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A few ideas of Muoi Khang ((possibly NVA General Hoang Van Thai)):

A. Situation: General Offensive and Uprising

B. Turning point in history:

1. Destroy the enemy, his war facilities, and his one million troops. The enemy's will of aggression was shaken and he had to de-escalate the war.
2. He saw himself forced to de-escalate the war.

He de-escalated his war of destruction ((possibly meaning the air war in North Vietnam)) and ((reverted to)) limited war.

3. He recognized the Front ((NFLSVN)) and agreed to attend the Paris ((peace talks)).

4. He unilaterally de-escalated the war in MN ((possibly South Vietnam)). This de-escalation was caused by the following reasons:

He is being driven into a position of defeat.

He is forced by ((US public opinion)) to gradually pull out his troops from Vietnam, because he is very stubborn.

The morale of US and Puppet troops is declining. The US' heavy defeat has had a bad effect on her economy. "Mac Carthy" ((possibly MacCarthy)) met Xuan Thuy. Sister Binh ((possibly Nguyen Thi Binh)), Deputy ((possibly Deputy Chief of the VC Delegation to the Paris Conference)) went to Id ((possibly London)). "Inton" ((sic)) went to MB ((possibly North Vietnam)).

The antiwar movement is becoming increasingly widespread.

The output of the workers is falling.

The enemy issued national bonds at a value of 25 billion ((dollars)).

Market prices are going up.

The Puppet's finance and economy are experiencing difficulties. The ((Puppet budget)) shows a deficit of 80 billion piasters ((118\$ SVN= \$1.00 US))

Our side: Consolidation and development of all spheres of activities.

Our political forces have been developed and reorganized. A "United Action Front" was formed.

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Our military forces have also been developed both qualitatively and quantitatively.

International support ((of our cause)) is greater than before. We have gained victories of an international significance. We have proved that this is the era in which the US can be defeated. We must eliminate the fear of the Americans.

Our Provisional ((Revolutionary)) Government is supported by 26 countries. It has received a ((delegation of the)) Indian Communist Party.

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Uncle ((Ho's)) prestige was international.

His last will is a "historic heritage" for us and for the world.

His death was regretted by the peoples of the world.

His anti-American policy and international policy is backed by all the socialist-bloc countries.

Our attitude toward both the USSR and China is correct.

Due to us, the USSR and ((Red)) China have been drawn closer to each other. This was a significant change ((in the relations between these two nations)).

Enemy side:

strategy. "Nixon" ((Present Nixon)) has had to revise his world

"Nixon's doctrine is to ((let)) "the Asians defend Asia".

efforts? On what main battle area is the enemy to concentrate his

This is a step backward in his world strategy.

((Friendly side:))

Several countries have sent their students to Vietnam for study. A Russian military group has gone to ((North)) Vietnam to learn ((ground-to-air)) missiles and anti-aircraft operations from us.

((These students also study how to apply)) science and techniques in a creative manner.

We have not been able to achieve all our objectives and win a decisive victory in the past because the enemy still possessed a ((great)) war potential and was still stubborn.

Our international position is very great. The ((US)) is being defeated by us and is sustaining setbacks internationally.

The enemy troop withdrawal will take place in many phases:

Two hundred thousand troops ((will be pulled out)).

((However, he will leave)) fire ((support units in South Vietnam)).

He must withdraw all his troops.

No deadline has been fixed ((for the complete withdrawal)).

((Friendly side)):

We have not made enough efforts.

Our work still presented many deficiencies.

We failed to realize that the General Offensive is a multi and not a single-phased offensive.

We neither exercised good leadership nor applied proper tactics and techniques in combat.

We failed to realize the importance of the US strategic schemes in the fields of pacification and de-Americanization.

The Political Staff Department overestimated the capabilities of the ((VC)) main forces in the Eastern Region ((possibly meaning III CTZ, RVNAF)), thinking that they could deal the enemy heavy and repeated blows because the Eastern Region has favorable terrain and a rear supply source.

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### C. Future Enemy Schemes and Capabilities:

#### 1. Enemy schemes:

The enemy has been defeated and is being further defeated. However, stubborn as he always is, he will concentrate his efforts on his Vietnamization program.

What is the purpose of the Vietnamization program?

The Vietnamization program is intended to prolong the war and enable the enemy to secure a position of strength.

The enemy still hopes to see ((us)) lose confidence ((in the final victory)).

He still has the capability to carry out pacification activities and conscript men into his army.

He still has a ((great)) war potential. The time for demanding ((President)) Nixon to ((blank)) is not pressing ((sic)).

He hopes that with Uncle Ho's death ((blank)) will develop among the Party leadership ((possibly dissension)).

With a combined US-Puppet combat strength of 1,200,000 men, the enemy still cannot win the war. ((The US)) does not believe that the Puppet Army alone can ever ((bring the conflict to a successful end)).

"Inton" ((sic)) paid a visit to MB ((possibly North Vietnam)) ((to present)) a formula for the establishment of a coalition government, ((because President)) Nixon cannot successfully implement his Vietnamization plan.

2. ((Red)) China is very encouraged by ((the VC achievements)) and believes that our victory is close at hand.

The USSR is also enthusiastic about our achievements.

The enemy can see that our determination is very high.

He sees that ours is a strong force but wonders why we have not conducted heavy attacks as yet ((sic)).

He has two great concerns: First, if we launched big attacks now, he will not know what strategic plan to adopt; second if we waited until all the US troops have been redeployed ((out of Vietnam)) to conduct a strong offensive, the Puppet Army would probably collapse.

We are steadfast to our four points ((sic)).

Even though he de-escalates the war, the enemy can see no way of standing up to us. To defeat him rapidly or slowly depends on our efforts.

However, we should realize that Nixon is not really willing to bring an end to the war he deescalates the war step wise and, in the meantime, he tries to bargain with us. By so doing he can both conceal his stubbornness and prove that he is logical.

The enemy dreads a more serious setback.

For this reason, the two "possibilities" ((which we have foreseen)) are still valid.

Because of the enemy subjectiveness and lack of determination, the year 1970 will offer us the most favorable conditions ever ((to defeat the US)).

#### Enemy Schemes in 1970

1. The enemy will expand his Vietnamization plan.
2. He will continue to pull out US troops.

3. He will be careful not to suffer further setbacks.

4. He will strengthen the Puppet Army.

((5)) He will increase his pacification efforts.

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((6)) He will continue to replace US troops with Puppet troops.

((7)) He will intensify attacks against our rear areas and corridors.

((8)) He will use firepower to wear down our forces ((while consolidating his)) defense system.

((9)) He may resume airstrikes against certain areas in North Vietnam.

((10)) He may expand the conflict to certain areas in Laos.

In the political field:

The enemy will consolidate the Thieu-Ky-Khiem Administration.

At the same time, he will prepare other henchmen.

He will prepare ((ex-General)) Tran Van Don for his plan ((no further information)).

He will consolidate the Puppet Government at the local level, reactionary organizations, and the six ((political)) parties formed by ((President)) Thieu.

Three phases:

The members of the ((RVN)) Government ((will be)) replaced on a partial basis.

A coalition government ((will be)) formed but the enemy will occupy more important positions than us.

Finally, (the enemy will) accept our 10-point ((peace)) solution. He ((will)) prepare his various forces for entering ((possibly the coalition government)) to "harass" us.

Diplomatic struggle:

The enemy will use the development of the war to conduct his diplomatic struggle.

In order to stabilize his economy in South Vietnam, the enemy will resort to extortion.

Possible future developments:

1. The Puppet ((Government and armed forces)) will further deteriorate. Dissension between ((the Puppet and the US)) will become increasingly acute.

2. The people's struggle movement will reach a higher degree of intensity than before.

Our political organizations will develop quickly in line with prescribed policy, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

3. In Region 5 and in the Tri-Thiên Region, the enemy's pacification efforts have failed, especially in Huế, where our ((revolutionary)) movement is strong.

We have control of over two-thirds of the 84,000 people of the Hoà Giang ((possibly Hoà Vang )) District.

With our new force deployment plan and the US troop pullout, we will have more favorable conditions to fight the war because the ((Puppets)) will have to disperse their forces.

4. If we conduct strong attacks, the enemy will become more confused. If we can frustrate his Vietnamization plan, he will have to change his strategy.

Our missions in 1970.

1. Our basic mission will be to defeat the enemy's Vietnamization plan, bring about a favorable change in the balance of forces, counter his search-and-destroy tactics, destroy his war facilities, and turn the tide of the war in our favor.

2. We will revise our strategy and intensify our attacks to win partial victories first, prior to moving towards the final victory.

The enemy is now on the defensive. He is trying to minimize his losses.

We must devise better means to destroy the Americans.

The General Offensive and Uprising ((was conducted)) at a time when the enemy still possessed a strength of 1,200,000 men.

The characteristic of this war is that it consists of many phases, and each phase is marked by the efforts made by one side to inflict as many losses to the other side as possible. So, while the enemy is only thinking of countering our blows, we must attack him more determinedly to win a decisive ((victory)).

3. Reasons of our success and the enemy failure.

The US and Puppet strategic role has changed.

We must seek to gain partial successes first before moving toward achieving the final victory.

It is important to have ((the enemy)) situation well in hand so as to be able to exercise leadership realistically.

Note: In 1970, we must attack the enemy move resolutely while increasing our national and class awareness.

Consolidate our various organizations in critical areas to meet immediate and future requirements.

Apply appropriate attack tactics.

4. Conditions for the final victory.

The US must withdraw all its troops from South Vietnam.

Our military and political forces must be stronger than the enemy's forces.

We must have control of a large part of the rural areas and a number of cities.

The General Offensive and Uprising consisted of three phases.

((The General Offensive and Uprising)) conducted in 1968 constituted a turning point in the history ((of Vietnam)).

The first phase was to force the enemy into an unfavorable position. The second phase was to compel the enemy to accept our 10-point ((peace)) solution. The third phase was to force the Americans to withdraw all their troops ((from South Vietnam)) and form a coalition government.

Guidelines for the all-out attacks.

To conduct attacks in all three areas ((mountain, delta and city)) is an extremely important mission.

Make preparations for a protracted struggle while striving to win a decisive victory in a short period of time.

Note: Food provisions and munitions are to be used extremely sparingly.

Regulations on ((the protection against)) cluster bombs must be strictly observed.

The health of cadre and soldiers must be protected.

Enemy plan for 1970.

In Jul 69, following our XH ((possibly Summer Campaign)), the enemy estimated that we would not be able to attack Saigon and claimed to have achieved success in his pacification program.

((President)) Nixon stated he would withdraw his troops in Jul ((69)).

Analyzing our situation, the enemy believes we have troop strength and food problems.

According to him, our purpose of fighting a protracted war is to create a political effect. He thinks that we only have the capability to conduct small attacks with regular forces, sapper attacks, guerrilla attacks, shelling attacks, and win over the people.

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1. If we conduct guerrilla activities, the enemy will have to fight a lengthy war, so his plan to end the war in 1970 ((can not be achieved.))

2. Implementing his Vietnamization plan, he will continue to pull out his troops, but only on a piecemeal basis, leaving behind enough forces to bolster the Puppet Army.

3. The enemy policy is to prolong the fighting so as to be able to secure a position of strength to end the war.

He will try to coordinate the pullout plan with the Vietnamization and pacification plans.

((Puppet)) regular units will continue to assume clear-and-hold missions in their areas of responsibility.

US forces will be used ((possibly less)) in "outer-line" areas.

Operating between the US and Puppet forces will be the Popular Force.

To minimize its casualties, the ((US)) will conduct small-scale attacks and send Puppet units to operate in outer areas.

Puppet forces will take on an increasingly greater share of the fighting in outer areas.

#### 4. Schemes and methods:

1. Mobile forces consisting of US, Puppet, and Allied troops.

2. Territorial security forces consisting of Regional Force troops, policemen, and Phoenix personnel.

3. ((For pacification purpose)) South Vietnam will be divided ((by GVN)) into four areas, each consisting of a number of provinces:

Area 1, or the secure area, will consist of Category A and B hamlets: 9% ((possibly 90%)).

Area 2, or the area to be consolidated, will consist of Category C hamlets: 30%

Area 3, will consist of areas yet to be cleared where the enemy has not been able as yet to control the people.

Area 4, will consist of all those areas on the border where border defense ((forces operate)).

#### Deployment of forces.

Area 1 will be manned by policemen and People's Self-Defense Force personnel.

Area 2 will be manned by Regional and Popular Force troops.

Area 3 is divided into areas of responsibility where ((RVNAF)) regular forces will conduct continuous operations and attacks

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Area 4 is protected by ((RVNAF)) Special Forces ((Biêt Kich)).

The enemy's regular forces target for attack in Areas 3 and 4 ((mentioned above)) is our main forces.

To destroy our underground installations in deep areas, the enemy will use his Regional Force to attack our local forces, and his Popular Force to cope with our guerrillas.

In border areas, he will use his Special Forces to attack our rear ((bases)).

#### 5. Establishment of the Phoenix Committee

Organize ((possibly an intelligence network)) into a system under the command of the Phoenix ((Committee)).

Emphasize the role of province chiefs and sector chiefs in charge of secure areas ((possibly Area 1 mentioned above)) and areas to be consolidated ((possibly Area 2 mentioned above)).

Play up the role of village chiefs who have the power to use the village forces.

Zone ((possibly Corps Tactical Zone)) commanders will divide their CTZ's into areas of activity and employ the CTZ regular forces in sweeps in border areas.

6. We can see that the ((Phoenix)) program reflects the enemy scheme ((possibly of destroying the VC infrastructure)).

This ((Phoenix)) program was initiated in Jul 69 after the enemy had gained certain successes and caused certain difficulties for us.

It is designed to support the US Vietnamization plan which consists of using the "inner forces" ((possibly meaning the Puppet forces)) to replace the "outer forces" ((possibly meaning the US forces)).

The US wants the Puppets to carry out her military plan and is now following a demagogic line to tranquillize the attitude of the Puppet.

Being subjective, the enemy cannot accurately assess our capabilities. He has failed to realize the weaknesses of the Puppet and to anticipate political reactions.

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#### Difficulties involved in the enemy plan.

The situation has greatly changed during the Autumn-Winter ((Campaign)).

The US had met with many difficulties in replacing its forces with Puppet forces.

The more troops the US will withdraw, the more the Puppet ranks will become disorganized:

If we had been more skillful, we could have disorganized the Puppets.

The weakness of our forces "inside" ((sic)) resulted in a seesaw fighting with the enemy.

The Puppet forces only have "quantity" and not "quality"

Our side: Our combat effectiveness is high.

Our political forces have developed.

Disputed areas have narrowed.

Liberated areas ((possibly have expanded)).

The political movement in the cities is rising.

The ((antiwar)) movement in the US and the world ((is mounting)).

We and the enemy are contending with each other ((possibly for the control of the people)).

Our position has been consolidated.

We must increase ((our attacks)) to re-establish the balance of forces.

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Purpose and requirement of the political reorientation.

In short, the political reorientation this time is aimed at shedding light on the following three subjects:

Our victories and the enemy's defeats.

The enemy's new plots

Upcoming missions.

Three determinations:

Determination to strengthen our combat spirit.

Determination to defeat the US aggressors.

Determination to strength our revolutionary concept of the protracted ((war)).

Improve our attitude toward the people.

Intensify the class struggle in which the people are to play the key role.

Counter bureacruracy and militarism.

Requirements:

Heighten ideological awareness.

Understand Party policies thoroughly and agree with all Party lines.

Students must concentrate on their lessons to obtain good results.

Conduct deep studies and engage in deep thought to find out the causes of our errors in ideology and policy ((interpretation)) to correct them.

Ideological problems: Combat rightism, passivism, and individualism.

Conduct studies.

Our victories and the enemy's defeats:

In invading Vietnam, the US wants to defeat the socialist bloc and check the people's liberation movement.

They also practised their "O Ty No" plan ((possibly Domino theory)).

Why did the US get directly involved in Vietnam in 1965 ? Was it because of Russia and ((Red)) China?

They brought troops ((to South Vietnam)) to probe ((possibly China's and Russia's reactions)).

We realize that our Party and people have the capability to defeat the US.

On the anti-American front, we will certainly be able to defeat the enemy because we have a just cause and the ((full support)) of all our people, the working class, and the Party.

General Offensive and Uprising:

The General Offensive and Uprising marked a turning point ((in the anti-American war)). Since it was initiated, we have achieved successive victories.

Our victories in 1968 were of a strategic defense and Vietnamization plan, the enemy had to ((further)) de-escalate the war.

We succeeded in annihilating a large number of enemy troops and in destroying many of the enemy's war facilities under extremely fierce ((combat conditions)).

Questions raised ((by students)):

A. In what areas have we defeated the Vietnamization plan in its initial phase? In areas where the enemy still had posts.

1. ((Use of)) local troops and guerrillas.

((Plant)) our agents in cities ((to lead)) political struggle movements.

Our rear areas are becoming increasingly narrow.

We are afraid of fighting with the enemy. Is this true?

2. Is it true that the enemy has been forced to de-escalate the war?

The Americans will strengthen the Puppet troops before withdrawing their troops from South Vietnam.

We are expecting the Puppet forces to collapse.

B. Future plans.

What is the Vietnamization plan? What does it consist of?

This plan is not aimed at prolonging the war, but at gaining a stronger position for the enemy.

2. What ((schemes did the enemy)) fail to carry out?

C. Our future missions.

Our coming missions depend on two "possibilities" we have foreseen.

What factors determine either of these two possibilities?

What changes have we brought to the war situation?

Is the war situation going to change this year?

How to gain the decisive victory?

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13 Feb 70. - Tam Tran ((aka Hai Chan, possibly aka Le Chan, Chief of the Political Staff Department, Headquarters, SVNLA)).

A. Contents of political reorientation and requirements of the missions:

Old contents with new points added.

The ideological knowledge does not meet the requirements of the missions.

### Circumstances:

There were dissensions among the Communist countries.

In 1965, 200,000 US troops landed in SVN.

In 1968, the US was defeated in its air war over North Vietnam. It established plans and tried to find a way to stop the war in South Vietnam without losing its prestige as a powerful nation. However, its plans could not be harmoniously carried out, and its congressmen engaged in violent discussions as to the achievement of peace in South Vietnam.

Our military achievements have had the following consequences:

They exerted a great influence on the socialist bloc.

They created enthusiasm for the people's liberation movements, both in the country and in the world. The world's peoples are no longer afraid of the US.

## II. THE ENEMY SCHEMES..

Why does the US reduce the number of troops fighting in South Vietnam?

((Review of all events:)) The Paris ((Peace)) Conference; the US attempt to reduce its military expenditures in South Vietnam; the US plans of de-Americanization and its attempt to carry out the Vietnamization of the war. We should understand that the Vietnamization of the war is the US's most important scheme.

### Causes for the de-Americanization:

Although the US has been defeated, it is still stubborn, which is substantiated by its refusal to accept our 10-point peace proposal.

The US carries out its strategic plan which is part of its world plan. It strives to soothe the dissensions of the US people.

Also, by carrying out its plan of de-Americanization, it strives to consolidate the ranks of its henchmen and increase the confidence of the latter in the "free world." It has prolonged the negotiations with us. Through the aforementioned points, we realize the US's sinister schemes in the Vietnamization of the war.

### Details of the de-Americanization and Vietnamization plans:

The Vietnamization plan has four requirements:

He strives to carry out his accelerated pacification plan.

If the US withdraws its troops, what will the situation be ?

((It will)) drive ((our force)) back from the frontline and block ((our activities)) in the rear.

### Politically:

((It)) tries all means ((to consolidate)) the Thiệu - Kỳ ((Government)).


What is the real situation ?

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The political situation is becoming increasingly unfavorable for the US.

Economically:

70 billion ((dollars))

$\frac{30}{70}$  ((sic)) 

((The US)) owes West Germany and Japan 50 billion ((dollars)).

Danger of inflation.

Saigon: ((There is a deficit of)) 182 billion.

Imported: 600 tons ((of goods))

Exported: 20 ((tons))

Increase in salaries: 30 ((%))

Increase in the cost of living: 300%

((Possibly casualties:)) 30,000

((Replacements:))

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((In the social field,)) there are on the average one prostitute and two "cowboys" ((young male thieves)) among every 30 people.

The aforementioned analysis outlines the importance of our victories which are of international significance. The question to be raised is which system, revolutionary socialism or revolutionary capitalism, will win?

((We must in any case strengthen)) the revolutionary militia and the national liberation movement.

Why the US sent its troops to ((South)) Vietnam

The US intends to establish a new colony in South Vietnam and enlarge its influence in Southeast Asia.

Requirements: Three things we must know and three determinations we must have:

((Make cadre and soldiers know)) the significance of our victories in Vietnam and in the world and which side is the winner.

Correct erroneous thought.

Strengthen our belief ((in our victory)).

Maintain a firm attitude under all circumstances.

I. ACHIEVEMENTS.

1968: Historic achievements ((gained in the General Offensive and Uprising)).

1969: ((We)) maintained and developed ((our forces and position)) in every aspect.

What achievements did we gain in 1968?

What achievements did we gain in 1969?

Differences between the achievements in 1968 and 1969.

Significance and value of the achievements of each year.

Value ((of achievements)) of 1968 as compared with 1969.

Strength and war facilities.

Political ((support)).

Position and power.

Destruction of ((enemy)) units (D, C ((possibly company and battalion size)) ): The destruction rate ((of 1969)) was higher as compared with 1968. Why?

Defensive strategy:

((The enemy)) adopted a defensive tactic and could not increase his ((offensive)) activities. He relied much on his ((modern)) weapons and ((combat)) techniques to ((destroy us)) in order to reduce his casualties.

Friendly situation at the end of autumn and at the beginning of the winter:

A number of ((friendly)) units did not fulfil their missions.

The enemy counterattacked us frantically.

We encountered numerous difficulties and committed many errors.

The enemy's hope in the Vietnamization ((of the war)) and his illusion in his plan of Vietnamization of the war:

A strong Puppet Government, a strong armed forces, a strong police force, and a strong political force.

This plan is designed for seeking an honorable settlement for the war ((in South Vietnam)).

The three objectives of the Vietnamization plan: The gradual withdrawal of the US from SVN, the development of the Puppet strength, and the frustration of our objectives.

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The enemy's illusions:

((He thought that)) he had succeeded in carrying out the pacification activities. He increased his troop strength to 800,000 fully armed soldiers.

((He thought that)) our activities had decreased because we were weakened due to a shortage of food and to illness.

The death of our Uncle caused sorrow to all people; we lost a competent and well-experienced leader, and as a result, the enemy is trying to exploit our present situation.

Therefore, he planned to intensify his pacification activities in 1970 and scheduled the building up of 11,000 hamlets. He fiercely tried to destroy our force while reinforcing and consolidating the Puppet force.

### III. MISSION OF OUR ARMED FORCES IN 1970.

1. Basically, we must destroy the enemy's plan of Vietnamization in order to change the present situation of the war and to achieve decisive victories.

Our political and armed activities in 1970 will play an important role throughout this decisive phase.

#### A. How to defeat the Vietnamization plan and how to change the present situation (of the war)?

Specifically, we must destroy the US and Puppet ((forces)) and frustrate the enemy's pacification program.

Politically, we must conduct simultaneous struggles. The struggles must be sustained, in coordination with the three-pronged attacks ((military, political, and military proselyting)). They must be capable of creating new positions and new capabilities for us.

#### B. Our capabilities and productivity.

Outline the details of our numerous advantages: Our political position; the situation of our armed forces with ((our supremacy in)) the lowlands and city bordering areas; our increasing strength in the three areas; and the development of the capabilities of our armed forces.

#### C. The enemy's passiveness and weakness. His stalemate.

His ((war)) potential still exists.

The US antiwar movements have been fierce ((in the US)).

((The US-Puppet troops)) always fear our attacks.

Based on these weak points, we made important efforts in compliance with the two capabilities and two strategic situations ((sic)).

#### Leadership:

We must intensify our General Offensive and Uprising movements in order to achieve decisive victories. We must be resolved to gain victories by conducting our activities in compliance with Capability 1.

In 1969, we achieved several victories. However, these victories were not enough to change the situation. Therefore, we must realize that our mission is much more important in 1970

C. Our mission and determination:

((The conduct of the )) three "rounds" ((of attacks)).

((The conduct of the)) three "pincers" tactics.

((The consolidation of)) concepts.

The positive activities ((against the enemy)).

The performance of the three purposes: ((Struggles for)) US withdrawal, ((the acquisition of)) the people's esteem, and the supremacy of our forces over the Puppet forces.

Suggestions for discussions:

Do we agree with the Resolution ((unspecified)) that the enemy is forced to de-escalate war?

Will the enemy remain passive before our attacks?

What must our concept and policy be?

((Comments on)) our organization, our ideology, and subjectivism.

The Vietnamization program with the balance ((of forces)):

As compared with the enemy's strategic schemes, our strategy is still of high value, and we can spoil the enemy's schemes. The nature of the Vietnamization program is strategically violent.

Presently, the enemy suffers three deadlocks, as follows:

((1)) The US will be defeated whether or not it withdraws its troops.

((2)) If the US withdraws ((from Vietnam)), the Puppet Government will collapse at once.

((3)) The results of the Paris peace talks:

We opposed the Vietnamization program in SVN.

The US-Puppet side must accept our 10-point peace proposal.

We asked the US to change the Thi<sup>^</sup>eu-Ky-Khi<sup>^</sup>em Government.

Our three strong points:

1. We will win the war whether or not the US withdraws ((from SVN)).
2. Our forces must be stronger than the Puppets.
3. The people always side with us.

The revolutionary achievements ((at the beginning of)) 1970. Strong points:

((We succeeded in providing)) mutual support between the various units.

((We succeeded in)) consolidating the relationship between the troops and the people.

There was a very correct administration of the units.

The spirit of solidarity has been great.

Weak points:

Rightist leadership.

Imperfect administration of cadre.

Imperfections in the establishment of the "Four-Excellences" Party Chapters.

Imperfection in the conduct ((of cadre)).

Remarks after the reorientation course:

Ideologies:

Wait for the US troop withdrawal

Wait for the outcome of the Paris Conference

((All the cadre)) are anxious

Concept ideology ((sic))

((The cadre were)) subjective in their attempts to solve problems.

1. Understanding of policies:

Our policy is constantly strengthening.

Solution of ideological weaknesses:

It is a requirement that we must use our maximum capabilities while carrying out our missions.

When can we change the situation of the war?

We must consider our policy towards the people first of all.

Can we succeed in defending the liberated areas?

Can we maintain our policy for a long time with our ((war)) potential?

Being confronted with atrocities, can we fight a protracted war?

Results ((of the reorientation course)).

1. ((All cadre and soldiers)) realized our victories as well as the enemy's failures.

Our policies were continuously strengthened.

We achieved greater victories in all fields.

Our advantages developed increasingly and thus overcame all difficulties.

The significance of our victories was substantiated in a gradual change in the balance of force ((to our favor)).

2. The enemy failures:

The enemy's capabilities have declined, and it is impossible for him to rebuild his strength.

His sinister Vietnamization ((plan)): The enemy was stubborn and his schemes were sinister, aimed at causing more difficulties for us. However, it has been difficult for him to achieve these schemes and we are in a victorious position.

((We must)) defeat the Vietnamization scheme: This task is not very difficult for us, and we are determined to deal deadly blows to the enemy.

### 3. Missions:

We are bound to our important missions; however, we have enough agents to carry out our missions. We must be conscious of our guidelines and particularly of the implementation of the three-pronged attacks in mountainous and lowland areas. ((Our missions)) will encounter atrocities and hardships in several areas, and we may be confronted with shortcomings due to subjectivism.

We must clearly determine the three combat capabilities and fully understand Resolution 9.

All the agents must correctly assess the friendly and enemy situations.

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Assessment of the people: We exercised a great political influence over the people.

Attitude of "K" Committee ((possibly the region's Party Committee:

Resolutely study ((the experiences gained)) by friendly troops in carrying out missions and in strengthening the unit. Otherwise, the Revolution will have no meaning, and our development will be restricted. ((The question is)) how can we reward the merit of our personnel? We must be careful to avoid hitting the friendly reconnaissance personnel.

Some suggestions ((during a meeting)) caused misunderstandings among the comrades. Self-importance ((was noted)).

We must overcome subjectivism and realize that we still have shortcomings in talent and in ethics.

February 17.

Explanation on the "two basic fronts" ((possibly military and political))

#### 1. Concerning our Party's policies in the military and political fields:

Our military missions are carried out according to the Party's political policy. Moreover, we implement our military mission in compliance with our national tradition.

A review of our national history reminds us of the various periods of war during which ((our ancestors)) bravely fought to save the country.

How did we defeat the French colonialists? ((We defeated the French colonialists)) due to our force and resoluteness and due to the establishment of our Party which assumed its historical mission.

((2.)) ((Blank))