

# WIRELESS BULLETIN

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TRANSCRIPT: SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON-- FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSCRIPT OF SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE ON OCTOBER 9:

SECRETARY ROGERS: I WOULD LIKE TO JUST SAY A FEW WORDS BEFORE I TAKE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE.

FIRST, AS YOU KNOW, THE ADMINISTRATION IS VERY PLEASED ABOUT THE REPOSE TO THE INITIATIVE; ESPECIALLY THE RESPONSE IN THIS COUNTRY, WHICH IS UNIFORMLY FAVORABLE. IT IS BI-PARTISAN IN NATURE AND IT CLEARLY SHOWS THAT ALL SEGMENTS OF THE POPULATION IN ALL PARTS OF THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE. AND WE THINK THAT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE WE THINK THE ENEMY HAS, OVER THE YEARS, RELIED ON THE DIVISIONS IN OUR OWN SOCIETY IN THE HOPE THAT THAT DIVISION WOULD CAUSE US TO LOSE OUR RESOLVE IN CARRYING OUT OUR POLICIES.

AND WE HOPE THAT BECAUSE OF THE SUPPORT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEIVED FOR HIS INITIATIVE HERE AT HOME THAT THE ENEMY WILL SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS, THOUGHTFULLY CONSIDER THEM, AND MAKE A SERIOUS RESPONSE.

NOW, AS FAR AS I AM CONCERNED, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE HAS BEEN MOST ENCOURAGING. ALL OF THE NATIONS IN THE AREA HAVE PUBLICLY RESPONDED FAVORABLY, SUGGESTED THAT THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS AND COME BACK WITH A THOUGHTFUL RESPONSE. NOT ONLY THE NATIONS IN THE AREA, BUT THE NATIONS AROUND THE WORLD -- IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA, THE NON-ALIGNED NATIONS, CERTAINLY MOST OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONS. AND WE ARE, THEREFORE,

ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT WE THINK THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE ITSELF WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY WILL SERIOUSLY CONSIDER THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE.

AND I WOULD LIKE, ALSO, TO SAY THAT THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT CONSIDER THIS PROPOSAL AS A PROPOSAL THAT IS TO BE EITHER ACCEPTED OR REJECTED. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE KNEEJERK REACTION WOULD BE WHAT IT WAS. WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD PROVIDE A FOUNDATION ON WHICH NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN.

THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT WE HAVE NEVER HAD EVER SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED IN PARIS ANY NEGOTIATIONS IN THE REAL SENSE OF THE WORD. WE HAVE NEVER EXCHANGED IDEAS. WE HAVE EXCHANGED POINTS OF VIEW, SPEECHES, BUT NEVER HAD AN HONEST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ABOUT HOW TO SETTLE THIS CONFLICT.

THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE PROVIDES SUCH A FOUNDATION. AND, IF THE OTHER SIDE IS INTERESTED IN PEACE, WE ARE SATISFIED THAT WE COULD FIND A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT THAT WOULD BE FAIR TO ALL CONCERNED.

AS THE PRESIDENT SAID -- BECAUSE THE TRAGIC WAR IN NIGERIA HAS ENDED, BECAUSE WE HAVE AT LEAST FOR THE MOMENT A CEASE-FIRE IN THE MIDDLE EAST -- IF A CEASE-FIRE COULD BE ACHIEVED IN INDOCHINA IT WOULD BE THE FIRST TIME SINCE WORLD WAR II THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR COMBAT IN THE WORLD. AND WE HAVE A FEELING THE TIME IS RIPE;

WE HAVE A FEELING THAT THE WORLD COMMUNITY DEMANDS THAT PEOPLE ACT SENSIBLY AND FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT WAR ITSELF IS NOT A VIABLE POLICY IN ANY AREA OF THE WORLD.

AND SO WE ARE VERY HOPEFUL THAT THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL WILL BE ACCEPTED, WILL FORM A BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS WHICH WILL LEAD TO A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, AND, HOPEFULLY, PEACE IN INDOCHINA.

MR. HIGHTOWER?

Q MR. SECRETARY, DOES THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAVE ANY INDICATION FROM THE COMMUNIST SIDE OF ANY KIND THAT IT WAS INTERESTED IN PROPOSALS OF THIS SORT; OR DO YOU HAVE ANY OTHER BASIS ON WHICH TO ASSESS NOW WHAT THEIR LONGER RANGE REACTION IS LIKELY TO BE?

A MR. HIGHTOWER, WE HAVE NO REASON -- BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE, OR WITH ANY OF THOSE ALIGNED WITH THEM -- TO THINK THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT THIS PEACE INITIATIVE.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE ELEMENTS IN THE SITUATION WHICH SUGGEST THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THAT THEY WOULD BE ATTRACTED TO THIS PEACE PROPOSAL. LET ME SAY THAT ONE OF THE THINGS THAT THE OTHER SIDE HAS CLAIMED ALL ALONG WAS THAT WE NEVER AGREED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. THEY SAID IF WE DID AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL THAT IT WOULD BE A VERY CONSTRUCTIVE STEP FORWARD.

NOW THE PRESIDENT AGREED TO THAT PRINCIPLE -- AGREED TO THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF INDOCHINA, AS LONG AS IT IS PART OF A GENERAL AGREEMENT SETTLING THE CONFLICT.

CERTAINLY, THE FACT THAT THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM HAS SUCCEEDED SO WELL -- ALMOST BEYOND OUR EXPECTATIONS -- WE THOUGHT IT WOULD SUCCEED, BUT IT IS SUCCEEDING BETTER THAN WE EXPECTED. THE COMBAT ACTIVITY IS DOWN TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT; AND, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID IN HIS SPEECH, OUR CASUALTIES ARE WAY DOWN. SO WE ARE MAKING THIS PROPOSAL FROM A POSITION NOT OF WEAKNESS BUT OF STRENGTH. WE ARE MAKING THE PROPOSAL AT THIS TIME BECAUSE WE FEEL SURE THAT THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM WILL SUCCEED AND THAT WE WILL HAVE AMERICAN FORCES OUT OF COMBAT IN VIET-NAM BY MAY 1ST.

BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, WE RECOGNIZE THAT ANY PROLONGING OF THIS CONFLICT IS MOST UNDESIRABLE AND MOST HARMFUL TO THE WORLD COMMUNITY AND TO ALL OF THOSE INVOLVED, AND WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE THE WAR END NOT ONLY FOR OUR AMERICAN FORCES BUT FOR THE VIETNAMESE FORCES AS WELL. AND, FOR THAT REASON, WE THINK THERE IS SOME POSSIBILITY THAT THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE ATTRACTED TO THIS OFFER. WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THEY WILL ACCEPT IT PUBLICLY; CERTAINLY NOT IMMEDIATELY. BUT WE WOULD HOPE THAT THERE WILL BE DISCUSSIONS, WHICH WE HOPE CAN BE CONDUCTED IN PRIVATE AND POSSIBLY LEAD TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, DID YOU MENTION JUST NOW THAT ON MAY 1ST YOU EXPECT ALL U.S. GROUND FORCES NOT TO ENGAGE IN COMBAT ANY LONGER?

A NO. I SAID THAT I THINK THAT BY MAY 1ST, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, HE IS GOING TO -- BETWEEN NOW AND MAY 1ST -- WITHDRAW ABOUT ANOTHER 95,000 TROOPS FROM SOUTH VIET-NAM. BY THAT TIME, MOST OF OUR FORCES WILL BE OUT OF THE COMBAT ROLE -- MAYBE SOME IN THE COMBAT ROLE, BUT BY AND LARGE THEY WILL BE OUT OF THE COMBAT ROLE BY THAT TIME. AND WHAT I SAID WAS THAT BECAUSE OUR CASUALTIES HAVE BEEN REDUCED, AND BECAUSE WE EXPECT THEY WILL BE REDUCED FURTHER AS THE REDUCTIONS OCCUR, THAT THIS PROPOSAL IS NOT DESIGNED JUST TO SAVE AMERICAN LIVES; IT IS DESIGNED TO SAVE THE LIVES OF THE VIETNAMESE AS WELL.

Q HAD YOU INTENDED TO SET A TIME ON THAT?

A WELL, THE PRESIDENT HAS ALWAYS SAID THAT HE WOULD WITHDRAW THOSE TROOPS BY MAY 1ST.

Q I MEANT THE END TO THE COMBAT BY MAY 1ST?

A NO. WE SAID, AT THE TIME THE PRESIDENT MADE THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE 150,000, THAT WE EXPECTED THAT AMERICAN FORCES WOULD BE LARGELY OUT OF THE COMBAT ROLE BY MAY 1ST.

MR. HENSLEY.

Q MR. SECRETARY, THIS IS NOT ON VIET-NAM. TWO WEEKS AGO, THE PENTAGON SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN DETECTED WHAT MIGHT BE THE BEGINNING OF A RUSSIAN SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. CONSIDERABLE WAS MADE OF THIS ELSEWHERE IN TOWN THE SAME DAY. AND NOW THE SUBJECT SEEMS TO HAVE DIED. WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU IS, ONE, DO YOU HAVE ANY BETTER INFORMATION AS TO WHAT THIS IS THERE; AND HAVE YOU UNDERTAKEN ANY DIPLOMATIC STEPS TO TRY TO FIND OUT WHETHER IT IS A RUSSIAN BASE, AND WHETHER THE RUSSIANS WILL PULL IT OUT?

A MR. HENSLEY, SINCE THE STATEMENT FROM THE PENTAGON AND SUBSEQUENT BACKGROUND BRIEFING IN THE WHITE HOUSE, THERE HAVE BEEN NO SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN THE SITUATION IN CUBA. WHEN I DISCUSS SOME OF OUR COMMON PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IN NEW YORK WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER

NEXT WEEK. I WILL RAISE THE SUBJECT. AT THIS TIME, I HAVE NO FURTHER STATEMENT TO MAKE ON THE MATTER.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, ONE OF THE REASONS IT IS EVIDENT WHY THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL HAS BEEN SO WIDELY WELCOMED BY MANY PEOPLE ON THE HAWK AND DOVE SIDE IS, IN FACT, THAT THEY ARE READING DIFFERENT THINGS INTO IT AS THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION. TO SOME OF THE PROPONENTS OF A CEASE-FIRE, IT MEANS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE EXISTING TERRITORIAL CONTROL THAT THE COMMUNIST SIDE HOLDS IN INDOCHINA. TO OTHERS IT EVIDENTLY MEANS FREEZING IN PLACE THE EXISTING GOVERNMENT HEADED BY PRESIDENT THIEU. WHAT IS THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTERPRETATION OF WHAT THE POLITICAL IMPLICATION IS OF A STANDSTILL CEASE-FIRE?

A. THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT POINTED OUT THAT IF THE CEASE-FIRE PROPOSAL WAS ACCEPTED THAT ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN, HAVE TO BE UNDERTAKEN, TO DETERMINE THE MODALITIES OF THAT CEASE-FIRE. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THAT WOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE PROVISIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE ITSELF.

WE HAVE MADE A VERY CAREFUL STUDY OF WHAT MIGHT HAPPEN IF THERE WAS A CEASE-FIRE STANDSTILL, CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE, AND WE HAVE CONDUCTED THAT STUDY OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.

NOW, A YEAR AGO WE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL TO PROPOSE A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE. BUT, AS A RESULT OF THE STUDIES THAT WE HAVE MADE, AND AS A RESULT OF THE CHANGE IN THE MILITARY SITUATION, WE ARE QUITE CONVINCED THAT IT IS PRACTICAL NOW TO WORK OUT A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE.

NOW, THE CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE WOULD NOT IN AND OF ITSELF BE EXPECTED TO HAVE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES WOULD RESULT FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT WOULD OCCUR BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. AND THAT, OF COURSE, IS PROVIDED IN THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL. SO WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THERE WOULD BE NEGOTIATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE, IN WHICH WE WILL TAKE PART IF IT SEEMS DESIRABLE, OR THE NEGOTIATIONS COULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. IN ANY EVENT, WE DON'T THINK OF THE CEASE-FIRE AS A PROVISION WHICH WILL IN AND OF ITSELF HAVE ANY POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES. WE EXPECT THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES TO FLOW FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, THE PRESIDENT AND OTHER TOP OFFICIALS HAVE OFTEN SAID THAT SERIOUS DIPLOMACY SHOULD BE CONDUCTED SECRETLY AND IN PRIVATE. IN VIEW OF THAT, WHY WASN'T THIS PROPOSAL PROPOSED TO THE COMMUNISTS IN PARIS IN PRIVATE?

A. WELL, I THINK THERE ARE GREAT ADVANTAGES TO QUIET DIPLOMACY; BUT IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT AND BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN DIVISION IN OUR OWN COUNTRY, AND BECAUSE THERE HAS BEEN SOME OPPOSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO SOME OF THE ACTIONS OF OUR GOVERNMENT IN THE PAST, WE THOUGHT IT WAS DESIRABLE FOR THE PRESIDENT TO MAKE A MAJOR STATEMENT ON IT WHICH WOULD BE SO FORTHCOMING THAT IT WOULD BE WIDELY ACCEPTED, NOT ONLY BY AMERICANS BUT BY PERSONS ALL OVER THE WORLD. AND THAT IS WHAT HAPPENED. WE THINK THAT FACT WILL CAUSE THE OTHER SIDE TO THINK TWICE BEFORE THEY REJECT IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, COULD YOU EXPLAIN WHETHER OR NOT SUCH OPPOSITE FORCES AS THE VIET CONG, THE PATHET LAO IN LAOS AND SIHANOUK'S PEOPLE, REPRESENTING PART OF CAMBODIA, THE CONTESTED PART, WOULD ALSO BE PRESENT AT AN EXPANDED PEACE CONFERENCE?

A. WE HAVEN'T ATTEMPTED TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT ABOUT WHO MIGHT ATTEND AN INDOCHINA PEACE CONFERENCE BECAUSE WE THINK IT IS PREMATURE. WE DO FEEL THAT THE PRINCIPAL PARTIES ARE THE GOVERNMENTS NOW IN POWER AND THOSE WHO ARE OPPOSED TO THEM ON THE BATTLEFIELD.

AS FAR AS SIHANOUK IS CONCERNED, HE DOESN'T ENTER THE PICTURE, I THINK, HERE. THE FORCES IN CAMBODIA FACING THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CAMBODIA ARE NORTH VIETNAMESE.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, A BROADER QUESTION. PARTLY BECAUSE OF THE MID EAST TRUCE VIOLATIONS, SOME PEOPLE HAVE RAISED THE QUESTION IF THE EGYPTIANS HAVE, APPARENTLY WITH SOVIET COOPERATION, CHEATED ON SUCH AN IMPORTANT AGREEMENT, WHAT POINT IS THERE THEN IN GOING AHEAD WITH OTHER BROADER AGREEMENTS WITH THE SOVIETS IF WE HAVE NO FAITH IN THEIR WORD? WHAT IS YOUR VIEW? IS THERE ANY POINT TO GOING AHEAD AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS ARE TAINTED BY THIS?

A. YES, I THINK THERE IS A POINT IN GOING AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS. OTHERWISE, YOU WOULD GIVE UP; THERE WOULD BE

NO POLICY. I HAVE ALWAYS RECOGNIZED THE POSSIBILITY OF VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS. AND WE HAVE NEVER ENTERED INTO AGREEMENTS ON THE BASIS OF GOOD FAITH ALONE. WE HAVE ALWAYS PROVIDED FOR VERIFICATION PROCEDURES. THAT IS WHY IN THE S.A.L.T. TALKS ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL ITEMS FOR CONSIDERATION IS THE VERIFICATION.

AS FAR AS THE SOVIET UNION IS CONCERNED, WE ARE DISAPPOINTED -- DISAPPOINTED NOT ONLY IN THE MISSILE SITES IN THE 50-KILOMETER ZONE, WHICH MUST HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED WITH, IF NOT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION, CERTAINLY WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE DISAPPOINTED IN THE RHETORIC THAT THEY ARE USING, RHETORIC WHICH IS REMINISCENT OF THE COLD WAR DAYS, VERY STRIDENT IN TONE. BUT, HAVING SAID THOSE THINGS, WE DON'T CONCLUDE THAT THE ANSWER IS, "DON'T TRY TO GET ALONG WITH THE SOVIET UNION." WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE. WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE REALISTICALLY AND IN FULL REALIZATION THAT THERE MAY BE VIOLATIONS OF AGREEMENTS. WE ARE GOING TO PROVIDE VERIFICATION PROCEDURES TO BE SURE THAT WE ARE NOT AT A DISADVANTAGE IF VIOLATIONS OCCUR.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WITH THAT PRINCIPLE OF VERIFICATION IN MIND, WOULD YOU TELL US WHAT IT IS THE U. S. IS TRYING TO GET IN THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS, AND HOW WOULD THEY BE VERIFIED IN THE SENSE YOU HAVE JUST EXPLAINED?

A. WELL, IN THE BERLIN NEGOTIATIONS I DON'T BELIEVE WE HAVE A VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION. WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO ELIMINATE THOSE ELEMENTS OF THE SITUATION WHICH CREATE VERY SERIOUS TENSION IN THE AREA. AND I AM SPEAKING ABOUT IMPEDIMENTS TO TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, TRAVEL, AND THE LIKE.

NOW, IF THE SOVIET UNION IS INTERESTED IN REDUCING TENSIONS IN EUROPE -- AND CERTAINLY BERLIN IS A GOOD PLACE TO START -- WE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT IT FAIRLY SOON. SO FAR WE HAVE BEEN TAKING SOUNDINGS IN THE FOUR POWER TALKS, BUT WE HAVEN'T UNTIL THE LAST MEETING OR SO GOTTEN DOWN TO THE SERIOUS QUESTIONS. BUT IN TERMS OF VERIFICATION IT IS NOT GOING TO BE VERY DIFFICULT. WE WILL KNOW WHETHER THEY LIVE UP TO THE AGREEMENT.

IF THEY MAKE ONE, OR NOT.

Q. BUT YOU MENTIONED S.A.L.T. AS BEING SELF-ENFORCING, I BELIEVE.

A. OH, NO, JUST THE OPPOSITE. I SAID ONE OF THE QUESTIONS IS VERIFICATION, ONE OF THE IMPORTANT QUESTIONS IN S.A.L.T. IS HOW DO YOU VERIFY AN AGREEMENT?

Q. WELL, IN THE BERLIN CASE, THE PROBLEM FOR 25 YEARS HAS ALWAYS BEEN, FROM THE AMERICAN STANDPOINT, HOW TO MAKE THE RUSSIANS LIVE UP TO ANY OF THESE TRANSIT AGREEMENTS. WHAT NEW ELEMENTS DOES THE UNITED STATES HAVE, IF ANY, TO SEE THAT IN ANY SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT WE CAN MAKE THEM LIVE UP TO IT IN THE TERMS OF CONSIDERING WHAT HAS PASSED?

A. WELL, WE HAVEN'T GOTTEN TO THE POINT OF DECIDING WHETHER THEY ARE EVEN GOING TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT THAT REDUCES THOSE TENSIONS. IF WE GET TO THAT POINT, WE CERTAINLY WILL PROVIDE ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES WHICH WE THINK ARE ADEQUATE. I DON'T BELIEVE IT WILL BE DIFFICULT. I THINK WE CAN PROVIDE IT; AND WE FULLY INTEND TO.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS FLATLY DENIED THAT RUSSIAN-MANNED MISSILES HAVE BEEN MOVED INTO THE SUEZ CANAL CEASE-FIRE ZONE. DO WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE MOVED THESE MISSILES IN THERE?

A. YES, WE HAVE EVIDENCE THAT THEY HAVE MOVED MISSILES IN. AND THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT THEY HAVE MOVED MISSILES IN. WHEN I SAY "THE," I MEAN THERE HAVE BEEN SA-3 SITES CONSTRUCTED SINCE THE DAY OF THE CEASE-FIRE, AND WE ARE CONVINCED, I THINK BEYOND A DOUBT, THAT THE SOVIET PERSONNEL ARE THERE TO ASSIST IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND MANNING OF THOSE SITES.

IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTICE THAT IN THE DISCUSSIONS THAT WE HAVE HAD WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE HAVE BEEN VIOLATIONS AND WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN INVOLVED IN THE VIOLATIONS HAS NEVER ARISEN. I THINK IT IS TAKEN FOR GRANTED THAT THAT IS THE CASE. AND WHEN I TALK TO MR. GROMYKO I CAN GIVE HIM THE EVIDENCE OF THE VIOLATIONS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, SOME OF THE RUSSIAN DIPLOMATS IN WASHINGTON ARE SAYING TO PEOPLE WE TALKED TO WHEN THEY ARE CHARGED WITH

HAVING VIOLATED THE AGREEMENT THAT THEY WERE NEVER PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT. COULD YOU GIVE US ANY INDICATION AS TO JUST HOW FIRMLY MR. DOBRYNIN WAS PINNED DOWN ON THIS AGREEMENT? DID HE EVER INITIAL IT? OR DID YOU GET THE CLEAR UNDERSTANDING THAT HE ACCEPTED IT ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET UNION?

A WELL, I DON'T THINK WE HAVE TO GET INTO THAT AT THE MOMENT BECAUSE NOW THEY SAY THEY DIDN'T VIOLATE IT ANYWAY. SO IT ISN'T A QUESTION OF WHETHER THEY WERE PARTY TO IT. THEY SAID THERE WERE NO VIOLATIONS. BUT THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT THE FACT THAT ALL PARTIES AGREED THAT AFTER THE CEASE-FIRE THERE WOULD BE NO IMPROVEMENT OF THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE FIFTY-KILOMETER ZONE. AND THE LANGUAGE IS PERFECTLY CLEAR. I NOTICE SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE LANGUAGE WAS FUZZY. THAT IS NOT THE CASE. THE LANGUAGE SAYS, AS CLEARLY AS LANGUAGE CAN BE STATED, THAT THERE WILL BE NO CONSTRUCTION OF NEW MISSILE SITES IN THE FIFTY-KILOMETER ZONE DURING A 90-DAY PERIOD. NOW, THE EVIDENCE IS CONCLUSIVE THAT THERE HAS BEEN NEW CONSTRUCTION OF MISSILE SITES, AND A NUMBER OF THEM, DURING THE CEASE-FIRE PERIOD. I SPENT FOUR HOURS GOING OVER ALL OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS MYSELF WITH THE TECHNICIANS AND I CAN TELL YOU THAT THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THE VIOLATIONS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WHAT NOW ARE THE PROSPECTS OF RECTIFYING THAT SITUATION, IN THE FIRST PLACE, AND SECONDLY, OF REVIVING THE TALKS UNDER GUNNAR JARRING?

A WELL, OF COURSE THE VIOLATIONS HAVE MADE IT MORE DIFFICULT. AND THE SITUATION, GOD KNOWS, IS COMPLEX ENOUGH. IT HAS BEEN GOING ON FOR TWENTY YEARS, AND IT IS GOING TO BE DIFFICULT TO BRING THE PARTIES TOGETHER.

ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FACT IS THAT BOTH SIDES NOW SEEM TO BE WILLING TO EXTEND THE CEASE-FIRE FOR ANOTHER NINETY DAYS. AND THERE ALSO ARE MANY INDICATIONS TO THE EFFECT THAT THE PARTIES WOULD LIKE TO END THE CONFLICT.

OBVIOUSLY WAR IS NOT A VIABLE POLICY. EVERYONE SUFFERS. THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ARE GREAT FOR ALL PARTIES. AND WHEN YOU CONSIDER THE PROSPECTS OF FURTHER WAR AND HOW IT MIGHT COME OUT AND WHO WOULD BENEFIT, YOU HAVE TO SAY TO YOURSELF THAT IT IS

A NO-POLICY, IT IS DESPERATION.

NOW, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF AN AGREEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT, THE PROSPECTS ARE QUITE BRIGHT FOR THE AREA. THERE ARE PLENTY OF RESOURCES. THERE IS A GOOD DEAL OF MANPOWER AND GREAT ABILITY IN THE AREA. THERE IS UNLIMITED OPPORTUNITY FOR EXPANSION. SO THAT ALL PARTIES COULD BENEFIT IF THEY COULD WORK OUT A SOLUTION. AND WE WOULD HOPE THAT THAT WILL DAWN ON PEOPLE. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ALTHOUGH THERE ARE ALL KINDS OF RECRIMINATIONS, WE HAVE ALL KINDS OF PROBLEMS, THAT WE COULD GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. AND I MYSELF BELIEVE THAT WE HAVE REASONABLY GOOD PROSPECTS TO GET THE NEGOTIATIONS STARTED.

THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE. NO ONE HAS A POLICY EXCEPT THAT. WHAT'S THE ALTERNATIVE? I ASK ALL PARTIES: "HOW DO YOU SEE THE FUTURE? JUST KILLING EACH OTHER FOR THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS? IS THAT A POLICY?"

SO I THINK THERE IS A PROBABILITY THAT WE CAN GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED. AND IN DISCUSSIONS THAT I HAVE NEXT WEEK AND THE WEEK AFTER THAT IN NEW YORK WITH THOSE CONCERNED -- I HOPE THAT FOREIGN MINISTER RIAD WILL BE THERE, AND POSSIBLY THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF JORDAN -- I HOPE WE CAN GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED.

I THINK YOU SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT OUR PROPOSAL HAD TWO PARTS: ONE, A CEASE-FIRE WHICH HAS BEEN OBSERVED AND IS IN EFFECT, AND THE OTHER NEGOTIATIONS. AND IF WE CAN GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, WE CAN GET THE SITUATION BACK ON THE TRACK.

ALSO I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE YOU KEEP IN MIND THAT TWO MAJOR HURDLES HAVE BEEN OVERCOME. FIRST, ISRAEL USED THE WORD "WITHDRAWAL" -- THEY WOULD BE WILLING TO WITHDRAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, WHICH WAS A MAJOR HURDLE, BECAUSE IT HADN'T USED THAT WORD. ON THE OTHER HAND, EGYPT AGREED THAT ISRAEL HAD THE RIGHT TO EXIST, RIGHT OF SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. AND THAT IS A MAJOR HURDLE, BECAUSE THE ARABS HAD NOT AGREED TO THAT BEFORE.

AND SO IF WE CAN GET NEGOTIATIONS STARTED, I STILL THINK THERE

IS A HOPE -- THOUGH WE HAVE TO LOOK AT IT REALISTICALLY --  
THERE STILL IS A HOPE THAT THE PARTIES COULD SETTLE THIS CONFLICT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YOU MENTIONED RIAD. HE, THE OTHER DAY, SAID,  
IN DENYING THE CHARGES THEY VIOLATED THE CEASE-FIRE, HE SAID THE  
UNITED STATES VIOLATED THE PEACE TREATY BY SUPPLYING ISRAEL WITH  
ARMS. IS THERE A CLAUSE IN THE CEASE-FIRE STANDSTILL AGREEMENT  
TO PREVENT THE UNITED STATES FROM SUPPLYING ARMS TO ISRAEL?

A NO, THERE WAS NO PROVISION AT ALL IN THE CEASE-FIRE  
OR STANDSTILL AGREEMENT THAT WE WOULD NOT PROVIDE ARMS. AS A  
MATTER OF FACT, WE HAVE PROPOSED SEVERAL TIMES THAT THERE BE  
AN ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT IN THE AREA. AND THAT HAS ALWAYS  
BEEN REJECTED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

SO THE UNITED STATES NEVER AGREED NOT TO PROVIDE ARMS.

WE DID SAY THAT WE WOULD ACT WITH RESTRAINT DURING THIS PERIOD  
IN PROVIDING ARMS, AND WE LIVED UP TO THAT AGREEMENT. WE DID  
NOT PROVIDE MORE ARMS THAN WE HAD PREVIOUSLY AGREED TO PROVIDE.  
BUT IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE VIOLATIONS OCCURRED AND IN  
VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN SUPPLYING MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT TO THE UAR, OF COURSE WE ARE UNDER NO RESTRAINTS AT  
ALL INSOFAR AS PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO ISRAEL.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YOU SET OUT ON SEVERAL POINTS HERE WHAT  
APPEARS TO BE A PATTERN OF SOVIET CONDUCT -- PARTICIPATION IN  
THE VIOLATIONS ON THE WEST BANK OF THE SUEZ, THE CUBA AFFAIR.  
WE KNOW THAT THERE HAS BEEN AT LEAST ONE ATTEMPT TO PRE-EMPT  
THE AIR CORRIDORS TO BERLIN AGAIN. AND SOME INTERFERENCE WITH  
TRAFFIC ON THE AUTOBAHNS TO BERLIN. DO YOU SEE IN THIS A PATTERN  
OF PERHAPS SOVIET MISCALCULATION OF AMERICAN INTENTIONS, AND  
IF SO WHAT ARE YOU DOING AND WHAT DO YOU PROPOSE TO DO ABOUT IT?

A MR. TREWHITT, WE ARE NOT SURE WHAT IT MEANS. I THINK IT IS  
TOO EARLY TO DETERMINE. CERTAINLY YOU CANNOT WITNESS THE VIOLATIONS  
OF THE STANDSTILL AGREEMENT WITHOUT HAVING VERY SERIOUS QUESTIONS  
ARISE ABOUT THEIR INTENTIONS.

ONE OF THE THINGS THAT WE WILL TALK TO THEM ABOUT IN THE MONTHS  
AHEAD IS THAT SUBJECT.

IN TERMS OF THE CUBAN BASE IS CONCERNED, WE ARE NOT SURE.  
I NOTED THAT INTEREST THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE SAID THAT THEY WERE

NOT CONSTRUCTING A SUBMARINE BASE IN CUBA. BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO WATCH THAT CAREFULLY. IT'S ONE OF THOSE THINGS THAT WE CAN DETERMINE WITH CERTAINTY, AND WE WILL WATCH IT.

INSOFAR AS THE AIR CORRIDOR MATTER IS CONCERNED, OF COURSE THAT IS SOMETHING THAT THEY HAVE DONE BEFORE. THE SOVIET UNION CLAIMED IT WAS AN ACT COMMITTED BY A SUBORDINATE OFFICIAL WHO WAS NOT AUTHORIZED TO DO IT. WE ACCEPT THAT EXPLANATION WITH SOME SKEPTICISM.

IN ANY EVENT, WE HOPE THAT THIS IS NOT A SIGNAL -- THAT THESE THINGS DO NOT SIGNAL A CHANGE OF POLICY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION. WE ARE GOING TO CONTINUE TO TRY TO NEGOTIATE THESE MATTERS WITH THEM, TO HAVE ACTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM. BUT CERTAINLY THE MATTERS THAT YOU REFER TO CAUSE US TO HAVE SOME SECOND THOUGHTS.

Q MR. SECRETARY, YESTERDAY WHEN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ISSUED THEIR STATEMENT ON THE FIVE-POINT PEACE PLAN, WHICH THEY SUGGESTED WAS ALSO THEIR OWN PLAN, THEY TOOK PRESIDENT NIXON'S POINT FOUR ON A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, MADE IT POINT FIVE AND CONSIDERABLY REWORDED IT, AND SPOKE SPECIFICALLY ABOUT ELECTIONS. COULD YOU EXPLAIN THE DISPARITY, AND COULD YOU TELL US WHETHER THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT STANDS PREPARED TO FIND A NEGOTIATED POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, RATHER THAN ONE THAT WOULD REQUIRE ELECTIONS?

A I DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS A DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO STATEMENTS. THE PRESIDENT, IN HIS PROPOSAL, SET FORTH CERTAIN GENERAL PRINCIPLES THAT WE THOUGHT SHOULD APPLY. THEY ARE NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE STATEMENT THAT PRESIDENT THIEU ISSUED.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM SHOULD BE DETERMINED BY THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIET-NAM. AND WE WOULD EXPECT THAT PRESIDENT THIEU AND HIS GOVERNMENT IN THE DAYS AHEAD WILL MAKE SOME PROPOSALS AND HAVE SOME DISCUSSION ABOUT THAT POLITICAL FUTURE.

WE DON'T BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS.

WE DID NOT HAVE ANY DIFFICULTY WITH PRESIDENT THIEU IN THE PROPOSAL THAT PRESIDENT NIXON MADE. WE DID NOT HAVE TO TWIST HIS ARM. WE AGREED WITH HIM. WE THINK THE PRINCIPLES THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ANNOUNCED ARE SOUND.

NOW, INSOFAR AS THE POLITICAL SOLUTION IS CONCERNED, WE HAVE SAID CONSISTENTLY THAT ANY POLITICAL SOLUTION THAT IS WORKED OUT BY THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM WILL BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE UNITED STATES.

Q MR. SECRETARY, I THINK THIS HAS TO DO WITH THE QUESTION OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIPS. THE STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN YESTERDAY EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT RUSSIA WOULD USE WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS ITS CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE ON HANOI TO CAUSE THEM TO ACCEPT THE FIVE-POINT PLAN. IN THE LIGHT OF THAT, I WAS WONDERING WHY, WHEN THE ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN SO CAREFUL TO PREPARE THINGS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ELSEWHERE WITH THE RUSSIANS BEFORE ADVANCING A PLAN, WHY MR. DOBRYNIN OR THE RUSSIANS, ACCORDING TO YOUR PEOPLE, HAD THEIR FIRST INFORMATION FROM YOU IN A TELEPHONE CALL ABOUT AN HOUR BEFORE THE PRESIDENT WENT ON THE AIR. I WOULD HESITATE TO SAY THAT THIS WAS ADMINISTRATION PIQUE AT THE RUSSIAN ACTIONS. SO I WONDERED WHETHER YOU COULD GIVE ME ANOTHER REASON.

A NO. THE REASON WAS THAT WE TRIED TO GIVE NOTIFICATION TO THE GOVERNMENTS THAT WE THOUGHT SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD CONSIDER THE PROPOSAL SERIOUSLY AND DO WHAT THEY COULD TO ASSIST IN HAVING THE OTHER SIDE ACCEPT THEM. WE NOTIFIED SEVERAL GOVERNMENTS FAIRLY SHORTLY BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S BROADCAST. THERE WASN'T ANY PIQUE INVOLVED. IF YOU START NOTIFYING TOO MANY PEOPLE, THE BROADCAST DOESN'T COME AS MUCH OF A SURPRISE.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WHAT DO YOU THINK IS THE SOVIET INTENT IN TESTING US IN THESE VARIOUS WAYS?

A FRANKLY, WE DON'T KNOW. AS I HAVE SAID, WE ARE WATCHING IT AND WE WILL JUDGE THAT -- WILL MAKE THAT JUDGMENT AS EVENTS DEVELOP. WE JUST DON'T KNOW AT THE MOMENT.

Q MR. SECRETARY, WE HAVE ALWAYS FELT IN THE PAST THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT NEGOTIATE FROM A POSITION OF WEAKNESS, WHICH YOU IMPLY THE SITUATION IS NOW, AND THEY HAVE ALSO SAID THEY WOULD NOT SEPARATE THE MILITARY FROM THE POLITICAL PARTS OF THE CONFLICT IN VIET-NAM, WHICH THE CEASE-FIRE ATTEMPTS TO DO. WHAT IS IT THAT MAKES YOU THINK NOW THEY ARE WILLING TO

CHANGE THEIR TRADITIONAL NEGOTIATING STANCE?

A WELL, IT JUST MAKES SENSE, THAT'S WHY. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY CAN MAKE A BETTER SETTLEMENT NOW AND ACHIEVE AT LEAST SOME OF THEIR OBJECTIVES, IF THEY HAVE ANY POLITICAL STRENGTH, BY DOING IT NOW. BECAUSE THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM IS WORKING, AND IT IS QUITE CLEAR, I THINK, TO ALL OBSERVERS THAT IT IS WORKING, THEIR CHANCES WILL DIMINISH AS TIME GOES ON. IT ISN'T A MATTER REALLY OF NEGOTIATING FROM WEAKNESS. IF THEY WANT TO NEGOTIATE, WORK OUT A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT WHICH GIVES THEM, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, RECOGNITION OF THE POLITICAL FORCES THAT EXIST IN SOUTH VIET-NAM, NOW IS THE TIME TO DO IT. IF THEY DON'T, AND WE CERTAINLY HOPE THEY DO, BUT IF THEY DECIDE NOT TO, THEN THE VIETNAMIZATION PROGRAM WILL PROCEED, AND IT IS PROCEEDING QUITE SATISFACTORILY.

Q MR. SECRETARY, HOW LONG DO YOU THINK IT MIGHT TAKE TO DISCERN WHETHER THIS PEACE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN ACCEPTED, AND HOW DO YOU THINK IT MIGHT BECOME APPARENT TO THE PUBLIC THAT IT WAS WORKING OR WASN'T WORKING?

A WELL, I DON'T THINK IT IS PARTICULARLY USEFUL TO MAKE PREDICTIONS ABOUT TIME. I WOULD BE INCLINED TO THINK THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE A PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THE PEACE INITIATIVE. THAT IS NOT HOW THE COMMUNISTS DO IT. ALSO, IF THEY DID IT IT WOULD UNDERCUT THE PROPAGANDA WHICH THEY HAVE USED FOR SO LONG.

I THINK THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT THEY WOULD LET US KNOW IN SOME OTHER WAY. WE MIGHT HAVE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS. THEY CERTAINLY WOULD PROBABLY COME UP WITH SOME COUNTER-PROPOSALS, AND THEN WE WOULD HAVE TO NEGOTIATE BASED ON THEIR POSITION.

THE IMPORTANT THING, IT SEEMS TO US, IS THAT IF THEY WOULD AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE IN PLACE, THEN AT LEAST THE KILLING WOULD STOP. AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THEY WOULD BE TEMPTED TO DO THAT.

THE FACT OF THE MATTER IS THAT THE LEVEL OF COMBAT ACTIVITY IS CONSTANTLY DECREASING. WHEN I WAS THERE A FEW MONTHS AGO I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT AT THAT TIME BECAUSE IT WAS SHORTLY AFTER CAMBODIA. I THINK NOW BECAUSE OF THE EVENTS THERE.

BECAUSE THE CAMBODIAN INCURSION HAS BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL, BECAUSE THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT HAS SURVIVED -- IT SEEMS TO BE MOVING ALONG SATISFACTORILY -- AND BECAUSE THE LEVEL OF COMBAT ACTIVITY HAS SUBSIDED, THAT THEY MAY BE INCLINED TO AGREE TO A CEASE-FIRE.

NOW, HOW THEY WOULD AGREE TO THAT, WE DON'T KNOW. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE DECREASE WHICH IS QUITE OBVIOUS IN THE LAST YEAR WOULD JUST CONTINUE. OR IT MIGHT BE THAT THEY WOULD AGREE IN A PRIVATE MEETING OF SOME KIND.

IF YOU GO BACK AND LOOK AT THE AGREEMENT ON THE BOMBING HALT AND TRY TO FIGURE OUT WHAT THE AGREEMENT WAS, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT IT IS RATHER DIFFICULT TO KNOW, BUT APPARENTLY THERE WAS SOME KIND OF AN AGREEMENT.

WE WOULD HOPE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY WOULD GIVE SOME INDICATION THAT THEY AGREED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL PROVIDES A FOUNDATION FOR NEGOTIATION, AND THAT THEY WOULD ENTER INTO TALKS LEADING TO A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THOSE TALKS PROBABLY IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WOULD BE PRIVATE TALKS. AND IF THEY ARE PRIVATE TALKS, WE HOPE THAT WE COULD KEEP THEM PRIVATE.

NOW, WHAT THE TIME FRAME OF THAT IS APT TO BE, I AM NOT SURE.

Q MR. SECRETARY, MAY I ASK YOU THIS ON THE MIDDLE EAST? GIVEN THE FACT THAT THE ISRAELIS SAY THEY WILL NOT RETURN TO THE NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT TAKING THE MISSILES OUT, AND THE EGYPTIANS DENIAL OF THE VIOLATIONS, WHAT DO YOU MEAN, WHAT DOES THE UNITED STATES MEAN BY THE WORD "RECTIFICATION"?

A WELL, "RECTIFICATION" MEANS A CONDITION WHICH WE MIGHT BRING ABOUT WHICH WOULD SATISFY BOTH PARTIES, AND THEN TO START NEGOTIATING. (LAUGHTER)

Q THANK YOU, MR. SECRETARY.

(END TRANSCRIPT)