot be made, but here in such places as this Chamber, and through the more familiar and traditional manner of working of our governmental institutions.

The adoption of this resolution does not not preclude such an event—it may in fact, encourage such a process and so, that is another reason why I am to vote for its enactment.

Mr. Chairman, we face together—a Congress and as a Nation—one of the most difficult problems ever encountered in the history of this Republic. The problem is composed of mistaken public attitudes—and presidential decisions in past years that have proven to be unwise but that more alert and more responsible Congresses in those years might have prevented; it is composed, too, of our awareness of our responsibility to those young men who, by lot, may have been chosen last night for future service in the Armed Forces in such places as Vietnam, and of the selfless sacrifice of parents of such as 2d Lt. Terrence Graves have made in behalf of this Nation's often uncertain purposes, a sacrifice that, somehow, must not altogether have been made in vain.

It is a heavy burden we bear—but the burden we must bear, along with President Nixon, with all the courage and wisdom we can summon forth.

Mr. HOGAN. Mr. Chairman, while we are today considering the House resolution for a just peace in Vietnam, I would like to offer as substantiating evidence of the people's support for the President's policy the results of a survey which I recently conducted among my constituents.

This survey, which was sent to a my constituents—over 688,000—indicate that the great majority support President Nixon's Vietnam policy. The preliminary results have been tabulated as follows:

I support President Nixon's Vietnam plans: 60%.

I favor immediate unilateral withdrawal of all troops: 23%.

I favor an all-out effort to win the war in Vietnam: 17%.

Mr. Chairman, judging from the opinions of my constituents, I believe that congressional approval of this resolution will indicate that the views of the people

are truly represented in the Halls of Government.

These views from the citizens of Maryland's Fifth Congressional District correlate highly with the recent Gallup poll conducted on the final day of the November Vietnam moratorium which indicated that only one adult in five backs the war protesters who favor immediate and total withdrawal of troops from Vietnam.

I firmly believe that most Americans now realize, as a result of the President's November 3 speech, that this country is committed to a just and honorable solution to the Vietnam conflict. Most Americans want our boys to come home but they are aware of the time element required for a true and effective Vietnamization of the war. It is clear that gradual withdrawal is the only feasible or possible alternative for U.S. policy.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to listen to the voices of American citizens around the country who are articulating the views of the silent majority in letters, opinion polls, demonstrations, and many other forms—to listen and heed their call by exhibiting a resounding measure of support for our President through approval of this resolution.

Mr. OLSEN, Mr. Chairman, although I have today voted in support of the President's efforts to find a just end to the war in Vietnam, I have done so with strong reservations. I regret that the House resolution made not mention of scheduled troop withdrawals, the continuation of which I most adamantly endorse. I will continue to seek aggressively further commitment from the administration in this regard.

I further consider it not only the right of the Congress to advise the President in his efforts toward peace, but I submit that we have an obligation to do so. I intend to fulfill this obligation.

In the drafting of this resolution, I would have much preferred the version cosponsored in the Senate by my Montana colleagues, MIKE MANSFIELD and LEE METCALF. However, I would go beyond this resolution also, in expressing the unqualified intention of the Congress to end this disastrous war and bring peace to Southeast Asia.

I can support this resolution in that it is designed as an effort toward peace. But this must not be construed as congressional approval of a blank check for future actions by the administration.

Mr. COHELAN, Mr. Chairman, I have listened to the debate and quite frankly I was first disposed to vote for the resolution. However, the more I listened to the variety of interpretations that are possible and the doubtful value and effect of the resolution itself has convinced me to cast my vote against the resolution.

With all the sound and the fury of the discussion in these hours of debate, the ambiguity of the resolution stands out. It badly needs clarification and amendment. This is the reason I voted against the previous question and against the closed rule. The haste with which the bill was brought to the floor without hearings suggests that it badly needs perfecting amendments.

Let me say in spite of my vote against this vague and imperfect resolution I want it to be known that I support the President of the United States in liquidating this war with all deliberate speed. It was because of this position that I recently cosponsored a resolution that offered more direction to the President. This resolution stated:

Resolved, That it is the sense of Congress that U.S. forces in South Vietnam should be systematically withdrawn on an orderly and fixed schedule—neither precipitate nor contingent on factors beyond our control—to extend only over such period of time as shall be necessary to (a) provide for the safety of United States forces, (b) secure the release of American prisoners of war, (c) assist any Vietnamese desiring asylum, and (d) enable the United States to make an orderly disposition of its facilities in South Vietnam.

Unfortunately, this resolution did not receive the "legislative speed-up" of House Resolution 613. We are now faced with a vote on a resolution that is susceptible to many interpretations.

Even though this House Resolution 613 is vague, I do not feel that it provides blanket authority for the President in South Vietnam. Indeed the two original sponsors from our side of the aisle, Mr. HAYS and Mr. WRIGHT, said that this resolution was to be a "peace" not a war resolution. All Members of this House desire peace, but as has been pointed out so many times, there is considerable division as to the means to achieve peace. I am convinced that whatever the vote on this resolution, each Member of this Chamber will continue to speak out constructively on Vietnam. I certainly intend to do so.

There is a related point I wish to make. This resolution can be interpreted as an unqualified endorsement of the President's November 3 speech. This can be seen from the words of the President himself in his unprecedented appearance before this Chamber in which he said:

Over 300 Members of the House had joined in sponsoring a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3.

In addition, the media has interpreted this resolution as an unqualified endorsement of the President's policy. I do not agree with this interpretation, nor do I think it a fair and legitimate evaluation. For myself, I choose to reserve judgment on the President's handling of the war, yet I must admit that I was disappointed in the rhetorical November 3 statement that seems more bellicose than the President's prior statements on Vietnam.

I yield to no man in supporting the President in foreign affairs, but given the divisive nature of this war, the President must be judged by his actions.

In place of a clear statement of intention, we have the November 3 speech and several informal reports that are confusing and somewhat contradictory to say the least. There are reports that the Department of Defense will continue withdrawal of U.S. troops unannounced, yet Secretary of Defense Laird is reported to have said that our support troop commitment will be on the order

of 150,000 to 200,000 for the foreseeable future. Thus, I feel that it is imperative for the President—perhaps at his December 8 news conference—to specify his plans and timetable for Vietnam.

There are other steps the President could take.

He must rapidly appoint a leading well-known negotiator to the Paris talks to keep these negotiations viable. Most importantly we must actively use our influence to make the Government of South Vietnam more representative to the people. It seems foolhardy to speak of "Vietnamization" of the war when the Government of South Vietnam is held in such low esteem by its own citizens. I have commented on numerous occasions on the vital aspect of a solution to the Vietnam war. The President's speech of November 3 and this resolution do nothing to take this vital factor into account. Finally, the President must continue to reduce the level of fighting in South Vietnam.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, given my grave doubts about the current direction of this war, the desire of the present Government of South Vietnam to broaden its base or facilitate free elections, and the uncertain pace of the liquidation of the U.S. commitment, I will not support this resolution. I will continue to support the President as he takes constructive steps toward the liquidation of this Vietnam quagmire.

Mr. DADDARIO, Mr. Chairman, yesterday the House of Representatives passed the rule on House Resolution 613, entitled "Toward Peace With Justice in Vietnam," thus limiting debate and closing the resolution to amendment. I voted against that action.

Today, I plan again to vote against this resolution, which I view as a hastily conceived, open-ended, and ill-defined commitment.

This resolution does not give the President any power he does not already have. It does not add to his flexibility, but rather places the House of Representatives in a most inflexible position and one which detracts from its ability to operate as a separate unit from the executive branch—which is, perhaps, its greatest strength. By our action here today, we abrogate this power, and on a subject which causes such a great distress to the people of our country and, indeed, to people everywhere.

House Resolution 613 is the first Vietnam resolution to be brought to the floor of the House in 5 years. It was drafted prior to the President's November 3, 1969 policy statement and was not intended, therefore, to specifically support that policy.

Despite this fact, the President thanked the cosponsors of this resolution on November 13 for their complete endorsement of his policy as stated on November 3. On that same day, the resolution was reported out by the House Foreign Affairs Committee after only 1 hour and 20 minutes of closed-door consideration and without any hearings. It was brought up on the floor yesterday under a closed rule, which limited debate and prevented amendment. This series of hasty steps has not only added to the confusion and uncertainty sur-

rounding the resolution, but has been a mockery of the legislative responsibilities of this body.

The very simplicity of this resolution belies the great complexities of the issues involved. We in the Congress must recognize that we cannot attack extremely complex problems such as this with oversimplified solutions and insufficient means. We have sought to resolve a history of conflict in Vietnam through an hour-and-a-half closed-door hearing and less than 4 hours of debate. We in the Congress owe more than this to the American people.

I am especially concerned, furthermore, that some of the constructive suggestions of many of my colleagues concerning this resolution have been precluded under this rule. For example, the language introduced by Representative PAUL FINDLEY in House Resolution 564 stated:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the substantial reductions in the United States ground combat forces in Vietnam already directed are in the national interest and that the President be supported in his expressed determination to withdraw our remaining such forces at the earliest practicable date.

The President has clearly expressed his support for this language in a letter to Representative FINDLEY. However, this language, which is only one example of many constructive suggestions, has not been afforded the opportunity of being introduced on the floor. There has been no chance to add or change so much as one single word of this resolution.

I do not support House Resolution 613 for these reasons, and for one other very critical reason. And that is this. We in the Congress should have learned, I believe, the inherent dangers of such open-ended resolutions as House Resolution 613. The Gulf of Tonkin resolution has been mentioned several times already this afternoon as an example. And I think that the simple facts are clear: resolutions of this kind are often easy to pass, but are very, very difficult to repeal. As experience has shown, the language in resolutions such as this, while susceptible to the problem or issue at hand, can often be made to fit any set of circumstances in the future, no matter how much conditions may have changed. Moreover, this resolution allows the President to pursue such divergent alternatives as escalating the war or making a precipitous withdrawal of our forces—neither of which extreme alternatives countenance.

There is no doubt that this resolution will be viewed by many as a vaguely worded expression of general support for the President in his efforts to extricate this country from our involvement in Vietnam. There is no doubt that most of its supporters intend it to be exactly that. But it is also true that many of us here recall all too clearly another such general expression of support, which was employed in circumstances and for purposes well beyond the remotest intentions of those who voted for it only five years ago. And yet, this body devoted more effort to the consideration of the Gulf of Tonkin resolution than we have to this, its successor.

I have said that I support the President's efforts to withdraw our troops and I will support his greater efforts in this direction. I now reaffirm that support. But I should not endorse a blanket statement which reads as an open-ended commitment to continue our effort in South Vietnam until such time as forces beyond the control of this body decree otherwise.

Mr. TEAGUE of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Resolution 613 which is designed to bring about peace with justice in Vietnam. Since the President of the United States, the Honorable Richard Nixon went to the people of this country with his Vietnam policy, I have received untold numbers of letters indicating my constituency's support of the President and asking me to lend my support wherever and whenever possible to his program.

It takes two to negotiate, and it is quite evident that Hanoi feels they can wait us out, particularly when they view the demonstrations throughout our country which lend credence to the statement that we are divided on the subject of Vietnam. Who, but the Congress, and particularly the House of Representatives who are closely associated with the people, can come most nearly to correcting this false impression. Only when the Communists are convinced that this country is united in their efforts and goals in Vietnam, can we sit across the negotiating table from them with strength in our convictions and attain some goals toward peace. The adoption of this resolution will give the President the symbol of unanimity he needs to move swiftly ahead on his program for peace.

Mr. YATES. Mr. Chairman, I agree with proponents of this resolution who have said this is not a partisan matter. It is above partisanship and I would take the same position I take today were there a Democratic President in the White House. I conceive the issue presented by this resolution to be: Should this House give blanket approval to the President's policies in Vietnam without being fully aware of what those policies are and where they may lead?

Taken in the abstract, who can find fault with the language in this resolution? We are all for peace. We are all for a just peace. We are all for negotiations looking to the establishment of a just peace. All of us want this horrible war to be over and our troops returned to their homes.

But, Mr. Chairman, the words in this resolution cannot be considered in the abstract. President Nixon gave new meaning to the words of the resolution when he appeared in the House on November 13 and referred to this resolution as "a resolution for a just peace in Vietnam along the lines of the proposal that I made in a speech on November 3." He also in that statement described supporters of the resolution as "well over a majority supporting the policy of the President of the United States." The President's statements make this resolution a policy statement, for no matter how vehemently those who support this resolution may deny any connection, one exists. It can-

not be gainsaid that he added a very important element. His speech of November 3 has become an inseparable part of this bill. It is most important, therefore, that we must know the full implications of his policy statements in that speech before we approve this resolution. No effort was made by the Committee on Foreign Affairs to determine these.

Why did the Committee on Foreign Affairs not hold hearings on this resolution? Why should Members of the House be prevented from presenting their ideas and amendments?

I would have thought that the after-taste of the Bay of Tonkin resolution was still in Members' mouths, strong enough to require a strict and careful analysis of any resolution approving Presidential action in Vietnam both retrospectively and prospectively as this does. It is clear from this debate that this resolution has as many meanings as there are Members of this House. There is difference and contradiction of its meaning even among its sponsors.

One is reminded of the allegory of the three blind men who felt different parts of an elephant and came to different views on what the elephant represents. Proponents say this resolution is no a firmation of any policy. They reject the President's interpretation and say "this does not control. It is what we in the House mean it to say." But this resolution specifically is an affirmation of the President's efforts, of what he has done. His views, therefore, of what he conceives the effect of this resolution to be will control his actions. No matter what is said in this House to the contrary, this resolution will be heralded far and wide as support for the President's November 3 statement by this House.

What are the implications of the President's Vietnamization policy which I said by his administration to be the path to peace? Does that policy mean that we will stay in Vietnam in force if negotiations in Paris fail?

Does it mean that this Government will support the Thieu-Ky regime until the next Vietnamese election? Do the proponents of this resolution approve the indefinite openendedness of the Vietnamization process even if it takes many years? That possibility is certainly in prospect, for the administration in its statement of agreement with Japan on Okinawa asked for the use in 1972 of that island for our planes in the event the war in Vietnam is still going on.

These are only some of the questions that come readily to mind. What are the answers to these questions? The answer given by the committee on the floor is "read the words of the resolution," as though it had the answers which obviously it does not.

Mr. Chairman, this might have been a most constructive debate, one that might have resulted in fashioning a resolution in which all of us could take pride. But this debate was doomed from the beginning because of lack of time for members to speak their thoughts and because of the closed rule procedure which forbade amendments.

The Vietnam issue is much too complex to be treated in this arbitrary man-

ner which does little justice to the resolution or to the great traditions of this House. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in the case of *Towne v. Eisner*, 245 U.S. 418 said:

A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged. It is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances in the time in which it is used.

I am convinced that the words of this resolution may be given implications and meanings unknown even to the sponsors—that it may be used, even as was the Bay of Tonkin resolution, to launch Presidential initiatives not intended by those approving it. I want to know what I am voting for before I give my approval to an important policy measure of this kind. There has not been adequate deliberation given to this resolution. Accordingly, I will vote against it.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, it was an honor for me to join our distinguished colleague from Texas, JIM WRIGHT, in co-sponsoring, together with more than three-fourths of the membership of this House, this resolution toward peace with justice in Vietnam.

In the past, I have never cherished illusions on the potential efficacy of some of the sense resolutions that have been brought before this House for approval. Such resolutions do not have either the force or effect of law, and they are simply formal expressions of the opinion of the majority of our membership. The present resolution and circumstances are uniquely different. A very great deal indeed depends on whether we vote for or against the resolution which is before us today.

Hanoi has remained intransigent and there has been no progress at the Paris peace talks because the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong believe we are a "nation deeply divided, almost wholly unwilling to continue the effort—and virtually on the point of internal political collapse." They have come to believe their own propaganda that they have only to hold out, and growing U.S. disunity and opposition to the war will force U.S. abandonment.

Why do they believe this? They believe it is because it is inconceivable to them that a strong and purposeful democracy can pursue its course while permitting the strongest expressions of dissent from people in all walks of life.

From what we know of the repressions of communism, it is not too difficult to understand their misconception of the U.S. position. Every time an elected official in the United States speaks out against our involvement in Vietnam, he is avidly read and quoted in North Vietnam and other parts of the Communist world. Instead of realizing he is simply exercising his inherent right of dissent, the other side takes it as proof we are falling apart at the seams.

I recently obtained a list of quotations used by the Communists which they took from public statements made by U.S. elected officials. Let me read several of them which were broadcast over Hanoi radio and also tauntingly flung at our Paris negotiators as evidence that our President lacked public support for his peace efforts. Here they are:

We cannot use the blood of American youth to save a corrupt regime like the regime to which the United States is tied in Saigon.

To continue the war in Vietnam can bring only tragedy to the country.

The American people must not continue indefinitely to sacrifice its youth or link its national interest to the fate of the military regime in Saigon.

The most correct and reasonable course of action is withdrawal and not to go on with that error.

It is stupid and irresponsible to continue to send our young men to their death.

The only way to put an end to the war is to withdraw our troops.

The executive branch in our country has been and continues to be dishonest vis-à-vis the American people.

There are many more. I have cited only these as representative examples. They are from the speeches of less than a score of elected individuals, but is it any wonder that the wishful thinkers of Hanoi have let themselves be hoodwinked by such statements emanating from such impressively high sources? I do not question the sincerity or the patriotism of those Americans who have been so quoted. They want to see the end of the war, but they do not want to see the end of the war any quicker than I or the rest of us do. They want peace, but they do not want peace any more earnestly than I or the rest of us do. I would not make such statements myself, first because I do not believe they are correct, and second because I would not want to say anything which could mistakenly encourage the other side to prolong the war and refuse to negotiate meaningfully.

Mr. SISK. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will count.

Eighty-four Members are present, not a quorum. The Clerk will call the roll.

The Clerk called the roll, and the following Members failed to answer to their names:

[Roll No. 298]		
Anderson, Tenn.	Gettys	Patman
Ashley	Gialino	Pepper
Bow	Griffin	Pollock
Brown, Calif.	Gude	Powell
Button	Halpern	Rallsback
Cabell	Hanna	Reifel
Cahill	Hansen, Wash.	Rivers
Clark	Hébert	Rosenthal
Dawson	Hollifield	Sandman
Dent	Hosmer	Saylor
Derwinski	Johnson, Pa.	Stuckey
Dickinson	Kirwan	Taft
Edwards, La.	Kuykendall	Teague, Tex.
Eilberg	Lipscomb	Utt
Fulton, Tenn.	Mathias	Wilson
Gallagher	Meakill	Charles H.
	Mills	
	O'Neal, Ga.	

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. FLYNN, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration House Resolution 613, and finding itself without a quorum, he had directed the roll to be called, when 383 Members responded to their names, a quorum, and he submitted herewith the names of the absentees to be spread upon the Journal.

The Committee resumed its sitting.

The CHAIRMAN. When the point of order that a quorum was not present was

made, the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. HAYS) had 10 minutes remaining. The gentleman from Ohio is recognized.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, when the Committee rose I had just finished reading a series of quotations from Members of the House and Senate which have been read back to our negotiators in Paris by the North Vietnamese, leading them to believe that all they have to do is sit it out and they can get their own way.

I will read the last one again for the benefit of those who were not there. One of the quotes is:

The executive branch in our country has been and continues to be dishonest vis-à-vis the American people.

There are many more. I have cited only these as representative examples. They are from the speeches of less than a score of elected individuals, but is it any wonder that the wishful thinkers of Hanoi have let themselves be hoodwinked by such statements emanating from impressively high sources?

Mr. Chairman, we will be voting on this resolution in a very few minutes under the rule. I understand there will be a motion to recommit offered, I hear now by the gentleman from Pennsylvania (Mr. FULTON) which will insert a sentence urging the President to continue to press Hanoi to accept the Geneva protocol on the treatment of prisoners of war.

I will say that the gentleman was the only Member on his side to vote against the resolution in the committee. If getting this in under his name will bring him over on the resolution, I guess the price is worth it. I have no objection. I believe it might do some good.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. WRIGHT. I, too, understand the motion to recommit to be of the same nature. If that is the case, I would have no objection to the addition of such a clause, and feel that most Members probably support such a clause.

Mr. ADAIR. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. ADAIR. I believe it is fair to say that the attitude on this side of the aisle is the same as that previously expressed. We have no objection to the motion.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield, very briefly.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. My feeling is that we should not be pulling out our forces—

Mr. HAYS. I do not yield for a speech. I want the gentleman to talk about the motion to recommit.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. That is why I put the language in the motion to recommit.

Mr. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAYS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BURTON of California. I should like to pose a question to the chief sponsor of the resolution, the gentleman from Texas.

Did I correctly hear the gentleman that this amendment was acceptable to the gentleman?

Mr. WRIGHT. I have seen a copy of the amendment. If the original motion is as it was represented to me, yes. I want North Vietnam to abide by the protocol on the treatment of prisoners of war; yes, I do.

Mr. BURTON of California. I expect that some Members on this side of the aisle would have appreciated such alacrity in compliance with some of the suggestions they had for clarification of this resolution.

Mr. HAYS. I will say to the gentleman, under the rule we had no way of getting at it. I told the Rules Committee I had no objection to a rule making it in order.

Mr. BURTON of California. My remarks were not addressed to the gentleman.

Mr. HAYS. I will say personally, as one individual, I will accept what the rules put before the House.

I should like to continue my statement if I may. If I have time at the end, I will yield further.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for one quick question?

Mr. HAYS. All right; I yield.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. I would hope that the gentleman and all the gentlemen in support of this resolution will commit to all of us that we will have an opportunity to have a record vote on the motion to recommit.

Mr. HAYS. Under the rules of the House, if enough Members stand up there is no way I can prevent it.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. In other words, the gentleman is going to stand up, too?

Mr. HAYS. No, I am not. I do not see any reason to. If the gentleman can get enough Members to stand up, that is up to him. Probably he can. I have no objection if he does. I am not averse to voting.

Mr. Chairman, there have been charges made here that this resolution is a resolution of disunity. Nothing could be further from the truth. I have said repeatedly in the debate, without many Members on the floor, that there is no hidden meaning. It is a resolution for negotiated peace, and it says it is the sense of the House that we ought to have free elections in South Vietnam. That is all there is to it—nothing more and nothing less. And I do not mind saying that I was slightly amazed when I heard the gentleman from New York (Mr. Lowenstein) say that this is a resolution of disunity. And it shook me a little bit, because he ought to be an authority on that subject; he has made a career out of it. He is the outstanding example of how to get into Congress by dissent. And I am not criticizing him. But this resolution is not a resolution of disunity. It is a resolution of unity. This is a resolution to show the world the people of this country want a just, negotiated peace.

Some people, very cutely, I think, try to trap some of us by saying, "Well, if you have free elections in South Vietnam and you get a Communist government,

where does that leave you?" If the people of South Vietnam under free elections supervised by neutrals vote for communism, then I say they ought to have it and it is good enough for them, if that is what they want.

However, I will say this to you: There has never been a nation in the history of the world that has freely voted communism upon themselves. Not one—not one. I heard a lot of criticism about the Saigon government. I do not stand here vouching that the Saigon government is perfect, near perfect, or half perfect, but the Saigon government is no worse than and probably a lot better than the Hanoi government. I think that the Saigon government will agree to free elections, when all we are trying to get Hanoi to do is to do likewise.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to close by talking to my friends on the Democratic side of the aisle. Some of you were here and some were not in the Eisenhower administration. I remember two people that many of you have forgotten who both happened to be from Texas who called us into caucus on more than one occasion and said, "You cannot win elections by being against the President just because he is a Republican; by saying we will support him when he is right and we will disagree with him when he is wrong." Mr. Eisenhower, the greatest popular figure up to that time in the history of this country in election processes brought in a Republican Congress which he kept for 2 years. The other 6 years we were in the majority because we were a responsible majority. Those two distinguished gentlemen were Sam Rayburn and the previous President Lyndon Johnson, who was the last Democratic President of this country. That was their philosophy. I have heard Members say to me in the cloakroom and other places, "I will not vote for this resolution because it helps Nixon." Let me say to you today that if this resolution helps Mr. Nixon, that is all right with me, too. I simply want to say to the country as one person, and I think the majority of this House and I hope the majority of my party will, that we are responsible, we are for peace, we are for peace with justice, we are for free elections, we are for getting this war over.

And, you know something? The American people are not as stupid as some of the New Left would have you believe. They can figure out why you might vote for this resolution and they can figure out why you might vote against it, and any man and any woman in this House has the right to vote, of course, as they please. I will not go into their districts and criticize them for it. I am just saying again for the last time that there is no hidden meaning in this resolution. There is no authority in it to escalate the war. There is no blank check about troops. We are simply affirming that this House of Representatives in a resolution which was written here—not written downtown and sent up here but written here—largely by the gentleman from Texas (Mr. Wright), although some of us suggested a change or two—which was certainly widely signed, by more than 300 Members of the

House—we are saying here that we are for a peace with justice in Vietnam; we are for free elections; and we are for getting the war over. You are not saying anything else but that if you vote for it. And do not think that the American people cannot figure out whether you are playing politics or whether you are not.

That is why I said a minute ago that there is a vast difference between this simple House resolution and some of the previous sense resolutions we have voted on in past years. I am not talking about the so-called Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It was not a simple sense resolution, but a joint resolution having the full force and effect of law.

The timing of this resolution and its urgency is directly related to the lives of our boys now serving in Vietnam. Its primary purpose is to give proof to the communists that they are wrong in their assessment of the U.S. position. It is to assure them that, despite the disagreement of a relatively few, the House of Representatives and the Americans we represent, do, by a tremendous majority support our President "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam."

The language of the resolution is simple and direct. There are no hidden meanings. It gives no authority to the President and it takes none away. Its entire thrust is in the direction of peace. In just one sentence, it emphasizes and reemphasizes our earnest hope for a just peace in Vietnam. I think most of us realize that it is just about impossible to combine any given number of words into a formula that would please everybody. Jim Wright has succeeded in drafting an affirmation of support which over three-fourths of us have been glad to cosponsor. Some few would have liked to hedge it with restrictions; some would have preferred to broaden it to the point of reemphasizing the authorities of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. The single simple sentence of House Resolution 613 offers a focal point for us to bypass all our minor differences, because all of us have a common objective, the end of the war through a just peace.

A minority of the committee was disappointed because hearings were not held on the resolution. The complaint was made by a few that the committee failed to follow past precedents and hear witnesses on this resolution. I respectfully suggest that if hearings had been held, they would have changed no opinions, shifted no votes, nor provided any new information. If there has ever been a subject which has evoked continuous study, constant comment, and the need and desire to keep informed on developments, it is that of our involvement in Vietnam. Millions of words on Vietnam have been printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. All of us have listened to countless speeches and have ourselves spoken on this question. The day before House Resolution 613 was introduced, the Nation was given a full and detailed report by the Commander in Chief of the United States himself on his efforts to secure peace. I do not know of any single witness who could have contributed more than the President to our understanding of the present situation. We ordinarily

ask for witnesses to learn the effects of proposed legislation. We certainly did not need to ask anybody to assess the force and effect of the adoption of this simple one-sentence resolution by the 435 Members of this House. I am also convinced that the membership of the House is so well versed on the facts that it needs no outside help in drafting the words of a resolution to express support for the President "in his efforts to negotiate a just peace."

I want to close these remarks with my most earnest appeal that we show unity in backing the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam. This resolution will be confirming evidence by the House of Representatives that our tolerance and acceptance of dissent here at home is a measure of the true strength of a democracy such as ours, and not an imminent sign of collapse the Communists think. We have every reason to hope this affirmation of our support of the President in his efforts will promote peace and help save American as well as Vietnamese lives. I urge its unanimous adoption.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio has expired. All time has expired.

Under the rule, House Resolution 613 will be considered as having been read and amended.

The resolution is as follows:

H. Res. 613

Resolved, That the House of Representatives affirms its support for the President in his efforts to negotiate a just peace in Vietnam, expresses the earnest hope of the people of the United States for such a peace, calls attention to the numerous peaceful overtures which the United States has made in good faith toward the Government of North Vietnam, approves and supports the principles enunciated by the President that the people of South Vietnam are entitled to choose their own government by means of free elections open to all South Vietnamese and supervised by an impartial international body, and that the United States is willing to abide by the results of such elections, and reports the President in his call upon the Government of North Vietnam to announce a willingness to honor such elections and to abide by such results and to allow the issues in controversy to be peacefully so resolved in order that the war may be ended and peace may be restored at last in Southeast Asia.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, no amendments are in order to the resolution except amendments offered by direction of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Are there any committee amendments?

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Chairman, there are no committee amendments.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair (Mr. FLYNN) Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration House Resolution 613, toward peace with justice in Vietnam, pursuant to House Resolution 722, he reported the resolution back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the resolution.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT OFFERED BY MR. FULTON OF PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman opposed to the resolution?

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. I am, Mr. Speaker, in its present form.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the motion to recommit.

The Clerk read as follows:

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. moves to recommit H. Res. 613 to the Committee on Foreign Affairs with instructions to the Committee to report the Resolution back to the House forthwith with the following amendment: On page 1, line 7, after the comma, insert the following: "requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war."

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the motion to recommit.

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the motion to recommit.

Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 392, nays 0, not voting 41, as follows:

[Roll No. 299]

YEAS—392

Abbutt	Buchanan	Dennis
Abernethy	Burke, Fla.	Derwinski
Adair	Burke, Mass.	Dervine
Adams	Burleson, Tex.	Diggs
Addabbo	Burlison, Mo.	Dingell
Albert	Burton, Calif.	Donohue
Alexander	Burton, Utah	Lennon
Anderson,	Bush	Downey
Calif.	Byrne, Pa.	Downing
Anderson, Ill.	Byrnes, Wis.	Dulski
Anderson,	Caffery	Duncan
Tenn.	Camp	Dwyer
Andrews, Ala.	Carey	Eckhardt
Andrews,	Carter	Edmondson
N. Dak.	Casey	Edwards, Ala.
Annunzio	Cederberg	Edwards, Calif.
Arends	Celler	Erlenborn
Ashbrook	Chamberlain	Esch
Ashley	Chappell	Ehleman
Aspinall	Chisholm	Evans, Colo.
Ayres	Clancy	Evins, Tenn.
Baring	Clark	Fallon
Barrett	Clausen,	Farbstein
Beall, Md.	Don H.	Fascell
Belcher	Clawson, Del.	Feighan
Bell, Calif.	Ciary	Feinley
Bennett	Cleveland	Fish
Berry	Cohelan	Fisher
Betts	Collier	Flood
Bevill	Collins	Flowers
Blaggi	Colmer	Flynt
Blester	Conable	Foley
Bingham	Conce	Ford, Gerald R.
Blackburn	Coryers	Ford,
Blanton	Corbett	William D.
Blattnik	Corman	Foreman
Boggs	Coughlin	Fountain
Boland	Cowger	Fraser
Bolling	Cramer	Frelinghuysen
Brademas	Crane	Frey
Brasco	Culver	Friedel
Bray	Cunningham	Fulton, Pa.
Brinkley	Daddario	Fuqua
Brock	Daniel, Va.	Garmatz
Brooks	Daniels, N.J.	Gaydos
Broomfield	Davis, Ga.	Gibbons
Brotzman	Davis, Wis.	Gilbert
Brown, Mich.	de la Garza	Goldwater
Brown, Ohio	Delaney	Gonzalez
Broyhill, N.C.	Dellerback	Goodling
Broyhill, Va.	Denney	Gray

Green, Oreg.	Mailliard
Green, Pa.	Mann
Griffiths	Marsh
Gross	Martin
Grover	Matsunaga
Gubser	May
Gude	Mayne
Hagan	Meeds
Haley	Melcher
Hall	Michel
Halpern	Mikva
Hamilton	Miller, Calif.
Hammer-	Miller, Ohio
schmidt	Minish
Hanley	Mink
Hansen, Idaho	Minshall
Harrington	Mize
Harsha	Mizell
Harvey	Mollohan
Hastings	Monagan
Hathaway	Montgomery
Hawkins	Moorhead
Hays	Morgan
Hechler, W. Va.	Morse
Heckler, Mass.	Morton
Helstoski	Mosher
Henderson	Moss
Hicks	Murphy, Ill.
Hogan	Murphy, N.Y.
Horton	Myers
Howard	Natcher
Hull	Nedzi
Hungate	Nelsen
Hunt	Nichols
Hutchinson	Nix
Ichord	Obey
Jacobs	O'Hara
Jarman	O'Konski
Johnson, Calif.	Olsen
Jonas	O'Neill, Mass.
Jones, Ala.	Ottinger
Jones, N.C.	Pagaman
Jones, Tenn.	Patten
Karsh	Pelly
Kastenmeier	Perkins
Kazen	Pettis
Kee	Philbin
Kelth	Pickle
King	Pike
Kleppe	Pirnie
Kluczynski	Poage
Koch	Podell
Kyl	Poff
Kyros	Preyer, N.C.
Landgrebe	Price, Ill.
Landrum	Price, Tex.
Langen	Pryor, Ark.
Latta	Pucinski
Leggett	Purocell
Lennon	Quile
Lloyd	Quillen
Long, La.	Randall
Long, Md.	Rarick
Lowenstein	Rees
Lujan	Reid, Ill.
Lukens	Reid, N.Y.
McCarthy	Reuss
McClary	Rhodes
McCloskey	Riegle
McClure	Roberts
McCulloch	Robison
McDade	Rodino
McDonald,	Roe
Mich.	Rogers, Colo.
McEwen	Rogers, Fla.
McFall	Rooney, N.Y.
McKneally	Rooney, Pa.
McMillan	Rosenthal
Macdonald,	Rostenkowski
Mass.	Roth
MacGregor	Roudebush
Madden	Roybal
Mahon	Ruppe

NAYS—0

NOT VOTING—41

Bow	Gialmo	O'Neal, Ga.
Brown, Calif.	Griffin	Patman
Button	Hanna	Pepper
Cabell	Hansen, Wash.	Follock
Cahill	Hébert	Powell
Dawson	Holifield	Railsback
Dent	Hosmer	Relfel
Dickinson	Johnson, Pa.	Rivers
Edwards, La.	Kirwan	Sandman
Eilberg	Kuykendall	Saylor
Fulton, Tenn.	Lipscomb	Stuckey
Gallfanakis	Mathias	Teague, Tex.
Gallagher	Meakill	Utt
Gettys	Mills	

So the motion to recommit was agreed to.

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

- Mr. Hébert with Mr. Bow.
- Mr. Hollfield with Mr. Hosmer.
- Mr. Dent with Mr. Saylor.
- Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Cahill.
- Mr. Hanna with Mr. Utt.
- Mr. Mills with Mr. Sandman.
- Mr. Pepper with Mr. Kuykendall.
- Mr. Rivers with Mr. Lipscomb.
- Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Meskill.
- Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Button.
- Mr. Patman with Mr. Reifel.
- Mr. Fulton of Tennessee with Mr. Pollock.
- Mr. Griffin with Mr. Railsback.
- Mr. Cabell with Mr. Mathias.
- Mr. Gettys with Mr. Dickinson.
- Mr. Gialmo with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania.
- Mr. Brown of California with Mr. Powell.
- Mr. Edwards of Louisiana with Mr. O'Neal of Georgia.
- Mr. Galifianakis with Mr. Eilberg.
- Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr. Stuckey.

Messrs. BOB WILSON and HARRINGTON changed their votes from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the instructions of the House in the motion to recommit, I report back House Resolution 613 with an amendment.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

On page 1, line 7, after the comma, insert the following: "requests the President to continue to press the Government of North Vietnam to abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949 in the treatment of prisoners of war."

The amendment was agreed to.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The question was taken; and there were—yeas 333, nays 55, answered "present" 1, not voting 44, as follows:

[Roll No. 300]

YEAS—333

- Abbutt
- Abernethy
- Adair
- Addabbo
- Albert
- Alexander
- Anderson.
- Anderson, Calif.
- Anderson, Ill.
- Anderson.
- Tenn.
- Andrews, Ala.
- Andrews.
- N. Dak.
- Annunzio
- Arends
- Ashbrook
- Aspinall
- Ayres
- Baring
- Barrett
- Beall, Md.
- Belcher
- Bell, Calif.
- Bennett
- Berry
- Betts
- Bevill
- Blaggy
- Blester
- Blackburn
- Blanton
- Boggs
- Boland
- Bolling
- Brademas
- Bray
- Brinkley
- Brock
- Brooks
- Broomfield
- Brotzman
- Brown, Mich.
- Brown, Ohio
- Broyhill, N.C.
- Broyhill, Va.
- Buchanan
- Burke, Fla.
- Burke, Mass.
- Burleson, Tex.
- Burlison, Mo.
- Burton, Utah
- Bush
- Byrre, Pa.
- Byrnes, Wis.
- Caffery
- Carter
- Casby
- Cederberg
- Celler
- Chamberlain
- Chappell
- Clancy
- Clark
- Clauser.
- Don H.
- Clawson, Del.
- Cleveland
- Collier
- Collins
- Colmer
- Conable
- Conte
- Corbett
- Corman
- Coughlin
- Cowger
- Cramer
- Crane
- Culver
- Cunningham
- Daniel, Va.
- Daniels, N.J.
- Davis, Ga.
- Davis, Wis.
- de la Garza
- Delaney
- Dellenback
- Denney
- Dennis
- Derwinski
- Devine
- Donohue
- Dowdy
- Downing
- Dulski
- Duncan
- Dwyer
- Eckhardt
- Edmondson
- Edwards, Ala.
- Erlenborn
- Esch
- Eshleman
- Evans, Colo.
- Evins, Tenn.
- Fallon
- Fascell
- Feighan
- Feinley
- Fish
- Fisher

- Flood
- Flowers
- Flynt
- Foley
- Ford, Gerald B.
- Foreman
- Fountain
- Frelinghuysen
- Frey
- Friedel
- Fulton, Pa.
- Fuqua
- Garmatz
- Gaydos
- Gibbons
- Goldwater
- Gonzalez
- Goodling
- Gray
- Green, Oreg.
- Griffiths
- Gross
- Grover
- Gubser
- Gude
- Hagan
- Haley
- Hall
- Halpern
- Hamilton
- Hammer-schmidt
- Hanley
- Hansen, Idaho
- Harsha
- Harvey
- Hastings
- Hays
- Heckler, Mass.
- Henderson
- Hicks
- Hogan
- Horton
- Howard
- Hull
- Hunt
- Hutchinson
- Ichord
- Jacobs
- Jarman
- Johnson, Calif.
- Jonas
- Jones, Ala.
- Jones, N.C.
- Jones, Tenn.
- Kazen
- Kee
- Keith
- King
- Kleppe
- Kluczynski
- Kyl
- Kyros
- Landgrebe
- Landrum
- Langen
- Latta
- Lennon
- Lloyd
- Long, La.
- Lujan
- Lukens
- McClary
- McCloskey
- McClure
- McCulloch
- McDade
- McDonald, Mich.
- McEwen
- McFall
- McKneally
- McMillan
- MacGregor
- Madden
- Mahon
- Malliard
- Mann
- Marsh
- Martin
- Matsunaga
- May
- Mayne
- Meeds
- Melcher
- Michel
- Miller, Calif.
- Miller, Ohio
- Minish
- Minshall
- Mize
- Mizell
- Mollohan
- Moran
- Montgomery
- Morgan
- Morse
- Morton
- Mosher
- Murphy, Ill.
- Murphy, N.Y.
- Myers
- Natcher
- Nelsen
- Nichols
- Nix
- Obey
- O'Hara
- O'Konski
- Olsen
- Passman
- Patten
- Pelly
- Perkins
- Pettis
- Philbin
- Pickle
- Pike
- Pirnie
- Poage
- Poff
- Preyer, N.C.
- Price, Ill.
- Price, Tex.
- Pryor, Ark.
- Pucinski
- Purcell
- Quie
- Quillen
- Randall
- Reid, D.
- Rhodes
- Riegle
- Roberts
- Robison
- Rodino
- Roe
- Rogers, Colo.
- Rogers, Fla.
- Rooney, N.Y.
- Rooney, Pa.
- Rostenkowski
- Roth
- Roudebush
- Ruppe
- Ruth
- St Germain
- Satterfield
- Schadeberg
- Scherle
- Schneebell
- Schwengel
- Scott
- Sebellus
- Shipley
- Shriver
- Sikes
- Slak
- Skubitz
- Slack
- Smith, Calif.
- Smith, Iowa
- Smith, N.Y.
- Snyder
- Springer
- Stafford
- Staggers
- Stanton
- Steed
- Steiger, Ariz.
- Steiger, Wis.
- Stephens
- Stratton
- Stubblefield
- Sullivan
- Svmington
- Taft
- Talcott
- Taylor
- Teague, Calif.
- Thompson, Ga.
- Thomson, Wis.
- Tiernan
- Udall
- Van Deerlin
- Vander Jagt
- Vigorito
- Waggonner
- Wampler
- Watkins
- Watson
- Watts
- Wecker
- Whalen
- Whalley
- White
- Whitehurst
- Whitten
- Widnall
- Wiggins
- Williams
- Wilson, Bob
- Wilson,
- Charles H.
- Winn
- Wold
- Wright
- Reid, D.
- Wyatt
- Wydler
- Wylie
- Wyman
- Yatron
- Young
- Zablocki
- Zion
- Zwach

NAYS—55

- Adams
- Bingham
- Blatnik
- Brasco
- Burton, Calif.
- Carey
- Chisholm
- Clay
- Cohelan
- Conyers
- Daddario
- Diggs
- Edwards, Calif.
- Farbstein
- Ford.
- William D
- Fraser
- Gilbert
- Green, Pa.
- Harrington
- Hathaway
- Hawkins
- Hechler, W. Va.
- Helstoski
- Hurgate
- Karh
- Kastenmeier
- Koch
- Leggett
- Lowenstein
- McCarthy
- Macdonald,
- Mass.
- Mikva
- Mink
- Moibead
- Moss
- Nedzi
- O'Neill, Mass.
- Ottinger
- Podell
- Rees
- Reid, N.Y.
- Reuss
- Rosenthal
- Roybal
- Ryan
- St. Onge
- Scheuer
- Stokes
- Thompson, N.J.
- Tunney
- Ullman
- Vanik
- Waldie
- Welf
- Yates

ANSWERED "PRESENT"—1

NOT VOTING—44

- Ashley
- Bow
- Brown, Calif.
- Button
- Rarick
- Cahell
- Cahill
- Dawson
- Dent
- Dickinson
- Dingell
- Edwards, La.
- Eilberg

- Fulton, Tenn.
- Galifianakis
- Gallagher
- Gettys
- Gialmo
- Griffin
- Hanna
- Hansen, Wash.
- Hébert
- Hollfeld
- Hosmer
- Johnson, Pa.
- Kirwan
- Kuykendall
- Lipscomb
- Long, Md.
- Mathias
- Meekill
- Mills
- O'Neal, Ga.
- Patman
- Pepper
- Pollock
- Powell
- Railsback
- Reifel
- Rivers
- Sandman
- Saylor
- Stuckey
- Teague, Tex.
- Utt

So the resolution was agreed to. The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Hébert for, with Mr. Brown of California against.

Until further notice: Mr. Hollfeld with Mr. Hosmer. Mr. Dent with Mr. Saylor. Mr. Gallagher with Mr. Cahill. Mr. Hanna with Mr. Utt. Mr. Mills with Mr. Bow. Mr. Pepper with Mr. Kuykendall. Mr. Rivers with Mr. Sandman. Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Lipscomb. Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Meskill. Mr. Patman with Mr. Button. Mr. Fulton of Tennessee with Mr. Reifel. Mr. Griffin with Mr. Railsback. Mr. Cabell with Mr. Mathias. Mr. Gettys with Mr. Dickinson. Mr. Gialmo with Mr. Pollock. Mr. Edwards of Louisiana with Stuckey.

Mr. Galifianakis with Mr. O'Neal of Georgia. Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr. Johnson of Pennsylvania. Mr. Ashley with Mr. Dawson. Mr. Dingell with Mr. Eilberg. Mr. Long of Maryland with Mr. Powell.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. HAYS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members have legislative days in which to extend their remarks and include extraneous matter on the resolution just agreed to.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio? There was no objection.

CORRECTION OF ROLL CALL

Mr. HECHLER of West Virginia. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No. 297, today, a quorum call, I am recorded as absent. I was present and answered by my name. I ask unanimous consent that the permanent record be corrected accordingly.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from West Virginia? There was no objection.

PUBLIC WORKS APPROPRIATION CONFERENCE REPORT

MR. KIRWAN submitted the following conference report and statement on the bill (H.R. 14159) making appropriations for public works for water, pollution control, and power development, including the Corps of Engineers—Civil, the Panama Canal, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, the Bureau of Reclamation, power agencies of the Department of the Interior, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Atomic Energy Commission, and related independent agencies and commissions for

There is the big-unit war, in which the ARVN (South Vietnamese) and American and other allied troops fight mostly against North Vietnamese (NVA) battalions and regiments. And there is the rice-roots war, in which the true VC—the native communist South Vietnamese who serve as hamlet or village guerrillas, or as soldiers in the local-force companies—are the enemy. In this war the main burden is carried by the South Vietnamese "territorial" forces: the little Regional Force companies and Popular Force platoons, and the thousands upon thousands of villagers who have now joined the People's Self Defense Force.

Populated districts, rather than remote and empty base areas, are the scene of the rice-roots war, and district chiefs are in effect the frontline commanders. Since they are fighting the VC around the clock (and hardest of all, at night), the district chiefs and their American advisers know their enemy rather intimately.

THE RICE-ROOTS WAR

To start getting a feel of the countryside I first visited Cu Chi district, in Hau Nghia province. For many years Cu Chi had been celebrated as a VC mini-fortress. The able and courageous South Vietnamese district chief, Maj. Nguyen Xuan Sanh, had administered this little patch of rural Vietnam, with its tens of thousands of hardworking people, for more than a year and a half. I asked him for a before-and-after comparison.

"When I came here," Major Sanh answered, "it was very different." In this one district, the VC had at its command the Cu Chi local-force battalion, plus four local-force companies, plus over-strength guerrilla platoons in every village, plus guerrilla squads in almost every hamlet—well above 800 fighting men, altogether. They fought hard, too. And although officially it was my district the VC party secretary for the district controlled most of Cu Chi."

And now? The answer was eye-opening. First, Major Sanh ticked off the units he no longer had to fight, beginning with the Cu Chi battalion. Since 1963 this had been a famously tough VC outfit, but in only seven weeks of 1968, it had lost four successive battalion commanders! The same hard fighting had also transformed the battalion's basic character; for there were no more recruits from the district to fill the terrible gaps in the ranks, and North Vietnamese infiltrators had to be used as replacements. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese big units in the province were in just as much trouble. In the end, this battered VC battalion, so long deep-rooted in the soil of Cu Chi, was called out of the district to strengthen the 268th NVA Regiment.

For the same harsh reasons—heavy losses and near-zero recruitment—Cu Chi's four local-force companies had also dwindled, until only two were left. "And those two companies, with a combined strength of about 40 men, are more like platoons," said Major Sanh's American adviser, with marked satisfaction. Next, to my astonishment, the major and his adviser all but began counting the remaining VC in Cu Chi on their fingers. After knowingly reviewing the different situations in their villages and hamlets, they put the number of surviving guerrillas at about two dozen. In sum, this district—where only 18 months earlier the VC had some 800 fighting men—no longer contained more than a hunted remnant of around 60 armed VC. Most important of all, and in consequence, effective control of Cu Chi had naturally passed from the VC party secretary to Major Sanh.

The lesson I learned in Cu Chi suggested that the whole VC structure in Vietnam must be in deep trouble. This is a complex structure, exactly comparable to a clandestine government, with all the usual departments that any government must have. Yet its real strength in any district or province

can always be measured with considerable accuracy by the numbers of armed VC. A VC village chief in refuge in deep jungle cannot function if he has no guerrillas to enforce his orders in his former village; and a province secretary hiding in the mountains, if he has no armed men to impose his will in the province's populated areas, is finished. All over South Vietnam, therefore, I asked the people in the districts, "How many armed VC do you still have to fight?" And what I learned in this manner is bad news for Hanoi—good news for our side.

NEW-FOUND PEACE

Our side should know, for example, that there are now whole districts, even whole provinces, where the VC structure has been entirely uprooted. These are still exceptional, but they are profoundly exciting. For in huge areas of this beautiful country, the industrious, long-enduring people are enjoying real peace for the first time in many years. The fertile coastal strip, which supports the entire population of Thua Thien and Quang Tri provinces, is a good example.

Except in two fringe districts still directly threatened by North Vietnamese troops, there are virtually no ARVN or U.S. forces in the long, rich strip. The regular troops are not there any longer because there is no enemy there any longer. The "territorial" self-defense troops stand guard, of course, against any attempted infiltration by the few hundred surviving VC, who have taken refuge in the mountains over toward the Laotian border.

Three of the less exposed districts of Thua Thien province are even being given a civilian administration—another first in Vietnam since the war started! And everywhere along the coastal strip, the people are tilling fields long fallow, heaping up new dikes to keep the salty sea tides from the land, rebuilding schoolhouses and roads and markets, and generally resuming the busy, cheerful, normal life of rural Vietnam in peacetime.

For the present, to be sure, this wonderful, new-found peace of the million people in this area squarely depends on the continuing presence of U.S. and ARVN troops, to the west and north. From base areas in Laos, and from above the DMZ, no fewer than ten North Vietnamese regiments keep trying to press into the two provinces. If they ever manage to break through the protective screen of U.S. and ARVN troops, these Northern regiments will carry fire and sword all up and down the coastal strip. This is therefore something the President Nixon has to think about, when he ponders thinning the protective screen by further U.S. troop withdrawals. But what Hanoi has to think about is the effective elimination of just about the whole VC structure in Thua Thien and Quang Tri.

Hanoi has other unpleasant things to think about. Take Hau Nghia province, where my district-hopping began. In 1963, this was the province with the largest number of armed VC in the whole of Vietnam—more than 10,000 of them. But in the last year and a half, the same things that happened in Cu Chi have also happened in the other districts of Hau Nghia, so the total of armed VC in the whole province has dropped to no more than 400. You cannot say that the VC structure has been absolutely uprooted: this wretched, always dwindling remnant still hangs on precariously in the province's populated areas. There is no peace in Hau Nghia, either, because North Vietnamese big units, like the 268th Regiment, are also hanging on precariously. But, as their captured documents tell us, the condition of the VC structure in Hau Nghia is now dreadful to contemplate. And there are a good many other provinces, such as Binh Duong, also in III Corps, or Go Cong, in the Delta, where the VC structure is in the same grave plight.

THE DAYS ARE NUMBERED

Finally, there is a third kind of situation, which I found in the provinces of lower I Corps, in big Binh Dinh province in II Corps, and in the VC's stronghold provinces in the Delta. In these places the VC's rice-roots strength, though still considerable, is visibly and rather rapidly declining. Everywhere the VC guerrillas and local-force soldiers are being killed or captured, most often by the government's territorial forces. In increasing numbers they are also defecting to the government, or fading into the landscape. And, everywhere, the VC recruiters are getting at best only one replacement—most often a woman or a little boy—for every three guerrillas they lose. Any structure suffering heavy and continuous losses, and unable to replace more than one loss in three, is obviously in trouble.

When I got back to Saigon from a trip to lower I Corps, I also got a crude numerical measurement of the erosion of the VC in the areas where they are strongest. Lower I Corps is one of these areas. The numbers of armed VC are still formidable but dropping conspicuously. I told what I had found to one of the most intelligent—and pessimistic—Americans in Vietnam.

"I've looked into all the facts," said my friend, glumly. (And no one had a better opportunity to know the rice-roots facts!) "You have to be careful not to exaggerate. After all, the VC in those provinces have lost only 14 percent of their strength since the end of May, although I admit that this rate of loss is likely to continue, and may even rise."

I answered, reasonably I think, that if I had lost 14 percent of all my worldly goods in three months, and were told I would go on losing indefinitely at the same rate, I should have to prepare for near bankruptcy before very long. That, so far as I can see, is what now lies ahead for the VC structure throughout South Vietnam. Even in those provinces where the VC as yet retain real strength, their days are numbered, unless President Nixon is finally driven to throw in the sponge.

In the big-unit war, one must always bear in mind, Hanoi has long been using North Vietnamese rather than VC as cannon fodder. Yet the new erosion of the VC structure, with its far-reaching and inevitable effects on the rice-roots war, has enormous significance; and it is important to know how it began to happen, and why.

The real turning point was the Tet offensive of 1968. Shockingly misreported in this country, Tet was in fact a disaster for Hanoi and a double disaster for the VC. The ablest Southern leaders of the VC, and the most seasoned of their soldiers, fell in vast numbers. And the ruthless brutality of the Tet attacks caused the fence-sitting masses in the cities and the countryside to turn bitterly against the VC.

After Tet, new, much more effective methods of government control of the countryside were adopted—which deserve a whole separate report. This control has now been enormously extended, and is still extending. It is crowding the VC out of more and more hamlets and villages, radically reducing the old VC recruiting base, and each month causing thousands of the more faint-hearted VC to go over the hill as defectors.

THE BIG-UNIT WAR

If the tide is turning in the rice-roots war, what of the big-unit war—the war fought with North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam?

First, let's take a look at the massive numbers of troops that Hanoi has in fact sent to South Vietnam. This movement has not been infiltration so much as continuous invasion—and on a scale that most people will find hard to credit.

Imagine the United States sending off to a foreign war, in a single year and with little hope of return, all the able-bodied young Americans who reached draft age in 1965, 1966 and 1967. It is not easy to imagine, thank God, because we have never done anything like that. Yet that is closely comparable to what Hanoi did in 1968. To provide manpower for the Tet offensive and its two sequels, Hanoi in truth sent southward in that one year just under 350,000 men—despite the fact that in North Vietnam only about 125,000 able-bodied youths annually reach military age.

And this was merely the climax of a long process. At least 400,000 had already been sent off to the war in the South before the year of Tet began. Hence, when the Hanoi war planners studied their balance sheets after the dire failure of the third of the 1968 "victory" offensives, the first item on the debit side was the sacrifice of six entire "year classes" of North Vietnamese young men!

Any government not completely irrational would be inclined to stop, look and listen, after throwing so many of its young men down the drain to no good military purpose. And this is just what Hanoi did. The numbers being sent off to the South were sharply cut back, from an average of 29,000 a month in 1968, to 10,000 a month in the first six months of 1969, and to only about 3,500 a month since July. The cutback was not a "signal" but a practical response to the cruel pressure of hard facts; and one may be sure that the cutback was a belated victory for those in the Hanoi Politbureau who have always advocated "protracted war," against the advocates of the much more costly "big-unit" war.

THE STRATEGY PARALLEL

Protracted war is the Hanoi theorists' phrase for classical guerrilla war, fought with small units and with minimal losses. After Hanoi's frightful and fruitless manpower losses in the 1968 offensives, it was only natural for its advocates to get their innings at last. No doubt they were aided, too, by the argument that American public opinion would not stand for a war indefinitely protracted. And their new policy could perhaps work, if the people President Nixon calls the "bug-outs" finally prevail in this country.

But if the President means what he has rather grimly said, about refusing to become "the first President of the United States to lose a war," he can take comfort from the fact that reversion to protracted war, which might have worked well in 1965, is working horribly badly in 1969. Four years ago, the Saigon government and army had had no time to recover from the near-total disintegration of the whole political-administrative apparatus that followed the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem. Meanwhile, the VC firmly controlled vast areas of the countryside; they had large reserves of manpower, and everywhere possessed the high morale that the South Vietnamese army then lacked.

By the beginning of this year, in contrast, the Saigon government and army had been strengthened in many ways; the huge fence-sitting element of the masses had been decisively turned against the VC; the VC structure and manpower reserves had also been severely strained. Furthermore, the whole VC structure had come to depend heavily on big-unit support. From 1966 onward, in fact, there was a kind of rough division of responsibilities: while the VC structure controlled as much of the countryside as possible, the North Vietnamese in the big units bore the main brunt of the fighting. In these greatly changed circumstances, Hanoi then began to starve the big units of replacements. The support for the VC structure was therefore drastically weakened; and the erosion of that structure thereupon became serious.

This is terribly bad news for Hanoi, because the protracted war that Hanoi is now trying to fight is, basically, guerrilla war; and you cannot indefinitely protract a guerrilla war if the number of guerrillas is continuously shrinking at a heavy rate. The rate of loss is such that, unless premature American troop withdrawals change the whole picture, the VC structure can be in ruins in most of South Vietnam by next spring. This constitutes a time problem for Hanoi, every bit as grave as the time problem President Nixon confronts because of American impatience to get the war over with.

Indeed, if you think about it, Hanoi's way of dealing with the war in South Vietnam has always oddly paralleled Washington's way of dealing with it. Both governments began in a small way, Hanoi aiding the VC, Washington aiding Saigon. Before U.S. intervention, Hanoi had in fact sent only two North Vietnamese divisions to the South, and the Hanoi Politbureau—which also controls the VC, of course—was counting on winning all of South Vietnam for this small investment of Northern manpower. Both governments then put in more and more troops, although, proportionately, the American effort was trifling.

For remember that the North Vietnamese sent off to the war in the South numbered close to 750,000 men by the end of 1968. Proportionately, because Vietnam is a small country, this figure is actually equivalent to about ten million Americans! Yet few of these poor North Vietnamese conscripts will ever come home again; and none at all have been sent home as yet, except for tragic thousands of hopeless cripples.

Both governments also responded in parallel to the bloody climax of the year of Tet. President Nixon's graduated withdrawal program is comparable to the Hanoi Politbureau's somewhat earlier decision to reduce greatly the flow of North Vietnamese troops to the South, and thus to transfer much more of the burden to the VC. To complete the parallel, picture what would have happened to the American effort in Vietnam if the Saigon government and army had fulfilled Hanoi's best hopes by collapsing under the impact of the 1968 offensives. You then get a rough idea of how unmanageable Hanoi's problems will be, if the erosion of the VC structure continues to the point of final breakdown all over South Vietnam.

IN SEARCH OF AN END

So we come back to the question: What can Hanoi do about it? I believe (or perhaps I should say, I hope with good reason) that we can rule out any prolonged return to the former dreadful level of expenditure of North Vietnamese manpower. If Ho Chi Minh were still alive, this would be less easy to rule out. But a viciously divided Politbureau, including at least four rivals for supreme power, and without the final arbiter of all decisions, is surely unlikely to be able to agree on resuming the appalling yearly sacrifice of three whole year classes of men of fighting age.

For the same reasons, however, it seems almost equally unlikely that this divided Politbureau will be able to agree on open admission of defeat. Seriously negotiating in Paris, on the basis of President Nixon's minimum condition of self-determination for the South Vietnamese, would really amount to that kind of open admission.

All the same, one must be careful to remember the difference between the two kinds of war, the Vietcong rice-roots war and the North Vietnamese big-unit war, that are now going on in Vietnam.

Unless—and it is an important unless—President Nixon withdraws too many U.S. troops too soon, it is hard to see anything Hanoi can do to avoid effective defeat for the Vietcong in the rice-roots war in the next six to ten months. What is happening at the

rice-roots cannot even be much slowed down, in fact, except by the kind of North Vietnamese big-unit effort that would require Hanoi to invest manpower as ruthlessly as in 1968.

On the other hand, the Hanoi leaders are remarkably wily, obstinate and resilient. They can still use all sorts of tactics of delay to keep the big-unit war going at a low level, in order to wear out American patience. They can also assault American public opinion politically, by proposing the kind of fake cease fire that would permit massive North Vietnamese re-invasion of the South after American withdrawal. Or they can assault our public opinion even more directly, by mounting one or more spasm offensives—relatively low in cost, not really aimed to achieve solid military results, but sure, nonetheless, to increase casualty rates.

In sum, victory in the rice-roots war against the VC, which can now be hoped for, should in the end (but only in the end) be decisive, because, in the long run, it will create unmanageable problems for Hanoi. Yet most of the real fighting in Vietnam, above the rice-roots level, has long been done by Hanoi's North Vietnamese troops; and Hanoi still has various ways to drag out this other war, or even to change its character. At the moment, for instance, two of the North Vietnamese divisions that formerly threatened III Corps from Cambodian bases are apparently moving into the Delta, where there are no longer any U.S. troops.

Gen. Creighton W. Abrams, the brilliant U.S. commander in Vietnam, is reportedly confident that the resulting test between South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese big units will turn out very well indeed. Pray God he is as correct this time as he has been in the past; but the fortunes of war are never exactly predictable.

In any case, however, the real key to the problem in Hanoi is nothing more nor less than the degree of resolution that will be shown by the President and the people who chose him as their leader. For the first time, it can be said with some assurance that if we want an honorable peace, we can get it by being resolute, and without over-long delays. But shall we? Who can tell?

PATIENCE!

For nearly five long years our nation has been immersed in a bloody, baffling and undeclared war 12,000 miles from our shores. The immediate aim of the United States in this effort is to prevent the enforced communist domination of a people who ask only to be allowed to live in freedom. Seldom if ever in our history have we endured a more frustrating and traumatic experience.

Into the deltas and jungles of South Vietnam we have poured some 85 billions of dollars of our treasure. We have seen nearly 40,000 of our young men go to their graves. The American objective in this war has been clear and carefully limited. We seek no territory. We seek only to give the people of South Vietnam an opportunity to determine their own destiny. Our immutable bedrock position is that the communist enslavement of the nations of Southeast Asia must stop at the 17th parallel.

Four American Presidents have committed our nation to this position—in the belief that the defense of South Vietnam is a defense not only of one country but of all of Asia.

Despite the dimensions of the threat, the United States has conducted the most restrained war that any nation has ever fought. Now, at last, we begin to see the successful end to our efforts. The American and South Vietnamese troops, as well as the troops of other nations who have fought, bled and died in this cause, have brought the war to a point where it is impossible for the enemy to win it by force of arms.

As the following article by Joseph Alsop points out, the enemy is in serious trouble.

The Vietcong guerrillas control less and less of the countryside, and the North Vietnamese armies are feeling the heavy drain on their manpower. That the United States is able to order the withdrawal of 60,000 troops from Vietnam—with more to come—shows that our position is increasingly strong. The leaders of the communist world know that time is no longer on their side.

Why, then, do they continue to hold out? Where do they look for hope of victory? As they survey the scene of battle, the North Vietnamese leaders and their Soviet and Chinese allies do not yet despair, for they know there still remains one resource that can tip the scale in their favor.

The enemy's greatest hopes lies in the division that he has created in public opinion in the United States. This is why the enemy fights on. This is why the Soviet Union has continued to support him in Vietnam. This is why Hanoi holds out in Paris. This is why the enemy refuses concession after concession offered him at the conference table. He clings to the belief that the American patience will run out, that sooner or later the American people will persuade their President to run up the white flag of ignominious surrender.

This is the hope that keeps the enemy going. Were it not for this, the war would have ended before this. No one will ever know how many American boys have gone to their death because the enemy holds on, watching for signs that American resolve is weakening.

To the enemy the constant outcries in the United States must sound like so many bombs being dropped against our troops in South Vietnam. The anti-war speeches in Congress, the campus protests from students and faculty, the barrage of defeatist editorials in some of the most powerful newspapers, these are worth regiments and whole divisions to the enemy. He reads his newspaper, hears the broadcasts, rubs his hands and once more refuses to talk in Paris, refuses to call his invaders back from South Vietnam.

Where is not for his belief that the American patience will crack, the enemy would lose his reason to keep on fighting. It is a monstrous irony that the louder the protest is raised against the war, the longer the war will continue.

Most of those who oppose the war sincerely believe that they are somehow helping to save the United States from error. But against that minority belief must be weighed the cost to the nation. For these are the voices that are listened to in Hanoi—and these are the voices that prolong the months of battle. In the interests of peace, they should now be lowered.

The President of the United States has said that he will not be shaken from his resolve to honor our nation's commitment—and our dead—in Vietnam. In this resolve, he is neither blind nor willful. No matter how loud the clamor from critics in Congress becomes, he will hold his course. He knows the nature of the enemy, the nature of the enemy's designs in Asia and the world. Most of all, he knows the consequences of a craven act of surrender on our part in South Vietnam. The results would haunt us for years to come.

The first consequence would be a blood bath for our friends—the certain slaughter of tens of thousands of South Vietnamese whose only mistake was to have trusted the word and will of the United States. The communists would deal swiftly and unmercifully with these as they butchered their way to power. Lest there be any doubt about this, we have only to look at what happened in Hue, where several thousand South Vietnamese were shot or buried alive during the brief communist occupation of the city during the 1968 Tet offensive.

The next to suffer from our betrayal would be the nearby countries of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Malaysia. They could not hope

to remain free once the South Vietnamese roadblock to communism had been removed. The communist domination of Southeast Asia would shake countries even farther away—such as Indonesia, India, Japan.

Vietnam has come to be a crisis point. If America and its allies in South Vietnam were to fail, the cause of freedom would fail and the area of freedom would be diminished. The lesson would be clear for all to read. *Defeat lies in store for those who put their trust in the United States. Freedom is a dead dream; the future belongs to the enslaver.*

If the world were to witness such a defeat, the United States, leader of the free world, overnight would lose the respect of the world and would lose its self-respect. In a test of will, the United States would have been found wanting. In a test of conscience, the United States would have been found to have no conscience. In a test of strength, the United States would have been found to have not strength enough.

Did 39,000 American boys die for this? Has America forgotten the stuff it is made of, its purpose in the world?

If one listened only to the cries of those who urge peace at any price, one would have cause to question as Hanoi must question—the essential fiber of this nation. But the cries for a dishonorable end to the war do not reflect the will of anything like the majority of the American people. Nor do many of those who urge withdrawal really mean that they would accept peace on the enemy's terms. They simply want—as who does not?—and end to the war.

It is easy for the enemy to underestimate this country. In waiting for us to surrender, he hears the shrill protests and misses the true, patient heartbeat of America. This country has never lost a war; it has never surrendered to an enemy. And it is not about to do so now.

The need today, when an honorable end to the war is within sight, is for courage and patience, in the best American tradition. When their country is in trouble the American people close ranks and stand together. Together, we have brought our country through many storms.

We are now in the midst of a storm, and we will see it through. If the enemy is counting on this nation to falter, he is wrong. The heart of America is as strong as ever, and its patience will endure. Our enemy need not question it. Our allies need not doubt it. Our President need not wonder.