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"Resolution Concerning Security
Tasks to be Performed from
October 1970 to June 1971,"
Security Section of a Province
Party Committee

RESOLUTION CONCERNING SECURITY
TASKS TO BE PERFORMED FROM
OCTOBER 1970 TO JUNE 1971

I. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SITUATION:

To implement the Vietnamization program, the Americans and puppets have recently intensified the activities of their security, intelligence, and reactionary forces. They have devoted all their efforts to serve their pacification plan, using Ca Mau Province as an area of emphasis and testing site for the Phoenix [Phụng Hoàng] which is designed to smash our infrastructure.

They used 50% of their security and intelligence forces from higher echelons to reinforce districts, villages, hamlets, sub-hamlets, and wards to exercise close control over the population. They recruited and trained reactionary landowners, their children, former intelligence agents and administrative personnel, ralliers and traitors, etc. as cadre to expand their intelligence network and establish a ruling system at village, hamlet, sub-hamlet, and ward levels.

While devoting their main efforts to pacification activities, they stepped up the development of intelligence and reactionary forces among religious sects, ethnic minority groups, political factions, and important areas (such as coastal areas, sea ports, densely populated and prosperous areas, etc.) to prepare a long-range operation against us.

They strongly developed their forces among the people to frustrate our activities and plant their personnel in our organizations. They followed a well-prepared overall plan. They collected information [on our activities] to sabotage our organizations. They chose main and secondary objectives and controlled each individual person.

They were very cruel and cunning. They terrorized, oppressed, bribed, and deceived everyone.

They intensified psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities in order to demoralize our cadre, troops, and the people.

Enemy weaknesses:

Reactionaries and intelligence agents are facing failure, whereas the Revolution is victorious. They work for money and positions so they fear that the people will unmask their criminal actions. They work without conviction. They are confused and wavering; this is a factor which limits the damages caused by their actions to the country and people. They are easy to break up and are ready to surrender when attacked by the masses' [revolutionary] movement.

In the past, many key enemy agents were killed. New agents lacked experience and displayed poor professional skills and unstable morale. Their organizations were run by a small number of agents who were disillusioned in the face of the people's revolutionary struggle movement. Therefore, though enemy organizations were numerous, they were composed of poor agents who worked for the enemy only because they were forced to. They had negative attitudes, displayed unstable morale, and were easily influenced to surrender to the Revolution.

Reactionaries and intelligence agents secretly serve the enemy's immediate and long-range goals. Because of his great requirements for disrupting our revolutionary structure, the enemy had to urgently develop his [intelligence and espionage] organizations on a wide scale in order to operate strongly.

Low level personnel were forced to carry out tasks ordered by higher echelons while burdened with anxiety and the fear of death. As a result, the enemy's organizations were in a state of confusion, and activities were conducted in a perfunctory manner. Contradictions between his present and future requirements, between high and low levels, and between the people and himself increasingly developed. Ca Mau Province is a "base" province where the Revolution's position and power are strong, and the enemy is now being encircled. These are the basic enemy

weaknesses which can never be overcome and which grow with each passing day.

In fighting enemy spies and reactionaries, our cadre, soldiers, and people have learned many lessons. We are gaining great victories against the enemy while defending and strengthening our forces.

In compliance with Resolution 9, the security branch held its fifth [possibly provincial] security conference to reassess the friendly and enemy situations and set forth tasks for the branch to fulfill the political requirements laid down by the Party and to frustrate the enemy pacification plan.

At the conference, the security branch properly assessed friendly victories and enemy failures and studied enemy strengths and weaknesses as well as our deficiencies and their causes. In addition, the security branch made everyone aware of enemy tricks and schemes, especially his espionage and reactionary activities. Upon completion of the above conference, the ideological standpoints and class concepts of [the personnel] of the security branch were improved.

As a result, during the last year, we have made considerable progress in our attacks against the enemy, in eliminating tyrants and spies, as well as protecting and strengthening our forces both in quantity and quality. We progressed especially in strengthening our armed reconnaissance force, political protection reconnaissance force, base-level security force, etc.

However, we still have a number of weaknesses as follows:

In the past, we succeeded in hitting the enemy tactical and overt elements and elements of secondary importance. But, we failed to destroy the covert elements, the organizers, especially the cruel ringleaders in order to create a great political impact. Our activities were irregular, and we did not promptly react against enemy sabotage activities. In repressing the enemy, we put too much emphasis on detention and neglected other forms of action to be carried out on the

spot. As a result, our detention camps are overloaded and trials are not expeditious enough.

In elimination of spies and reactionaries, various branches and associations did not closely coordinate with one another; as a result, they could not motivate the people to participate enthusiastically in security activities.

Our internal security operating methods remained unchanged despite the changing situation. The security of base areas and Party Committee authorities has been given greater consideration, but the motivation of the people to participate in the movement to preserve secrets and maintain security in agencies and units left much to be desired.

The strengthening of basic security forces, especially base-level security forces and secret forces, was poor both in quality and quantity. Our guidelines and policies were not suitable to the current situation. Training of key cadre for the branch was insufficient.

In brief, as compared with enemy sabotage activities and requirements prescribed by higher echelons, the recent progress we made was inadequate and could not ensure successful performance of present and future tasks.

Reasons for deficiencies:

1. The ideological viewpoints of our personnel were not firm. They only see those presently serving in the puppet administration but failed to see the revanchist landlords, the wicked tyrants, henchmen, and reactionaries in various religious and ethnic minority groups. They failed to see the obdurate nature and wily schemes of the enemy. They overestimated the enemy while underestimating our forces and displayed rightist and shirking attitudes.

They hesitated to suppress local tyrants lest the latter take revenge on them. They were worried that their families living in or having to go in and out of enemy controlled areas would meet difficulties.

They worried more about their families than about their duties. They were inclined to overlook mistakes of

relatives and friends because of personal feelings and they showed a lack of determination in repressing them. They did not dare to capture enemy spies. A number of our cadre did not discriminate between friends and foes. There were also a number of cadre and Party members who were resentful of enemy atrocities. However, they did not fully understand the requirements of the security task, lacked patience, or did not know how to motivate the people and coordinate with local revolutionary authorities to repress the enemy. They thought only of capturing or killing the enemy. If they were unsuccessful in doing so, they became confused, passive, and inactive.

2. They failed to master their political task which is a principal part of the security mission. Security activities are closely related to Party policies and the daily activities of friendly agencies and branches. They did not thoroughly understand the following three major tasks:

Closely coordinate with other branches and organizations.

Employ combined forces to fight the enemy.

Motivate the people to participate in attacking the enemy.

These three major tasks cannot be neglected. Recently, the leadership for these three major tasks was ineffective. Especially poor were the employment of combined forces and the conduct of the people's movement. This has reduced the strength of the front against enemy spies and reactionaries.

3. They failed to fully comprehend policies and guidelines concerning the repression of counter-revolutionaries. The application of repression measures was not suitable to each target and each area of operation. Our cadre did not take the initiative in repression activities. As a result, they failed to disrupt the enemy ranks.

4. Security machinery and forces were weak both in quantity and quality. Especially weak were base-level security agencies and secret forces. Troop skills were inadequately improved. Operational procedures of each type of force have not been understood.

5. Leadership of security authorities of various levels: This leadership was inadequate in political and professional matters. They failed to accurately assess the friendly and enemy situation, to work closely with the villages and hamlets and as a result, were unable to timely cope with the situation.

Leadership was poor. For this reason, [cadre] could not gain much experience. They did not make recapitulative or preliminary reports, thus failing in their functions and duties entrusted by Party Committee authorities.

6. Party Committee leadership of the security task was not close and did not follow a set pattern.

These deficiencies were the main causes directly affecting the performance and development of Party security missions in the past.

II. PURPOSES OF SECURITY MISSIONS:

To serve the primary mission of countering pacification activities and making preparations for struggles against the enemy in the future, FT [sic] prescribed a number of future missions to expedite the development of the security task in accordance with Resolution 9.

A. Motivation for initiating a people's movement to preserve secrecy and repress reactionaries and spies in accordance with the guideline:
"Party Chapters provide leadership, key organizations mobilize the people to participate in the movement, and security [personnel] provide technical guidance".

1. Requirements:

Conduct indoctrination to increase the revolutionary awareness in the Party, revolutionary organizations, armed forces, and among the people in order to:

Expose the wicked schemes of reactionaries and spies; foster hatred of the enemy so that everybody will understand missions, guidelines and policies for repressing reactionaries and see the targets of repression for the

present time and for the future. Mobilize all branches, organizations and armed forces to activate a movement to preserve secrecy, maintain security, and suppress spies and reactionaries, among the people at large in order to cope with and frustrate all enemy schemes and subversive activities, especially his psywar activities, divisive tricks, his schemes to relocate local inhabitants, and eliminate puppet and US depraved culture, etc. Gradually consolidate [the security system of] each hamlet and village and purge our old base areas [of undesirable elements].

2. To meet the above requirements, the following missions must be accomplished:

Each area may organize and plan for a short phase of intensive propaganda and indoctrination to heighten revolutionary awareness or coordinate its program with other motivation campaigns conducted by the Party.

The Security [sections] must coordinate with all branches and organizations to indoctrinate backward people and individuals having a doubtful background to prevent them from being taken advantage of by the enemy.

All branches and organizations must consider the indoctrination task as part of their regular village and hamlet activities. Proceed with the formation of hamlet and village "security maintenance councils" to ensure close coordination between branches and organizations in countering enemy spies and reactionaries in hamlets and villages (directive providing specific guidance thereon is available).

Security [sections] are responsible for providing guidance for cadre in charge of protecting organizations to perform their assigned security missions.

Make preliminary and recapitulative reports after each phase of motivation.

Step up the destruction of tyrants and wicked officials and the repression of spies and reactionaries in three areas.

The main mission is to arrest and kill enemy and overt and covert personnel at the grass-roots level who are

oppressing the people in order to actively support the people to rise up to counter enemy pacification activities.

1. Liberated and disputed areas where we are strong:

Properly adopt the principle of "taking the initiative to attack the enemy aggressively in order to protect ourselves."

We must immediately clean up our liberated areas and villages and hamlets in base areas by wiping out all enemy secret [espionage] networks.

Each hamlet must kill from one to two key enemy cadre secretly operating in the area.

We must hold thought reform sessions for individuals who have doubtful political background because they may support the enemy and give him favorable conditions to recruit and plant his spies in various hamlets.

Specific missions to be fulfilled:

To motivate the people, we must clearly understand enemy activities. Security agents at all levels must penetrate deep into [friendly and disputed areas] to detect and repress enemy cadre and local covert agents and expose his espionage networks. We must also resolutely punish enemy psywar and open arms agents, pacification personnel, anti-revolutionaries, reactionaries who disturb public order, and surrenderers and traitors, etc. Care should be taken to have these elements judged by the people.

It is necessary to closely watch the individuals with doubtful political background and investigate them to detect enemy elements and apply appropriate repressive measures against them. In addition, specific measures must also be taken to indoctrinate and reform the thoughts of reactionaries to destroy the enemy's foothold. We must have high determination to eliminate any shortcomings which the enemy can exploit.

Notice: We must closely coordinate with various [popular] organizations, branches and forces to get enemy

information. We must carefully indoctrinate suspects and follow up their [ideological evolution] in order to take prompt precautionary measures against their activities.

We must organize [our security forces] and cooperate with assault forces to arrest and destroy the enemy's agents operating in hamlets under his oppressive control and expose his [espionage] networks in areas bordering cities and liberated areas. These activities are to be carried out with the purpose of stopping enemy espionage activities.

Step up the implantation of covert agents in strategic areas for the purpose of detecting the targets [of repression] and taking repressive measures in time.

Notice:

While applying repressive measures, take into consideration the situation of each local area and the individual case of each target to implement the Party's policies in a concrete way with a view to serve our political requirements which are to frustrate the enemy pacification plan, step up the people's uprising movement, attack the enemy fiercely, and break his oppressive control to win the peoples' support.

2. Enemy-controlled rural areas and disputed areas where we are weak:

In compliance with the principle of "actively attacking the enemy to positively protect ourselves" we must actively arrest and destroy enemy ring-leaders and tyrants and disorganize his oppressive machinery which includes such elements as village and hamlet administrative personnel, leaders of the People's Self-Defense Force, reactionary landlords, reactionaries in various religions and political parties and ethnic minority people, surrenderers, traitors and pacification personnel, etc. We must expose from two to five enemy secret espionage networks and kill or arrest from one to three ring-leaders in the hamlets in order to help the people rise up to break the enemy's oppressive control.

Specific missions to be performed

We must organize [our security forces] and work out specific plans to get full information on every enemy organization, individual target [of repression], especially the cruel ring-leaders and the enemy secret [espionage] networks. We must classify these people into specific categories with information on their political background.

On the basis of getting full information on the enemy, we must have specific plans to effectively arrest and kill each individual. There must be a verdict for each case and there must be indoctrination and motivation of the people [to participate in the action].

Employ security forces in coordination with specialized agencies to arrest and kill enemy ring-leaders and tyrants, and disorganize their subordinate personnel with special attention paid to secret agents.

Due attention must be paid to the build-up and development of security and secret agent forces in each hamlet or village so that they will be able to kill tyrants and traitors.

Make preliminary and recapitulative reports on activities to learn lessons, enabling our [movement] to become stronger with each passing day.

3. Province capitals and district towns:

Requirements concerning the continuous annihilation of the enemy's low-level tyrants and attacks against his high-level personnel to cause confusion in his organizations.

Each city ward or housing area must kill two to five low-ranking tyrants and one to two upper level ring-leaders who have been targeted [for suppression] and expose one to three espionage networks. It must also conduct one to three attacks to terrorize the enemy's upper level personnel, confuse his oppressive machinery, and favor the people's uprising to seize control of their local areas.

We must be determined to accomplish the following:

Security sections and other forces must urgently

investigate targeted individuals and cells, especially ring-leaders and secret agent networks oppressing the people in villages and hamlets. Draft a plan for them to arrest, kill, or force enemy agents out of action one by one.

It is necessary to review past activities to learn lessons and find out strengths and weaknesses and, on this basis, make plans for villages, hamlets, and city wards to follow-up each objective, and direct cadre in charge to resolutely hold firm to enemy areas. In-place agents must coordinate with the "outside" forces [forces operating outside GVN-controlled areas] to have the situation well in hand. They must be prepared to be able to act promptly when good opportunities arise. As an immediate requirement, concentrate efforts on tyrants, traitors, and key personnel, and be determined to stay close to them to kill them. Tyrant killing activities must be wide and constant, but great attention must be paid to areas of emphasis.

When killing tyrants, there must be a plan for politically attacking the enemy's ranks to disrupt his organization. The armed reconnaissance force responsible for eliminating tyrants and traitors must also assume the mission of motivating the people and developing agent network.

Points to stress in the elimination of tyrants and traitors:

Enemy-controlled areas:

Limit the detention [of tyrants and traitors]. If they are worthy of being condemned to death, we must kill them without delay. We may exploit information from them, but this must be done quickly. As for those who do not deserve to be killed, apply on-the-spot repressive measures. Village Party Committees and security sections are in charge of determining those who deserve to be killed.

Province capitals and district towns:

Party Chapters have the right to consider, arrest, and kill overt ring-leaders and tyrants, and give warnings

to their subordinates. They must ask the city Party Committee and EU [sic] for instructions concerning the arrest or killing of enemy secret agents.

Liberated areas:

The various forms of on-the-spot repression must be put into full use. Village Committees together with village security sections must consider and decide the forms of on-the-spot repression (consisting of warning, thought reform, and house arrest), then report their actions to districts. Concerning the imprisonment and execution, these are to be carried out as prescribed before. In case an arrest cannot be delayed (because the subject would cause us great damages or would leave for enemy areas), Village Committees and security sections must immediately arrest the subject and send him [to higher echelons] according to the usual procedures.

Repression must be absolute but repression policies must be thoroughly understood and properly applied to each target and each area.

While repressing the enemy, close coordination with various forces must be maintained in order to create strength with which to destroy the enemy.

Intensify political attacks to disrupt the enemy in conjunction with the killing of tyrants and traitors. Urgently recruit and develop security forces, especially secret agents to kill tyrants and eliminate traitors.

After each phase of activity, recapitulative reports should be made to gain experiences to improve the capabilities of [security] members.

Detention camps:

Promptly solve all [prisoner] problems and properly carry out the policy towards prisoners. According to the present situation, each district and province detention camp is authorized to detain 20 to 30 prisoners, but these detention camps must be carefully guarded to prevent the prisoners from escaping and the enemy from rescuing them.

Following are missions to be carried out:

We should concentrate security forces to urgently take care of all cases in the camps where there are a large number of culprits. These should be promptly brought to trial.

In the coming days, arrests and exploitation of information must also be expedited in order to successfully support the Party political task.

Appropriate forms and methods of trial must be applied according to the situation of each area, but there must be participation by the people.

Assign enough qualified interrogators and administration and indoctrination cadre.

C. Increase of internal security activities:

Make every effort to increase political indoctrination, provide ideological guidance, promptly correct erroneous thoughts and consolidate our organizations.

Conduct an indoctrination phase to increase the revolutionary vigilance of every member in agencies and units. A plan should be drafted to initiate a security maintenance movement. Intensify struggles against enemy psywar activities conducted in an attempt to make our troops defect to his side and create dissension among our ranks. Prevent the US enslaving culture from infiltrating our ranks and gradually consolidate our agencies and units.

Properly observe established regulations when admitting the following personnel into our internal organizations:

Soldiers and [administrative] personnel.

Newly assigned cadre and Party members; Party members and cadre released from enemy captivity.

Personnel who have relatives working for the enemy or living in enemy-controlled areas.

Cadre and soldiers who have lost contact [with their own agencies].

Plans should be made to protect our cadre and avoid unnecessary losses.

Provide ideological guidance and promptly correct erroneous thoughts in internal organizations.

Units and agencies must observe security maintenance regulations in billeting and messing areas. Agencies must construct good trenches and fox holes. They must promptly uncover spies and reactionaries and suppress them. They must always be ready for combat to maintain security.

They must strengthen, train, and provide efficient leadership for the security unit to improve its personnel's political knowledge, ideology and technical skills.

They must observe movement and bivouacking regulations.

They must closely coordinate with local authorities to foster a guerrilla warfare movement, maintain security, and repress spies and reactionaries operating around the areas where friendly agencies are located.

They must adhere to the principles and regulations concerning the maintenance and safekeeping of documents and Party policies to prevent them from being captured by the enemy or lost.

They must strengthen the Security Guard Section of agencies and units, and ensure an adequate number of qualified cadre for the various people's organizations who can perform their mission in a satisfactory manner.

Security cadre at all levels must provide technical guidance for agency security guards and cadre in charge of protecting the people's organizations. They must also exchange information on the activities of agents with friendly agencies and make preliminary and recapitulation reports to gain and disseminate experience to improve the skills of their personnel.

D. Urgently improve and develop the basic security forces:

We must develop all types of security forces so as to be able to successfully fulfill our immediate task. We must also energetically prepare for the struggle against the enemy in the future. Therefore, the main mission to be fulfilled by the security branch at present consists of developing the security forces at village, hamlet, sub-hamlet, and [city] ward level. We must also plant our agents in our areas of operations and in strategic targets [sic] such as coastal and populated areas, in religious sects, ethnic minority groups, and political parties.

Development procedures:

We must act expeditiously and firmly. In the present situation, we must consider both quality and quantity but put emphasis on the quality.

Requirements for future development:

1. In liberated areas and disputed areas where we are strong:

We must recruit an adequate number of village and hamlet security agents and establish a secret security network comprising 10 to 15 agents in each hamlet. Plant agents in sensitive areas of operations and among dubious political target groups.

2. In enemy-controlled rural areas and in disputed areas where we are weak:

In these areas, each hamlet should recruit one to three hamlet security members, one to two non-overt [sic] security members and five to seven secret agents. Two-thirds of the security force should consist of sub-hamlet security agents.

3. In provincial capitals and district towns:

Each city ward must recruit one to two secret security members, one armed reconnaissance cell, and three to five secret agents.

In short, all three areas should have enough secret agents to effectively keep watch on all targets, especially [targets] in strategic areas of operation. We must provide effective guidance for secret agents and gradually improve them so that they can struggle against the enemy immediately and in the future.

The armed reconnaissance force must urgently build up its strength. One or two armed reconnaissance platoons must be activated at province level; one or two squads at district level; and one squad at village level. In addition, each district must recruit at least 10 members for the reconnaissance force in charge of political security.

The above forces must work out a good plan for political and professional training. The armed reconnaissance force, in particular, must be well-trained in special actions tactics and in the techniques of holding on to the area of operation, keeping watch on the targets [of repression].

Strengthen all echelons of security sections qualitatively and quantitatively in order to enable them to carry out their present and future missions.

Firmly expel unqualified cadre and personnel from the security branch, promote those who are capable and admit good persons to the branch.

All security branch cadre and personnel must have a stable status and be turned into specialists.

Training:

Conduct immediate training for all available forces to improve their political knowledge and professional skills, especially village, hamlet, sub-hamlet, city ward [security forces] and forces having immediate combat missions (such as armed reconnaissance force, reconnaissance agents in charge of political security, and espionage and secret agents). The requirement is that within six months, all the available secret agents and security forces in the three areas must be improved.

Contents:

Resolution 26 C112 and the Resolutions of T1 [Region] and FT [sic] advocate concentrating efforts on the destruction of enemy pacification efforts and on assessing the situation to settle ideological problems and strengthen the [proletarian] concept for the working class, rendering them determined to fight and to defeat the enemy.

[Security cadre and personnel] must fully comprehend their missions and responsibilities in the present situation to be determined to accomplish their tasks.

They must master our policy and guidelines concerning the repression of counter-revolutionaries.

Each force must conduct training for its personnel to improve their technical skills (the armed reconnaissance force must be well-trained in special actions techniques).

Training methods:

The province conducts training for key district personnel and coordinates with the district to train village security elements while the village must do so for the hamlet and sub-hamlet [security elements]. According to the situation, the training subjects can be taught in one, two or three sessions.

In addition, during the training, the leadership echelons must impart the experiences they have learned from the realistic situation to their trainees.

Ⓓ. Increase the Party's leadership.

[Security cadre and personnel] must properly assess the situation and realize that the enemy is now building and using a force of spies and reactionaries as a forward element on his pacification and Vietnamization plans. He also employs this force as a main element to confront us on a long-range basis. For that reason, the security task is a very important task in the immediate missions of frustrating the enemy pacification program and in the countering of enemy activities in the future. Thus, Party Committee authorities must provide close leadership for the security branch.

Our leadership must fully understand all the important aspects of the security task. For example, we must underline the task of motivating the people to participate in security maintenance activities and in the repression of counter-revolutionaries. The question is to resolutely repress all counter-revolutionaries but we must also pay attention to the various forms of on-the-spot repression. We must constantly develop our security forces, especially village, hamlet, and city ward elements and secret agents.

These forces must be well-trained politically and professionally.

We should make our comrades fully understand the guideline and policy of repressing anti-revolutionaries. In the repression of anti-revolutionaries, we must have specific plans for each target and each area of operation. We must resolutely destroy the cruel ring-leaders and break up the ranks of their henchmen to serve the Party's political purposes. We should closely follow the activities and know the situation of our security forces and secret agents in hamlets, sub-hamlets, and city wards. Only by doing so can we train and strengthen them to make them capable of performing their immediate and future tasks. Furthermore, we must strive to give political and professional training to security forces and secret agents, especially those operating in villages, hamlets, sub-hamlets, and city wards.

Every month, the security section [chief] must go to authorities of the Party Standing Committee and report on security activities (according to the priority ordered by the Party Committee authorities), and request instructions and guidances from the Party Committee authorities.

The Party Committee members in charge of security tasks must have a stable status to be able to perform both their immediate and future tasks. The Party Committee authorities, therefore, must make proper assignments of missions after careful study and avoid changes [in the assignment of personnel] except in case of necessity or when so requested by the Party.

Any assignment or transfer of the cadre belonging to the security branch (including the comrades Party Committee

members in charge of security) must be made in accordance with the regulations prescribed by COSVN and Ti [Region].

Security leadership must improve and strengthen the political background, ideological concept, and class viewpoint of security personnel. We must strengthen the Party organization within the security branch.

The security [branch] must have its own leadership, learn past lessons and comply with the regulations on submission of reports and requesting instructions.

[Document captured in
V.C. Sóc Trăng Province,
V.C. Military Region 3]