

18 Sep ((70))

STUDY OF DIRECTIVE 20
COMING TASKS IN THE 1970 RAINY SEASON

CONTENTS:

1. Characteristics of the situation in the ((1970)) rainy season.
2. Balance of power.
3. Our ((VC/NVA)) missions and requirements in the ((1970)) rainy season.

(I, CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION IN THE 1970 RAINY SEASON),

1. ((Blank in O.T.))
2. ((US schemes:)) Abolish the neutral regime in Cambodia and set up a pro-American government.

Turn Cambodia into a colony.

Suppress the Cambodian people's revolutionary movement.

Destroy our key agencies ((in Cambodia)).

It was the US ambition to carry out ((the above schemes)) within six to eight months. It intended to proceed with de-Americanizing the Vietnam ((war)) at the same time.

3. Our forces have widened their areas of operation in Cambodia. Enemy forces there included two brigades and 67 battalions of the Cambodian forces, eight Saigon ((RVNAF)) battalions, and five US battalions.

Cambodia has taken a great step forward.

In Laos, friendly forces completely occupied the Plain of Jars and liberated the two ((Lao)) provinces adjacent to the Cambodian border and many others areas throughout Laos.

In South Vietnam, friendly forces put 230,000 enemy out of action, including 70,000 Americans, and inflicted heavy casualties upon 70 enemy battalions, equivalent to 450 companies, and 40 pacification groups and units. In addition, friendly forces also downed 4,200 airplanes, destroyed 10,000 military vehicles, 200 warships, and 1,500 artillery pieces, captured 8,000 weapons of various types, and caused 7,000 enemy soldiers to desert their ranks.

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II. BALANCE OF POWER.

1. The enemy is continuing to withdraw his troops while accelerating the pacification program.

2. Because he has been attacked repeatedly by our forces on all battlefields, the enemy has had to disperse his troops widely.

3. The enemy is now faced with four difficulties.

He has come to a deadlock. He is now engaged in the Cambodian and Lao battlefields, yet he cannot increase the number of his troops, but instead has to withdraw them. In addition, he has had to cope with our repeated offensives. All of these difficulties have rendered the enemy incapable of getting out of his deadlock.

The Puppet forces ((RVNAF)), which were incapable of protecting the South, have now been sent to help Cambodia.

Internal dissension ((possibly between the US and GVN)) grew even more acute.

Dissension between the people and the Thiéu-Ky clique has developed.

((The living conditions)) of Puppet servicemen and civil servants ((have become more difficult)).

The US ((planned to)) cut its economic aid to Cambodia ((sic)) and limit its aid to the South as soon as it completed the troop withdrawal.

4. The entire US and Puppet forces have been deployed thinly on battlefields. Enemy soldiers have been seriously demoralized and are indifferent to combat. As US troops are withdrawn, Puppet soldiers get confused and seek ways to protect their own lives.

5. Enemy schemes in the days to come.

Cause disturbances (partially in Cambodian and Laos) and continue the pacification program ((in South Vietnam)).

((Page 3 of O.T.))

Enemy and Friendly ((Situation)):

Intermediate areas:

Assembly area for troop withdrawal.

Area adjacent to troop stations.

Area where the enemy developed control and frequently launched sweep operations.

Our strong points:

The enemy does not believe in the effectiveness of his pacification activities.

His internal organization is weak.

His Popular and Regional Forces are weak.

We are able to penetrate enemy controlled areas.

Our weak points:

The people are being relocated ((to GVN resettlement centers)), and we can only operate around them.

Our underground forces are still inadequate.

The enemy has rallied our agents to his side in many parts of his controlled areas.

In some areas, we failed to control the population. In others, the revolutionary movement declined. In some areas, we ran short of food.

Requirements and missions:

Considering the characteristics of the battlefield, we should make every effort to motivate the people to rise up and conduct three-pronged attacks.

Our armed forces must fulfill their role of a driving force.

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Friendly situation:

1. We are holding the initiative throughout the three zones ((meaning Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia)) of Indochina.
2. The Cambodian Revolution is developing to its fullest extent and was successful in the recent campaign ((sic)).
3. The situation has turned in our favor.

The rainy season of this year is very significant and is quite different from that of last year.

III. OUR MISSIONS IN THE RAINY SEASON:

Develop our advantages and capabilities on the main battlefield ((meaning SVN)) and throughout Indochina.

Intensify our attacks during the rainy season to gain great victories.

Closely coordinate our forces on all battlefields of SVN, Cambodia, and Laos.

Urgently develop our forces in all aspects.

Develop a high determination among units at all levels and various associations.

Try to inflict heavy casualties on the enemy's mobile troops, ((RVN)) Regional and Popular Forces, and pacification teams in local areas.

Closely coordinate three-pronged attacks with mass uprisings and the elimination of tyrants.

All echelons should clearly realize our successes and the enemy's failures and thoroughly understand our strategic plans for the rainy season.

Specific tasks and plans of each unit:

Parallel with destroying the enemy's combat potential, protect our infiltration corridors.

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Total quantity of rice

Money

312 liters of rice:

14,040\$ ((SVN)) ((118\$ SVN = \$1.00 US))

Medical allowances for 13 comrades (80\$ SVN for each person): 1,000\$ ((sic))

Food allowances for 13 comrades (360\$ SVN for each person): 4,680\$

Operational expenditures: 400\$

5,000
5,000
3,200
3,300
3,700
20,200
840
19,360
3,755

80
13
240
80
1040
14040

23,115

14,040
1,040
4,680
400
20,160
20,160

23,115
20,160

02,955

40,320
23,115

17,205

((Page 6 of O.T.))

Make positive efforts to frustrate ((enemy)) pacification activities and to disorganize People's Self-Defense Force units.

Smash his troop upgrading plan.

Encourage the people to continue farming. Return the people to their native lands. ((We must)) stay close to our areas of operations.

Enlarge ((liberated)) areas, promote our movement in cities, take care of the people's living conditions, and increase secret self-defense forces.

Employ secret guerrillas to destroy ((enemy)) storage facilities and airfields.

Provide concentrated or separate leadership according to each primary or secondary objective.

Insure the success of attacks in the rainy season. Be ready to counter enemy activities in the dry season.

Enlarge our base areas and liberated areas.

Insure that equipment is well maintained.

Attack the enemy and equip our troops with captured enemy weapons.

- - - - - END OF TRANSLATION - - - - -

(WHEN FILLED IN)
EVALUATION WORKSHEET

pc... 8
Urgent - (A)
General

LOG # 10-1162-70
39011
4 Oct 70

Evaluator: 35
Accuracy Ck: 8
English Ck: 3/13
Classification Ck: SEN
Distribution Ck: 3
Log/Final Ck:

DISTRIBUTION: MR 3

1/6 Docs/Pages

Circumstances of Capture:

Date: 26 Sep 70
Coord: YS167950
Bien Hoa Prov
RVN MR 3
Unit: 2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 1st Regt, RTAVF
Batch No: Unk
Operation
Circumstances: Body
Received CDEC 4 Oct 70

Sum: , Ex: , Full:

SUBJ: Directive 20, COSVN.

10-1162-70

(C-Mar 71) (6 pages, handwritten; B-3). Notes on Directive 20 ((possibly adopted by COSVN)), dated 18 Sep ((possibly 70)), unsigned, provide guidance on activities to be conducted in the 1970 rainy season.

Divided into three main parts, the document first points out the following goals of the US schemes ~~being performed~~ in Cambodia: (1) Topple the neutral regime; (2) establish a pro-American government; (3) turn Cambodia into a colony; (4) suppress the ((Cambodian)) people's revolutionary movements; and (5) destroy friendly ((VC/NVA)) key agencies ((in Cambodian territory)). However, the document states that regardless of ~~enemy~~ ((FVMAF/RVNAF)) increasing efforts, ~~the~~ friendly forces were still capable of widening areas of activity, completely occupying the Plain of Jars ((in Laos)), liberating two Lao provinces ((unspecified)) adjacent to the ~~located in~~ Cambodian border area, and

controlling a majority of ~~the~~ ^{militarily} military, there were 230,000 enemy soldiers put out of action, 4,200 aircraft downed, and 10,000 military vehicles, 200 warships, and 1,500 artillery pieces destroyed.

Subsequently, the document states that the balance of force is presently in favor of the friendly side. The enemy forces were compelled to ~~they~~ ^{thinly} deploy in a large battlefield, including ~~that in~~ Cambodia and Laos; therefore, they were unable to cope with friendly units ^{were} and driven into a serious dilemma. ~~Furthermore~~, ^{In addition} the ^(RVNAF) puppet forces were designated to replace US troops in Cambodia, even though they could not effectively protect SVN and ~~was~~ ^{received only} limited military aid from the US. As a result, all puppet servicemen were seriously demoralized and indifferent to combat actions.

In the third part, the document stresses that in ^{the} 1970 rainy season, ~~the~~ friendly forces enjoy many favorable conditions to gain greater victories, and in order to accomplish all assigned missions, they were to do the following: (1) ^{Exploit} ~~promote~~ past victories to ^{expand successes in the friendly} ~~readily enter~~ ^{all} battlefield ((meaning SVN)) and ~~that~~ of Indochina; (2) coordinate with ~~activities conducted by~~ friendly units in southern battlefield of Cambodia; (3) ^{develop friendly} ~~build up~~ friendly forces quantitatively and qualitatively; (4) ^{Force} ~~strive to~~ destroy enemy mobile, Popular, Regional, People's Self-Defense, and ^{Force} ~~pacification~~ ^{elements}; (5) ^{friendly} ~~protect~~ bases and ~~our~~ corridor lines; (6) boost agricultural production; and (7) incite political struggles in urban areas.

~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~
~~_____~~

NP H

Các khâu giữa là các khâu.

1. Dùng vôi bôi lên thân cây.

2. Rửa sạch thân cây bằng nước.

3. Dùng tay bóp kỹ thân cây để lấy nhựa, rửa sạch.

3. Dùng tay bóp kỹ thân cây để lấy nhựa, rửa sạch. + Dùng tay bóp kỹ thân cây để lấy nhựa, rửa sạch.

+ Dùng tay bóp kỹ thân cây để lấy nhựa, rửa sạch.

nam, ngay tại chỗ hái đưa qua máy xay

(CPC) x máy xay nhỏ thân cây để lấy nhựa.

x máy xay nhỏ thân cây để lấy nhựa.

[là cây chừa,

- Dùng tay bóp kỹ thân cây để lấy nhựa, rửa sạch.

để lấy nhựa thân cây để lấy nhựa.

9. Dùng tay bóp kỹ thân cây để lấy nhựa, rửa sạch.

lấy nhựa ra sử dụng ngay.

để lấy nhựa thân cây để lấy nhựa.

13. Dùng tay bóp kỹ thân cây để lấy nhựa, rửa sạch.

(CPC) lấy nhựa thân cây để lấy nhựa.

#

- 144
- Ca oxy Buj tuai
- Diu ruih ghai
- Sath oai chon dii quai
- vuy dii co ra loo ebanl.

(Mach) hui shu may 13 diu.
 (Bach) hui shu may 12.
 - Bao du dai oi ki o hao.
 (Mach) hui ta so diu.
 - Tai ohy quai qe. Bi, gom
 - the hui Bach tay can may.
 - Hoi hui co vai hui chait co so.
 (Jui) * co dai qe. astu q. d'ac.
 - co dai ki heo.
 - co dai chon chon vut o bit.
 (Jui) can a hoi may co dai co hui chait o hui.
 - vat diu co vuy qe vai tay 3 mat.
 Hui so tay tam dii chit may don heo.

Chỉ là + hình ảnh ở hình dáng công nhân
Ba dãy của dãy to ở dãy đây -

2 Chỉ em cpc, hình đã phát hiện
xác định, thay lại ở đây với qua

3 Hình có nhiều chi tiết

mua mua hôm nay mang giấy đã viết
qua tay của ông này đây.

III

x phát hiện như là và ở đây này
hình ảnh của ở đây đây -

phần này hình thức mới
đang thay lại hình chi tiết

x phát hiện chưa hình ảnh cpc

x hình ảnh này hình thức mới này

x quyết tâm và hình ảnh của công nhân
góp và đưa ra

x cần phải hình ảnh này quyết

phần này và hình ảnh của hình ảnh
hình ảnh này hình ảnh của hình ảnh

hình ảnh này, hình ảnh của hình ảnh

quyết tâm quyết tâm hình ảnh

hình ảnh của hình ảnh của hình ảnh
hình ảnh của hình ảnh của hình ảnh

hình ảnh của

hình ảnh

hình ảnh của

hình ảnh

Đi về các đảo phía B tìm kiếm rổ có thể lấy

về đảo sử dụng vũ khí

→ phía đảo Bạch Long Quân

chủ thông của họ ra ngoài sản xuất. Dựa vào các

truyền thuyết dân gian địa phương của ta.

* mở rộng vùng này mạnh mẽ hơn ở các

châu là đảo Sơn Ngọc. tăng cường TQM.

- vấn đề tồn tại sống hay chết phụ thuộc ở M.

* chỉ cần bảo đảm được vấn đề này

phần này

* luôn có tên gọi của phần chính này.

Sản xuất đời sống của họ.

ở các đảo này vì cần có sự giúp đỡ

ở các đảo khác.

Bảo đảm vật chất cho tốt.

Đảm bảo lấy về chất lượng sản phẩm.