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15. SUMMARY:

(C-Apr 71) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns Circular 87/TBSY, dated 31 October 1970, which is signed by Phan Van Trang for the Current Affairs Committee of U ((possibly Bien Hoa)) Province Party Committee, ((VC Region 7)). It was distributed to various districts and agencies and informs them of the enemy ((PWMAF/RVNAP)) scheme of strengthening the People's Self-Defense Force. The document criticizes the enemy scheme and urges friendly ((VC/NVA)) cadre to strongly oppose it. The plan for opposing this scheme includes indoctrinating the people, assassinating ((RVN)) policemen, security agents, and tyrants ((meaning RVN officials)), and destroying People's Self-Defense Force units.

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Number: 87/TBSY

To: Various districts and agencies.

R ((COSVN)) just informed us of the enemy scheme of strengthening the ((RVN)) People's Self-Defense Force during 1970 as follows:

The enemy planned to select 500,000 from his 1,500,000 People's Self-Defense Force members to activate a People's Self-Defense Combat Force. This force is to carry out defensive missions and attack our revolutionary agencies in villages and hamlets, then gradually conduct patrols and coordinate in sweep operations with Regional and Popular Forces to enable enemy main forces to attack the border and Cambodia. The area of operations of the Regional Force is large, while the Popular Force coordinates with the People's Self-Defense Force to attack our low-level revolutionary installations.

The enemy intended to organize one inter-group in each hamlet (equivalent to a platoon) and two or three inter-groups in densely populated hamlets. Then, group leaders (equivalent to squad leaders) and inter-group leaders (equivalent to platoon leaders) will be trained at training centers to become key officials while their members are trained in place by mobile training teams. Training expenditures are contributed by the people in the hamlets. After training, they will be armed with modern weapons and automatic rifles. By the end of 1970, Categories A, B, and C hamlets will complete the organization. Category A hamlets will be organized first. To step up the attack on revolutionary installations and intensify the activities of the People's Self-Defense Force, the enemy establishes police posts in villages and hamlets. The enemy military security service also establishes its posts in villages and hamlets.

The budget reserved for 60,000 key personnel of the People's Self-Defense Force increased from 391 to 789 million piasters.

The above cunning scheme reflects the enemy stubbornness. His intent is to turn a large number of people against the Revolution with the idea of destroying our revolutionary installations, consolidating control over local people and, at the same time, creating a reserve force, and concentrating the Puppet Regional Force and main force in order to attack the Revolution. At present, the enemy is still capable of carrying out his plan and causing difficulties for us in his defensive operations, especially in his temporarily controlled areas. But this scheme will drive the enemy to a political failure. It will create dissension between the enemy and the people. The people will soon realize that with this scheme, the enemy drives their relatives to death and also compels them to contribute money to support his force. The people and majority of members of the People's Self-Defense Force are opposing this organization. They will succeed in disorganizing the People's Self-Defense Force if we provide them with effective leadership.

Therefore, in defeating the enemy pacification program, cadre of all levels should pay attention to frustrating the enemy intent of organizing the People's Self-Defense Force. Give concern to the following points:

1. Make the people and members of the People's Self-Defense Force clearly realize the cunning enemy schemes and motivate them not to join the enemy organization and not to contribute money to him. When forced to join the People's Self-Defense Force, they should try to disorganize it.
2. Annihilate the enemy personnel who force the people to join their organization, personnel of enemy village police posts, military security agents, and key officials and disintegrate the remainder.
3. According to the situation and requirements of local areas, make proper plans for attacks against the enemy People's Self-Defense Force. Disarm their members to make them unable to operate or step up struggles to cause difficulties to the enemy. At the same time, secretly plant our agents in enemy organizations to control some key enemy personnel with the idea of expanding our control, staying close to the organization, eliminating tyrants, and establishing a fifth-columnist force for disrupting the whole organization when necessary. Take advantage of this opportunity to disrupt enemy organization so that he cannot use this force to attack our revolutionary movement and installations. All areas should properly assess the situation to promptly provide effective leadership and then forward reports on the results and strong and weak points to the Front. ((NFLSVN)).

Above is information on the current situation and guidances provided by the Current Affairs Committee of NT ((COSVN)) to various districts for study and execution. The Current Affairs Committee of U ((possibly Bien Hoa Province Party Committee, VC Region 7)) provides our U ((possibly province)) the following points:

1. Make cadre and village Party Chapters clearly realize that the enemy Vietnamization program and his special pacification plan will force our people to serve as the US' henchmen to attack the Vietnamese people, especially in villages and hamlets. We should not place less emphasis on these plans.
2. Indoctrinate the people to clearly realize the enemy scheme so that they will strive to frustrate his scheme by opposing conscription and refusing to join the People's Self-Defense Force, receive weapons, stand guard duty, attend military training, and contribute money in support of the People's Self-Defense Force.
3. At present, the enemy organizes the People's Self-Defense Force in every village. We must make close contact with the people and families that sympathize with the Revolution to recruit agents to assess the situation. Then, groups of agents should coordinate with our troops to disarm the village People's Self-Defense Force and instruct them not to receive weapons, stand guard duty, or persuade others to enlist in the People's Self-Defense Force.

The enemy is organizing People's Self-Defense Force units consisting of women and teenagers called "rural protection female units" and "rural protection teenager units." We should motivate the people to oppose and destroy these organizations.

All villages should fully understand the situation of each village and hamlet in order to report to the district. The district should follow up this report to provide guidance and submit the report to U ((possibly Biên Hoà Province Party Committee)). Recently, we failed to keep track of the situation and our countermeasures were inadequate. In some villages, such as Hưng Nghĩa, where we successfully motivated the people to oppose the People's Self-Defense Force and seize its weapons, the enemy could not carry out his activities. In other places, such as Báp Ham 1, and Bàu Ca we succeeded only in weakening it. In many villages and hamlets where we could not motivate the people, the enemy successfully carried out his activities.

Besides the People's Self-Defense Force, the enemy set up one police sub-station in Areas 2 and 3 of Vinh Cửu Village to oppress the people in local areas. We should shadow the personnel of these sub-stations and find out their messing and billeting procedures in order to organize secret guerrillas to destroy them.

All districts should regularly report to the Current Affairs Committee of U on enemy schemes and tricks and our countermeasures.

31 Oct 70

For the Current Affairs Committee of U

/S/ Phan Văn Trang

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