

SUBJ: Estimate of Allied Invasion of NVN, by NVN Military Region IV. (U)

CDEC LOG NO.  
04-1436-71

(C-Jul 71) (104 pages, handwritten; B-3) Notebook, with entries dated from 4 Dec 68 to 25 Jan 71, maintained by Pham Hoang Can, Commanding Officer of C1 ((possibly 1st Company, 15th Engineer Battalion, B5 Front)), contains a series of marksmanship lessons concerning the B-40, B-41, AK, and RPD ((28 pages)), a history of the ((Indochinese Communist)) Party ((16 pages)), minutes of Party meetings ((15 pages)), political reorientation lessons ((11 pages)), higher headquarters' resolutions ((3 pages)), activity reports ((8 pages)), and songs and poems ((23 pages)).

29 Mar 71  
XD884443,  
Quang Tri Prov  
RVN MR 1  
B/2/1st Inf,  
11th Bde, 1/5t  
US Mech Div  
Opcon to 101st  
US Abn Div  
(AM)  
Batch No.  
101-147-71  
Bodies  
Received CDEC  
15 Apr 71  
Category: A

The author reveals that he was born in Duc Xuong Village, Gia Loc District, Hai Hung Province, NVN in 1949; enlisted ((NVA)) on 5 Apr 68; and was initially assigned to a ((NVA)) combat unit ((unspecified)) in Quang Tri Province. He was reassigned to D18 ((possibly NVA battalion in Quang Tri Province)). Shortly afterward, D18 was deactivated and the author was assigned to E102 ((possibly 102nd Regiment, 308th NVA Division)), which was then commanded by Ha Quang Hien ((rank unspecified)). On 15 Sep 69, the author was transferred to C3-D15 ((possibly 3rd Company, 15th Engineer Battalion, B5 Front)), and was reassigned to C5 Doan 15 ((5th Company, 15th Engineer Battalion)) two months later. His unit was operating northeast of Con Tien in mid-Apr 70; and as a B-41 gunner, he reportedly had destroyed a number of enemy tanks. In Nov 70, he was appointed Executive Officer of Doi 3 ((3rd Company, 15th Engineer Battalion)); and on 16 Jan 71, he was designated as Commanding Officer of C1-D15. He was granted a leave of absence to visit his native village ((Duc Xuong Village)) on 5 Jan 71.

Entry, dated 7 Dec 70, states that "C" ((possibly 3rd Company, 15th Engineer Battalion)) was composed of four platoons, designated Mui 1 through Mui 4. Key personnel listed were: Phuc, Leader of Mui 1; The, Leader of Mui 2; Sam, Leader of Mui 3; and On, Leader of Mui 4.

Entry, dated 11 Jan 71, reveals that during Jan 71, the unit ((15th Engineer Battalion)) was to undergo an intensive training program to perfect itself in combat tactics and ((engineer)) techniques. Following this training program, the unit was to prepare for combat.

Entry, dated 21 Jan 71, contains excerpts from a report prepared by the

Party Committee of the Military Region ((possibly NVN Military Region IV)) concerning a possible invasion of NVN by the enemy ((US/RVNAF)) which reads in full as follows:

"An invasion of NVN by the enemy is, in all likelihood, not an operation limited in time; but rather a sustained military campaign planned to last until complete victory ((by the US/RVNAF)). The enemy may choose one of these three courses of action for his invasion of NVN: (1) Concerted attacks by enemy aircraft and naval forces; (2) raids and ambushes by independent enemy groups ((possibly meaning Special Forces)) in the northern and southern parts of ((NVN)) Military Region ((IV)); and (3) a limited ((conventional warfare)) attack on both the northern and southern parts of the Military Region.

The enemy has five goals in this invasion: (1) The cutting of all supply lines to various theaters of operation through attacks on rear bases; (2) the destruction of military objectives; (3) the capture of cadre ((meaning NVN high-ranking cadre)) and civilians to be utilized for future exchange of prisoners of war; (4) the destruction of our great rear bases; and (5) a final desperate military action which is part of the enemy's "Tam Quang" ((possibly meaning scorched-earth policy calling for the destruction of NVA rear bases which directly support VC/NVA operations in RVN, Cambodia, and Laos)).

The Military Region is now determined to repulse all enemy air and naval attacks at any cost, and to destroy all invading Special Forces elements. Steps are to be taken by all subordinate units to: (1) Insure an adequate transportation and communication network ((from NVN)) to various battlefields; (2) safeguard both public and private property; and (3) provide adequate security for the population and subdue all revolts or uprisings ((by the civilian population)) that may occur within the Military Region ((during the cited invasion))."

Entry, dated 23 Jan 71, contains an assessment of an attack conducted by subordinate units ((of the 15th Engineer Battalion)), including the 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 6th, and 7th Companies ((time and location of the attack unspecified)). This attack resulted in 115 enemy personnel KIA and 10 vehicles destroyed. The same entry notes that the unit's area of responsibility in the upcoming months was large, and that its subordinate companies were to operate independently. Preparations were to be made so that the unit could become combat-ready as soon as possible on "both sides" ((possibly of the B<sup>h</sup> H<sup>h</sup> River)). Even though the unit's principal area of responsibility would be in the area south of the ((possibly B<sup>h</sup> H<sup>h</sup>)) River, the northern area was to be considered of vital importance ((for tactical considerations)). Three Đ<sup>i</sup> ((companies)) were to infiltrate ((possibly the Qu<sup>h</sup>ng Tri area)) during Feb 71 for combat missions in the eastern, western, and central parts ((possibly of Qu<sup>h</sup>ng Tri Province)). The remaining companies were to consolidate and improve themselves in combat tactics. C1 was to be among these companies and was to undergo a reorganization period.

Entry, dated 25 Jan 71, describes a meeting held by the unit to point

---

out the unit's strengths and weaknesses. The author's company had transported 2,000 kilograms of supplies to the southern side of the ((Bến Hãi)) river for Đoàn ((meaning 15th Engineer Battalion, possibly since the beginning of Jan 71)). Nevertheless, some personnel still pretended to be sick to avoid combat duty while others were unwilling to assume dangerous missions. According to higher headquarters' criteria the author's company was to destroy 15 enemy vehicles during each of the upcoming months.

Also mentioned in a lesson on the B-41 is the fact that the NVA is now capable of producing the B-41 REK-7B, 40mm caliber, which was first produced by the Soviet Union in 1966.