

VALUES AND DECISIONS SERIES

INTERVIEW

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The Vietnam Buildup



A Time for

DECISION

By March of 1965, after long years of political and military strife, the Republic of Vietnam seemed about to fall to Communist forces.

Most Americans were only vaguely aware of the crisis. Indeed, public opinion polls taken as late as 1964 indicated that only 25 percent of the American people had even heard of Vietnam.

But America was already deeply involved. For ten years, under three Presidents, the U.S. had been pouring guns, ammunition, aircraft, and military and political advisers into this tiny Southeast Asian country in an effort to prevent a Communist take-over.

Until now the military, as well as the diplomatic, job had been assigned largely to professionals: Green Beret Special Forces, career Air Force and Navy men, West Point officers.

As yet there had been no massive commitment of U.S. ground combat troops—infantry and artillery units that would necessarily involve draftees, or a call-up of National Guard or reserve troops as in a “regular” war.

Yet it was on the ground that the Communists were winning: with guerrilla raids on hundreds of villages; with the support of increasing thousands of infantrymen infiltrating from Communist North Vietnam—winning against a South Vietnamese army that still seemed poorly led and lacking in fighting morale, and an unstable South Vietnamese government shot through with rivalries and political plots.

How much further was America willing to go in defending South Vietnam? How many American families were prepared to send their sons—drafted from civilian life—to possible death in this faraway Asian land?

The values upon which a decision had to be made were varied and conflicting. Generations of military men, including Gen. Douglas MacArthur, had warned against becoming involved in a ground war in Asia. President Johnson, in a campaign speech in 1964, had said “I will not send American boys to do a job that Asians should be doing.”

Yet for more than 20 years the U.S. had been committed to a “containment of communism”—in Western Europe, in Greece, in Korea. If the average American knew little about Vietnam, he was, at least, on the side of freedom and democracy. He knew that Communist expansion had destroyed free democratic governments in many countries since World War II and could pose a threat to his own.

The average American, of course, would not make the decision himself. But the men at the top, whose advice would weigh heavily in the outcome, reflected many of these same basic values. And when all of the advice was in—military, political, strategic—one man, President Lyndon B. Johnson, would make a decision based on his own values.

This book is about that crucial decision; one that, like so many others, has shaped the course of our history.

Vietnamese army and their own awkward position. But as the tempo of the fighting rose, Americans accompanying South Vietnamese combat units died in increasing numbers. In the first month of 1964, 173 Americans lost their lives.

South Vietnam's capital city of Saigon became swollen with refugees uprooted by the war. Prices soared. As the crisis deepened, fear once reserved for the countryside now seeped through Saigon. The United States feared that the Communists would actually take over all of South Vietnam.

The Administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson had already publicly committed the United States to preventing South Vietnam from falling to the Communists. In his first major public statement on Vietnam, President Johnson reaffirmed President Kennedy's basic policy of opposing Communist expansion in Southeast Asia.

And in a National Security Action memorandum on November 26, 1963, President Johnson wrote that the American goal in South Vietnam was to assist "the people and government of that country to win their contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy."

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk spoke repeatedly of America's determination to keep its treaty promise to South Vietnam. He said that the United States could not shrink from protecting that nation's right to be free and to determine its own future. The worldwide prestige of America and the value of her word seemed to be squarely on the line.

But the United States also considered South Vietnam important to American security. Every Communist victory was seen as a potential threat to the U.S. itself. And since World War II, American policy had been directed at containing the spread of world communism.

Under this policy the U.S. helped Greece, Turkey, and other countries stave off Communist threats. In the early 1950's the United States and her allies made a bloody stand against a Communist military challenge in Korea.

The stakes for America were high. If South Vietnam fell to the Communists, it was widely believed that Laos, Cambodia,

Thailand, and Malaysia would topple like a set of dominoes. This was the so-called "domino theory," developed in the 1950's during the Eisenhower administration and continued under President Kennedy.

In 1964 the domino theory had support among top officials in the U.S. Government—including President Johnson. As the crisis in South Vietnam deepened, some of his advisers urged President Johnson to order a full-scale bombing of North Vietnam by U.S. planes. The President resisted advice to step up American involvement in the war. He was in the midst of a presidential campaign in which he was seeking public and congressional support for election. In speeches he criticized his Republican opponent, Sen. Barry Goldwater, for urging immediate heavy bombing of North Vietnam.

However, the Pentagon Papers (secret documents published by *The New York Times* in 1971) revealed that there was already agreement within the Johnson Administration to launch air strikes early in 1965 against North Vietnam. A final decision on bombing was not made, according to the Pentagon Papers, because "tactical considerations required a delay."

In August 4, 1964, two U.S. destroyers patrolling in the Gulf of Tonkin off North Vietnam reported that they had been attacked by North Vietnamese patrol boats. The destroyers had been gathering information for South Vietnamese commando attacks. Twelve hours after the report of the attacks reached Washington, U.S. jets were on their way to bomb North Vietnam in retaliation.

A few days later President Johnson asked for and received from Congress a resolution that not only approved the bombings but also gave him broad support for future action against the Communist forces. It was resolved that "the Congress approve and support the determination of the President, as commander-in-chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression."

The Tonkin Gulf Resolution, as it was named, passed easily in Congress on August 7. The vote was 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to 0 in the House of Representatives. The two senators

who voted against the resolution were Wayne Morse of Oregon and Ernest L. Gruening of Alaska.

The resolution would later be the subject of bitter controversy. But at the time it appeared to give President Johnson wide authority to act in South Vietnam.

Pressure on the President built. On November 1 the Viet Cong launched a devastating mortar attack on the U.S. base at Bien Hoa, 20 miles northeast of Saigon. The surprise attack destroyed five B-57 bombers worth \$1.25 million each and killed four Americans and wounded dozens of others. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urged President Johnson to make a strong military reply.

Still the President hesitated to make a decision. Instead he appointed William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to head a group of high-level advisers to prepare "options"—possible courses of action. The Bundy group met on November 3, the day that Mr. Johnson won the 1964 presidential election by a landslide.

After a series of meetings the Bundy group sent its recommendations to President Johnson. Every course of action presented to the President contained some form of bombing of

A devastating mortar attack by the Viet Cong on the U.S. air base at Bien Hoa increased pressure on President Johnson.



North Vietnam. In December President Johnson finally agreed that bombing in increasing amounts would force Hanoi to come to terms favorable to the United States.

Before the bombing began, Washington's sense of the crumbling military situation was heightened. Two South Vietnamese marine battalions were nearly wiped out by Viet Cong forces outside of Saigon. It had been a "highly visible" defeat. A few weeks later the Viet Cong launched a daring attack on a U.S. military compound at Pleiku in the central highlands. Nine Americans were killed, 76 wounded.

Within 14 hours of the Pleiku attack nine U.S. Navy jet fighter-bombers penetrated a heavy layer of monsoon clouds and delivered bombs and rockets upon North Vietnamese training barracks in Donghoi, 40 miles inside North Vietnam. A few days later, on February 13, 1965, President Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder—continuous bombing of North Vietnam—to begin.

The President was gambling that the air assaults would break North Vietnam's will and persuade Hanoi to call off the Viet Cong attacks in South Vietnam. But, after three weeks of heavy bombing, no word came from Hanoi. The bombing seemed to stiffen rather than soften North Vietnam's backbone.

The situation in South Vietnam was more desperate than ever. With the Saigon government in disarray and the South Vietnamese army reeling from defeat, the war was being lost to the Communists forces. Reports indicated that the Communists were moving in for the kill.

According to the Pentagon Papers, the United States had two choices: (1) to withdraw from Vietnam, leaving the South Vietnamese to fend for themselves, or (2) to send American combat troops to South Vietnam.

The decision was President Johnson's.



THE MAN A Vigorous President

● ONE day in 1965, Lady Bird Johnson, the President's wife, said, "I just hope that foreign problems do not keep mounting. They do not represent Lyndon's kind of Presidency."

She was voicing what most observers already believed—that the Chief Executive's able mind preferred to concentrate on the *national* rather than the *international* arena.

Modern American Presidents such as Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower had felt at home beyond American shores. They had dealt with foreign leaders in a variety of situations, both military and diplomatic, through the long years of World War II and the international political maneuvering that followed.

Lyndon Johnson, on the other hand, was an all-American product. And he once remarked, "Foreigners are not like the folks I am used to."

Raised in the down-to-earth, roaring, bronco-busting political life of rural Texas, he learned early how to handle the levers of American government. Gifted with brains and guts, he rose swiftly to the national level. As majority leader of the U.S. Senate, he was responsible for the passage of much valuable and progressive legislation during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations.

Few men in the nation's history had learned as much as Johnson about the nuts-and-bolts workings of Washington—and even fewer had understood how to use that knowledge skillfully to get things done.

The longshoreman-philosopher Eric Hoffer once hailed Lyndon Johnson as a truly American President. Hoffer said Johnson's worth could be gauged by the number of times he had traveled across the Rockies—as opposed to the many

fewer times he had made trips to foreign countries.

Johnson liked the carving of highways across lonely plains, the stringing of electric wires, the building of dams. The common Yankee worker, struggling his way from poverty to the full life, appealed to him. Earthy in speech, driving in spirit, Johnson believed in the American Dream—and took it for granted that the vast majority of the country did too.

This enthusiasm was a characteristic that he carried everywhere—even into the field of international politics. During World War II he had seen Franklin Roosevelt's bold, get-things-done leadership replace the weak appeasement that had allowed Nazi Germany to threaten the world—and he became dead set against giving in to bullying from any quarter.

It would be nice if foreign powers would let us alone. But if they would not, Johnson believed in handling them firmly.

To critics it often seemed that he oversimplified this belief to the point where any foreign power that resisted American policy was considered an aggressor, an enemy.

A former administration consultant, Eric Goldman, has written: "To him, aggression was the nub of the world problem in the 20th century . . . Looking back over the past, he saw the United States as having been endangered by two major waves of aggression, first the Fascist and then the Communist. The Fascists of the 1930's, he remarked again and again, did not believe the United States understood and would fight for its interests in Europe . . . The Communists of the 1950's did not believe that the United States understood and would fight for its interests in Asia."

Although foreign affairs were troublesome and distracting, Johnson appeared to think that they could be handled by the hard, swift snuffing-out of threats to peace.

In 1961, when Johnson was Vice-President, his brand of Americanism—optimistic, noisy, determined—had a chance to test itself in Southeast Asia. President John Kennedy sent him on a tour to reassure South Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries that the United States stood with them against Communist aggression.

The vigorous Texan stunned everybody. He avoided stuffy meetings with leaders alone. He plunged into a person-to-person diplomacy patterned on the slam-bang fairgrounds model of rural U.S.A.

In Bangkok, Thailand, he burst from his car, arm extended, and shook hands with the astonished crowds. In India he examined the flawless Taj Mahal—then let out a war whoop to test its echo.

Southeast Asia was not used to this kind of approach. Political leaders had always kept their distance from the people, barred by tradition and fear of assassination from the Johnson-style intimacy. By the time he reached Saigon, the Vice-President was convinced that his unconventional Yankee methods were wowing the public.

Coatless, tieless, he moved into throngs of poverty-wracked Vietnamese and made short speeches full of friendship and hope. When the time came to leave, he grabbed a Vietnamese flag and marched with a joyful crowd the last half mile to the plane.

In Manila he shook hands with everybody from Philippine congressional leaders to page boys. On Formosa, he shouted to the Nationalist Chinese: "I assure you on behalf of President Kennedy that we love our friends, and expect to stand behind them every day, today, tomorrow, and every day to come." In New Delhi he gave away old LBJ campaign ball-point pens.

And in Pakistan he told a startled camel driver that "our President wants to see your camel. He has plans to make things better for you." Then he offered the camel driver an expense-paid trip to the United States—which the man promptly accepted.

The whole affair had turned out a thunderous success. While some State Department career men had winced at LBJ's "cornball" display, the Vice-President himself came away convinced that Asians were just like Americans. The common people wanted to climb out of poverty just as the American pioneers had done. They were being held back by heartless enemies, that was all.

"It's the same old story," Johnson announced, "aggression

against decent people, leading to danger of war for all decent people. Aggression is the evil of the 20th century."

The trip sank into Johnson's thinking as a clear warning—Asian Communist aggression must be stopped or it would overflow all through the South Pacific. In a memo to President Kennedy, Johnson said that the time was past for talk; what was needed now was "a clear-cut and strong program of action." And this depended absolutely on the United States.

"There is no alternative to United States leadership in Southeast Asia," the Vice-President wrote. "Leadership in individual countries—or the regional leadership and cooperation so appealing to Asians—rests on knowledge and faith in United States power, will, and understanding."

Determined not to repeat the appeasement policy of the 1930's, Lyndon Johnson believed the nation must go all-out



As President, Lyndon B. Johnson kept a firm grip on the levers of power. But it was said that he was more at home dealing with national problems than with foreign affairs. During World War II, Mr. Johnson served as a naval officer in the South Pacific.

to check any hostile move by an opponent. He said: "The battle against communism must be joined in Southeast Asia with strength and determination to achieve success there—or the United States, inevitably, must surrender the Pacific and take up our defenses on our own shores.

"Asian communism is... contained by the maintenance of free nations on the subcontinent. Without this inhibitory influence, the island outposts—the Philippines, Japan, Taiwan—have no security and the vast Pacific becomes a Red Sea..."

After he became President, Lyndon Johnson continued to see Southeast Asia largely as a vast challenge in economics. He was convinced that the ordinary men and women of the area wanted only to be free from Communist attack so that they could progress as America had progressed.

Finally he announced a far-reaching Asian doctrine. Under it, aggression would be halted. Then the damaged nations would be rebuilt. American farm surpluses would be sent to help them.

All industrial nations (including the Soviet Union) and the United Nations would cooperate by sending engineers, social workers, and teachers. The Mekong River system—the heartland of Southeast Asia—would be converted into a massive TVA-style project. It would supply power and flood control for millions of struggling Vietnamese peasants.

This great vision stayed with the President as he paced the White House, trying to find a formula to build peace in Southeast Asia.

THE ADVISERS

Many Hawks, Few Doves

AS PRESIDENT JOHNSON


moved toward a decision on whether to commit American combat troops to the Vietnam war, he was not alone. Gathered about him were high-ranking military and civilian advisers: Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency John A. McCone, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and top State Department planner Walt Whitman Rostow.

William Bundy, older brother of McGeorge Bundy, participated in Vietnam planning as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. George Ball, Undersecretary of State, was involved as the State Department's number two man and chief troubleshooter. In South Vietnam, General Maxwell D. Taylor was the U.S. ambassador and General William Westmoreland the American military commander.

President Johnson inherited these advisers from President Kennedy, along with a broad commitment to South Vietnam. The advisers had a lot in common, despite differing backgrounds. They were not ordinary bureaucrats or soldiers, but men of superior intelligence and training.

They had been educated at America's best universities and had earned the highest academic honors. Most had been university professors at one stage of their career. Their numerous books ranged from political texts to romantic novels.

As a group they had faith in their ability to solve any problem. Secretary McNamara, once a "whiz kid" at the Ford Motor Company, was said to have a computer mind and the best managerial instincts of any of the advisers. He routinely demanded mountains of information from aides and often startled people with his rapid-fire command of the facts. He



President Johnson confers with his top advisers. left to right, McGeorge Bundy, Robert S. McNamara, and Dean Rusk

gave the impression that any problem could be solved by applying logic to the facts.

The President's chief adviser on foreign affairs is, traditionally, the Secretary of State. President Kennedy had summoned Dean Rusk to that office in 1961 from his post as president of the Rockefeller Foundation.

A former Rhodes scholar and college professor, the soft-spoken Rusk gave the impression of solid ability and quiet determination. He rarely spoke forcefully. But it was known that Rusk felt the United States had to make a strong stand against communism in South Vietnam.

China, a special worry to most of the presidential advisers, cast a particularly dark shadow over Asia in Dean Rusk's eyes. The huge land with its teeming millions and tough-talking leaders seemed to him a threat to be contained.

Rusk's attitude may have stemmed from his World War II experiences in Asia. As an Assistant Secretary of State, Rusk had been an architect of the U.S. decision to take a military stand against the Communists in Korea in 1950.

Ambassador Taylor, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and military adviser to both President Kennedy and President Johnson, was a talented soldier-scholar. Besides being a medal-studded World War II hero and former battlefield commander in Korea, he was fluent in French, Spanish, and German, had a good working knowledge of Japanese, and was rapidly learning Vietnamese. He was steeped in the military classics, from which he could quote readily.

As a military man, Ambassador Taylor was a long-time advocate of the strategy of limited war, as opposed to massive intervention or the use of nuclear weapons. He did not fear U.S. involvement in a land war in Asia so long as it was limited.

According to the Pentagon Papers, he advised President Johnson that the U.S. could function as well militarily in Southeast Asia as it could almost anywhere in the world.

McGeorge Bundy, William P. Bundy, and Walt Rostow were all brilliant intellectuals and members of the so-called "East-

ern Establishment" of influential opinion-molders. They contributed broadly to the President's thinking.

As the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy stood almost equal in rank to McNamara and Rusk. Bundy, formerly Harvard's youngest dean, worked out of a paneled office in the White House basement. His office was a command post from which he channeled ideas to the President and transmitted decisions on all matters of foreign policy.

Bundy's was a fighting brilliance, whether it was in smashing a volley on the tennis court or demolishing a point of view. To him virtue was being right, skillful, and energetic on the big issues. He believed that America's intervention in Vietnam was necessary.

Rostow, formerly a professor of history at MIT, was an influential planner with the State Department. He was, as an admirer noted, "inexhaustible in his capacity to meet every crisis with a plan." President Kennedy had been impressed with Rostow's original and inventive mind. President Johnson was open to his stream of ideas.

William Bundy for years had labored as an official with the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), lost in the shadow of his better-known brother McGeorge. But as Assistant Secretary of State for Asian Affairs, William Bundy played a key role in the decision-making process on Vietnam. He convincingly echoed McGeorge Bundy's view of the Vietnam dilemma.

John A. McCone, Director of the CIA, kept President Johnson abreast of information gathered by his worldwide secret agency. The Pentagon Papers disclosed that intelligence reports frequently contradicted what many of the President's advisers were saying—even on basic assumptions such as the domino theory.

Walt Rostow, Ambassador Taylor, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff seemed to have accepted the domino theory in its most literal meaning—that all the nations of Southeast Asia would automatically tumble into the Communist camp if South Vietnam fell. The President, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy also seemed to have regarded the struggle

in Vietnam more or less in terms of the domino theory.

Mr. McCone directly contradicted this thinking in reply to a question formally submitted by President Johnson. The President asked: "Would the rest of Southeast Asia necessarily fall if Laos and South Vietnam came under North Vietnamese control?"

The CIA replied: "With the exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in the area would quickly succumb to communism as a result of the fall of Laos and South Vietnam." The CIA analysis stated that so long as the United States kept its bases in Guam, Okinawa, the Philippines, and Japan, it could wield enough power to deter China and North Vietnam from aggression against Southeast Asia.

The CIA under Mr. McCone challenged official thinking on another crucial assumption: that the Viet Cong guerrillas in South Vietnam operated under the control and direction of North Vietnam. A CIA analysis stated that the real roots of Viet Cong strength lay in social forces rising in South Vietnam. Such an analysis contradicted the official view that South Vietnam was the victim of aggression from the north.



John A. McCone, left, Director of the CIA, channeled intelligence information to President Johnson. Reports by the CIA frequently contradicted official assumptions. George W. Ball, second-ranked in the State Department, suggested a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam.

George W. Ball, Undersecretary of State, also raised his voice in dissent. He argued that neither bombing North Vietnam nor fighting the Viet Cong on land offered a solution. The Pentagon Papers said: "Convinced that the U.S. was pouring its resources down the drain in the wrong place, Mr. Ball proposed that the United States cut its losses and withdraw from South Vietnam."

The Pentagon Papers said that Ball was "cold-blooded in his analysis." He argued that the U.S. would temporarily lose face by withdrawing, but could emerge from the experience as a "wiser and more mature nation."

But President Johnson was leaning more toward the advice from Vietnam of General Westmoreland and Ambassador Taylor, who were seeking more American troops to hold the line against Viet Cong attacks. The President and most of his advisers, according to the Pentagon Papers, were in no mood for retreat or compromise. Top civilian advisers—McNamara, Rusk, the Bundys, Rostow—joined the military men in favoring a hard line.

Through the whole period President Johnson preferred to order steps that were "noncommitting" to ground combat. Yet weaknesses in the South Vietnamese government and the declining military situation kept driving the planning process toward more forceful measures.

The dominant impression of all this activity was of a President pushing his advisers to plan for increased American military involvement but hesitating to order the plans translated into action.


So the presidential advisers, with their chief's approval, proceeded with secret planning. They would be ready—if and when the President decided to step up American intervention.

During this period it had become fashionable in the United States to divide people into "hawks" and "doves" on South Vietnam. The hawks supported increased American intervention; the doves questioned whether the United States should be involved in the war at all.

Among the President's top advisers there were many hawks but few doves.

THE DEBATE Early Warning Signals

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon (far left) was one of the first prominent Americans to speak out against the war. President Johnson, enjoying wide public support, won the 1964 election by a landslide.



TO the American people, the Johnson advisers were of one mind. When they spoke for the record, it was all talk about defending the independence of South Vietnam. Seldom did any of them ever mention the human price Americans might have to pay for a national commitment to Vietnam.

Then one Sunday afternoon in May 1964, Wayne Morse, a crusty, independent senator from Oregon, appeared on the CBS radio and television program "Face the Nation." For almost 30 minutes the Senator fielded questions put to him by a team of news correspondents: Paul Niven (CBS News), Peter Lisagor (*Chicago Daily News*), and Marvin Kalb (CBS News).

Throughout the interview Senator Morse ripped into the policies and decisions that had drawn the U.S. into an Asian conflict. What follows is some of the dialogue between Morse and the correspondents:

MR. KALB: Senator, do you feel that a U.N. Peace Force can actually maintain peace in as turbulent an area as Southeast Asia?

SENATOR MORSE: Why, if there is any hope for the United Nations to survive, it must. You certainly can't destroy—justify destroying—the United Nations the way we are doing now. The purpose of the United Nations is for the signatories there to band together and keep the peace, and that is why we are supporting United Nations forces in the Congo, in the Middle East, in Cyprus. Why not in Southeast Asia?

MR. KALB: Well, Senator, there is always a constant battle at the U.N. as to how you set up a peace-keeping force under a United Nations umbrella.

SENATOR MORSE: Of course—

MR. KALB: Do you really feel that the Soviet Union, which has already made its position quite clear on this issue,

would agree to setting up a United Nations force for Southeast Asia?

SENATOR MORSE: As I have said so many times in my Senate speeches, let's put Russia and Red China on the spot. Let us put Russia on the spot and see if she dares veto such a program in the Security Council, but don't think the Security Council ends the power of the United Nations. If Russia vetoes it in the Security Council, then you know what I think my Government ought to do? It ought to call for an extraordinary meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations—and I was one of your delegates to the General Assembly in 1960 and after that experience I came away more convinced than ever that the only hope for peace in the world is through the United Nations—and we ought to... let the world speak up, because I am satisfied that the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world would join in insisting that the United Nations move in and maintain the peace. Now,—

MR. KALB: Senator—

SENATOR MORSE: If you are not going to do it, what is your alternative? Let me say on this telecast today to the American people: The real danger, if you don't follow that course of action, is escalating the war in Southeast Asia, and the plans are in preparation for escalating it if our Government decides that is the course it wants to follow. And that will mean the death of thousands and thousands of American boys, and you will be bogged down in Southeast Asia for a quarter of a century and then you won't win.

MR. LISAGOR: Senator Morse—

SENATOR MORSE: I happen to think we are really on the brink this time and the United States ought to take this issue to the United Nations and go back to its glorious record of using the United Nations as the instrumentality for maintaining peace.

MR. LISAGOR: Senator Morse, Communist China is not a member of the United Nations and it is a chief offender in Southeast Asia.

SENATOR MORSE: So what?

MR. LISAGOR: How do you bring China before the dock in

the United Nations? We tried that in the Korean War. It didn't work then. How do you do it in Southeast Asia?

SENATOR MORSE: You won't know until you try it, and let me tell you what I think the result will be. If you get the United Nations to recognize that this is a threat to the peace of the world, and we may go into third world war if we don't stop this, and the nations line up in support of that doctrine, watch Red China work for an accommodation because Red China has no intention in my judgment—she wouldn't be that shortsighted—to try to take on the world.

So Wayne Morse had spoken his piece. Keep on escalating the war, he warned, and young Americans would pay for it with their lives. This article of faith was clear enough. But Morse had trouble in winning converts to it. Only Ernest Gruening of Alaska stood steadfastly with him in the Senate.

Not that the others agreed with every estimate or accepted every report offered by Pentagon strategists. Almost unnoticed, deep doubts were welling up.

For the time being, however, the political and popular mood dictated support for President Johnson. He had been in office scarcely a year. And while he doubtless had influenced U.S. actions in the Far East, he had not really masterminded them. The point of origin went back to other administrations.

Through most of 1964 there were spokesmen aplenty urging Americans to stick it out. They seldom spoke anymore about victory, though. Instead they talked of the long war. Frederick E. Nolting, Jr., U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam from 1961 to 1963, put it this way:

"I believe we must hang on and build back. We should not offer to negotiate from a weak position. Our U.S. strategic interest is essentially to block the advance of communism in Southeast Asia by preventing the take-over of South Vietnam by Hanoi and Peking. We don't have to score an immediate and complete victory to do this. We have only to prevent the take-over."

Nolting's successor, Henry Cabot Lodge, sounded the same note:

“To dwell on the fact that we have not achieved victory in Vietnam does not negate the other fact that we have prevented defeat and that a stalemate is much better than a defeat.”

Perhaps Ambassador Lodge saw it that way; John Q. Public certainly didn't. Americans, historically, have not had much liking for stalemates. And now, as they pieced together official statements, they saw the fuzzy outline of a no-win policy. It displeased them.

In November 1964, George Gallup pollsters put this question to the public: “Do you think the U.S. is handling affairs in South Vietnam as well as could be expected, or do you think we are handling affairs there badly?” The results:

As well as could be expected.....	35 percent
Badly.....	50
No Opinion.....	15

There was frustration and undisguised impatience in the replies. Said a 25-year-old Lincroft (New Jersey) housewife: “We should go all out to win the war, or get out so that more of our boys won't be killed.”

And from an Ohio machine operator: “We should send in a lot more troops and get the job done. We're just fooling around over there now.”

Every strong action taken by President Johnson cut into this criticism. When in August he had ordered an immediate retaliation for the PT boat attack on U.S. destroyers in the Bay of Tonkin, 71 percent of the persons polled backed his move.

However, a public opinion analyst looking for a pattern in these answers could be misled. Americans, in fact, did not welcome the prospect of a wider war. Overwhelmingly—81 percent, according to one Gallup poll—they favored U.S. negotiations with Asian leaders to see if a peace arrangement could be worked out.

Throughout this period, American students were strangely silent on events in Vietnam. Their commitment was to the civil rights crusade. Very few of them bothered to demonstrate for a complete U.S. withdrawal.

In Berkeley, California, folk singer Joan Baez brought in crowds with her antiwar ballads. And the *National Guardian* carried the following proclamation signed by 87 college men:

Believing that United States participation in that [Vietnam] war is for the suppression of the Vietnamese struggle for national independence, we see no justification for involvement.

Such statements, to the average American, came off as the well-planned tantrums of political leftists. Undeniably, the protest group was leavened with members of the Progressive Labor Movement and other Marxist-style organizations. But also among its number were young men and women who were acting independently of any political ideology.

“I'm not a Communist or a Socialist,” said the son of a factory owner. “I'm not a complete pacifist. This country really is the best country. I just don't believe in immoral acts by a few military leaders who are guided by principles I don't stand for.”

After the November elections Mr. Johnson was President in his own right. As such he could expect his actions to come



Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee: “We should never have been there [Vietnam] in the first place.”

Senator Everett Dirksen of Illinois: “It [withdrawal] is simply a proposal to run up the white flag.”

under closer scrutiny.

Disenchantment was setting in fast. By January 1965 an Associated Press survey of 83 senators found only 30 lining up with the Administration's Vietnam course.

On the Senate floor, white-haired Albert Gore of Tennessee thundered: "We should never have been there [Vietnam] in the first place." Allen Ellender of Louisiana agreed, stating that it was time for the United States to get out "without any ifs or ands."

Even Richard Russell of Georgia, perennial backer of Pentagon planning, now had doubts about the wisdom of "going it alone" in Asia. The Deep South, always Mr. Johnson's stoutest wall against liberal antiwar critics, was beginning to buckle.

On the other side of the issue stood Minority Leader Everett Dirksen, his powerful influence in the Senate flush against U.S. withdrawal or peace talks.

"However such proposals for negotiations under pressure may be explained or camouflaged by intricate rationales," he cautioned, "it is simply a proposal to run up the white flag."

William Proxmire of Wisconsin, for the moment parting company with other liberals, backed Dirksen: "It's a mistake to negotiate when losing," he said.

Years of service on Capitol Hill had provided Lyndon Johnson with complete training in the political process. Looking down the road he could see there would be speeches—many speeches—praising and condemning U.S. policy. But in the end, he would be the one left with the decision.

This awareness drained Mr. Johnson of humor and tolerance. He had had his fill of faultfinding politicians, editorial writers, and churchmen. At least he could rule his small kingdom of advisers. Those not endorsing the full range of his actions were cast into limbo, their usefulness to the Administration virtually at an end.

In February, escalation climbed another notch with bombing strikes on preselected targets in North Vietnam. The American public, told that this was in retaliation for earlier Communist raids on the air base at Pleiku, rallied once more behind the President. Before long Mr. Johnson could brandish (as he did)

a Louis Harris poll showing that 83 percent of the public approved the bombings. This was the last time he got such support.

In the days ahead he would continue to say, "We seek no wider war." But for too many Americans the words had a hollow ring. They saw that the Saigon government was on the edge of collapse; that a full-scale military intervention by U.S. ground troops might be near.

The Council on Foreign Relations, a nonprofit organization that takes no stand on U.S. policies, went out and talked with 600 prominent Americans. Nine out of ten of them were convinced the United States was failing in Vietnam. And if Vietnam fell, how long could Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand hold out against the Communists? Or Burma, Pakistan, and Indonesia, for that matter?

The awesome loneliness of the Presidency was settling around Mr. Johnson. And he knew that, for him, decision time had again arrived.

1. Below are some values that many Americans associate with the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

- Democratic government is best; that is, a political system in which leaders are elected by the people and held accountable to them in periodic, free elections.
- Respect for human life and the individual is basic to a free and humane society.
- Each nation has the right to be secure within its boundaries.
- As the richest and most powerful nation in the world, the United States has special international responsibilities.
- International law and treaty agreements should be honored.

Were all of these values at stake in Vietnam? Explain. Can you think of any other American values that might have been involved in Vietnam?

2. Following are some facts of the crisis in Vietnam as seen from an American point of view:

- The Viet Cong used terror and violence against innocent people.
- North Vietnam was attempting to take over a neighbor by force.
- South Vietnam was too weak to defend itself, and no other nation was able or willing to help.
- The United States had treaty commitments to protect the people of South Vietnam.
- South Vietnam had a military, undemocratic government.
- The South Vietnamese army was inept and unwilling to fight vigorously for its own people.

Given the American values involved in (1) above, what do you think would be the natural reaction of most Americans to these facts? Would they be likely to support more intervention or less? Which facts do you think would be most likely to make Americans favor intervention? Which would be most likely to make them favor withdrawal?

3. Why do you think that the overwhelming majority of

Americans supported President Johnson's decision to bomb North Vietnam?

4. Which of the following characteristics is more desirable in a decision maker?

- willingness to make a decision and stand by it no matter what happens
- willingness to change or even reverse a decision as a result of a changed situation


In which category, if either, would you place President Johnson?

5. Suppose you were President Johnson at the time of the Vietnam crisis. Rank the following, by number, according to the importance you think each *should* have in influencing your decision:

- ___ a. danger of Communist victory and expansion
- ___ b. doing what is morally right
- ___ c. public opinion polls
- ___ d. American prestige
- ___ e. your personal prestige and place in history
- ___ f. national security of the United States
- ___ g. keeping treaty promises
- ___ h. election campaign
- ___ i. views of your advisers
- ___ j. views of dissenters like Senator Wayne Morse

6. Senator Wayne Morse argued that the United States should seek a negotiated withdrawal from Vietnam for several reasons: The U.S. was supporting a corrupt and anti-democratic government; the domino theory was false, and China's role in Vietnam was an American illusion; the U.S. could only lose prestige in Vietnam; the U.S. was more of an aggressor than North Vietnam; the U.S. could not win a military victory.

Why do you think Senator Morse had so little success in influencing the thinking of President Johnson and his advisers? Why did his position fail to gain public support at the time?



THE DECISION The Marines Land

A HUGE bank of grey clouds hovered over the city of Da Nang, South Vietnam, as dawn broke damp and gloomy on March 8, 1965. On the city's outskirts the white beaches were nearly deserted.

The only sound on the beaches was that of unusually heavy surf crashing ashore. The white-capped waves rose 5 feet or more—ideal for surfers to ride later in the morning.

But there would be no surfing on this fateful day.

Unsuspecting citizens of Da Nang awoke. The coastal city came to life with the early morning sounds of people getting started on their daily tasks.

In countless cities across the United States it was also business as usual. Relatively few Americans were, as yet, concerned about a jungle war being fought thousands of miles away in a mysterious place called South Vietnam.

But this day and its aftermath would soon etch the name of Vietnam into the mind of almost every American. On this day the war in Vietnam would take a dramatic change in direction.

An armada of American transport ships lay half a mile offshore. Promptly at 9 a.m. dozens of landing craft filled with United States marines churned away from the big mother ships and sped toward the beach at Da Nang.

As the craft landed, wave after wave of marines in full battle dress charged ashore. The invasion continued into early afternoon, until 3,500 marines and tons of ammunition and equipment had been landed.

There was no resistance. Enemy forces were nowhere in sight. Instead of the enemy fire the marines half expected, they were met by pretty Vietnamese high school girls. The giggling girls draped garlands of flowers around the shoulders of the smiling Leathernecks. By nightfall the marines were

camped in tents on the enormous American-built Da Nang airfield.

When the marines arrived in South Vietnam, there were already 23,500 other American servicemen in the war-torn country. However, the American military units already in South Vietnam were officially classified as "advisers" or "support and supply forces." Soldiers of these units were not supposed to do any fighting.

The marines who landed at Da Nang came as combat units, ready and willing to do battle with the Viet Cong. Officially, they were restricted to defending the Da Nang air base from attack. But when a marine spokesman was asked whether marines would fight back if attacked, he replied, "Obviously. That has been the history of the Marines."

Within a month President Johnson approved a critical change in mission for the Marines to permit their "more active use." He also approved General Westmoreland's request for 18,000 additional men to enable the American commander to enter his "win phase."

This meant that American forces would no longer be restricted to defending strategic "enclaves," but could seek out and kill the enemy.

It was soon discovered that 18,000 more men would not be enough. General Westmoreland sent urgent requests to Washington for still more men. By the end of April, American troops in South Vietnam exceeded 50,000. And the United States was deeply committed to a land war in Asia.

Only President Johnson and a few top advisers knew the full story of the President's decision to increase American involvement. Later, when writing his memoirs of his decisions leading to the American military buildup, even President Johnson qualified his story of the period. He wrote: "I have not written these chapters to say 'This is how it was,' but to say 'This is how I saw it from my vantage point.'"

The former President's book, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969*, confirmed many disclosures of the Pentagon Papers about the decision-making

process that led to American involvement in a massive air and ground war in Vietnam.

The decision to commit American ground troops to Vietnam was made in secret. The Pentagon Papers and Mr. Johnson's own book said the mission of the marines was changed from defense to combat on April 1, 1965. On that day President Johnson told a group of reporters, "I know of no far-reaching strategy that is being suggested or promulgated."

But as the U.S. buildup continued during April, the new dimension of the war was there for all Americans to see. With the war now the topic of intense national debate, President Johnson made a major public address at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965. In the televised speech he explained his basic reasons for sending more combat troops to South Vietnam. Excerpts from this speech follow.

Tonight Americans and Asians are dying for a world where each people may choose its own path to change. This is the principle for which our ancestors fought in the valleys of Pennsylvania. It is a principle for which our sons fight tonight in the jungles of Vietnam.

Vietnam is far away from this quiet campus. We have no territory there, nor do we seek any. The war is dirty and brutal and difficult. And some 400 young men, born into an America that is bursting with opportunity and promise, have ended their lives on Vietnam's steaming soil.

Why must we take this painful road? Why must this nation hazard its ease, its interest, and its power for the sake of a people so far away?

We fight because we must fight if we are to live in a world where every country can shape its own destiny, and only in such a world will our own freedom be finally secure

The world as it is in Asia is not a secure or peaceful place.

The first reality is that North Vietnam has attacked the independent nation of South Vietnam. Its object is total conquest. Of course, some of the people of South Vietnam are participating in attack on their own government. But trained men and supplies, orders and arms, flow in a constant stream from North to South.

This support is the heartbeat of the war

Over this war—and all Asia—is another reality: the deepening shadow of Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are urged on by Peiping. This is a regime which has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has attacked India, and has been condemned by the United Nations for aggression in Korea

Why are these realities our concern? Why are we in South Vietnam?

We are there because we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American President has offered support to the people of South Vietnam. We have helped to build, and we have helped to defend. Thus, over many years, we have made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence.

And I intend to keep that promise.

To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies and to the terror that must follow, would be an unforgivable wrong.

We are also there to strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to Thailand, are people whose well-being



As U.S. troops took a more active part in Vietnam fighting, President Johnson told Americans: "We are there because we have a promise to keep."

rests in part on the belief that they can count on us if they are attacked. To leave Vietnam to its fate would shake the confidence of all these people in the value of an American commitment and in the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war.

We are also there because there are great stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a moment that retreat from Vietnam would bring an end to conflict. The battle would be renewed in one country and then another. The central lesson of our time is that the appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To withdraw from one battlefield means only to prepare for the next. We must stay in Southeast Asia—as we did in Europe—in the words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou come, but no further"

Our objective is the independence of South Vietnam We want nothing for ourselves—only that the people of South Vietnam be allowed to guide their own country in their own way. We will do everything necessary to reach that objective, and we will do only what is absolutely necessary.

In recent months attacks on South Vietnam were stepped up. Thus, it became necessary for us to increase our response and to make attacks by air. This is not a change of purpose. It is a change in what we believe that purpose requires.

We do this in order to slow down aggression.

We do this to increase the confidence of the brave people of South Vietnam who have bravely borne this brutal battle for so many years with so many casualties.

And we do this to convince the leaders of North Vietnam and all who seek to share their conquest—of a simple fact:

We will not be defeated.

We will not grow tired.

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the cloak of a meaningless agreement.

THE IMPACT A Long, Costly War

BY the end of 1965 some 185,000 American troops were fighting in South Vietnam. As the military situation worsened in succeeding months, President Johnson committed more thousands of Americans to the land war in Asia. Three years after the first U.S. Marines landed at Da Nang, the number of American fighting men reached a peak of 550,000.

There is evidence that President Johnson's military advisers believed that the sheer weight of American men and machines would bring an early victory. For intervention to succeed, the military men believed, it would have to be on a massive scale. And so it was.

Military intervention, however, brought no quick victory. The war instead became unending and increasingly bloody. The conflict became an American war, with American troops doing most of the fighting and dying. Casualty figures jumped, until the weekly toll of American dead went to 300 and 400 some weeks.

At home in their living rooms Americans watched the war on television. The evening news showed film clips of American soldiers leaping from helicopters, or wading through rice paddies, or diving into sandbagged bunkers for cover against incoming Communist shells.

The television screen flashed the agony of Vietnamese women weeping at the death of husbands and sons. And sometimes there were pictures of the dead, Communist and American. For the war had become one of body counts, in which success was measured by subtracting the number of American and "friendly" dead from the number of Communist dead.

Communist casualties were always much higher than those

suffered by the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. It was one standard by which Americans were told that the war was being won. The enemy forces, Americans were told, were being sapped of fighting strength; they were gradually losing the will to fight. Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, after several trips to South Vietnam, repeatedly said that victory was just around the bend.

But as the war dragged on, the enemy seemed to get stronger, not weaker, more determined, not less. For three years U.S. planes had been bombing North Vietnam. Yet there was no sign that the bombing had broken the enemy's will. The bombing, if it did anything, seemed to strengthen their resolve.

In the United States opposition to the war had started with the burning of draft cards, pickets at the White House, petitions, and meetings. But as American involvement in South Vietnam increased, so did opposition to the war.

Thousands of young men fled to Canada rather than be drafted into the Army. College campuses erupted. There was a mass march on the Pentagon in 1967.

The American public, according to public opinion polls, began to withdraw its support for President Johnson and his conduct of the war. Riots and upheavals over poverty and discrimination in some large cities suggested to many Americans that the millions going for the war could be better spent at home.

Some of the antiwar activists focused on President Johnson personally. A chant popular at rallies against the war went: "Hey, hey, LBJ/How many kids did you kill today?" Protesters carried signs that read: "LBJ, the Butcher."

On the other side were Americans who supported the war. They believed that intervention had been necessary to prevent a Communist take-over in South Vietnam and other areas of Southeast Asia. They thought that the President of the United States deserved the support of all Americans as he struggled to fight and win a major war.

The national debate seemed ready to tear American society apart. In the spring of 1968, at the height of the antiwar move-

ment and U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, President Johnson announced that he would not seek a second term.

Protests against the war did not end. The fury of antiwar feeling turned the 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago into a battleground. As the Democrats were nominating Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D—Minn.) for President, Chicago police confronted thousands of jeering war-protesters in the streets. The convention went on, a nervous island of politics amid club-swinging, tear gas, and mass arrests.

Richard M. Nixon was elected President in 1968 on a promise that he would end the Vietnam War. Peace talks began in Paris. The President began a steady withdrawal of U.S. ground forces. But the fighting continued. U.S. bombing of North Vietnam was raised to record levels. The fighting expanded to Cambodia.

In 1972 Senator George McGovern (D—S.Dak.) won the Democratic nomination for President. He was the candidate of a nationwide antiwar movement. In the campaign he attacked President Nixon for not ending the war. He promised that if he were elected he would end the war immediately.

President Nixon said he was trying to find a solution that would assure a lasting "peace with honor," one that would assure the survival of South Vietnam and return U.S. prisoners. He reminded voters that since taking office he had withdrawn more than 300,000 American troops from South Vietnam.

Meanwhile, Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's top adviser in foreign policy, was conducting negotiations with the North Vietnamese. A few days before the election of 1972 he announced that "peace was at hand."

President Nixon won a landslide victory. Senator McGovern carried only one state—Massachusetts. Both candidates, however, had been for peace and an end to American intervention. By 1972, Americans seemed to agree broadly that the war should end.

Peace was indeed at hand. On the evening of January 23, 1973, President Nixon went on nationwide radio and television

and announced a settlement "to end the war and bring peace with honor to South Vietnam and Southeast Asia." Under the agreement all U.S. troops would be withdrawn from South Vietnam within 60 days. During the same period all American prisoners of war would be returned. An international commission was set up to supervise all phases of the agreement.

The day before President Nixon's public announcement of peace, Lyndon B. Johnson died. Before his death, however, the former President had been informed of the peace settlement. In one incredible day the man who had decided on large-scale intervention in Vietnam was gone and peace had arrived.

Was it really the end? Was the longest, most divisive, least conclusive war in the nation's history over? It appeared that it really was when the first of the American prisoners began arriving home to joyous, tearful welcomes after years in North Vietnamese prisons.

Speaking for the first group of returning prisoners, Captain Jeremiah A. Denton, Jr. of the United States Navy said: "We



President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his top foreign policy adviser, presided over the end of the U.S. military intervention in Viet Nam.

are honored to have had the opportunity to serve our country under difficult circumstances, and we are profoundly grateful to our Commander-in-Chief and to our nation for this day. God bless America."

Other returning prisoners echoed Captain Denton's words.

At last the war had heroes. Americans had been deprived of heroes in this strange shadowy war of booby traps, hit-and-run terror, long-range shelling, and saturation bombing. There had been few stand-up battles, no decisive victories, little glory.

The prisoners had at least come out of the war alive and well, and for the most part convinced that the conflict had been just and necessary. They helped Americans forget the costs: 46,000 dead; 300,000 wounded; a minimum of \$110 billion—not to mention millions of Vietnamese dead, maimed, and homeless in Indochina.

The U.S. experience in Vietnam caused many Americans to reappraise the nation's role in world affairs. The decade of the 1960's had begun with a young American President, John F. Kennedy, saying: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty. This much we pledge—and more."

In 1972, after years of fighting in Southeast Asia, the United States was less eager to become involved in land wars on distant continents. President Nixon was more modest in pledging what Americans would do.

"We shall do our share in defending peace and freedom in the world," he said. "But we shall expect others to do their share. The time has passed when America will make every other nation's conflict our own, or make every other nation's future our responsibility"

ILLUSTRATION CREDITS—Cover, *Wide World* (left), UPI; p. 6 (top), A.F.P. from *Pictorial*; pp. 6 (bottom), 12, 16 (left and right), 22 (right), 24, 25, (all three), 29 (right), 40, UPI; pp. 29 (left), 34 (top and bottom), 38, 44, *Wide World*; p. 10, *Paris Match*; p. 22 (left), *Pictorial Parade*; p. 18, credit unknown.

1. In 1965 President Johnson said he was sending American combat troops to Vietnam because (a) China was preparing to send regiment-sized units south across the 18th parallel, (b) his on-the-spot advisers warned that the Saigon government could not last another week without U.S. direct military intervention, (c) the U.S. had made a national pledge to help South Vietnam defend its independence.
2. Briefly define any five of the following terms and phrases: (a) infiltration, (b) negotiating from strength, (c) military adviser, (d) options, (e) domino theory, (f) aggression, (g) containment, (h) search-and-destroy.
3. The United States has intervened militarily in other nations on several occasions, especially since 1900. Can you name at least four such instances?

4. Pretend you are President of the United States. The Middle Eastern leader of a nation friendly to the U.S. is in grave danger. Rebels have infiltrated his army and plan to overthrow him.

He appeals to you for military aid, pointing out that his government has helped bring some stability to this part of the world. Your intelligence chief confirms that the rebel leader is a dedicated Marxist who plans to bring that nation into the Soviet camp.

A quick sounding indicates that Congress and the American public are cool to the idea of sending troops or planes to the trouble spot. Meanwhile the Israeli ambassador has hinted that his government may have to take some strong countermeasures if the rebels are indeed successful. What do you see as your best strategy under these circumstances? Why?

5. The U.S. has been criticized for trying to play the role of an international policeman. Walter Lippmann, a widely read journalist, has had this to say: "But the event has shown that the role of unique policeman in Asia was beyond our military reach and our political experience, and we must therefore welcome the prospect, or at least the possibility, of sharing the burden with the powers which have greater interests in Asia than we have." You

- may agree. But what problems could prevent a regional congress of nations from dealing effectively with a crisis?
6. Within two months of the Vietnam landing, U.S. marines were also sent into the Dominican Republic, where they helped put down a revolutionary uprising. In announcing his decision to send marines to the latter country the President said he had been informed that "American lives are in danger," and that local authorities "are no longer able to guarantee their safety." Do you feel that such an explanation provides sufficient justification for ordering U.S. troops into a foreign country? Why or why not?
7. In 1956 the Soviet Union sent troops and tanks into Hungary to bring down a new government that had indicated it would not accept the Russian brand of communism. In 1968 this scene was repeated in Czechoslovakia. These interventions—brutal and repressive—were not altogether surprising to foreign affairs experts. Under what circumstances is a great power likely to intervene in the affairs of another country?
8. What effects did the U.S. intervention in Vietnam have on American society?
9. Should the President consult the American public through a poll before sending U.S. troops to a foreign trouble zone?
10. Should Congress pass laws to prevent a future Vietnam-style intervention?
11. Administration officials frequently cited two reasons for U.S. intervention in Vietnam: (a) To permit a young nation to develop democratic ways, and (b) to check Communist aggression. Which do you see as the more important?
12. We have talked in this book about military intervention. What other ways are there for one nation to intervene in the affairs of another nation?
13. Communist spokesmen talk from time to time about waging wars of "national liberation." This means encouraging peoples in non-Communist nations to undermine the government and seize power. Would you regard Vietnam primarily as a test between national liberation and containment, or primarily as a civil war?

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