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15. SUMMARY: (C-Jun 71) This report contains information obtained from an enemy document and concerns an extract translation of a notebook maintained by an unidentified member of an unspecified agency ((possibly subordinate to Mo Duc District Party Committee, Quang Ngai Province, VC Region 5)). The extract, dated 12 December 1970, pertains to Resolution 1 which provides an assessment of friendly ((VC/NVA)) activities during 1970, and an outline of military and political activities to be performed in ((Quang Ngai)) Province during the ((1971)) Spring-Summer Campaign.	

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12 Dec 70

POLITICAL REORIENTATION ON RESOLUTION 1 OF TL
 ((POSSIBLY VC QUANG NGAI PROVINCE PARTY COMMITTEE))

The opening of the political reorientation course was at 1300 hours on 12 Dec 70.

A speech was delivered by Comrade T Vu ((possibly Current Affairs Committee)).

To disseminate Resolution 1 of the province Party Committee, the district Party Committee decided to convene the entire Executive Committee of the district Party Committee, the chiefs and assistant chiefs of branches, and the village secretaries.

One comrade read the province resolution on behalf of the Current Affairs Committee of the province Party Committee.

Purpose and requirements ((of the resolution))

During the year, we gained victory through two campaigns, ((Campaigns)) 180 and 130, and frustrated the enemy pacification program. The results have been satisfactory.

To achieve greater victories, we must intensify the movement and make greater efforts.

To achieve overall victory, we must:

1. Thoroughly understand the provisions of the resolution.

Make progress in every field.

2. Properly assess the friendly and enemy situations, understand that we are victorious, and be confident in victory in order to perform our missions.

3. We must thoroughly understand the following points:

How to smash the enemy Vietnamization plan and gain control of the majority of the people.

Improve our ideology and make progress to push the movement one leap forward.

Continue to learn lessons to correct weaknesses.

((The political reorientation is conducted in)) four steps:

1. Study the provisions of Resolution 1 of the province Party Committee.
2. Learn lessons on major missions.
3. Review the activities of the movement.
4. Make the district Party Committee and local areas understand the resolution.

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The contents of Resolution 1 are divided into two parts:

Assessment ((of the situation)).

During the past, the enemy sustained many defeats and was forced to de-escalate the war and withdraw troops gradually. But being stubborn by nature, he still keeps his troops ((in SVN)). He implemented the Vietnamization plan, and to save the situation, he tried to enlarge the war in Indochina. His efforts resulted in heavy failures.

For example: In Cambodia, we annihilated a great part of the enemy force, liberated territory, and threatened the capital. The enemy was confused while we established the revolutionary front and achieved a great victory.

In Laos, the enemy tried to weaken our movement. He attacked our liberated areas. But we achieved great victories on the Indochinese battlefield.

NVN stands firm and supports SVN.

The backbone of the enemy Vietnamization plan is the pacification program.

When his accelerated pacification program resulted in failure, the enemy shifted to special pacification which has also failed from 1970 to date. In some places, the enemy special pacification activities have decreased. The enemy pacification program is very unstable. The upgrading of enemy troops has been intensified, especially the Regional, Popular, and Regular Forces. Compared to 1965, his strength has not increased and is still 165,000 troops. The enemy force is heterogeneous ((sic)).

In spite of his defensive activities, we succeeded in attacking the enemy and destroying the Tra Bong strong point.

However, the enemy has caused us many difficulties. Compared to 1969, we have succeeded in countering famine. 80,000 US troops withdrew ((from SVN)).

((Possibly the enemy underwent an)) economic crisis.

The four major schemes of the enemy were frustrated.

The enemy tried to cause us difficulties by creating confusion among the people and by attacking our corridors to deal us heavy losses. In brief, the enemy Vietnamization plan has met with total defeat.

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The enemy sustained political failures. Dissension occurred within the Thiệu-Kỳ-Khiêm regime; reactionary parties were disintegrated; and the middle classes strongly opposed the Saigon government. Due to successive failures, the US drove the Paris Conference into deadlock.

The US Government was isolated in America. We achieved great victories. Specifically, we succeeded in maintaining control over the people and smashing the enemy pacification program. During the spring-summer phase, we conducted Campaigns 180 and 130, **annihilating a great part** of the enemy force. Our movement in enemy controlled areas was promoted by competent agents. The legal movement was also intensified.

Compared with 1969, our financial and economic situation has improved **a little**.

The situation has the following characteristics:

1. We succeeded in destroying a number of strongholds in Quảng Ngãi and some blocking points in other areas.
2. We attacked resettlement centers to gain control of the people, as in Kim Sa.
3. We expanded our attacks to gain first piecemeal, and then overall, control from Bình Trung to west of Bình Sơn.
4. We filled the unpopulated areas by bringing the people back to farm, as was done in Đức Phổ, west of Tú Trùng, Bình Sơn, Mộ Đức, Cay Gáo, and Cam Tịnh.

We succeeded in winning over the people throughout the province. Our movement in cities was promoted. North of Quảng Ngãi, we recruited 500 teenagers.

Seeing that the use of reason with the enemy did not succeed, we resorted to the use of force to counter enemy attacks. We can conclude that our movement will take a great leap forward. The situation shows our capability.

Reasons for victory:

1. We had a correct Party policy and a political reorientation which improved our ideology and strengthened our confidence.
2. Our Party Headquarters and people inherited a good tradition. They have unity of mind and are faithful.

3. There is support for the war in Indochina. In our region the victories achieved are still small in comparison to our requirements and capability.

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Especially in Quang Ngai, our troops were competent and inherited a good tradition .

Weaknesses:

Military: Military operations were still poorly conducted. We failed to annihilate the enemy. Guerrilla warfare was not regularly waged, and the recruitment of forces did not equal the losses sustained.

The development of **regular forces and guerrillas** was slow.

Counterpacification activities were not conducted promptly and were sporadic. We failed to break the oppressive enemy control and win the support of the people. Our agents operating in enemy controlled areas were inadequate and weak. The elimination of tyrants was not successfully carried out as required by the movement.

Our movement in district seats was weak politically, militarily, and economically.

Guidelines for political and military proselyting activities were not understood. Political and military proselyting organizations did not coordinate with each other. Operational methods were not very effective.

Counterconscription activities and destruction of the People's Self-Defense Force was unsatisfactory.

The development of Party and the Group Forces was still weak. Replacements, especially for frontline Party Chapters, were not timely.

Production, requisition, and purchasing of food was unsatisfactory.

Requirements for a food surplus were not fulfilled.

Counterespionage activities were weak, and our sense of vigilance was not high.

The "**all the people fight the enemy**" movement was not strong enough.

The ideology ((of our troops)) was poor. Therefore, our activities were not constant, and the motivation ((of the people)) was not actively performed.

((Party)) policies were not thoroughly understood or successfully implemented. This limited the development of the movement. Some areas did not even discuss gaining control over the people.

Causes for weaknesses:

1. Our men did not understand the Party policy or the characteristics of each activity phase.
2. They did not properly estimate the enemy and friendly situations.
3. They were not determined to eliminate individualism and rightism and to pursue high goals.
4. They did not study activity plans carefully. Therefore, these plans were not effective.

III ((SIC)) GUIDELINES AND MISSIONS:

Forthcoming enemy schemes: The enemy is very stubborn. He is placing his hopes in the Vietnamization plan. He therefore concentrates all his combat efforts against our forces. His schemes are old and well-known by everybody, so he is trying to invent risky new schemes.

The enemy may increase sweep operations and intensify military activities before Tét. Taking advantage of the storms and floods, he may launch attacks against our forces to stem our offensive activities and cause us great difficulties.

Anticipated activities:

The US will withdraw more of its troops ((from SVN)) and turn a number of strongholds over to the Puppet ((RVN)) troops.

The enemy is doing his best to conscript and upgrade troops.

The US is executing sweep operations to support pacification activities.

((sic)) ((The enemy)) is carrying out large-scale ((pacification activities)) in prosperous, densely-populated areas and dominated areas, especially the coastal districts, to stop our attacks. The US is trying to consolidate the Puppet Government and its defensive system.

The enemy will land his troops suddenly to attack our forces, intensify activities of Lê Liêt ((possibly meaning US Marines)), and ambushes against hamlets, relocation areas, and corridors. He will occupy more blocking points and send more administrative personnel to them to gain control over the people.

He will plant spies in our ranks to undermine and weaken our forces and create favorable conditions for his forces to raid us.

He will increase psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities to divide our ranks.

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In brief, the enemy will try to weaken our infrastructure to destroy our forces and accomplish his pacification program during the dry season.

The enemy will use money as a means of bribery and increase his economic robbery.

He will concentrate his efforts on undermining farming to cause us difficulties.

In conclusion, the enemy is weakened, but he is still very stubborn and his strong points are momentary ((sic)). His troops are numerous, but he still has shortcomings.

1. The US will continue the withdrawal of its troops ((from SVN)).
2. Enemy forces are widely dispersed on the battlefield. The balance of forces is tipping to our side. Enemy war facilities and troops are decreasing.
3. Puppet troops are not capable and are demoralized. Enemy organizations are in chaos.

Difficulties and advantages:

1. Enemy attacks caused us losses.
2. Our forces developed slowly. Policies and guidelines were not thoroughly understood.
3. Farming was not increased much because of difficulties caused by enemy attacks. Rear services provided for the people were not secure.
4. Rightism, reluctant attitudes, and fear of death were still prevalent. Party organizations and people's organizations were not closely coordinated. Tasks were not successfully performed.

Great advantages:

1. The US is de-escalating the war because it is being defeated.
2. Our forces have recently shown great potential in attacking the enemy. The Party Headquarters was united in thought and purpose.
3. Leadership was close and appropriate to the situation. It was a great support to our forces.

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General Mission

Measures taken to achieve great victories during the winter, spring, and summer phases.

1. Motivate ((our troops to perform their tasks)).
2. Intensify three-pronged attacks, motivate the people to rise up and partially liberate the ((local)) areas.
3. Increase our movements in district seats and province capitals.
4. Enthusiastically counter enemy conscription and fulfill the prescribed requirements.
5. Make strenuous efforts to gain great victories now and decisive victories in the future.

Our ((present)) goals:

1. Force the US to withdraw its troops ((from SVN)).
2. Form a coalition government ((in SVN)).
3. Win the support of the majority of the people.
4. Weaken the enemy.

Tasks:

1. Focus efforts on destroying the enemy, especially the Puppet forces.
2. Develop three-pronged attacks and motivate the people to participate in the combat task.
3. Intensify all movements in the cities, including the guerrilla warfare movements. Stage uprisings and launch three-pronged attacks against the enemy.
4. Make every effort to strengthen our forces and recruit soldiers for the third activity phase, emphasizing the development of our organizations. Initiate guerrilla warfare movements and develop ((agricultural)) production to strengthen our liberated areas in all fields.
5. Provide leadership for economic activities and prevent famine.
6. Intensify the ideological and organizational tasks.

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Improve our ideology.

Tightly control the organization ((of units and agencies)).

Request the Current Affairs ((Committee)) to point out the seven tasks ((sic)).

1. Carry out the present military tasks and maintain our attacks launched in the three areas. Kill many enemy troops, including the US Marines and mobile troops, and destroy tanks and aircraft. We can then defeat the enemy pacification program, and at the same time, carry out our combat task, strengthen our guerrilla forces, improve our tactical and technical skills, and heighten our combat effectiveness.

Develop the local and guerrilla forces, especially secret guerrillas. Increase the number of village guerrillas. Assign them to districts for reinforcement and pay more attention to the training of sapper and engineer units and the improvement of our armed and guerrilla forces.

By so doing, we will be capable of foiling the enemy pacification program.

2. Motivate the people to establish combat villages.

Manufacture rudimentary weapons, construct fortifications, fight the enemy, and maintain contact with him.

Gain the initiative to fight the enemy.

On the front line:

Increase our regular activities, destroy enemy spy networks, and hit the enemy ringleaders.

Know the enemy situation. Encourage our ((VC)) forces outside enemy areas to launch attacks on the enemy with the support of our forces inside these areas.

Smash enemy ambushes.

Comply with the leadership of higher echelons, destroy the enemy potential, and win the support of the people.

Have small forces using sapper tactics engage larger forces.

Employ small forces to gain remarkable results. Destroy the enemy resettlement centers and key positions.

Prescribe requirements for each person, unit, and guerrilla. The guerrilla forces must annihilate the enemy. The number of guerrillas must equal five percent ((of the population)) in liberated areas, two percent in disputed areas, four percent in ((VC)) controlled areas and one percent in enemy controlled areas.

Each district must have one ((guerrilla)) platoon.

COUNTER THE ENEMY SPECIAL PACIFICATION ACTIVITIES
AND EXPAND OUR AREAS TO WIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE:

We must fully realize the significance of this mission and maintain our liberated areas, bring the inhabitants back to the cleared areas, and win the support of a majority of the people in the rural areas.

We must clearly understand enemy schemes and be determined to destroy him.

Guerrillas must be considered our "backbone" forces. We must intensify our political and military proselyting activities, indoctrinate the people to thoroughly understand enemy schemes, and hold our areas of responsibility.

We must strengthen our forces politically and military. Cadre and soldiers must build combat fortifications in order to hold the areas.

We must try to encircle enemy blocking positions and conduct attacks to destroy him.

We should make a maximum effort to annihilate tyrants and create favorable conditions to bring the inhabitants back to their former villages.

Specific requirements to be fulfilled:

Break the oppressive enemy control.

1. Maintain our offensive position and fiercely attack the enemy front line. Consolidate guerrilla and secret security forces and destroy irregular forces and covert tyrants.

Strengthen our military forces by 100 to 200 percent.

Strengthen our personnel both in quality and quantity.

The action units must effectively motivate the people ((to take part in revolutionary activities)).

Where conditions are favorable, we should try to penetrate deep into enemy areas and develop our attacks in all directions.

I. INTENSIFY REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN DISTRICT SEATS AND PROVINCE CAPITALS.

Maintain close coordination between forces inside cities and those coming from external areas to destroy the enemy defensive system.

Pay particular attention to annihilating tyrants, intensifying guerrilla warfare, and using violence to confuse the enemy in province capitals.

Conduct political struggles and motivate the people to demand social welfare and democratic rights.

Arouse dissension in the enemy ranks.

Destroy the ((GVN)) People's Self-Defense Force.

Establish steering committees inside cities.

Step up propaganda activities and post political slogans ((against the enemy)).

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Employ sapper and disguised forces to execute deep thrusts into enemy areas.

Conduct political and military proselyting attacks throughout his rear areas.

Keep abreast of student activities and Buddhist movements.

Develop the ((Liberation)) Front.

COUNTER ENEMY SPIES AND PSYWAR ACTIVITIES

Establish penetration bases inside cities. Coordination and Operation cadre must take specific measures to maintain military secrecy.

IV. POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROSELYTING TASKS:

Intensify political and military proselyting activities and conduct an intensive struggle movement demanding the withdrawal of US troops and the overthrow of the Puppet Government.

1. From now to 1971, fierce attacks are to be conducted ((against cities)) at Christmas and the Solar and Lunar New Year Holidays. Therefore, the struggle movement must be maintained.

Specifically, the rural areas must directly counter the enemy pacification activities, robberies, and immoral acts. Hold areas of responsibility and take specific counteractions against enemy violations of the people's rights.

In densely populated and rear areas, motivate the people to demand social welfare and democratic rights. In resettlement camps, motivate the inhabitants to demand to return to their former villages.

Consolidate leadership committees to guide their specialized units and branches effectively.

Counter enemy conscription and conduct military proselyting activities:

Recognize the significance of the strategic Party task and ((observe the following points)):

1. Motivate the people to use violence against enemy conscription.
2. Motivate the people and servicemen's families to participate in military proselyting activities to disorganize enemy ranks and annihilate tyrants.
3. Make maximum efforts to plant more fifth columnists in enemy ranks.

Motivate US soldiers to participate in the antiwar movement.

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V. ESTABLISH STRONG BASE AREAS

1. Continue to recruit agents during the third phase, paying particular attention to Party Chapters. Consolidate organizations.
2. Spare no effort to strengthen the tools to protect the government, village units, and security ((sections)).

Exert every effort to counter enemy psywar activities. Institute ((progressive)) culture and education. Use banners. Conduct training courses. Organize medical services. The more we intensify these missions, the sooner we will be successful.

3. Increase ((farm)) production.
4. Conduct political motivation for the people. Initiate an emulation movement to follow the illustrious example of Uncle Hô. Promote the masses' will to fight the Americans for national salvation.

VI. ECONOMY AND FINANCE

Assign immediate and long-range missions to our men. Consider production a primary task. Exert all effort to achieve great victories during the Winter-Spring Campaign. Increase cultivated land and store water.

Protect ((rice)); conduct three-pronged attacks; and be frugal in expenditures.

Make ((the distribution of)) land more just.

2. Purchasing and requisitioning ((of materials))

For the sake of the survival of the Resistance, it is vital to push forward the requisitioning and purchasing ((of materials)).

VII. IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION:

The following are basic and decisive factors:

Conduct political motivation for the Party and the people.
Properly assess the enemy and friendly situations.

Develop revolutionary determination. Be dedicated to the Communist ideal. Promote internal solidarity. Be alert to enemy schemes.

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Thwart the enemy psywar plan. Conduct Party caucuses in all Party Chapters and cells on a regular basis.

2. Organize and recruit agents for hamlet and village units.

3. Recruit more Party members. Attempt to establish legal Party Chapters in the front areas. Spare no efforts to recruit Ho Chi Minh Generation Party members. Establish Four-Good-Quality Party members and insure that 60 to 70 percent of all Party Chapters will become Four-Good-Quality Party Chapters and will voluntarily perform missions.

DISCUSSION ON ENEMY DEFEATS AND HIS STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Victories and their causes.

Our deficiencies and their causes.

Find out the reasons for deficiencies still prevalent in units.

Promote achievements of local units.

((Point out)) specific failures of local units.

Strengthen our forces.

Assess our capabilities for all possibilities.

The discussions on the first part ((of the enemy defeats)) will last one hour and 15 minutes. Those for friendly achievements will last an hour and a half. An hour and a half is reserved for comments on ((friendly)) vulnerabilities. We must have a plan to encourage personnel to express their opinions.

((TN: The pages following the extract translation contain political indoctrination lessons, and reports on the hamlet guerrillas in Đúc Thanh Village and the status of personnel in Đúc Minh village.))

----- END OF TRANSLATION -----