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15. SUMMARY:
 (C) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document captured on 26 June 1970, and concerns a draft of an activity plan, dated 10 December 1969 and ((possibly originated by VC Military Region 7 Headquarters)). Document assesses friendly and enemy situations and contains guidelines and military missions for the immediate ((1970)) future. Document further contains information on VC/NVA food and ammunition supply difficulties.

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ENHANCE THE VICTORIES GAINED IN 1969, BE DETERMINED TO OVERCOME SHORTCOMINGS, AND STRIVE TO FERVENTLY ATTACK THE ENEMY AND ATTAIN GREATER VICTORIES WHICH WILL LEAD TO A DECISIVE VICTORY IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE AND THE COMPLETE DISRUPTION OF THE ENEMY'S INTENT TO END THE WAR IN A STRONG POSITION.

I. ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION.

The 1969 Spring and Summer ((Campaign)) victories were achieved under very difficult material conditions. During the Autumn and Winter ((Campaigns of 1969)), we successfully attacked the enemy on three fronts. Our activities along the Lòng Tàu and Đồng Nai ((Rivers)) and National Route No. 15 caused great losses to the enemy, hindering his plan to attack our storage facilities, his accelerated pacification program, and his encroachment policy. We also strengthened our position in the intermediate areas. D4 and D8 ((possibly 4th Infantry and 8th Sapper Battalions)) of Sub-Region 4 remained in the fringe areas of Thủ Đức District((seat)); D1 Bã Rịa ((possibly 445th Local Force Battalion)) remained in the Ninh Bám area; and D1 Sapper ((Battalion)) of Thị Biên ((possibly Biên Hoa City Unit)) ((remained in the fringe areas of Biên Hoa City)).

These units successfully attacked and destroyed the enemy forces in these areas.

Our forces in the cities and district seats have been only moderately developed. The activities of the secret guerrillas were successfully, but not widely, expanded (attached is a copy of the military achievements attained as of Nov 69).

Due to the tactical importance and characteristics of the battlefields in VC Military Region ((?)) which were described by the Coordination and Operations Committee in a conference held in May 69, the enemy stubbornly continued his violent military operations in this military region. Although the enemy was driven into a defensive position and had to de-escalate the war, he did not yield in his aggressive neo-colonialist policy directed against SVN and continued to cling to the battlefield in this military region.

By acting thusly, the enemy hopes to use this military region as a basis for bringing in more troops ((to SVN)), in case he has to prolong the war or withdraw his troops as required ((sic)). Many see-saw engagements have taken place between friendly and enemy forces on the battlefields in this military region. These resulted in particular from operations against the enemy's clear-and-hold operations and his accelerated pacification program.

1. The enemy concentrated his troops to attack and destroy the intermediate areas from Long Điền, Đất Đỏ, and the area east of Route 15 to Cây Gáo, in an attempt to drive us out of this area and prevent our infiltration into areas bordering cities. Through this action, the enemy

also endeavored to protect his bases and storage facilities, such as those at Biên Hòa Airfield, Long Bình and Vũng Tàu. Relying upon airstrikes and an increased number of B - 52 raids, the enemy conducted search operations with the support of armored elements and employed separate Special Forces elements, usually C ((Company))-size units, to penetrate deeply into our areas or to ambush friendly elements at our entry and exit points. He also altered the features of our terrain by frequently employing toxic chemical agents for defoliation and clearing and dividing forests into sections in order to establish a number of artillery emplacements deep in our areas. He caused many difficulties for the living conditions and movements of our troops and limited the concentration

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of large numbers of friendly troops. The enemy employed the Australian Task Force, Thai Manxa Vuong ((sic)) Regiment, and the 48th ((Regimental)) Task Force of F18 ((possibly 18th RVNAF Infantry Division)) supported by the 2nd Battalion, 199th ((US Light Infantry)) Brigade, to carry out repeated sweep operations.

In the outer perimeter areas, the enemy's 43rd and 52nd ((Regimental)) Task Forces from F18 and one battalion from the 199th ((US Light Infantry)) Brigade continuously blocked our entry and exit points on the Đông Nai and La Ngã Rivers and on National Routes 1 and 15 and Provincial Routes 2, 3, 20, and 24. This created many difficulties for our movements. The enemy intended to disrupt our attack preparations and divide our battlefield into small areas. He blocked our entry and exit points, destroyed our agencies and hindered our food supply activities.

The enemy considered district seats, cities, and areas bordering cities as pacified areas and employed forces (as in Thủ Đức) to intensify control operations, utilizing various methods to track, capture, or kill our cadre. The enemy strengthened the Puppet Government ((GVN)) by organizing People's Self-Defense Forces (which have been established in Biên Hoa City, Thủ Đức, and Cáp). The enemy also established many assault platoons which consist mainly of tyrants or members of Regional and Popular Forces.

2. The enemy intensified his accelerated pacification program in populated areas (areas bordering district seats and cities), along strategic communication lines and in areas surrounding military bases and their storage facilities. Occasionally, we successfully intercepted and destroyed many enemy pacification teams and People's Self-Defense Force Units. However, the enemy always stubbornly tried to reorganize his forces. Within their support role, US, Australian, Thai, and Puppet ((RVNAF)) regular forces conducted repeated training courses for pacification cadre in Vũng Tàu and forced the people to join the People's Self-Defense Force. The enemy's accelerated pacification program is a strategic measure designed for both military and political purposes which are as follows:

- a. To review the Puppet ((GVN)) administrative structure at village and hamlet level in order to control and oppress the people.
- b. To develop local armed forces, especially Popular and People's Self-Defense Forces, so that the enemy can upgrade troops or carry out conscription in order to Vietnamize the war.

c. To increase espionage activities in local areas in order to attack and destroy friendly organizations (cadre and key agents), which would assist in the blocking of our entry and exit points and hinder our food supply missions, and at the same time, to prepare forces to counter us in the future ((postwar)) political struggle.

The above points will be carried out in the near future because the enemy intends to accomplish the following:

a. Concentrate troops to attack intermediate areas in order to carry out his clear-and-hold strategy and to drive us from these areas. Attack our transportation corridors to disrupt our attack preparations in order to protect his city and security-belt areas.

b. Intensify his accelerated pacification program in order to gain control of the land and gain the support of the people, so that he can Vietnamize the war.

However, we have the following advantages which should be exploited:

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1. Enemy situation: The US government has withdrawn 60,000 troops from SVN. The antiwar movement of the US people and soldiers is becoming increasingly violent, and has been enthusiastically supported by people around the world. These events have seriously affected the combat potential of the US, Puppet, and satellite troops. Internal dissension within the Nixon Government's Congress and the ((RVN)) Puppet Government's National Assembly has increased greatly and become more profound.

On the ((VC)) Military Region ((7)) battlefield, the 18th RVN Puppet ((Division)), a major combat element, suffered 60% losses during the spring and summer phase. It has tried to consolidate its troop strength by carelessly conscripting individuals from various social classes. For this reason, its combat efficiency has continued to decrease. One battalion of the 199th US ((Light Infantry)) Brigade was assigned to accompany the ((VN)) task force. However, the US troops have displayed a longing to be returned home and frequently have strived to avoid casualties when encountering our forces. The enemy sustained heavy losses during the ((1969)) Autumn and Winter Campaign; and for this reason, his fighting spirit has become confused and weak.

In addition, the Thai and Australian troops also suffered bitter failures in 1969. They are no longer as aggressive in their sweep operations as before, and they have often told the people that they will withdraw their troops as soon as the US forces leave and that they have requested the Viet Cong not to attack them. During the year, an estimated 5,558 Thai troops were killed, resulting in the destruction of six battalions (including one armored battalion), three companies, and eight platoons. Another battalion and four companies were depleted. Approximately 2,509 Australian troops were killed, resulting in six companies and five platoons destroyed. Five other companies and six platoons were depleted. They admitted that the 5th Australian Battalion has lost its combat effectiveness.

In addition, most of the members of the Regional and Popular Forces, with the exception of some tyrants, have continued to remain

in the enemy ranks because the enemy has forced them to do so. Some of these people have had to stay in the enemy ranks in order to earn a living. Others feared the rigors of war they would have to face if they abandoned the enemy and joined the Revolution. In the intermediate areas, the enemy has continuously conducted fierce operations. He has employed small elements consisting of US, Australian, Thai, and Puppet troops to search for and discover our installations. However, many shortcomings existed among these troops, such as a lack of coordination between various elements and no plan of reinforcement.

Therefore, it is possible for us to stay close to the enemy and destroy these elements. This fact proves that we are being afforded favorable conditions for frustrating the enemy forces. In towns and cities, for instance in Cáp ((Vũng Tàu City)), the enemy seems to have strong capabilities, but he actually has many weak points in his defense due to the dense population and the presence of various types of troops in this city. Generally speaking, the enemy's military force is smaller than it was during the 1969 Spring ((Campaign)). Defection is rapidly becoming widespread in his ranks, and the enemy is incapable of increasing the number of his troops on the military region battlefields. If we increase our violent attacks, he may send two or three Puppet reserve battalions to the area. However, there would be no increase of US troops, as they would be gradually withdrawn from SVN.

2. Friendly situation: During the ((1969)) Autumn and Winter Campaign, we improved our employment of troops and methods of attack. Even though our attacks were not actually strong at first, we obtained some good results, such as the complete destruction of one company from each of the US, Australian, and Thai forces during sweep operations.

Being fully aware of our primary mission of frustrating the enemy pacification program, we successfully eliminated enemy control in Long Đát (Bà Rịa), Phú Hội (Nhân Trạch), and Area 3 (Long Thành). We also created a 'see-saw' situation, or turned the situation in our favor, in Trang Bôn, Vĩnh Cửu, Long Thành, and Nhân Trạch. We thwarted the Australian tactic of planting M-16 mines and completely destroyed the bunker and watchtower networks in the areas surrounding strategic hamlets in Long Đát.

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Our province and district local forces and village guerrillas (secret guerrillas) have cleverly utilized the tactic of disguise to execute deep thrusts or special action attacks into enemy areas. This tactic has been very effective on the Military Region ((7)) battlefield, and we have gained some successes in the initial phase of fighting.

Conclusion: During two trial years of the General Offensive and Uprising phase, we have accumulated numerous experiences in staying close to the enemy areas. However, the quality of the three types of forces ((main, local, and guerrilla forces)) did not increase and our combat experiences and combat efficiency increased only slightly. At present, our armed forces are in positions from which they can encircle enemy objectives and accomplish their missions.

3. People's situation: Revolutionary pride is becoming increasingly strong among the people. Especially after the death of Uncle HỒ ((Chi Minh)), the mourning for and absolute prestige of Uncle HỒ increased among the people of the world (even in the enemy ranks), and consequently this increased the people's confidence in the success of the Revolution and in the failure of the Americans. The Puppet ((Government)) will be defeated if the US troops are withdrawn from SVN. In the face of the utterly barbarous crimes of the US and Puppet troops, such as the burning of houses and the seizing of property, etc. ((sic)), the people have displayed a venomous hatred of the enemy. Although the enemy has resorted to all kinds of oppressive measures, the people have continued to make every effort to contribute to the Revolution by **supplying food to friendly troops**. This is a very significant factor for a military region which is situated very far away from our ((VC)) rear area ((possibly meaning NVN)).

4. We have also had Resolution 9 to guide us during the General Offensive and Uprising phase.

Along with the above advantages, we still have certain shortcomings and difficulties which we must still overcome:

1. The food and ammunition supply activities have continued to face many difficulties which has seriously affected our activities.

2. Our strength (armed and political forces) in local areas is weak. Party Chapters have not been established among the people. The people's organizations, even though they are in existence, have been very weak thus affecting the effectiveness of the three-pronged attacks. The guerrilla warfare movement has not been strongly developed, especially the secret guerrilla force. The use of locally-made, rudimentary weapons is still poor. The fighting capabilities of various units, especially D Sapper ((Battalions)), have been weak. Meanwhile, the enemy continues to possess a large number of troops and numerous facilities with great mobility and firepower. His activities have increasingly affected the recruitment and concentration of our troops and the rear service task.

3. This year, the battlefield was divided into many small areas. More terrain features were destroyed in this year than ever before, especially in the areas where we usually concentrated our troops. The employment of major units met more difficulties than in the 1969 Spring Campaign. Leadership and establishment of organizations were not provided in accordance with the division of the battlefield. Therefore, if we do not actively overcome the above shortcomings, they will adversely affect our knowledge of tactical situations and our abilities to provide proper guidance **needed by us** to make maximum use of the combat potential of our forces and armed services.

CONCLUSION

Having bitterly failed in all fields, the enemy is now confronted with a deadlock in his "clear-and-hold" strategy. He now has to carry on his aggressive war from a defensive position.

The enemy's defense requires a large number of troops, but the US troops, considered as the principal force, are being withdrawn. Puppet units replacing the withdrawing forces are too weak. The fighting spirit of the Puppet and US troops has declined. The more the US troops are withdrawn from VN, the more difficult the enemy's situation becomes. The enemy is confronted with a deadlock which is like a man moving in the blackness of night. Though we have many difficulties, we are in an advantageous situation which is comparable to a man moving in the light of dawn.

In order to make a clear comparison between the friendly and enemy situations, we have to visualize the enemy and ourselves as two athletes who are running a race in a stadium and are approaching the finish line. One (we) is supported and encouraged by the spectators, and the other (the enemy) does not receive any support. If we make an additional effort in the last moment, we will gain the victory.

In the ((VC)) Military Region ((7)), the enemy has tried to move forward, but he has not been able to avoid failures in all fields.

II. GUIDELINES AND MILITARY MISSIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE.

Considering the military missions outlined in Resolution 9 and the specific situation of the military region, our military missions in the immediate future are to: Resolutely develop our strong points and overcome shortcomings; continually attack the enemy, using three-pronged attacks in the three areas ((highlands, lowlands, and urban areas)) during increasingly violent, simultaneous phases as well as during daily operations in order to destroy and wear down the enemy's manpower and war facilities; strive to expand military forces and contribute efforts to other units throughout SVN in order to develop our strong position and frustrate the enemy's clear-and-hold strategy and accelerated pacification plan; shatter the enemy's hope, "To end the war in a strong position," and frustrate his de-Americanization plan in order to gain a decisive victory in the immediate future; and be ready to expand the role of the armed forces in the ((possibly postwar)) political struggle. At the same time, we should prepare to defeat the enemy in case the war is prolonged.

Specific requirements and missions:

a. Destroy and deplete the enemy's manpower and war facilities.

We should strive to reach or exceed the criteria outlined by higher echelons in every phase of activity. Various D's ((battalions)), province and sub-region forces, and Q4 ((possibly 274th Main Force Regiment, ((VC)) Military Region 7)) must insure the complete destruction of one enemy company, of either the US forces, satellite troops, or Puppet main force (F18 ((18th ARVN Infantry Division)). This should become a common practice. Q4 should insure the complete destruction of one enemy battalion. The activities of Q4 should be aimed at the 199th US Light Infantry Brigade and sometimes at satellite forces and Puppet units which support the accelerated pacification teams. The destruction of the US forces will highlight significant points in both the military and political fields which will create favorable conditions for the American antiwar movement to grow rapidly. At present, ((the antiwar)) movement is growing among the US troops.

Province and district units and guerrilla forces must develop their capability to destroy enemy forces which support or directly carry out the accelerated pacification program, or which oppress the people in their local areas.

There are many important enemy depots and military bases located in the military region. They have been attacked by friendly forces and have suffered some losses, but they have continued to function. In fact, they have not been attacked recently and have not suffered any considerable losses. Therefore, it is necessary to train friendly troops, particularly sapper forces, in order to attack them constantly. The attacks should be coordinated with artillery activities and sabotage actions by the people (by workers).

In the military region, there are training centers of the Puppet main forces and reactionary organizations (pacification and public security personnel and Special Forces troops). It is necessary to provide additional training to units in charge of attacking these facilities. The units should also coordinate with the people in the anti-conscription struggle. We must strongly attack and cause heavy losses to the two main strategic forces of the enemy, which are the US and Puppet forces, in order to prevent them from implementing the "clear-and-hold" strategy and to frustrate their plan for ending the war in a strong position.

b. Frustrate the enemy's accelerated pacification program.

The accelerated pacification program is the backbone of the de-Americanization plan and a main factor in the "clear-and-hold" strategy. Consequently, the enemy is making great efforts and utilizing ruthless measures to implement it at all costs. He wishes to rebuild **everything** that we destroy. For the above reason, the main and immediate missions of the military region are to frustrate the accelerated pacification program. We can maintain and expand our control in the densely populated areas, weak areas, and the areas along the strategic communication lines only if we succeed in disrupting this program of the enemy. If we succeed in this task, we will easily settle other difficult problems and insure the supply of materiel for our troops. In the immediate future, we have to carry out sustained attacks against the enemy and at the same time, prepare for the future ((postwar)) political struggles. (The guideline for this matter will be issued latter).

c. Intensify continuous attacks and constantly encircle enemy towns, district seats, military bases, and depots. These military activities should be coordinated with political struggles to create disturbances in the enemy's rear during each phase. Break the enemy's oppressive control of the population at low ((hamlet and village)) level and gain control of the population so as to move the ((revolutionary)) movement forward. When we succeed in these activities the enemy's large forces will become bogged down. In addition, we should step up activities (by secret guerrillas) in the local areas and occasionally employ the local forces ((sapper and action teams)) in coordination with outside ((reinforcement)) forces to conduct large-scale attacks in order to support the revolutionary movement, recruit new personnel, and develop the guerrilla warfare movement.

d. Conduct constant military attacks along communication lines, especially strategic routes and waterways (Lông Tàu ((possibly River)), Đông Nai River, Highway No. 1, Route 15, and the ((Saigon-Biên Hòa)) Highway). Cut off and/or gain control of parts of these routes for a period of time, and later gain control of the entire communication network (including provincial and inter-provincial routes) for a long period of time in order to isolate the cities as well as enemy posts from other areas.

Due to the withdrawal of the US forces from Vietnam, the enemy will suffer a shortage of aircraft needed to transport ammunition and food to

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his various posts; he will have to use vehicles to supply his forces. For this reason, the destruction of communication lines will be of important significance. The destruction of them will help us isolate the enemy posts, cause confusion to enemy soldiers, and finally wipe out each enemy post, one after the other. This will also prevent the enemy from dividing up the battlefield into different areas. ((The responsibility for road destruction is as follows:))

Sub-Region 4: Lông Tàu and Đông Nai River, the ((Saigon-Biên Hòa)) Highway, National Route No. 15, and ~~Provincial Routes No. 17, 19, 31, and 33.~~

Bà Rịa ((Province)): Routes No. 2, 44, and 52, Highway 1, and Inter-Provincial Route No. 23.

Thị Biên ((Biên Hòa City Unit)): Highway 1, the railroad, and Provincial Route No. 24.

e. While performing combat activities, we should develop the three types of forces and expand the guerrilla warfare movement throughout the three areas.

This is an urgent requirement which will facilitate the accomplishment of the immediate mission and make friendly forces stronger than the Puppet Army after the withdrawal of the US troops. The military region, provinces, and sub-regions must have capabilities to carry out decisive attacks on the enemy. The districts should have strong units, and villages should have a large-size militia, guerrillas, and secret guard and guerrilla forces (particularly in deep areas, towns, and district seats). The present number of local force troops does not yet fulfill the requirement. Therefore, we should make plans for recruiting youths to reinforce our forces. We should also assign each type of force or armed service unit to appropriate tasks so as to fully utilize each one's capability. We should divide the military region's battlefield into many parts and assign each unit to take charge of several strategic targets (such as harbors, depots, and the enemy's bases) in the deep areas. Our present tactical guideline is "use a small force to destroy a large enemy force." For this reason, we must strive to train the infantry, artillery, and engineer forces and especially sapper units. The military region, sub-regions, and provinces must have well-trained sapper forces, and guerrilla and infantry units which are capable of launching sapper and special action attacks. (The details concerning guerrilla warfare will be issued later).

f. We must enlarge the liberated areas, build strong military bases for the region, sub-region, and province, and hold the battlefield in order to perform the assigned missions. Districts and villages under unified

leadership should build their own bases and have good plans for protecting the bases and depots. Competent personnel should be assigned to various areas to lead local forces in countering enemy sweep operations and Special Force activities. They must try to hold the land in order to perform their tasks.

The guerrilla force belonging to the ((political)) agencies of the districts, provinces, and the military region must be consolidated. Their capability of attacking the enemy with assorted types of mines should be improved. They should pay attention to the modification of captured enemy weapons, so that they will have enough weapons to counter both enemy infantry and armored forces in their local areas.

In addition, we must guide the people in increasing farm production. Members of our agencies and units must also engage in farm production in the base areas in order to resolve the food problem.

Sub-Region 4 should coordinate with the units of T ((VC **Military** Region 7)) to build firm bases in the area east of Route 15 so as to strengthen our position in this area.

In Ba Ria, main bases should be established in the area stretching from the eastern side of Route 2 to the bank of the Ray River, and alternate bases should be built in the areas east of the Ray River and south of Route 4.

In the area east of the Ray River, ((bases)) should be established in the area west of Route 3 and north of Route 1.

In Thi Bien, ((bases)) should be established in the areas north of Route 1 and south of the ~~D~~ong Nai River.

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III. MATTERS REQUIRING SPECIAL LEADERSHIP

1. To accomplish the vital missions and requirements, we must constantly make the Party Headquarters and armed forces thoroughly understand the following:

a. The spirit of attacking the enemy continually and resolutely during the General Offensive and Uprising phases. The attacks conducted in the subsequent phases must be stronger than those in the previous one; the victories gained in the subsequent phase must be greater than those in the previous one.

b. The spirit of completely destroying enemy forces.

c. The spirit of using a small friendly force to destroy a large enemy force.

Use indoctrination sessions to make subordinate personnel understand the situation and missions and correctly evaluate the enemy and friendly situations. They should understand that we have gradually gained victories and the enemy has suffered repeated setbacks. If we succeed in making our personnel understand these points, we can overcome passive rightism and fears of hardship and difficulties, and strengthen the above spirits.

Our combat guidelines are to conduct small and medium-scale attacks against the enemy's forces. We will conduct large-scale ones if we are in an advantageous situation and fully prepared for them. Attacks should be launched continuously on the right targets, and must cause extensive losses to the enemy. Especially in the climaxing phases, we must conduct many attacks. The three types of troops should coordinate with political and troop proselyting forces to conduct activities throughout the three areas ((highland, lowland, and urban areas)) so as to force the enemy to disperse his forces.

The enemy had changed his tactics in the battlefields of the military region. He now relies on his superiority of troop strength and transportation facilities. He is dispersing his forces throughout the three areas (many forces are located in the intermediate area). These forces with the fire support ((of aircraft, watercraft, and armored vehicles...)) are carrying out the accelerated pacification program and conducting attacks against the corridor areas through which we transport supplies for our forces. These activities are aimed at creating difficulties for our deployment and materiel supply, disrupting our attack preparations, and driving our forces out of the intermediate areas. In order to cope with the present situation, we should change our tactics with the aim of increasing the capabilities of the three types of forces and other forces in order for them to be able to completely destroy each small enemy unit (company and platoon). We should increase attacks in order to interrupt the enemy's activities and wear down his strength and create a strong position on the battlefields. In the climaxing phases, reinforced battalions as well as under-strength regiments (of regional, provincial, and sub-region forces) should conduct decisive attacks on the enemy. After that, they must disperse into small elements, such as platoons and companies, and coordinate with district units and village guerrilla units.

2. Concentrate efforts on resolving rear service problems.

We are meeting with many difficulties in food and weapons supply. These difficulties will be prolonged if we do not make the entire Party and people thoroughly understand the immediate requirement, "everything for the front line and for defeating the US aggressors," and the Party's concept of self-support in the rear service field. The people must be motivated to increase farm production in their local areas. Furthermore, rear service cadre of various levels, Party chapters, and local organizations should motivate the people to increase production and penetrate strategic hamlets in order to carry out armed propaganda tasks, attacks on pacification personnel, and requisition and purchase of food. In addition, ((political)) agencies and troop units should also participate in farm production, particularly by exploiting all edible plant roots in the forests, so as to settle the individual food problem as well as to insure reserves of food. It is necessary to remember that our policy is to fight for a long time and rely only on our capabilities.

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Efforts should be concentrated on resolving the problems which arose in the transportation of ammunition issued by higher echelons. However, attention should also be paid to the collection of enemy weapons and ammunition for our use. At the same time, provide additional indoctrination for cadre and soldiers on being aware of economy measures in the handling of properties, weapons, ammunition, and foods provisions. Use a small number

of weapons to kill a large number of enemy troops and use weapons in compliance with their effects (for example, B-40 and B-41 antitank grenade launchers are used only for destroying armored vehicles and not for attacking enemy troops).

Tighten the control and administration of equipment and supplies at all levels. Expeditiously consider awards for all units and individuals who successfully carried out the administration of material, and severely criticize or take appropriate actions against individuals who are responsible for losses due to carelessness.

Along with this, the treatment of wounded and sick soldiers must be properly implemented. Convalescence camps should be established by the military region, provinces, and sub-regions.

3. Strengthen military agencies at all levels and make them light and compact in order to increase the number of combat personnel ((sic)). At the same time, improve working procedures and the manner of providing leadership, assure that the situation is fully understood, and expeditiously submit reports for expeditious action. Revise the functions and leadership of commanders of all echelons and revamp the leadership machinery from region to district and village levels. Reassign responsibilities to military affairs Party Committees at all levels.

4. Strengthen leadership in Party and political activities among the three types of troops ((main, local, and guerrilla forces)). In reality, the war has become more violent, hard, and difficult day after day, thus affecting the morale of our cadre and combatants. Hence, we must increase Party and political activities among the three types of troops, especially the local forces and guerrilla militia forces, in order to:

a. Strengthen their fighting determination, enhance their revolutionary enthusiasm, and promote their combat will, so that they will fight persistently to attain the combat goals of our Revolution Resolutions 9 and 5, the five oaths of the Central Headquarters, and the Testament of Uncle ((Ho Chi Minh)) which may be used as training materials.

b. Improve the fundamental characteristics of the people's revolutionary armed forces which are to be loyal to the Party and the people, defeat any enemy, and overcome any difficulty. Always be a sharp tool of the Party by understanding the Party's policy and the situation, clearly seeing the enemy's failures and our victory, and using the Four-Good-Quality Party Chapter program as a means to improve Party ((members)) and the Party organization in the three types of forces, and to promote the ((working)) class concept and the vanguard spirit of cadre and Party members. Strengthen the political leadership machinery in local forces and guerrilla units, including those belonging to ((political)) agencies.

The military missions of ((VC)) Military Region ((7)) in the immediate future are very important. To successfully accomplish these missions, members in the Party Headquarters must strengthen their leadership in armed struggles ((military matters)) in order to develop the armed forces. As a minimum, they must thoroughly understand the policy, guidelines, and missions of the General Offensive and Uprising phases.

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