

CSD

FILE	SUBJ.
DATE	SUB-CAT.
10-70	

EXTRACT FROM NOTE BOOK 2

THE IMPORTANCE OF TRI THIEN IN 1971

[Notebook kept by North Vietnamese military cadre in VC Tri-Thien-Hue Military Region in October, 1970, Entry appears to have been written on October 19, 1970]

1. At present, the Tri Thien battlefield holds an important position. In addition to the characteristics already mentioned, it adjoins the Da Nang base, North Viet-Nam, and Central Laos. After the enemy shifted his attack to Cambodia and the Nam Bo Region and Western Highlands became endangered, the Tri Thien battlefield became even more important to the entire Mien [SVN]. It ensures the establishment of bases for southern Indochina and will help reduce the difficulties on the other battlefields. (In the new situation the position of Tri Thien battlefield, which was always important, is more important than ever).

Enemy schemes:

Deescalate its mission such as launching counter-offensives against Laos from Tri-Thien Region [sic]. Its bases will be Hue and Dong Ha. We should contribute every effort to the frustration of that enemy scheme in order to safeguard the strategic corridors of the entire country. After disrupting the enemy adventurous plan we must try to develop our successes.

2. 1971 will be an important year for both the enemy and us. It will have great political and military significance. The enemy is still obstinate but he is forced to carry out the troop withdrawal. When that troop withdrawal reaches a certain level, there will be a great change in the situation. It is possible that the situation will greatly change in 1971. The U.S. pullout will make the puppet army's war burden heavier, the people's life more miserable, raise the various social classes' struggle movement to a higher level, and aggravate the economic crisis. 1971 will be the year the enemy will hold the puppet presidential election and prepare for the American presidential election. It is certain that the contradictions between the U.S. and the puppet governments will become more serious.

If we do not promptly change the balance of forces on the common battlefield in general and on the [Tri-Thien] Region battlefield in particular, we will offer the enemy favorable opportunities to correct his shortcomings. That is the important mission for 1971.

The enemy is still obstinate so he continues to launch military, political and diplomatic counteroffensives against us. We should make every effort to defeat enemy schemes. The year 1971 will be more advantageous to us than 1968, 1969 and 1970. In 1969 the enemy launched counterattacks and we had to pull back our forces. In 1970 we returned attacks on the enemy, the Party gained more experience and the people displayed enthusiasm. For these reasons in 1971 we will have many favorable conditions and great prospects for success. We will be able to do many things but must now correct our existing shortcomings. Misunderstanding of the Party's policy line may create great difficulties for us. So, in 1971 we should make every effort to develop our victory and to correct our shortcomings. In addition we should take advantage of our opportunities and create favorable conditions for our big leap forward.

We should make use of past experience to fight the enemy while he believes he can reverse the situation. Realizing the enemy shortcomings we can easily create new opportunities. The war of aggression has adopted three strategies. After using the strategies of special and limited wars the enemy put forth the Vietnamization strategy which is a new characteristic of modern war. Therefore, the Party and the people need time to gain experience [to defeat the Vietnamization strategy].

In brief, our battlefield will be very important in 1971. We must strategically change the balance of forces in our favor and change the situation in our favor to make a big leap forward. At the same time, every effort must be devoted to the exploitation of the unexpected events that may develop as a result of the dissensions between the enemy and the people and within his organizations.

## PART II.

Our mission and activity plan in rural areas.

I. MISSIONS AND ACTIVITY PLAN:

1. In compliance with the resolution issued by the Politburo, [of the Viet-Nam Workers' Party] concerning the creation of a new strategic position appropriate to the new situation and the plan of attacking densely populated and prosperous rural and lowland areas, our present strategic plan is to strengthen in-place political and armed forces for an overall combined attack in coordination with main force units.

Based on the previous resolution issued by the region Party committee, we will prepare the plan of coordinating our rural activities with the counter-pacification task in 1971.

2. Specific activities in rural areas may be summarized as follows:

To change the balance of forces between the enemy and the friendly sides in hamlets and villages, we must wipe out all the enemy forces, strengthen our armed forces, destroy enemy organizations, and develop our political forces in hamlets and villages. In addition we must disrupt the enemy oppressive machinery, develop the Party's organization, and destroy enemy strongholds. We also have to strengthen our areas of operations and create a new strategic position in hamlets and villages. The above missions must be thoroughly understood to work out a plan for implementation. To accomplish the above missions is to carry out the most important aspects of the revolutionary war policy.

3. Requirements.

These missions must be carried out throughout the rural area. The requirements must be attained by 90% of the villages in the region, 100% of the villages in certain districts, and 60% to 70% of the hamlets. By doing so we can favorably change the balance of forces in the rural area of the Tri-Thien Region. The fulfillment of the prescribed requirements will make our strategic position [solid] and the strategic situation ripe. So every effort should be made to attain this goal in 1971.

4. Direction:

The direction of our efforts will be the lowland and rural areas, districts and villages of the areas bordering cities, and prosperous and densely populated areas where the enemy is carrying out the Vietnamization policy.

Only by attacking the enemy in these areas can we bring the war into the enemy heart and homeland. Failing to do this will put us in the enemy's trap. To create a strategic position and attack the enemy nerve center areas we must have a firm foothold in these areas as well as in [city] bordering areas [because control of these areas] will facilitate our penetration in deep areas, and because it is in these areas that the Vietnamization policy must be frustrated. To support our activities we must attack the enemy in his rear areas and in the blue [possibly meaning attack his aircraft].

5. A specific division of areas is necessary for the application of guidelines and tactics. According to the rural situation [the region is divided into these areas] the area bordering Route 1; the former liberated areas; the area under enemy temporary control; the concentration areas [sic].

a. The area bordering Route 1 lays within the defensive system of the enemy. We have succeeded in motivating the majority of the people there, and the influence we can exert on them from our mountainous areas is great. The bordering area links the three strategic areas. In the division of areas, the bordering area plays the most important role. This area is more advantageous than the other areas so we are capable of coordinating military and political activities, destroying oppressive forces, and launching attacks on rear and base areas, communication lines and enemy main forces. Outside the populated area we should use armed forces to conduct small and large mobile attacks against sweep operations and encirclements. Inside the populated area we must coordinate military and political activities, annihilate tyrants, and break oppressive controls by mobilizing secret and full time guerrilla forces. Every effort should be made to maintain a legal status for the people.

Attention: in some important hamlets and areas of operation for which there is a common leadership plan, our personnel must operate resourcefully.

b. Former liberated areas: These areas used to be and still are our base areas. But the people are threatened with the annihilating attacks by the enemy. In these areas, the revolutionary pride is low, the remaining people are few, the scope of activities is narrow, and the terrain is disadvantageous. The people in some places have been relocated by the enemy. Therefore our missions consist of restoring the movement and gaining control over the population. We must pay

attention to the motivation of the people. In addition, we must by all means try to develop our armed forces, annihilate tyrants, and launch attacks of all sizes; small, moderate, and large. Political struggles must be stepped up to the utmost to promote [revolutionary] pride, create and maintain legal status for the people, and prevent the enemy from oppressing the people. Large forces should not be employed to hold on to positions and conduct attacks on a long term basis when we do not have a stable foothold in the area. We should make use of the political and military influence which we can exercise from bordering areas and mountainous areas to support our activities there. Concurrently we should use this area to penetrate deep areas, conceal our forces, and extend our offensives to other areas.

c. Deep area [are under RVN temporary control]:

Two-thirds of the rural people live in this area where the enemy implements his Vietnamization plan and sets up his defensive system. Yet the enemy still has some weaknesses because the people there, although they do not have many struggle experiences, bear a deep hatred for him. In some places we have succeeded in motivating them, have good conditions for messing and billeting, and favorable terrain features, but we still have weak installations. We should aim our attacks at these areas in order to thwart the enemy's Vietnamization plan, create our strategic position, and mobilize manpower and material resources to strengthen our forces. To liberate these areas is to defeat the enemy's Vietnamization plan, and to change the balance of power in these areas is to change it in the whole region and partially contribute to restoration of the old liberated areas. We should be highly determined and coordinate military and political activities. We should, at any cost, recruit armed political agents among the people in these areas. These are four methods of recruiting these agents:

First, each overt cadre secretly infiltrates or disguises himself to penetrate these areas to assess the situation, recruit agents, and guide their operations.

Second, improve the capabilities of the agents who have receptive relatives in these areas, plant them there to motivate the people, and recruit new agents.

Third, we can move from the stepping stones in the cities to these areas to recruit agents.

Fourth, we should choose the receptive people in the local areas and assign our agents to recruit them. (We should not choose talkative agents.) The agents assigned must be well instructed in operating methods, in assessing the situation, and mingling with the people. They must study the people's aspirations, make their acquaintance, and establish solidarity with them. They must instruct them in the enemy's plans and in measures to counter the enemy. At first we should limit the liaison between these agents and let them operate separately.

[The balance of these notes discussed political propaganda to refugees in resettlement centers and factors in the change in the "balance of power."]