

A FILE / SUBJ.  
 DATE / SUB-CAT.  
~~61~~  
 10/20

1. COUNTRY: <b>SOUTH VIETNAM</b>	8. REPORT NUMBER: 6 028 0281 71
2. SUBJECT: Supplemental Political Lesson to Resolution 9. (U)	9. DATE OF REPORT: 30 March 1971
3. ISC NUMBER: A769.000	10. NO. OF PAGES: 1
4. DATE OF INFORMATION: 12 October 1970	11. REFERENCES: DIRM 1M3
5. PLACE AND DATE OF ACQ: CB; 14 November 1970	12. ORIGINATOR: COMUSMACV (CDEC)
6. EVALUATION: SOURCE <u>R</u> INFORMATION <u>3</u>	13. PREPARED BY: EDWARD A. FELIX, 1LT, MI CHIEF, PROD DIV, US ELM, CDEC
7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: George S. Lapinskes GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(C-Apr 71) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns an extract translation of a notebook maintained by an unidentified individual. The extract, dated 12 October 1970, is a supplemental political lesson to Resolution 9, which concerns ((VC/NVA)) diplomatic efforts and the situation in K ((meaning Cambodia)). The extract reveals that friendly ((VC/NVA)) peace proposals require the unconditional withdrawal of US troops from SVN, the establishment of a coalition government without Thieu, Ky and Khiem, and the resumption of diplomatic ties with all nations on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

DIP L

(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 14 November 1970 in Cambodia (Prey Veng Province; WT205665) by 8th Mar Bn, RVNAF IV Corps. The document was received at CDEC on 7 February 1971, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 42,329, dated 10 February 1971, under CDEC Document Log Number 02-1416-71. Translation was requested by JUSPAO, Vietnam.

03.05

02-1416-71

12 Oct 70

SUPPLEMENTAL ((LESSON)) TO RESOLUTION 9

I. DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

II. SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

III. SITUATION IN K ((POSSIBLY CAMBODIA))

I. DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE

1. Situation of the ((past)) six months ((and coming missions)):  
Future diplomatic offensive:

We will wage ((diplomatic)) offensive phases A, B and C, and frustrate the enemy pacification plan.

We have intensified military proselyting, political, and military activities and have increased the destruction of the enemy regular force.

US troops coordinated with Lon Nol troops to attack our forces in the border area. Lon Nol troops were used against us. All ambassadors ((in Cambodia)) were recalled to their countries. This was a political defeat for the enemy.

The enemy has destroyed our prestige and the area where we could expand our influence.

The enemy is slowing down ((the rate of)) troop withdrawal in an attempt to protract the war.

In the international ((political)) theatre, he is isolated.

The Puppet Army and troops are in favor of breaking away from Thi<sup>^</sup>eu-Ky-Khi<sup>^</sup>em, isolating them.

2. Requirements: US troops must withdraw before 30 Jun 71.

Only the withdrawal of US troops can satisfy the demands of the US people.

3. Coalition Government:

The Coalition Government will consist of three groups:

Resistance ((NLF))

Saigon Government without the participation of Thi<sup>^</sup>eu-Ky-Khi<sup>^</sup>em.

Religious factions, and political parties operating abroad.

The coalition government will be established through a free and democratic general election, based on the principle of non-reprisal.

## II. FOREIGN POLICY

((The coalition government)) must have the right to establish diplomatic relations with the various countries ((of the world)) on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

As soon as the Paris conference is over, our delegates will tour different countries to gain their support.

## III. OUR FUTURE PROBLEMS

We have decided that peace can be restored only through our complete victory on the battlefield.

((We must foil the)) US scheme of using Indochinese against Indochinese and Asians against Asians.

((We must frustrate the)) enemy accelerated pacification plan and special pacification plan which have made deep inroads into our internal organization.

### Five missions:

1. Continue to develop ((struggle)) movements in cities. Intensify attacks against the enemy's rear.
2. Frustrate the enemy's special pacification plan in rural areas.
3. Intensify military activities; aid K ((possibly Red Khmer troops)); and strengthen our ((transportation)) corridor ((system)).

((Page 3 of O.T.))

4. Coordinate all forces to develop movements in cities and coordinate military and political activities with diplomatic activities.

5. If we carry out the four above missions successfully, there will be great changes in the situation. Our position will be much more consolidated, and the enemy's much more weakened.

Intensify people's uprising movements and attacks against the enemy storage facilities and critical areas.

During the six months of the dry season, we must build up our forces, such as secret Party Chapters, secret reconnaissance forces, political ((struggle forces)), and civilian proselyting forces.

Problems in K ((Cambodia))

Main forces must be strong.

We must destroy much of the enemy manpower.

We must replenish our troops and widen the Ho Chi Minh Trail, because it is a strategic communication and transportation route.

As soon as the US troops have withdrawn from K, the Lon Nol Government will ~~collapse~~ rapidly, if we destroy much of its forces.

In the meantime, when the US troops attack us, our Party and region will conduct counteroffensive activities with resourcefulness and ingenuity to destroy them.

Providing aid to friendly ((Red Khmer)) troops will bring many advantages to us.

Capability in the dry season

Route I, Route VII (Kg Cham) ((possibly Kompong Cham)) ((sic)).

((Page 4 of O.T.))

We must consolidate bases and corridor areas and improve the border defense ((system)).

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----