

ASSESSMENT BY GENERAL LE TRUNG TIN (PAVN)

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T states that the present strategy of the enemy ((FVNAF/RVNAF)) is based on the de-Americanization of the Indochina War. Although it appears to be a defensive strategy, it is designed to shift the enemy to an offensive position. The Americans continue to carry out their scheme in Indochina, capitalizing on the contradiction among the nations throughout the world. The two blocs ((possibly the Free World and the Communist Bloc)) are seeking to expand their influence and to bargain with one another. The situation of the friendly bloc ((possibly Communist Bloc)) has been unstable ((possibly due to dissension)). They ((possibly the USSR and Red China)) pledge to support the friendly ((VC/NVA)) side, but they look after their interests first. The existence of the ((Communist)) Bloc is not without problems ((possibly due to the dissension between the USSR and Red China)). Although they support the friendly side, they both strive to maintain good relations with the Americans. This complicated situation enables the Americans to apply pressure to the friendly side, because the friendly side depends on the aid ((of socialist countries, especially the USSR and Red China)) to fight the Americans. This aid is "relative" ((possibly meaning it will be cut off if the USSR or Red China are in good terms with the Americans)). The situation in SVN has not been advantageous to the friendly side due to faulty strategy. After the 1968 Tet General Offensive, the friendly side failed to realize enemy capabilities and failed to attack the enemy in the rural area. While the enemy intensifies his attacks to pacify the rural area, the friendly side directs attacks on city areas. This incorrect strategy has led to considerable difficulties in all fields. The failures sustained require an immediate change in strategy; and Trung Đổng ((possibly Politburo, Lao Đổng Party)) advocates that to win the war, the friendly side must seize control of the rural areas instead of city areas.

The concentration of efforts to dominate the city area is a mistake which prolongs the war. Because the enemy has been successful in the rural areas, the Americans can withdraw 250,000 troops from SVN and launch cross-border operations into Cambodia. In VC Tri-Thiên-Huê Region, the enemy attacks are successful because they are directed at the right objectives and because the enemy strategy in the local region is correct. The friendly side experiences bitter failures in the rural area and has been deprived of his manpower and material resources. As he loses his base camps and springboards, the enemy becomes stronger. The resolution ((possibly adopted by the Politburo, Lao Đông Party)) discusses the friendly weak points of the past two years ((1969 and 1970)), and admits that the friendly side has lost its strong posture. To remedy the situation, he is to strengthen his organizations and speed up the establishment of base areas. Because the friendly side fails to control the rural area, he is to seek control of an area to serve as his base area. The establishment of this base area will be the primary mission. The friendly side could establish his base area in the region which encompasses one part of Central and Lower Laos, the Northeastern area of Cambodia, and the Southwestern area of SVN. This area has been subjected to sporadic enemy ground attacks and air raids. The war will drag on because the friendly side must first defeat the Puppet and American Armies. After this victory, the friendly side will be engaged in a covert struggle ((possibly the political struggle after the cease fire)). Consequently, he must have a base area to continue his resistance. Comrade Ba Duân ((possibly Lê Duân, First Secretary, Central Executive Committee, Lao Đông Party)) says that the Comrades in SVN know nothing, because they do not realize the complicated nature of the protracted war ((in SVN)). In VC Tri-Thiên-Huê Region, the usable land is in the mountainous area. The friendly side must motivate the people to move to this area in order to better establish it as a friendly base camp and to mechanize farm production in this area. The Ba Lông area, the zones adjacent to Route 9 in Quảng Trị Province, and the ((mountainous)) area in Thừa Thiên ((Province)) will be selected for the establishment of base areas.

Entry, dated 25 Dec 70, pertains to the meeting of the Coordination and Operations Committee ((possibly of Thừa Thiên Province, VC Tri-Thiên-Huê Military Region)). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the situation in Indochina. The Coordination and Operations Committee states that of the three countries in Indochina, SVN is the primary battlefield. NVN is the prime base area of the three countries, and NVA troops are the main force troops of Indochina. In SVN, the rural area will be the primary objective and the city area the secondary objective. Difficulties confronted by the friendly side include the exhaustion of cadre and replacement personnel.