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SUBJ: Topics for 1971 Political Reorientation Prepared by the Military Affairs Party Committee, VC Military Region 2. (U)

(C-Jul 71) (12 pages, typewritten; B-3) Political outlines, undated and unsigned, ((possibly prepared by the Military Affairs Party Committee, VC Military Region 2)), concerns the topics for the political reorientation training of platoon and squad cadre subordinate to ((VC)) Military Region 2 during 1971.

The three-part document first reviews the general situation in Indochina, indicating that 230,000 enemy ((FWMAF/RVMAF)) personnel were reportedly put out of action in all battlefields in SVN. The majority of the Cambodian people and most of the territory of Laos were placed under the control of friendly ((VC/NVA)) elements within the first six months of 1970. It also states that in the coming months, the enemy would employ a permanent force in the ((Cambodia-SVN)) border areas to hinder penetration of friendly units and support the Lon Nol Government. The enemy may also conduct large scale operations in Cambodia and possibly even in Laos. In SVN, the enemy would focus efforts on implementing the accelerated pacification program, particularly in ((VC)) Military Region 2, as this is an important area of the Mekong River delta.

In the following part, the document outlines the necessary measures to be taken against enemy pacification activities in ((VC)) Military Region 2 which were aimed at attaining three successive goals: (1) Wiping out friendly forces in various localities; (2) establishing strict administrative control systems; and (3) eliminating revolutionary agents. The enemy attempted to pacify about 300 villages employing Phụng Hoang ((Phoenix)) personnel to discover friendly underground agents, but in reality almost all of these 300 villages were still placed under the military and political control of the friendly side, whereas Phụng Hoang personnel and even ((RVN)) Regional Force, Popular Force, and People's Self-Defense Force personnel were unable to operate effectively. In order to counter the enemy, the document stresses that efforts were to be made to: (1) Destroy forces which were designated to support the pacification program; (2) kill ((RVN)) tyrants and break the enemy oppressive control; (3) stay close to the people and then plant underground agents among them; and (4) make full use of friendly forces, especially sapper and guerrilla units, to reduce the military effectiveness of enemy operational units.