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PAVN-RED KHMER RELATIONS - 1971

HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR ON MICROFILM

SVN PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY
POLITICAL STAFF DEPARTMENT

8 ((month illegible)) 71
No. 22/HD

GUIDANCE

On the study of the document concerning "Experiences gained from the relationship and cooperation between friendly ((possibly Red Khmer)) forces and ours ((VC/NVA))."

The Liaison Section of X97 ((possibly COSVN)) has recently disseminated a document concerning "Experiences gained from the relationship and cooperation between friendly forces and ours." This is a valuable and realistic document which helps not only the Liaison Section but also other ((VC)) units operating in K ((Khmer Republic)). It promotes good relationships with friendly ((Red Khmer)) forces in compliance with the Party policies and principles concerning the relationship between the two Parties ((possibly Vietnamese and Khmer Communist Parties)) and countries. The document stresses the correction of shortcomings that unfavorably affect the friendship of the two Parties and countries.

For this reason, the Political Staff Department disseminated this document to all units operating in K ((Khmer Republic)) so they may indoctrinate their cadre and soldiers. Special attention should be paid to the following points:

1. The document contains eight parts dealing with experiences gained and principles and guidelines to maintain the relationship between the ((Liaison)) Section and friendly ((Red Khmer)) forces. Each part presents practical experiences gained in the past, good or poor conduct, and erroneous thoughts of ((VC/NVA)) troops. Therefore, all units must instruct their members on these general guidelines and then improve their knowledge and ideology by applying corrective measures.
2. The document also refers to the role and responsibilities of the Party Committee members and responsible cadre in their units. They play a great and important role in maintaining solidarity and friendship with the friendly country. Thus, the Party Committee members and responsible cadre must carefully study this document.
3. In training sessions cadre in charge must always display a firm working class ideology and solve every problem in a proper and objective manner, avoid superficiality and subjectivism, and be subtle in solving critical problems. Along with the training, they must promote the international proletariat spirit of cadre and soldiers and teach them their responsibilities to the Revolution of the two Parties and countries.
4. The training should be conducted in accordance with the specific situation of each unit. If conditions permit, special training should be conducted for cadre of C ((Company)) level and higher to insure better results.

After the training, reports on the results obtained and experiences gained should be submitted to the Political Staff Department for proper guidance.

((For)) The Political Staff Department

/S/ Vo T.

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Copies to:

Various areas to aid in training for subordinate agencies and units and submission of reports on results obtained to higher echelons through the ((Political)) Staff Department.

30 Oct 71
Political Section

Typist Hồng Vân
30 copies
Completed on 1 Nov 71

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SOME EXPERIENCES LEARNED FROM THE RELATIONSHIP AND COOPERATION BETWEEN FRIENDLY ((RED KHMER)) FORCES AND OURS ((VC/NVA))

For more than one year, in maintaining our relationship and cooperation with ((Red)) Khmers in the new situation, our cadre and soldiers have, under the Party leadership eagerly and properly implemented all policies adopted by our ((Lao Dong)) Party and friendly ((Red Khmer)) authorities. They have respected the Khmer sovereignty, customs, and habits, thus contributing to the maintenance of the friendship between the two countries, consolidating and developing the solidarity in combat of the two Parties.

However, at times, some of our cadre and soldiers still committed errors which adversely affected the relationship between the two Parties. The above shortcomings originated from the lack of a thorough understanding of the Party policy on the part of our cadre. Other misunderstandings developed in the following areas: Principles of relationship between the two parties and two nations, the Red Khmers' policy, the approach to commonly recognized problems, and the influence exerted by greater nations ((in the world)). To help the cadre of the Liaison Section to effectively carry out their tasks assigned by the Party, the following experiences gained from our cooperation and relationship with our friends ((Red Khmers)) are provided:

First: All cadre must fully understand our ((Lao Dong)) Party policy, the principles for relations between the two Parties, the policies of the friendly ((Red Khmer)) Party, and the policies that both accepted as basic principles for all activities. Lessons learned from past political and ideological tasks indicate that in places where the leadership was effective, all cadre and soldiers displayed a high revolutionary awareness and properly carried out all Party policies concerning the relationship and cooperation with the ((Red)) Khmer and our ((VC/NVA)) authorities. On the contrary, in agencies and units where cadre in charge assumed their task

negligently (such as delivering irresponsible speeches), their lower echelons failed to properly observe the Party policy and respect the Khmer sovereignty. A small error generally leads to bad results. As a result, the cadre in charge must strictly comply with the prescribed principles and be exemplary in the implementation of all Party policies concerning the relationship between the two parties.

In the past, relations with our friends, there existed strengths and weaknesses. We must be modest toward our friends. In regards to our weaknesses, we must indoctrinate our personnel to correct them. We must be sincere towards our friends ((Red Khmers)) and objectively accept their critiques to improve ourselves.

We must learn their strengths to improve ourselves. We should let them correct their own weaknesses. We should oppose advocating that we are always right and our friends are always wrong in all aspects and vice versa.

Second: We must evaluate the ((Red)) Khmer revolutionary movement and the ((Red)) Khmer Party leadership in a correct and objective manner. In order to be able to correctly assess the strengths and weaknesses of the ((Red)) Khmer Revolution, we must base our judgement on the progress of the ((Red)) Khmer revolutionary history and the characteristics of the Khmer society. Generally, a rapidly expanding revolution always exposes shortcomings and weaknesses. Therefore,

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only after a comparison between our August Revolution and the ((Red)) Khmer Revolution, can we objectively understand all strengths and weaknesses of the ((Red)) Khmer revolutionary movement.

We must know the working class attitude and the international Communist viewpoint, to understand all our strengths and to attain the great victories of the ((Red)) Khmer Revolution, which should realize certain victory under the leadership of the ((Red)) Khmer Party. We must realize our friends' shortcomings and difficulties, to be aware of our responsibilities. We must share their happiness and worries and must not behave as a spectator to criticize or underestimate them.

Third: We should observe the principles of relationship between the two Parties and the two nations in the interest of cooperation and mutual support.

We must wholeheartedly help our friends as requested since this is the international duty of our Party. Furthermore, in so doing, we reap benefit from it, for our friends' strength also means our strength. Thus, we must fulfill all our promises. We should not do what we have not approved. We must struggle, not in a rude manner, but with patience, and wait for favorable opportunities to settle problems relating to both sides to gain a common accord. Recently, in some areas, our personnel tried to gain approval from our friends on certain matters that the latter did not approve of. Therefore, not only did they disapprove but also thought us to have a hidden motive.

When the ((Red)) Khmers require us to do something for them, we should not do it by our principles, but in an indirect manner through discussions to exchange experiences. Any suggestion to our friends should be carefully studied in accordance with the realistic situation of the ((Red)) Khmer Revolution. The following erroneous attitudes must be avoided:

Overconfidence and impatience and asking the Red Khmers to do everything for us.

A negative attitude when encountering difficulties. We should never think that we are unable to cooperate with them except in combat coordination between the two armies. When requested by friendly forces to do something, our personnel often acted beyond their competence, neglecting the basic principles concerning the relationship between the two parties and the two nations.

Fourth: Indoctrinate our personnel to fully understand the guidelines concerning mutual support between the ((Red)) Khmers and ourselves to make improvements and further developments. A large number of our cadre and soldiers still erroneously think that their presence in the Khmer Republic has only the purpose of helping the ((Red)) Khmer Revolution. They do not understand that our Revolution receives considerable and valuable aid from the ((Red)) Khmer Party and Khmer people. During nine years of resistance against the French, they contributed their part to the resounding victories gained at Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva Conference in 1954. From 1954 to 18 Mar 70, the Khmer people, under the leadership of the ((Red)) Khmer Party, struggled to safeguard their independence, peace, and neutrality in support of our Revolution (in such as base areas, corridors, and material support). We must be grateful to the ((Red)) Khmer Party and people for their support. Without such valuable support, the Revolution will meet many difficulties. Even their suggestions are valuable support to us. We must be grateful for their assistance and must listen sincerely to their recommendations for appropriate action.

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We must realize that our presence in the Khmer Republic is to coordinate with ((Red)) Khmer troops in combat activities. On the one hand, this creates favorable conditions for the ((Red)) Khmer Revolution. On the other hand, it causes certain difficulties to our friends. We must be aware of this and teach our personnel to respect the sovereignty of the Khmer people and behave properly toward the Khmer people and ((Red)) Khmer revolutionary organizations. We must cease causing additional difficulties for the Khmer people. We should not consider ourselves a great country, a great Party, or despise the Khmer revolutionary organizations.

Recently, due to the concept of considering ourselves the benefactor, a number of our cadre and soldiers praised their achievements; displayed a lack of modesty; and disregarded the regulations, laws, and procedures of the ((Red)) Khmer Revolution. This resulted in regrettable friction which adversely affected the relations between the Khmer and Vietnamese ((Communist)) Parties.

Fifth: We must deal with the ((Red)) Khmers on current matters. We should never repeat the past problems which derived from a lack of understanding between both sides. We must avoid engaging in debates with ((Red)) Khmer cadre. We must be enthusiastic and sincere toward them. We must consider their affairs as ours. We must cooperate with them on an equal basis and understand them so as to promote mutual comprehension.

Sixth: We must obtain the consent of our internal organization before solving problems concerning the ((Red)) Khmers. When no guidance is provided by the Party Committees for the handling of problems relating to policies and principles, we must report these problems to higher echelons and request instructions. We are strictly forbidden to solve these problems by ourselves. If we commit errors concerning our internal organization, we may review them for correction. However, in dealing with friends, no matter how negligible our imprudence may be, it will result in an adverse effect on the relations between the Khmer and Vietnamese ((Communist)) Parties. We must know the Party policy and must be well aware of the ((Red)) Khmer Revolutionary movement in order to solve all problems relating to the Khmer people. Experience proves that recently in places where friendly ((VC/NVA)) agencies and units maintained relations with the ((Red)) Khmers through the Liaison Section, their relationship and cooperation with ((Red)) Khmers were strengthened. On the contrary, in certain areas, a lack of unanimity among our internal organizations (such as agencies, units, and the Liaison Section) caused additional difficulties in the relations between us and the ((Red)) Khmers. Our agencies and units operating in the Khmer Republic must thoroughly understand the responsibilities of our Party in promoting the solidarity between the two Parties and the two peoples to strengthen the solidarity among ourselves in dealing with the friendly ((Red Khmer)) authorities.

Various Liaison Sections assigned by the Party to directly contact the ((Red)) Khmer authorities must exchange views with and help friendly ((VC/NVA)) agencies and units to improve their cooperation with the Khmers and the accomplishment of their missions.

Seventh: How do we properly solve frequent conflicts between both sides? With a large combat strength operating in the Khmer Republic frictions between both sides are unavoidable. There is an essential difference in the two peoples. We must make positive efforts to minimize these conflicts and properly solve them for they concern the two Parties and the peoples of the two nations.

We must be calm and objective to carefully determine whether the friction is caused by our personnel, the Khmers, or by the enemy. We must realize that the responsibility of our Party is to promote the solidarity among the Khmer and Vietnamese ((Communist)) Parties, to defeat the common enemy.

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Hence, we must solve all conflicts in friendship and comradeship. We fully agree with a ((Red)) Khmer cadre who said: "The Vietnamese and Khmer people will embrace each other after beating each other black and blue."

Faced with difficulties caused by ((Red)) Khmers' reactions, we must display our patience, suppleness, and leniency. We should not envy them. We must provide guidance for our personnel on the correction of mistakes. In areas where such action was taken, the relations between both sides have been strengthened. On the contrary, whenever we displayed an envious attitude, the relations became worse.

Regarding conflicts in which the enemy is involved, we should cooperate with the ((Red)) Khmers to discover him. We must patiently exchange views with them to make them aware of the enemy's cunning schemes for appropriate action. If we do so, they will understand our sacrifice and endurance. On the contrary, if we are impatient by solving problems in a careless manner, we may be deceived by the enemy's ruse and may injure the solidarity between the Khmer and the Vietnamese peoples.

In case of friction and when its cause has not yet been determined, no false rumors should be allowed to create confusion in our ranks.

The best way is to go along with the ((Red)) Khmer authorities to make investigations and solve the problems on the spot. In many instances, conflicts have been satisfactorily solved by applying this method.

Investigation reports on the conflict should be submitted to higher echelons and to the Liaison Section concerned for notification to the ((Red)) Khmer authorities when necessary.

The Khmer people are very clear-sighted and impartial concerning conflicts between both sides. They are very much concerned about the solidarity between the two peoples. We must understand their just concern but we must not sympathize with their discontents. Instead, we must make them understand that mistakes which are the cause of conflicts have been committed by individuals while the group always adopts a correct policy. We must reaffirm that the Khmer - Vietnamese solidarity is unshakable. If mistakes are committed, it is only due to the fault of individuals or small elements of either side.

Eighth: We must continuously, regularly, and carefully carry out the political indoctrination and ideological guidance task in our ranks for we are presently living, performing tasks, and fighting in the Khmer Republic. Every day, our cadre, soldiers, and personnel contact Khmer civilians, cadre, and soldiers. If we do not have a high political awareness and a firm viewpoint, we will commit erroneous acts which may create an undesirable friction between the two parties and the two peoples. When incidents occur between the ((Red)) Khmers and the friendly side, we must take advantage of this opportunity to indoctrinate our personnel to heighten their political awareness and improve their ideology. Various Party Chapters must pay attention to the indoctrination of their members on the relations with our ((Khmer)) friends as an objective for continuous self-improvement. Responsible cadre must strictly implement all the Party policies and always uphold the sense of critique and self-critique.

The above are some lessons learned from the relations and cooperation with the ((Red)) Khmer authorities and people. Cadre of the liaison sections of various agencies and units in charge of contacting the ((Red)) Khmer agencies every day are encouraged to submit recommendations to improve the lessons learned and help our agencies and liaison sections effectively carry out their tasks assigned by the Party.

19 ((month illegible, possibly Jan)) 71

The Liaison Section of X97 ((possibly COSVN))

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