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No. 16/CT-K
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Lái Thiêu [District]
and Comrade Nam Thuan

9/70

D I R E C T I V E

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ON CONDUCTING ATTACKS
DURING THE RAINY SEASON AND ON CONCURRENT
INTENSIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMING
DRY SEASON [CAMPAIGN]

I. THE ENEMY'S SPECIAL PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES
AND OUR ACTIVITIES DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS
(JULY AND AUGUST 1970)

Recently, the enemy initiated a special pacification program. In our rear and base areas, U.S. forces supported by armored vehicles, aircraft, and artillery launched sweep operations to destroy and block our forces. These activities have caused us temporary difficulties in regard to living conditions and movement. Nevertheless, in comparison with [activities] in Sept. 69 and the last dry season, these activities have decreased in scale and intensity. We have suffered fewer losses and had less difficulty. In populated intermediary areas and areas bordering cities, the enemy did not conduct intensive operations as he previously did. Instead, he resorted to more wicked schemes and actions in implementing his special pacification program to destroy our base level organizations. The enemy primarily used Regional and Popular forces. However, despite his actions, our organizations remain intact and are developing. The movement has expanded in some places (as in the hamlets of the villages in Thủ Đức, Phú Giáo, and Tân Uyên [Districts]). In some areas, the enemy succeeded in consolidating his oppressive administrative machinery, upgrading his troops, developing his People's Self-Defense Force

(PSDF), and forcing them to operate. Yet, in other areas his repressive control has weakened, a number of PSDF units have been disorganized, and his village and hamlet officials have become more reluctant to perform their duties. Generally speaking, enemy activities have decreased.

During the past two months of his pacification program, the enemy resorted to more wicked schemes and actions. He intensified his control over a number of villages (south of TU [possibly Tân Uyên]). In spite of that, our movement continued to develop in some areas. However, on the whole, we failed to meet the requirements of the movement and our [superiors] for the Rainy Season [Campaign], especially when considering our advantages.

Achievements in countering the pacification program and in strengthening [weak] areas were below standard.

Our forces developed slowly.

The number of enemy killed in action was small.

Financial contributions were inadequate.

REASONS

We did not thoroughly understand the situation and failed to comprehend the significance of the Rainy Season [Campaign]. As a result, we lacked a high determination. We were reluctant to attack the enemy and to improve ourselves.

The required planning for each area was not specifically suitable for local situations. We did not grasp the key tasks, and failed to work together. In addition, we did not properly utilize our forces.

Our forces have been poor in quality and quantity. For example, they could not establish close relations with the people. Overt forces failed to stay close to the people, and covert forces were incapable of controlling the people by means of organizing or leading them to stage struggles in local areas.

Organization and leadership were not effective. We assigned tasks [to personnel], but neglected to give instructions and to set specific deadlines for the assignments. We also did not inspect work, improve quality, or learn from experiences.

II. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS

On the whole, we must continue to execute Directive 14/CT-K. According to this supplementary directive, we must conduct diplomatic offensives and make intensive preparations for the coming Dry Season [Campaign] in addition to attacking the enemy, countering his pacification plan, building up our strength, and strengthening our [weak] areas. All echelons are required to clearly understand the strategic significance of the Rainy Season [Campaign] in order to make achievements possible, thus creating favorable conditions for achieving greater victories in the coming Dry Season [Campaign].

To successfully accomplish these tasks, we should:

1. Intensify the ideological and political task to fully realize the strategic significance of the Rainy Season [Campaign]. In reviewing the enemy's recent special pacification activities and our spoiling actions (particularly in local areas), we must point out the malicious schemes, tricks, and capabilities of the enemy and the results of our movement in order to strengthen confidence in our ability to conduct destructive attacks, and heighten our determination in order to fulfill the requirements prescribed for the rainy season. We must display determination by performing tasks and combat operations and developing our forces. We must remain in the area of operations and maintain close contact with the people. We must get rid of escapism, rightism, and the tendency to balk at hardships. At the same time we must prevent ourselves from losing vigilance.

Indoctrination on this directive must be included in the agenda of monthly conferences. In these conferences, we must not only review resolutions and plans, but must also discuss this directive. This is aimed at following up the ideological evolution of each echelon, Party member, and cadre to correct erroneous thoughts.

2. Check and revise village activity plans by emphasizing the following points:

Frustrate the enemy's pacification plan by conducting three-pronged attacks [military, political, and military proselyting].

Consolidate and develop our forces (consolidate the existing personnel and recruit new personnel).

Collect financial contributions.

Cling to one's area of responsibility and maintain contact with the people (including overt and covert agents).

Proper attention must be paid to discussions of measures [for implementing the above plans] with clearly fixed requirements and time limits. The content and requirements of the plans must be based on the enemy and friendly situations, but essentially on our own capabilities. (Friendly forces consist of overt and covert units and the cadres and forces assigned by higher echelons to the local areas. In addition, we should know the quality of these forces).

During this period each district must maintain surveillance of at least two villages and assist in implementing their plans.

3. Consolidation and development of forces:

Emphasis should be placed on forming new "Four-Good" Party Chapters (both overt and covert) in compliance with the Resolution (concerning political tasks in local areas). Strong efforts must be made to counter enemy pacification activities; build and develop friendly forces; and maintain close coordination with the people (staying close to the people and directing them in their fight against the enemy). Every month, conduct a preliminary review of the activities of each Party member and Party chapter (both overt and covert).

Pay attention to the development of special action forces. Each village is to activate one special action cell (if overt personnel are not available, use covert ones). Each district must activate one special action platoon selected from the personnel sent by Sub-Region and the district's own personnel. Thủ Đức and Phú Giáo

must activate one squad, and Di An and Lai Thieu, half a squad. This is the resolution of the Party Committee which all subordinate Party echelons must execute in a satisfactory manner.

Directly lead the people to fight the enemy. Organize secret Party members into Party Chapters and train them to have a good sense of responsibility and effective methods of operation. They should become qualified to operate effectively under any circumstances, and be able to perform the following missions: Attacks on enemy pacification teams; development of friendly forces; motivating fund contributions, etc. In short, they should be able to motivate and lead the people to counter enemy pacification activities; keep watch on the enemy's movements and attack him or use guerrillas to attack him; proselyte [puppet] servicemen's dependents; persuade [puppet] soldiers to set up base-organizations, make propaganda for and develop the Party, etc. Therefore, covert Party Chapters must clearly understand their responsibility and role inside [enemy-controlled areas], and strive to maintain contact with [friendly forces] outside [enemy-controlled areas] to help and lead them to penetrate and operate in these areas. In addition, overt forces must activate an element which maintains close contact with the people, so that it knows how to guide the latter and coordinate with covert forces to fight the enemy under any circumstance. To fulfill this task, it is necessary to intensify ideological indoctrination, draft specific plans, and undertake appropriate measures.

Develop mass organizations.

In addition, we should strive to develop the people's liberation organizations in areas from the intermediate line to city fringe areas, in province capitals, and in district seats. Particular attention should be paid to the utilization and development of legal and semi-legal organizations to operate in a manner consistent with the people's aspirations and their daily activities.

In "white areas," we should be determined to activate action teams to build up base-level organizations. (These organizations are required to perform missions throughout the rainy season).

In areas where our movement is difficult, missions should be assigned to personnel for a three-month period. They should not be frequently recalled to their units.

However, contact with them should be constantly maintained. They must regularly submit reports to and request instructions from Party Committees in order to benefit from the latter's timely guidance.

Before going on missions, cadre of the action teams should be carefully trained on their basic tasks. They should have specific plans for successful operations.

4. Political struggle and military proselyting

a. As a result of the enemy's Vietnamization plan and his atrocious terrorism, oppression, bribery, and deceitful actions, a deep contradiction has developed between the people and the enemy particularly concerning the people's pressing rights to make a living. Especially, in recent days, the people have broken out of relocation sites to engage in farm production [in defiance of the enemy]. A struggle has been conducted by a number of troops to protest the upgrading and sending of troops to the Cambodian battlefield, etc. This is a new factor which has created favorable conditions to allow us to win over the people. Therefore, we should strongly concentrate and guide them to struggle in order to intensify our political and military proselyting activities. This is an essential task which must be urgently carried out in this critical situation to frustrate the enemy's schemes, strengthen our forces, and develop the revolutionary movement. We must fully understand the present significance and effects of the political and military proselyting fronts, heighten our determination, and adopt specific measures to enable the movement to meet the new requirements. This will necessitate that positive efforts be made to fully understand the following main points:

Be realistic in providing guidance for the movement. Rely on the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy in each area, village, and hamlet and the pressing problems of the people to determine the requirements, slogans, and method of rallying the people for each struggle.

Make maximum use of the legal status of the people, and above all exploit the contradictions and weaknesses displayed by the enemy in the execution of his Vietnamization scheme to promote our movement.

Coordinate political struggle with military proselyting activities more closely than before. In pacified areas and areas under enemy temporary control, the number of people conscripted by the enemy is relatively high. In some areas, it was 70% or 80% [of the entire male population in the draftable age group]. Faced with this situation, it is necessary to focus all our attention on military proselyting tasks.

To struggle we must have forces. Therefore, from now on, one of the main criteria in assessing the results of our struggles is to assess the improvement and development of our forces during struggles and the leadership of these struggles. In any struggle, we must always strive to fulfill the requirements of attacking the enemy and strengthening our forces.

b. Presently, we must coordinate the political, military proselyting and military movements with the diplomatic offensive phase to isolate the U.S. and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique even more and to rally those who advocate peace, independence, and neutrality in accordance with the realistic situation (especially in cities and towns) where the situation has increasingly turned in our favor. We must create favorable conditions to intensify the political and military proselyting movements and support the struggle movement of the U.S. people.

The essential content of this struggle is based on the declaration of our delegation at the Paris Conference (to be broadcast by Liberation Radio).

In order to timely implement this new diplomatic offensive, all recipients, upon receipt of the contents of the declaration, should promptly ensure that all cadre, Party members, members of the armed forces, and the people clearly understand the contents and significance of this diplomatic offensive phase.

Work out plans, print documents and leaflets and use loudspeakers to widely disseminate the contents of our new solution in cities, towns, and enemy posts. This is intended to create a seething popular movement in which even enemy soldiers, officers, and officials would take a stand supporting our argumentative struggle against the U.S. and Thiêu-Kỳ-Khiêm (specific directions will be given later).

5. Motivation of the people to increase [farm] production and financial collection:

a. [Farm] production:

In addition to motivating the people to increase [farm] production (as instructed in the former plan), local areas, units, and agencies must have a plan for self-sufficiency production for the next season, and should hold a meeting to make a preliminary review of production for self-sufficiency (as required by the previous resolution).

b. Financial collection: Assess good points and shortcomings. Weaknesses should be corrected to insure increased financial collections.

In addition, our armed forces should be mobilized in financial collection motivating phases to settle difficulties in local areas.

6. Leadership for implementation:

a. Concentrated guidance for villages:

Presently, the enemy is focusing all efforts on competing with us for control of the people in villages. On our side, cadre, including sub-region personnel, have been assigned to exercise direct guidance and leadership in the villages. However, in some villages the guidance provided by cadre continued to be inefficient due to their low ability and poor ideology. Therefore, cadre of various branches from the sub-region to district levels assigned to the villages must know their responsibilities, which are to assist the villages while at the same time carrying out their practical missions for which they answer to the village and higher authorities. Their task consists of correcting erroneous thoughts [of cadre in villages], helping villages to draft [activity] plans, and supervising the implementation of plans.

In villages where cadre are unavailable, these villages must recruit cadre and guerrillas; develop mass organizations, etc.

Cadre and forces sent by higher echelons to districts will be employed according to the mission requirements of districts. Specialized cadre of branches, beside working for the common tasks, must improve their specialized skills in order to serve the branches to which they belong.

Before assignment to villages, the action teams must be improved. If they fail to perform their duty, they must be recalled to submit reports and receive further training. Regarding the local action teams, we must continue to improve them for the fulfillment of missions.

From now on, districts must submit monthly reports on action teams assigned to villages, its subordinate forces, and results of guidance and assistance provided to villages.

7. Preparations for the dry season:

The success of missions implemented in the rainy season will create favorable conditions for [activities in] the coming dry season. Therefore, we must accomplish missions assigned during the rainy season to prepare for the dry season.

Improvement of ideology: Conduct political reorientation courses for Party members and make the masses understand the immediate political mission and the importance of the coming Dry Season [Campaign] (a directive concerning political reorientation has already been issued).

Both covert and overt forces must remain in their areas of operations, stay close to the people, maintain favorable relationships with the masses, and insure the successful performance of missions in accordance with operational guidelines. They should make combat preparations and ensure that there are sufficient materiel and adequate financial collections.

Besides the political and military training conducted for the recruits, we must improve mess facilities to improve their health so as to increase the effectiveness of our activities in the coming dry season.

Methods of operation:

Districts must coordinate with villages to hold meetings every month to conduct preliminary reviews of experiences acquired, and to study directives concerning the plan of activity for the coming season.

Branches must review [their activities] and rely on this directive to improve their leadership to appropriately direct the activities of lower echelons.

(Notice: Districts and branches within the Sub-Region must submit preliminary reports to A15 [possibly Standing Committee, Sub-Region 5, COSVN] prior to 30 October 1970).

16 Sept. 70
For the Standing Committee
of Sub-Region

/S/ Nguyễn Văn Trục