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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>George S. Lapinskas</i> GEORGE S. LAPINSKAS, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report concerns a full translation of a J2, Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam study on the Communist assessment of the Indochinese situation since the RVNAF/FWMAF operations in Cambodia. The documents on which the study is based were captured by the Long Khanh Sector on 26 October 1970, at YT400048 (Long Khanh). Interpretation of the documents by J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, has not yet been fully correlated with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam interpretation as set forth in this study and may differ in some specific areas.

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URGENT

COMMUNIST DOCUMENT ANALYSIS REPORT

No: 135/70

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REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE

JOINT GENERAL STAFF, RVNAF

J2

No: 2154/TM/2/TT204

I. DATA:

Type of information: Communist military activities.

Origin: J2/JGS.

Source: The Communist documents were captured on 26 Oct 70, by the Long Khanh Sector at coordinates YP400048 (Long Khanh).

Evaluation: A-1

Subject: Communist assessment of the Indochinese situation since the RVNAF/FWMAF operations into Cambodia.

II. CONTENTS:

The documents consist of a directive on intensifying ideological leadership and a training document containing an assessment of the Cambodian operations by RVNAF/FWMAF prepared in Jun 70, by the Propaganda and Training Section, Sub-Region 1. An analysis of these documents provides the following information:

A. The US strategy in Indochina:

1. Strategic policy:

The Communists stated that the US had tried all means to overthrow the neutral Cambodian Government in order to bring Cambodia into the war. It attempted to establish a firm military position and a strategic line of defense stretching from South Vietnam to Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand.

2. Political policy:

The US always advocates settling the war in a "strong position". Therefore, it focussed all its efforts on the Vietnamization plan and maintaining the present regime in South Vietnam. To withdraw its troops and resist North Vietnam, Communist China, and North Korea, the United States had to cause great difficulties to the Vietnamese Communists and coordinate with Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand to establish a defense line throughout Southeast Asia.

((Page 2 of O.T.))

3. Meaning of the coup d'etat in Cambodia.

The Communists stressed that the 18 Mar 70 coup d'etat in Cambodia was arranged by the US so that it could move troops to attack and destroy

key Communist agencies in the border area. The US also conducted limited bombings over North Vietnam in order to hinder the reinforcement of South Vietnam by North Vietnam and limit the attacking force of the South Vietnamese Communists during the campaigns conducted in early 1970. The Communists believed two causes led the RVNAF and FWMAF to initiate operations into Cambodia:

a. Future cause:

The RVNAF/FWMAF hoped to destroy the key military support of the Vietnamese Communists, clear their main forces out of the border area, block their transportation and infiltration corridors, and eliminate their economic potential in order to exert pressure upon the Communists and force them to end the war with conditions advantageous to the RVN and the US.

b. Immediate cause:

The RVNAF/FWMAF hoped to cause difficulties to the Communists and limit their attacking force for the 1970 Spring-Summer Campaign in South Vietnam to support the Laotian battlefield.

E. The Communists' assessment of the situation in Cambodia after the 18 Mar 70 coup d'etat.

1. Militarily:

The Lon Nol Government reoccupied the seaport of Sihanoukville where "merchant ships of socialist countries had previously come to trade with Cambodia. Our side (Vietnamese Communists) also used this seaport to transport a part of our military aid for South Vietnam. However, since 18 Mar 70, (Vietnamese Communists) have no longer used this seaport."

In attacks conducted against Cambodia (especially in the Mo-Vet and Luoi Cau areas), RVNAF/FWMAF reoccupied National Route 1 which leads from Phnom Penh to Saigon and some cities, province capitals, and district seats; captured "a few" weapons and ammunition and a large quantity of rice and food; and destroyed some storage facilities.

2. Vietnamese Communist strengths and weaknesses after the border crossings by RVNAF and FWMAF in May 70.

a. Installations:

The Communists confessed that the RVNAF/FWMAF operations in Cambodia drove them into confusion. They were obliged to move their agencies and storage facilities and disperse their troops for an evacuation.

((Page 3 of O.T.))

Ammunition, weapons, and especially rice were discovered and captured. This disrupted the logistical support for the SVN battlefield.

The replacement of political and military cadre as well as the weapons supply and financial assistance for "the Cambodian Revolution (meaning Red Khmers) was cut off or delayed."

b. The morale and thinking of ((VC)) cadre and soldiers:

Due to the fierceness of the Cambodian border crossing operations conducted by the RVNAF/FWMAF, Communist cadre and soldiers displayed unstable morale.

"We do not know whether we can implement the Party decision outlined in Directive 136 which requires that we change the situation and gain greater successes in 1970.

"The enemy conducts large-scale and long-range attacks on the border areas. How can we provide the battlefield with manpower and material resources? Our ((VC)) forces are thinly dispersed. The war will be prolonged."

"The enemy has a large strength, but friendly forces (Red Khmer) are weak. How can we (Communists) fight in both Laos and Cambodia? Why has Red China not participated in the war?"

"The steering agency of sub-region is on the defensive. How is the leadership for countersweep operations?"

3. Advantages:

Despite these deficiencies and shortcomings, the Communists thought that they had the following advantages:

The border crossing operation will make the "Cambodian Revolution" advance and create conditions for the ((VC)) to fight directly and overtly in Cambodia.

In late Jun 70, the US will withdraw its troops from Cambodia. The remaining RVNAF units will lose the effective air and artillery support and supply.

They will be forced to deploy their troops widely and their combat effectiveness will be reduced.

The Communists, therefore, thought that we ((RVNAF)) would be unable to endure their attacks for a long period of time.

The revolutionary movement in Indochina has been developed. It had only spread to two countries (Vietnam and Cambodia), but now it includes (Laos).

The American antiwar movement has a favorable opportunity to advance.

((Page 4 of O.T.))

C. Communist assessment of the general situation:

At the conclusion of the documents, the Communists expressed the following judgements on the future situation:

The US wishes to establish a pro-American government in Cambodia. However, this government will have neither any popular base of support among the Cambodian people nor gain any support from foreign countries. Its military forces are inadequate. Therefore, in the future they will be unable to accept their responsibilities despite US support.

Furthermore, because too large a force was assigned to Cambodia, the remaining RVNAF troops have been thinly deployed throughout the other battlefields. Many gaps are opened and even the "Vietnamization" and strategic defense plans are affected.

The US support for Indochina was reduced while the war was expanded into the three Indochinese countries. This will lower the rate of military operations and other support by the US.

D. Future Communist activity plan:

Strengthen determination and be determined to implement COSVN Directive 136 of 1970.

Deplete and destroy as much enemy strength as possible, frustrate the pacification plan, and maintain legal status in both RVN and VC controlled areas.

Strengthen ((VC)) forces in every field and create new opportunities to gain greater achievements.

Ensure successful operations on the battlefield and avoid unnecessary casualties.

Practice thrift and be self-sufficient.

Strengthen the guerrilla warfare movement, disorganize the People's Self-Defense Force, and seize power from low to high levels.

Consolidate and develop forces in order to meet the revolutionary requirements in villages and hamlets.

III. COMMENTS BY J2, JGS:

1. The documents are valuable, because they give further details of the Communists' assessment of the situation after the 18 Mar ((70)) coup d'etat in Cambodia. They disclose that the morale of North Vietnamese Communist cadre and soldiers is low since the border crossing by RVNAF/FWMAF.

((Page 5 of O.T.))

2. Although the purpose of these documents is to spread propaganda, they demonstrate that the Communists have been encountering difficulties since the coup d'etat in Cambodia. They fear our border crossing operations, especially the blockade of Sihanoukville.

3. This problem affects both the VC in RVN Military Regions 3 and 4 and those in the Western Highlands and in Laos.

For General Cao Văn Viên
Chief of JGS, RVNAF
For LT GEN Nguyễn Văn Mạnh
Chief of Staff, JGS
Colonel, Acting Chief of J2/JGS.

((Signed and sealed))

END OF TRANSLATION