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7. SOURCE: CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT	14. APPROVING AUTHORITY: <i>George S. Lapinskes</i> GEORGE S. LAPINSKES, LTC, USA DIRECTOR, US ELM, CDEC

15. SUMMARY:

(C) This report concerns a full translation of a J2, Joint General Staff, Army of the Republic of Vietnam study on Directive 16/CT-70 of the COSVN Current Affairs Committee. The document on which the study is based was captured by the Racon Platoon of the ((RVNAP)) 404th Battalion on 23 February 1971, at XS434029 (Vinh Binh). Interpretation of the documents by J2, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, has not yet been fully correlated with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam interpretation as set forth in this study and may differ in some specific areas.

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24 Apr 71

APO 4002

Republic of Vietnam  
 Ministry of Defense  
 Joint General Staff  
 J2

No. 0757/TTM/2/TT204

## COMMUNIST DOCUMENT ANALYSIS REPORT

No. 065/71

I. SUBJECT:

Contents of COSVN Current Affairs Committee Directive 16/CT-70 concerning guidance provided for local areas to review past activities and draw future plans for political movements in cities, province capitals and district.

II. CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:

This document was captured by the Reconnaissance Platoon of the ((RVNAF)) 404th Battalion on 23 Feb 71, at coordinates X5434029 (Vinh Binh).

III. CONTENTS:

The document consists of 11 typewritten pages. It is a copy of COSVN Current Affairs Committee Directive 16/CT-70 reproduced by Tu' Binh, acting Region 3 Party Current Affairs Committee member, and disseminated on 26 May 70.

1. Communist assessment of political struggle movements (in 1969-1970):

The assessment was made after the review of vigorous and continuous political struggles in cities and province capitals, especially struggles of students with slogans opposing the collection of tuition fees in public schools, demanding peace and the withdrawal of US troops from SVN and opposing the conduct of military operations into Cambodian territory... ((sic)). The document reveals that the struggle movements were initiated under many forms and maintained in legal status with the large participation of almost all students from high schools and universities in Saigon and large province capitals.

In addition, the movements were supported by a number of professors, students' fathers and brothers, newspapers, senators and representatives (?) ((sic)).

In connection with the above movements, war invalids, workers and women were also incited to demand rights and social warfare and oppose dismissal, etc ... ((sic))

The document also mentions that the movements of the "Progressive Buddhists" has not yet restored its powers and positions and that the "Front 3" force (meaning defeatist neutralist) was weaker than before and did not succeed in rallying its own force. In another paragraph of the document which contains the comments on the political struggle movement in Saigon, the Communists admit that thanks to the leadership of the Party headquarters at various echelons in Saigon and local areas, the timely exploitation of enemy contradictions, the many forms applied in struggles, and the use of appropriate slogans, the political struggle movements in Saigon and the cities "have successfully developed." The political struggle movements in many local areas have been promptly coordinated with Saigon movements, especially the struggle movements of students and war invalids. However, the leadership of the steering committee (which failed to directly control the war invalids) was still poor.

## 2. Leadership in the immediate future:

### a. Requirements:

In order to successfully coordinate the struggles in Saigon and SVN cities with those on the SVN battlefields and the revolutionary movement in Indochina, the following requirements are to be fulfilled: Strengthen leadership and especially organization to control the political movement in Saigon and cities "to advance the movement."

Concentrate efforts on strengthening forces and skillfully exploit dissensions among the people and all social strata to strengthen the movement.

### b. Specific missions:

Continue to maintain and step up the students' struggle and use it as a fuse to ignite the larger struggles.

Rely on the experience gained from past struggles and coordinate separate struggles with large-scale ones under all forms.

Rapidly recruit agents among students and admit zealous students into the Party.

Activate more legal and semi-legal organizations to lead the movement, concurrently motivate the people of all social strata such as professors and students' fathers and mothers to support the movement. Strive to step up the struggle movements of women, war invalids and workers in various areas in coordination with those in Saigon.

Develop key agents in all commercial enterprises and labor unions, especially in the main objective (Saigon).

Emphasize stepping up legal activities especially those of Front 3 of "the Progressive Buddhists."

### Comments of J2/Joint General Staff (CDEC)

1. This document was disseminated in the middle of 1970 but it is still useful for studying the Communist plan of motivating the people in cities, province capitals and district seats, especially in Saigon.

2. This is a strategic plan which has been recorded through Communist captured documents.

3. The primary events of 1970 were the student and war invalid movements; therefore, this directive lays emphasis on taking advantage of these movements. It is necessary to pay attention to the part dealing with the ((VC)) strengthening and development of agents among students and professors and take appropriate action.

4. The term ((Front 3)) is used to distinguish Front 1 (meaning NFISVN) and Front 2 (National Alliance Front for Peace and Democracy). Front 3 is used to designate people of neutral tendency (pro-Communists and defeatists). The Communists presently pay much attention to Front 3 and think that it is lead by the "Progressive Buddhists."

For General Cao Văn Viên  
Chief of Joint General Staff, RVNAF  
For Lieutenant General Nguyễn Văn Mạnh  
Chief of Staff, JGS  
Colonel, Chief of J2, JGS

((Signed and sealed)).

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----