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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT		

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report contains information obtained from enemy documents captured on 9 October 1970 and concerns Directives 16/CT-K and 17/CT-K, dated 16 and 18 September 1970, which were originated by the Current Affairs Committee, Sub-Region ((5)). The first directive first assesses friendly and enemy activities during the past two months ((July and August 1970)) and then outlines indoctrination and proselyting activities to be conducted in preparation for the coming ((1971)) Dry Season ((Campaign)). The second directive pertains to the new diplomatic phase with emphasis on publicity through radio broadcasts, newspapers, magazines, and leaflets.

This document (less item #1), less capture data, all references to the Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) to include personnel, comments, and Log Numbers; US remarks indicated by double parentheses, I.E. (()); and deciphering of code words, cover designations, and enemy units, was declassified on 28 Oct 20 by [Signature] Dir, US Elm, CDEC, this declassification does not constitute authority to release information contained therein outside of US military channels.

(C) CDEC COMMENT: These documents were captured on 9 October 1970 in South Vietnam (XP204438; RVN MR 3) by [Signature] Cav, 1/1st US Cav Div (AM). The documents were received at CDEC on 14 October 1970, and were summarized in Bulletin Number 39,335, dated 16 October 1970, under CDEC Document Log Number 10-1681-70. Translation was requested by JUSPAO, Vietnam.

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No. 16/CT - K

((To)) Lái Thiêu ((District))
and Comrade Năm Thuận

D I R E C T I V E

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ON CONDUCTING ATTACKS DURING
THE RAINY SEASON ((POSSIBLY OF 1970)) AND ON CONCURRENT
INTENSIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMING ((1971)) DRY SEASON
((CAMPAIGN))

I. THE ENEMY'S SPECIAL PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND OUR ((VC/NVA)) ACTIVITIES
DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS (JUL AND AUG 70).

Recently, the enemy initiated a special pacification program. In our rear and base areas, US forces supported by armored vehicles, aircraft, and artillery launched sweep operations to destroy and check ((the VC/NVA)). These activities have caused temporary difficulties in regard to living conditions and movement. Nevertheless, in comparison with ((FWMAF/RVNAF activities)) in Sep 69 and the last dry season, these activities have decreased in scale and intensity. We have suffered fewer losses and had less difficulty. In populated intermediary areas and areas bordering cities, the enemy did not conduct intensive operations as he previously did. Instead, he resorted to more cunning schemes and actions by implementing his special pacification program to destroy our agencies. The enemy **primarily used** Regional and Popular Forces. However, despite his actions, our agencies remain intact and are developing. The ((VC)) movement has increased in some places (as in the hamlets of the villages in Thủ Đức, Phú Giao, and Tân Uyên ((Districts))). In some areas, the enemy succeeded in consolidating his oppressive administrative machinery, upgrading his troops, developing his People's Self-Defense Force ((PSDF)), and forcing them to operate. Yet, in other areas his repressive control has weakened, a number of PSDF units have been disorganized, and his village and hamlet officials have become more reluctant to perform their duties. Generally speaking, enemy activities have decreased.

During the past two months of his pacification program, the enemy utilized more cunning schemes and actions. He intensified his control over a number of villages (south of TU ((possibly Tân Uyên))). In spite of that, our movement continued to develop in some areas. However, on the whole, we failed to meet the requirements of the movement and our ((superiors)) for the Rainy Season ((Campaign)), especially when considering our advantages.

Achievements in countering the ((GVN)) pacification program and in strengthening ((weak)) areas were below standard.

Our forces developed slowly.

The number of enemy killed in action was small.

Financial contributions were inadequate.

REASONS.

We were **uninformed** about the situation and failed to comprehend the significance of the Rainy Season ((Campaign)). As a result, we lacked a high determination. We were reluctant to attack the enemy and to improve ourselves.

The requirements and plans for each area were not specific or suitable for ((local situations)). We did not grasp the key tasks, and failed to work together. In addition, we did not properly utilize our forces.

Our forces have been poor in quality and quantity. For example, they could not establish close relations with the people. Overt forces failed to stay close to the people, and covert forces were incapable of controlling the people through local organizations or of leading them to stage struggles in local areas.

Organization and leadership were not effective. We assigned tasks ((to personnel)), but either neglected to give instructions or made improper assignments. We did not set specific suspense dates. We also did not inspect work, improve quality, or learn from experience.

II. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS.

On the whole, we must continue to execute Directive 14/CT-K. According to this new directive, we must conduct diplomatic offensives and make intensive preparations for the coming Dry Season ((Campaign)) in addition to attacking the enemy, countering his pacification plan, building up our strength, and strengthening our ((weak)) areas. All echelons are required to clearly understand the strategic significance of the Rainy Season ((Campaign)) in order to make achievements possible, thus creating favorable conditions for achieving greater victories in the coming Dry Season ((Campaign)).

((Page 2 of Item 1 of O.T.))

To successfully accomplish these tasks, we should:

1. Intensify the ideological and political task to make ((cadre and Party members)) fully aware of the strategic significance of the Rainy Season ((Campaign)). In reviewing the enemy's recent special pacification activities and our destructive attacks (particularly in local areas), we must point out the malicious schemes, tricks, and capabilities of the enemy and the results of our movement in order to strengthen confidence in our ability to conduct destructive attacks to heighten their determination. To fulfill the requirements prescribed for the rainy season, we should make them display their determination by performing tasks and combat operations and developing our forces. They must remain in their area of operations ((in RVN areas)) and maintain close contact with the people. They should get rid of escapism, rightism, and the tendency to balk at hardships. At the same time we must prevent them from losing vigilance.

Indoctrination on this directive must be included in the agenda of monthly conferences. In these conferences, we must not only review activity resolutions and plans, but must also discuss this directive. This is aimed at following up the ideological evolution of each echelon, Party member, and cadre to correct erroneous thoughts.

2. Check and revise village activity plans by emphasizing the following points:

Frustrate the enemy's pacification plan by conducting three-pronged attacks ((military, political, and military proselut...))

Document No. 4

((Page 1 of Item 1 of O.T.))

No. 16/CT - K

*[Handwritten note at margin]*Lai Thiêu (District)
and Comrade Năm ThuậnD I R E C T I V E

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS ON CONDUCTING ATTACKS DURING
THE RAINY SEASON (~~POSSIBLY OF 1970~~) AND ON CONCURRENT
INTENSIVE PREPARATIONS FOR THE COMING (~~1971~~) DRY SEASON
CAMPAIGN

I. THE ENEMY'S SPECIAL PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES AND OUR (~~VC/NVA~~) ACTIVITIES
DURING THE PAST TWO MONTHS (JUL AND AUG 70).

Recently, the enemy initiated a special pacification program. In our rear and base areas, US forces supported by armored vehicles, aircraft, and artillery launched sweep operations to destroy and ~~back~~ ^{block our forces} (~~the VC/NVA~~). These activities have caused temporary difficulties in regard to living conditions and movement. Nevertheless, in comparison with ~~the enemy's~~ ^{the enemy's} activities in Sep 69 and the last dry season, these activities have decreased in scale and intensity. We have suffered fewer losses and had less difficulty. In populated intermediary areas and areas bordering cities, the enemy did not conduct intensive operations as he previously did. Instead, he resorted to more ~~cunning~~ ^{wicked} schemes and actions in implementing his special pacification program to destroy our ~~agencies~~ ^{agencies}. The enemy ~~primarily used~~ ^{primarily used} Regional and Popular Forces. However, despite his actions, our ~~agencies~~ ^{agencies} remain intact and are developing. The ~~VC/NVA~~ ^{VC/NVA} movement has ~~increased~~ ^{expanded} in some places (as in the hamlets of the villages in Thủ Đức, Phú Giao, and Tân Uyên (Districts)). In some areas, the enemy succeeded in consolidating his oppressive administrative machinery, upgrading his troops, developing his People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF), and forcing them to operate. Yet, in other areas his repressive control has weakened, a number of PSDF units have been disorganized, and his village and hamlet officials have become more reluctant to perform their duties. Generally speaking, enemy activities have decreased.

During the past two months of his pacification program, the enemy ~~utilized~~ ^{utilized} more ~~cunning~~ ^{wicked} schemes and actions. He intensified his control over a number of villages (south of TU (possibly Tân Uyên)). In spite of that, our movement continued to develop in some areas. However, on the whole, we failed to meet the requirements of the movement and our ~~superiors~~ ^{superiors} for the Rainy Season Campaign, especially when considering our advantages.

Achievements in countering the (~~GVN~~) pacification program and in strengthening weak areas were below standard.

Our forces developed slowly.

The number of enemy killed in action was small.

Financial contributions were inadequate.

REASONS.

We ~~were not informed about~~ ^{did not thoroughly understand} the situation and failed to comprehend the

The requirements ^{d plans} and ~~plans~~ for each area ^{was} were not specific ^{or} suitable for local situations. We did not grasp the key tasks, and failed to work together. In addition, we did not properly utilize our forces.

Our forces have been poor in quality and quantity. For example, they could not establish close relations with the people. Overt forces failed to stay close to the people, and covert forces were incapable of controlling the people ~~through~~ ^{by means of} ~~organizational~~ or ~~of~~ leading them to stage struggles in local areas.

Organization and leadership were not effective. We assigned tasks ~~(to personnel)~~, but ~~either~~ neglected to give instructions ~~and~~ ~~made improper~~ assignments. ~~We did not set specific suspense dates.~~ We also did not inspect work, improve quality, or learn from experience.

II. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS.

On the whole, we must continue to execute Directive 14/CT-K. According to this ^{new} ~~new~~ directive, we must conduct diplomatic offensives and make intensive preparations for the coming Dry Season ~~((Campaign))~~ in addition to attacking the enemy, countering his pacification plan, building up our strength, and strengthening our ~~((weak))~~ areas. All echelons are required to clearly understand the strategic significance of the Rainy Season ~~((Campaign))~~ in order to make achievements possible, thus creating favorable conditions for achieving greater victories in the coming Dry Season ~~((Campaign))~~.

~~((Page 2 of Item 1 of O.T.))~~

To successfully accomplish these tasks, we should:

1. Intensify the ideological and political task to make ~~((cadre and Party members))~~ fully ^{realize} ~~aware~~ of the strategic significance of the Rainy Season ~~((Campaign))~~. ^{creating actions} In reviewing the enemy's recent special pacification activities and our ~~destructive attacks~~ (particularly in local areas), we must point out the malicious schemes, tricks, and capabilities of the enemy and the results of our movement in order to strengthen confidence in our ability to conduct destructive attacks ^{and} ^{our} ^{in order} ^{we must} heighten ~~their~~ determination ^{to} fulfill the requirements prescribed for the rainy season. We should ~~display~~ ^{display} ~~our~~ determination by performing tasks and combat operations and developing our forces. ~~We~~ must remain in ~~our~~ ^{the} area of operations ~~((in SWN areas))~~ and maintain close contact with the people. ~~They~~ ^{we} should get rid of escapism, rightism, and the tendency to balk at hardships. At the same time we must prevent ~~them~~ ^{ourselves} from losing vigilance.

Indoctrination on this directive must be included in the agenda of monthly conferences. In these conferences, we must not only review ~~activity~~ resolutions and plans, but must also discuss this directive. This is aimed at following up the ideological evolution of each echelon, Party member, and cadre to correct erroneous thoughts.

2. Check and revise village activity plans by emphasizing the following points:

Frustrate the enemy's pacification plan by conducting three-pronged attacks ~~((military, political, and military proselyting))~~.

specific instructions for the assignments

Consolidate and develop friendly forces (increase the actual personnel strength and recruit new soldiers).

Collect financial contributions. Remain in one's area of responsibility ((in RVN areas)) and maintain contact with the people (including overt and covert agents).

Proper attention must be paid to discussions of measures ((for implementing the above plans)) with clearly fixed requirements and time limits. The content and requirements of the plans must be based on the enemy and friendly situations. (Friendly forces consist of overt and covert units and the cadre and forces assigned by higher echelons to the local areas.) In addition, we should know the quality of these forces.

During this period each district must maintain surveillance of at least two villages and assist in implementing their plans.

3. Consolidation and development of forces:

Emphasis should be placed on forming new Four-Good-Quality Party Chapters (both overt and covert) in compliance with the Resolution (concerning political tasks in local areas). Strong efforts must be made to counter enemy pacification activities; build and develop friendly forces; and maintain close coordination with the people (staying close to the people and directing them in their fight against the enemy). Every month, conduct a preliminary review of the activities of each Party member and Party Chapter (both overt and covert).

Pay attention to the development of sapper forces. Each village is to activate one sapper cell (if overt personnel are not available, use covert ones). Each district must activate one sapper platoon (personnel of this platoon may be selected from the personnel sent by Sub Region ((5)) or reinforcements). Thủ Đức and Phú Giáo must activate one sapper squad, and Di An and Lai Thiêu, half a squad. This is the resolution of the Party Committee which all subordinate Party echelons must execute in a satisfactory manner. Directly lead the people to fight the enemy. Organize secret Party members into Party Chapters and train them to have a good sense of responsibility and effective methods of operation. They should become qualified to operate effectively under any circumstances, and be able to perform the following missions: Attacks on enemy pacification teams; development of friendly forces; motivating fund ((contributions)); etc ... ((sic)). In short, Party Cadre should be able to motivate and lead the people to counter enemy pacification activities; assess the enemy's situation and attack him or conduct guerrilla activities; proselyte ((Puppet)) servicemen's dependents; conduct propaganda in planting agents and recruiting Party members, etc... ((sic)). Therefore, covert Party Chapters must clearly understand their responsibility and role inside ((enemy-controlled areas)), and strive to maintain contact with ((friendly forces)) outside ((enemy-controlled areas)) to help and lead them to penetrate and operate in these areas. In addition, overt forces ((Party Chapters)) must activate an element which maintains close contact with the people, so that it knows how to guide the latter and coordinate with covert forces to fight the enemy under any circumstance. To fulfill this task, it is necessary to intensify ideological indoctrination, draft specific plans, and undertake appropriate measures.

Develop civilian organizations.

In addition, we should strive to develop the people's liberation organizations in areas from the intermediate line ((between the front and the rear)) to fringe areas, in province capitals, and in district seats. Particular attention should be paid to the utilization and development of legal and semi-legal organizations to operate in a manner consistent with the people's aspirations and their daily activities.

In cleared areas, we should be determined to activate action teams to recruit agents. (These organizations are required to perform missions throughout the rainy season.)

In areas where our movement is difficult, missions should be assigned to personnel for a three-month period. They should not be frequently recalled to their units.

However, contact with them should be constantly maintained. They must regularly submit reports to and promptly request instructions from Party Committees.

Before going on missions, cadre of the action teams should be carefully trained on their basic tasks. They should have specific plans for successful operations.

4. Political and military proselyting struggles:

a. As a result of the enemy's Vietnamization plan and his atrocious terrorism, oppression, bribery, and deceitful actions which create great difficulties in the people's living conditions and rights, a deep contradiction between the enemy and the people has developed and is expanding daily. Especially, in recent days, the people have begun farm production again ((in defiance of the enemy)). A struggle has been conducted by a number of troops to protest the upgrading and sending of troops to the Cambodian battlefield, etc... ((sic)). This is a new factor which has created favorable conditions to allow us to win over the people. Therefore, we should strongly concentrate and guide them to struggle in order to intensify our political and military proselyting activities. This is an essential task which must be urgently carried out in this critical situation to frustrate the enemy's schemes, strengthen our forces, and develop the revolutionary movement.

We must fully understand the present significance and effects of the political and military proselyting fronts, heighten our determination, and adopt specific measures to enable the movement to meet the new requirements. This will necessitate that positive efforts be made to fully understand the following main points:

Be realistic in providing guidance for the movement. Rely on the balance of forces between ourselves and the enemy in each area, village, and hamlet and the pressing problems of the people to determine the requirements, slogans, and method of rallying the people for each struggle.

Consolidate and develop ^{our} friendly forces (~~consolidate~~ ^{consolidate} the ~~actual~~ ^{existing} personnel strength and recruit new soldiers).

Collect financial contributions. ^{Personnel} ^{of} ^{cling to} ~~one's~~ ^{one's} area of responsibility (~~in RVN areas~~) and maintain contact with the people (including overt and covert agents).

But essentially on our own capabilities

Proper attention must be paid to discussions of measures ^{for} implementing the above plans with clearly fixed requirements and time limits. The content and requirements of the plans must be based on the enemy and friendly situations. (Friendly forces consist of overt and covert units and the cadres and forces assigned by higher echelons to the local areas. In addition, we should know the quality of these forces.)

During this period each district must maintain surveillance of at least two villages and assist in implementing their plans.

3. Consolidation and development of forces:

Emphasis should be placed on forming new Four-Good ~~Party~~ ^{Party} Chapters (both overt and covert) in compliance with the Resolution (concerning political tasks in local areas). Strong efforts must be made to counter enemy pacification activities; build and develop friendly forces; and maintain close coordination with the people (staying close to the people and directing them in their fight against the enemy). Every month, conduct a preliminary review of the activities of each Party member and Party Chapter (both overt and covert).

Special action

Pay attention to the development of ^{special forces} ~~warrior~~ forces. Each village is to activate one ~~warrior~~ ^{warrior} cell (if overt personnel are not available, use covert ones). Each district must activate one ~~warrior~~ ^{warrior} platoon ~~(personnel of~~ ^{selected from} this platoon ~~may~~ ^{selected from} the personnel sent by Sub Region ~~(45))~~ ⁽⁴⁵⁾⁾ reinforcements). Thu Đức and Phú Giao must activate one ~~warrior~~ ^{warrior} squad, and Di An and Lai Thiệu, half a squad. This is the resolution of the Party Committee which all subordinate Party echelons must execute in a satisfactory manner. Directly lead the people to fight the enemy. Organize secret Party members into Party Chapters and train them to have a good sense of responsibility and effective methods of operation. They should become qualified to operate effectively under any circumstances, and be able to perform the following missions: Attacks on enemy pacification teams; development of friendly forces; motivating fund ~~(contributions)~~; etc. ~~(sic)~~. In short, Party Cadres should be able to motivate and lead the people to counter enemy pacification activities; ^{keep watch on} ~~assess~~ the enemy's situation and attack him or ^{use} ~~conduct~~ guerrilla activities; proselyte ~~(Puppet)~~ ^(Puppet) servicemen's dependents; ~~conduct propaganda~~ ^{to planting agents and recruiting Party members, etc.} ~~(sic)~~. Therefore, covert Party Chapters must clearly understand their responsibility and role inside ~~(Enemy-controlled areas)~~ ^(Enemy-controlled areas), and strive to maintain contact with ~~(Friendly forces)~~ ^(Friendly forces) outside ~~(Enemy-controlled areas)~~ ^(Enemy-controlled areas) to help and lead them to penetrate and operate in these areas. In addition, overt forces ~~(Party Chapters)~~ must activate an element which maintains close contact with the people, so that it knows how to guide the latter and coordinate with covert forces to fight the enemy under any circumstance. To fulfill this task, it is necessary to intensify ideological indoctrination, draft specific plans, and undertake appropriate measures.

attach

the district's own resources (friendly forces)

Make maximum use of the legal ((GVN)) status of the people, and above all exploit the contradictions and weaknesses displayed by the enemy in the execution of his Vietnamization scheme to promote our movement.

Coordinate political struggles with military proselyting activities more closely than before. In pacified and temporarily enemy controlled areas, the number of people conscripted by the enemy is relatively high. In some areas, it was 70% or 80% ((of the entire male population in the draftable age group)). Faced with this situation, it is necessary to focus all our attention on military proselyting tasks.

To struggle we must have forces. Therefore, from now on, one of the main criteria in assessing the results of our struggles is to assess the improvement and development of our forces during struggles and the leadership of these struggles. In any struggle, we must always strive to fulfil the requirements of attacking the enemy and strengthening our forces.

b. Presently, we must coordinate the political, military proselyting and military movements with the diplomatic offensive phase to isolate the US and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique even more and to rally those who advocate peace, independence, and neutrality in accordance with the realistic situation (especially in cities and towns) where the situation has increasingly turned in our favor. We must create favorable conditions to intensify the political and military proselyting movements and support the struggle movement of the US people.

((Page 4 of Item 1 of O.T.))

This struggle stems from the declaration of our delegation at the Paris Conference (to be broadcast by Liberation Radio).

In order to immediately implement this new diplomatic offensive, all recipients, upon receipt of the contents of the declaration, should promptly ensure that all cadre, Party members, members of the armed forces, and the people clearly understand the contents and significance of this diplomatic offensive phase.

Formulate and print **plans and widely disseminate the** contents of our new solution in cities, towns, and enemy posts by disseminating documents and leaflets and using loudspeakers. This is intended to create a vociferous popular movement in which even enemy soldiers, officers, and officials would take a stand supporting our argumentative struggle against the US and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem ((Government)) (specific directions will be given later).

5. Motivation of the people to increase farm production and financial collection:

a. Farm production:

In addition to motivating the people to increase farm production (as instructed in the former resolution and plan), local areas, units, and agencies must have a farm production plan for the next season, and should hold a meeting to make a preliminary review of farm production (as required by the previous resolution).

Financial collection: The situation should be reviewed to isolate strengths and weaknesses. Weaknesses should be corrected to insure increased financial collections.

In addition, our armed forces should be mobilized in financial collection motivating phases to settle difficulties in local areas.

6. Leadership for implementation:

((Page 5 of Item 1 of O.T.))

a. Concentrated guidance for villages:

Presently, the enemy is focusing all efforts on competing with us for control of the people in villages. On our side, cadre ((of various echelons)), including the sub-region, have been assigned to villages to assist and guide them in the performance of their missions. However, in some villages the guidance provided by cadre continued to be inefficient due to their low ability and poor ideology. Therefore, cadre of various branches from the sub-region to district and village levels must know their responsibilities. They must understand that in providing guidance and assistance to villages they also fulfill a realistic mission, and that they must be responsible to both villages and higher echelons. Their task consists of correcting erroneous thoughts ((of cadre in villages)), helping villages to draft ((activity)) plans, and sometimes assuming command to accomplish such missions.

In villages where cadre are unavailable, these villages must recruit cadre and guerrillas; develop Farmers Organizations, etc... ((sic)).

Cadre and troops sent by higher echelons to districts will be employed according to the mission requirements of districts. Specialized cadre of branches must improve their specialized skills and simultaneously ensure the leadership of the branches.

Before assignment to villages, the action teams must be improved. If they fail to perform their duty, they will be recalled to submit reports and receive further training. Regarding the local action teams, we must continue to improve them for the fulfillment of missions.

From now on, districts must submit monthly reports on action teams assigned to villages, its subordinate forces, and results of guidance and assistance provided to villages.

6. ((Sic)) Preparations for the dry season:

The success of missions implemented in the rainy season will create favorable conditions for ((activities in)) the coming dry season. Therefore, we must accomplish missions assigned during the rainy season to prepare for the dry season.

Assign good points and shortcomings.

Financial collection: ~~The situation should be reviewed to isolate strengths and weaknesses.~~ Weaknesses should be corrected to insure increased financial collections.

In addition, our armed forces should be mobilized in financial collection motivating phases to settle difficulties in local areas.

6. Leadership for implementation:

~~((Page 5 of Item 1 of O.T.))~~

assigned to the villages

a. Concentrated guidance for villages:

Presently, the enemy is focusing all efforts on competing with us for control of the people in villages. On our side, cadre ~~(of various echelons)~~, including ~~the~~ ^{relevant} sub-region, have been assigned to villages to assist and guide them in the performance of their missions. However, in some villages the guidance provided by cadre continued to be inefficient due to their low ability and poor ideology. Therefore, cadre of various branches from the sub-region to district, ~~and village levels~~ must know their responsibilities. ~~They must understand that in providing guidance and assistance to villages they also fulfill a realistic mission, and that they must be responsible to both villages and higher echelons.~~ Their task consists of correcting erroneous thoughts ((of cadre in villages)), helping villages to draft [activity] plans, and ~~sometimes assuming command to accomplish such missions.~~ *supervising the implementation of plans.*

In villages where cadre are unavailable, these villages must recruit cadre and guerrillas; develop ~~mass~~ ^{mass} Farmers Organizations, etc.

Cadre and ~~troops~~ ^{forces} sent by higher echelons to districts will be employed according to the mission requirements of districts. Specialized cadre of branches ~~must improve their specialized skills, and simultaneously~~ *improve their leadership of branches.*

beside working for the common tasks, in order to serve the branches to which they belong.

Before assignment to villages, the action teams must be improved. If they fail to perform their duty, they ~~will~~ ^{must} be recalled to submit reports and receive further training. Regarding the local action teams, we must continue to improve them for the fulfillment of missions.

From now on, districts must submit monthly reports on action teams assigned to villages, its subordinate forces, and results of guidance and assistance provided to villages.

6. ~~the~~ Preparations for the dry season:

The success of missions implemented in the rainy season will create favorable conditions for [activities in] the coming dry season. Therefore, we must accomplish missions assigned during the rainy season to prepare for the dry season.

which are to assist the villages while at the same time carrying out their practical missions for which they answer to the villages and higher authorities.

recruit the best cadres in the villages to the villages

Make maximum use of the legal ~~((GVN))~~ status of the people, and above all exploit the contradictions and weaknesses displayed by the enemy in the execution of his Vietnamization scheme to promote our movement.

Coordinate political struggles with military proselyting activities more closely than before. In pacified ^{areas and areas where} ~~and temporary~~ enemy controlled ~~areas~~, the number of people conscripted by the enemy is relatively high. In some areas, it was 70% or 80% [of the entire male population in the draftable age group]. Faced with this situation, it is necessary to focus all our attention on military proselyting tasks.

To struggle we must have forces. Therefore, from now on, one of the main criteria in assessing the results of our struggles is to assess the improvement and development of our forces during struggles and the leadership of these struggles. In any struggle, we must always strive to fulfil the requirements of attacking the enemy and strengthening our forces.

b. Presently, we must coordinate the political, military proselyting and military movements with the diplomatic offensive phase to isolate the US and the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique even more and to rally those who advocate peace, independence, and neutrality in accordance with the realistic situation (especially in cities and towns) where the situation has increasingly turned in our favor. We must create favorable conditions to intensify the political and military proselyting movements and support the struggle movement of the US people.

The essential content of this struggle is based on (Page 4 of Item 1 of O.T.)

~~This struggle stems from~~ the declaration of our delegation at the Paris Conference (to be broadcast by Liberation Radio).

In order to ^{timely} ~~immediately~~ implement this new diplomatic offensive, all recipients, upon receipt of the contents of the declaration, should promptly ensure that all cadre, Party members, members of the armed forces, and the people clearly understand the contents and significance of this diplomatic offensive phase.

~~Formulate and print~~ ^{work out plans, documents and leaflets and use loudspeakers} ~~and~~ widely disseminate the contents of our new solution in cities, towns, and enemy posts, ~~by disseminating documents and leaflets and using loudspeakers~~. This is intended to create a ^{mass} popular movement in which even enemy soldiers, officers, and officials would take a stand supporting our argumentative struggle against the US and ~~the Thieu-Ky-Khiem ((Government))~~ (specific directions will be given later).

5. Motivation of the people to increase [farm] production and financial collection:

a. [Farm] production:

In addition to motivating the people to increase [farm] production (as instructed in the former ~~resolution and plan~~), local areas, units, and agencies must have a ~~farm production~~ plan for the next season, and should hold a meeting to make a preliminary review of ~~farm~~ production (as required by the previous resolution).

Improvement of ideology: Conduct political reorientation courses for Party members and make ~~new Party members~~ ^{the masses} understand the immediate political mission and the importance of the coming Dry Season Campaign (a directive concerning political reorientation has already been issued).

Both covert and overt forces must remain in their areas of operations, stay close to the people, maintain favorable relationships ~~with civilians~~ ^{with the masses}, and insure the successful performance of missions in accordance with operational guidelines. They should make combat preparations and ensure that there is sufficient materiel and adequate financial collections.

Besides the political and military training conducted for the recruits, we must improve mess facilities to improve their health so as to increase the effectiveness of our activities in the coming dry season.

Methods of operation:

Districts must coordinate with villages to hold meetings every month to conduct preliminary reviews of experiences acquired, and to study directives concerning the plan of activity for the coming season.

Branches must review (their activities) and rely on this directive to improve their leadership to appropriately direct the activities of lower echelons.

(Notice: Districts and branches within the Sub-Region must submit preliminary reports ~~(on the results of the implementation of the above tasks)~~ to A15 (possibly Current Affairs Committee, Sub-Region 5, COSVN) prior to 30 Oct 70.) ^{standing}

16 Sep 70

For the ^{standing} ~~Current Affairs~~ Committee
of ~~Sub-Region~~
/S/ Nguyễn Văn Trúc

((Marginal note)) Lai Thieu ((District)) ((End of marginal note))

D I R E C T I V E

ON OUR CONDUCT OF A NEW DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE PHASE

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Although successively defeated in their war of aggression in SVN and additionally bogged down in their attempt to expand the war throughout Indochina, the US imperialists, due to their monumental obstinacy, are intensively carrying out their special pacification plan to implement their Vietnamization plan in an attempt to create a strong position at the Paris ((talks)). They will resort to a new ((propaganda)) theme to deceive public opinion in the world and in the US, where the people are demanding that the US ((Government)) immediately end the war in Vietnam. We will initiate a new diplomatic offensive phase in the immediate future to frustrate the cunning US scheme and their stubborn and deceitful undertakings. This will be done in close coordination with the military and political struggle fronts in SVN, thus creating favorable conditions for changing the balance of forces between the enemy and friendly sides on the battlefields in our favor. At the same time, we will reveal the imperialists' schemes hidden beneath their so-called "desire for peace," in close coordination with the American people's struggle movements prior to the partial election of the US Senate in Nov 70.

The basic point of ((our new diplomatic offensive phase)) is the declaration by our delegation at the Paris Conference (to be broadcast by Liberation Radio) which will be based on the 10-point general ((peace)) solution of the NFLSVN and the fundamental principles of the 1954 Geneva Agreement on Indochina. We will be flexible in our program towards the US, but we will remain unswerving as far as our principle of settling the war in SVN is concerned.

We will demand an end to the US war of aggression in SVN and the total withdrawal of US troops and their satellite troops from SVN; and, in coordination with the struggle movement of the American people, we will attempt to isolate the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique and broadly rally all those who advocate peace, independence, and neutrality in accordance with the ((present)) realistic situation, (especially in towns and cities) where the situation is increasingly turning in our favor.

In order to insure the maximum effect of this new diplomatic offensive phase, we should coordinate it with military, political, and military proselyting activities by launching attacks ((against the enemy)) in all fields and positively supporting the anti-Vietnam War movement in the US.

To achieve the above effect, the following guidance is offered by the Sub-Region ((5)) Party Committee:

1. Ideology:

It is necessary to make all Party members, cadre, soldiers, and people thoroughly understand the significance and purpose of our new diplomatic offensive phase which is to create ((favorable)) conditions for intensifying our ((political)) struggle movement (especially in towns and cities) in order to rally the people of all walks of life, completely isolate the Thieu-Ky-Khiem clique, support the American people's struggle movement, and contribute to changing the balance of forces in our favor.

Improvement of ideology: Conduct political reorientation courses for Party members and make non-Party members understand the immediate political mission and the importance of the coming Dry Season ((Campaign)) (a directive concerning political reorientation has already been issued).

Both covert and overt forces must remain in their areas of operations, stay close to the people, maintain favorable relationships with civilians, and insure the successful performance of missions in accordance with operational guidelines. They should make combat preparations and ensure that there is sufficient materiel and adequate financial collections.

Besides the political and military training conducted for the recruits, we must improve mess facilities to improve their health so as to increase the effectiveness of our activities in the coming dry season.

Methods of operation:

Districts must coordinate with villages to hold meetings every month to conduct preliminary reviews of experiences acquired, and to study directives concerning the plan of activity for the coming season.

Branches must review ((their activities)) and rely on this directive to improve their leadership to appropriately direct the activities of lower echelons.

(Notice: Districts and branches within the Sub-Region must submit preliminary reports ((on the results of the implementation of the above tasks)) to A15 ((possibly Current Affairs Committee, Sub-Region 5, COSVN)) prior to 30 Oct 70.)

16 Sep 70

For the Current Affairs Committee

/S/ Nguyễn Văn Trúc

((This new diplomatic offensive phase)) is designed to create favorable conditions to allow us to intensify our attacks against the enemy in all fields and to build up our forces. This is not a solution which will settle the war in VN or restore peace. However, we must guard against making light of, and failing to realize the whole significance and the total effect of this new diplomatic offensive phase, or entertaining unrealistic hopes for peace without realizing that the problem ((meaning the conflict between RVNAF/FWMAF and VC/NVA)) can be basically settled on the battlefield when the forces of both sides are balanced.

The diplomatic offensive is one of the most important offensive fronts, which include the military, political, economic, and diplomatic fronts.

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It is designed to initiate a broad political motivation campaign among the people to translate the ((Party's)) policies into power and revolutionary actions.

It is necessary to understand that the new diplomatic offensive phase is not designed to last only a few days before and after the announcement of the document. It will consist of many steps, in the course of which we must coordinate our activities in all fields in order to change the balance of power between ourselves and the enemy in our favor. It should not impede the conduct of other activities, but must help increase other activities in the rainy season and during the subsequent period.

2. To permit immediate action, as soon as the contents of the document are announced on Liberation Radio, all echelons must instantly carry out the aforementioned instructions, and instruct cadre and Party members, especially those in hamlets and village, to monitor Liberation Radio.

Documents and leaflets dealing with ((the diplomatic offensive phase)) should be printed and widely disseminated to the people, especially those in towns and cities and areas surrounding posts and outposts, in order to create an extensive movement among enlisted men and officers of the Puppet army and civil servants of the Puppet Government. To have adequate reasons for the struggles, we should, according to the prescribed slogans, coordinate these struggles with those demanding more rights and better daily living conditions.

Elaborate plans must be outlined for coordinating the above struggles with the following: Frustration of the pacification plan, destruction of enemy's vitality ((manpower)), breaking of the enemy's oppressive control, elimination of tyrants, and leading the people back to their native village to do their farm work, etc ...((sic)) (according to plan for the rainy season). Particular attention should be paid to providing guidance to the people, especially Puppet troops' dependents, so that they can explain the significance of the phases to these troops. Encourage troops' dependents to appeal to their relatives to leave their posts and outposts and return home to make their living. The movement in cities and towns should be intensified using the slogan: "Peace, independence, and neutrality" to appeal to the middle class. Motivate the people to demand the withdrawal of US troops from SVN and the establishment of a Saigon government without Thiệu-Ky-Khâm, etc ...((sic)). In addition, encourage people of all walks of life to demand democracy and social welfare measures. We must know how to skillfully make newspapers publish overt and seething discussions on this problem.

On the basis of the struggle, efforts should be made to recruit revolutionary forces, especially legal agents (in areas bordering cities and towns), penetration agents, and secret guerrillas.

The Propaganda Training Section of the sub-region must draft plans and provide guidance for conducting propaganda among the people.

All district Party Committees must formulate plans for implementing the above tasks and closely coordinate to carry out missions during the rainy season in order to step up the movement in an overall manner and make utmost efforts to gain new victories.

Reports on the results of the implementation of the ((diplomatic offensive phase)) must be submitted to A.15 ((possibly Current Affairs Committee Sub-Region 5, COSVN)).

18 Sep 70

For Current Affairs Committee

/S/ Nguyễn Văn Trục

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