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15. SUMMARY: (Leave Blank)

(U) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns Directive 46/CT, issued by the Command Committee, ((VC)) Military Region 6. The directive, dated 25 November 1970, concerns the development of forces in 1970 and 1971.

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(C) CDEC COMMENT: This document was captured on 20 April 1971 in South Vietnam (BN235578; RVN MR 2) by Recon Co, 44th Inf, 23rd RVNAF Inf Div. The document was received at CDEC on 1 June 1971, and was summarized in Bulletin Number 44,310, dated 3 June 1971, under CDEC Document Log Number 06-1065-71. Translation was requested by JUSPAO, Vietnam.

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13.18.01

SOUTH VIETNAM  
LIBERATION ARMY

Military Region 6

No. 46/CT

/TOP SECRET/ ((VC Classification))

D I R E C T I V E

DEVELOPMENT OF FORCES IN 1970-1971

To meet the requirements of the situation, the ((SVNLA)) Military Affairs Party Committee and the ((VC)) Military Region ((6)) Headquarters has issued a directive pertaining to the development of combat units and staff agencies at region, province, and district levels during late 1970 and early 1971. The directive is reproduced as follows:

I. IN 1969 AND EARLY 1970, MANY SUCCESSES WERE ACHIEVED IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARMED FORCES THROUGHOUT ((VC MILITARY)) REGION ((6)).

a. During various climaxing phases, ((military)) region, province, and district armed units gained numerous achievements and increased their ((combat)) efficiency even though the strength of some units decreased considerably when compared with their strength in late 1968 and early 1969. Particular attention was also paid to the development of sapper, artillery, and engineer units and province and district female units. However, many difficulties were experienced, including a lack of replacements for friendly ((VC/NVA)) units after each operational phase. As a result, the combat formation of province and district forces was upset. In particular, the development of district local force and guerrilla and militia units was low.

b. The quality of friendly units was improved through combat activities. In spite of the strength decrease and shortage of replacements, friendly units attained many achievements throughout ((VC Military)) Region ((6)). They successfully carried out all assigned missions due to intensive military training and proper ideological guidance. However, the progress made by friendly units was not steady. Some units met only 50 percent of the combat requirements; and some others, 30 percent.

c. Province and district agencies were gradually organized according to the basic TO & E. However, the number of non-combat personnel in these agencies was still much higher than that of combatants. This was inconsistent with the principles for the organization of armed forces. Besides, the command channel, especially from district to province levels, remained unimproved and failed to meet the requirements of the current situation.

d. Many weaknesses continued to exist in the administration of troops, weapons, equipment, and Party property, although some progress has been made.

Political indoctrination and ideological guidance were not conducted on a regular basis. All prescribed regulations were not strictly observed.

In some units, there were two or three incidents of desertion. Breach of discipline and loss of weapons and ammunition was prevalent among the units. Besides, some units did not place proper emphasis on capturing enemy weapons.

Due to improper employment of troops, much time was wasted in correcting administrative errors.

Troop messing and care for wounded and sick soldiers were neglected. Casualties from non-combat activities were reportedly increased.

A number of units which failed to accomplish their missions were adversely affected for these reasons.

II. Regarding the development of forces in late 1970 and early 1971, efforts should be made to improve the armed forces in ((VC Military)) Region ((6)) in every field (including the three types of forces and staff agencies) in order to accomplish the missions assigned by the Party. The missions are to accomplish resounding feats with the support of the people, create favorable conditions for friendly units to attain the final victory as soon as possible, and defeat all enemy plans under all circumstances. Consequently, the main point in developing friendly armed forces in late 1970 and early 1971 is to consolidate and increase the quality of various available forces. The activation of additional sapper, special action, engineer, reconnaissance, and signal elements in the units or local areas which need them is a vital task. Preparations should be made to develop these specialized units when the situation permits.

### III. SOME REQUIREMENTS TO BE THOROUGHLY UNDERSTOOD IN DEVELOPING ARMED FORCES.

Indoctrination training and ideological guidance should be conducted for armed forces and guerrilla and militia units on a continuous basis. Party Committees and unit commanders of higher echelons are to help Party Committees and unit commanders of lower echelons improve the troop morale and maintain the high spirit of a heroic army. Efforts should be made to eliminate all signs of bureaucracy, arrogance, and breach of discipline which are detrimental to the good traditions of our army.

Due to the small quantity of friendly forces, emphasis should be placed on increasing their quality by intensifying indoctrination and military training. The purpose is to reduce casualties, improve combat capabilities, and accomplish all assigned missions.

Particular attention should be paid to caring for and feeding wounded and sick soldiers. Those wounded and sick soldiers who are unfit for combat activities should be properly utilized.

Agencies should be reduced to small and compact organizations according to the situation in our region. At the same time, emphasis should be placed on sending healthy staff agency personnel to combat units as replacements. These personnel should be replaced by capable wounded and sick soldiers acting as medics, cooks, liaison and ((farm)) production personnel, and quartermasters etc...((sic)). In addition, ((VC Military)) Region ((6)) units should not use more than 35% of their total personnel for staff work; province units should not use more than 30%; and district units should not use more than 20%.

Local units should take particular interest in destroying ((RVN)) hamlets, liberating the civilian people, and expanding ((VC-controlled)) areas. They should also recruit as many youths as possible to provide replacements for combat units. Staff agencies in the rear areas are to receive necessary replacements only. Not only should province and district units provide replacements for themselves, but also for units of higher echelons. Local units are to provide replacements for ((VC Military)) Region ((6)) units operating in their areas.

The table of organization of the unit should be strictly observed. Any change in the organization of the unit should be reported to higher headquarters (district units should submit reports to province units and province units to Military Region ((6)) units for approval). Sapper, special action, engineer, and artillery units are authorized to receive replacements from staff agencies in the rear areas.

To temporarily solve a number of problems due to personnel shortages, personnel of subordinate units and agencies should assume other responsibilities besides their official jobs. For example, liaison personnel and medics should be concurrently cooks and armorers. Clerks in D ((possibly battalions)), C ((possibly companies)), and B ((possibly platoons)) should be responsible for management and administration activities.

#### IV. SOME REGULATIONS FOR THE TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT OF MILITARY REGION, PROVINCE, AND DISTRICT UNITS AND FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF STAFF AGENCIES AT VARIOUS LEVELS.

This directive is designed to help subordinate units arrange their organizations. Efforts are to be made to recruit new personnel and reduce the number of non-combat personnel in staff agencies in order to provide more replacements for combat units.

Province and district agencies should use this directive to determine their own strength. Equilibrium between the number of combat and non-combat personnel should be maintained. Actions should be taken to prevent an agency from having a low percentage of combat personnel as compared with its total strength.

Method of implementation:

Upon receipt of this directive, staff agencies should carefully study its content, review the situation in subordinate units and agencies in the province, and formulate a plan which should be approved by the Coordination and operations committee of the province unit. After it is revised by the current affairs committee of the province Party Committee, the plan is to be disseminated to local units and agencies. This first step will end in late Dec 70. The second step, which is designed to review the results from the reorganization and indoctrination training for cadre and soldiers and to work out corrective measures, will last from 12 to 15 Jan 71. During the third step, which will last from late Jan to early Feb 71, subordinate units and agencies are to prepare recapitulation reports and continue to consolidate their organization. In addition, they are to control the implementation of the directive in C's and D's every month.

Remarks: Some parts of the directive should be carried out simultaneously including an adjustment of the number of replacements and an arrangement of detachments in various C's and D's. Results from the development of forces should be reported to higher headquarters every month. In addition, local units should submit their suggestions concerning the development of forces to the Headquarters of ((VC)) Military Region ((6)) for a thorough study.

25 Nov 70

For the Headquarters of ((VC))  
Military Region ((6)).

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