



----- FULL TRANSLATION -----

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V.5452 ((possibly the Political Section, VC Binh Dinh Province Unit, VC Military Region 5)).

No. 73/CT

**IMPLEMENTATION  
OF DIRECTIVE 70 OF MILITARY REGION ((5)) CURRENT AFFAIRS  
PARTY COMMITTEE ON THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF CADRE**

**I. PURPOSE:**

((This document is issued with the purpose of guiding political sections)) to thoroughly investigate the political background and ideological standards of personnel in order to promptly indoctrinate them and correct their deficiencies concerning the implementation of policies, maintenance of internal relationships, and ideological development. These activities are aimed at coping with and hindering backward individuals whose actions may lead to (surrender, betrayal, or assassination. They are also concerned with detecting and dealing with enemy personnel who are planted in our ranks. They will also enable us to ensure good political attitudes of our personnel and the effective organization of our internal ranks.

**II. SUBJECTS FOR CAREFUL INVESTIGATION:****1. Servicemen who have families and relatives serving as enemy henchmen:**

We must know the ideological evolution, weaknesses, and strengths of the servicemen who have families or relatives presently or formerly serving in the ((GVN)) armed forces, ((RVN)) hamlet, village, district or province administrative machinery, other reactionary organizations, and the secret service, security, and police networks. In general, we must carefully check the political background of personnel who were punished and reformed by the Revolution. We must closely control the relationships between these soldiers and their families in order to promptly record their ideological evolution. Particularly, we must keep abreast of every activity of the servicemen with families residing in the enemy controlled areas or with relatives serving as his henchmen.

**2. Servicemen who have served in the enemy ranks before rallying to the Revolution:**

We must pay particular attention to keeping track of the servicemen who have served as enemy inter-family chiefs, hamlet chiefs, ((RVN)) soldiers and officers, Special Forces personnel, reconnaissance agents, secret and security agents, policemen, collaborators, spies, young antirevolutionaries, and PW's who had been forced to join the ((GVN)) army and members of reactionary organizations, etc.. ((sic)). We must investigate their past activities and determine whether or not their crimes are contrary to the people's good. When and for how long did they serve in the enemy ranks? (Did they participate in direct or indirect attacks against the friendly forces?) The specific circumstances and causes for them joining the Revolution must also be clearly described. Did they assume any special task for the enemy when they rallied to our side? In addition, we must carefully watch their present working attitudes and ideology.

3. Servicemen who had been captured by the enemy and then were released or escaped:

We must carefully determine and draw a conclusion from the crimes of the individuals ((who had been captured by the enemy and then were released or escaped)) before admitting them to our units.

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Particularly we should not admit them without permission from higher echelons. We must know when and the reasons why they were captured by the enemy. What declarations were made to the enemy? What did they do during the time they were kept in his prison? Did they escape or were they released by the enemy? Did they assume any special task for the enemy? Did they display a good working attitude when they returned to their former units? Their statements on past activities and their aspiration must be carefully verified by responsible Party Committee and lower-level Party Committees. The reports of these committees must be submitted to higher echelons together with the personal record of the returnee.

4. Servicemen who had deserted or were listed as MIA and then returned to their former units or asked to be admitted to other units:

These personnel must also be carefully investigated. We must clearly understand their specific circumstances. Where did they previously leave their units? Describe their past activities with specific reference to the motive for their return to their former units. Their present political attitudes and the people's opinion must also be carefully noted in order to come to a specific conclusion.

5. Enemy personnel who defected to our ranks:

(Personal records of enemy personnel who defected to our ranks must be complete with the specific crimes they committed in their former units. The motives which motivated them to rally to our ranks and their present political attitudes must also be clearly described. If they are suspicious, we should not admit them to our units, but wait for instructions from higher echelons.)

6. Servicemen who had poor ideology:

We must carefully check the daily ideological evolution of the servicemen whose morale has been seriously affected by the enemy's psywar and Chieu Hoi activities. These activities brought about bad tendencies such as surrender, desertion, self-mutilation, passiveness, and irresponsibility in executing the orders of the higher echelons. In our units, we must keep track of the number of these individuals, (which may change monthly), in order to indoctrinate them, follow up their activities and take precautionary measures against them.

7. Servicemen who maintained complicated relationships with undesirable persons:

We must carefully check the political background, working attitudes, and activities of the servicemen who maintained daily relationships with

objectionable civilian elements in the society in order to make effective plans to guide and prevent them from continuing such social relationships.

In sum, the names and individual records of the above seven types of subjects must be established in order to keep a daily record of their ideological evolution. Monthly reports on their ideological development must be submitted to the higher echelons security sections for investigation. (In emergency cases, reports must be sent daily by telecommunication or couriers.)

Political officers of c's, d's ((possibly companies and battalions)), and district units must coordinate with the security section to closely follow up the ideological evolution of the suspected individuals, individuals with complex problems, or servicemen who maintained complicated relationships with their families in enemy

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controlled areas. We must work out specific plans for proper leadership, investigation and indoctrination, and take effective measures against their harmful activities.

1. Concerning various units:

All units must appoint personnel to take charge of investigating all cases of desertion, surrender, self-mutilation, disclosure of military secrets, loss of documents, air strikes and raids, personnel KIA, weapon loss or damage and dissemination of groundless rumors on enemy activities. We must immediately investigate every case and then make a conclusion. We must carefully check the political backgrounds of the individuals concerned to clearly determine the political situation of our units and to take prompt measures against their activities.

2. Concerning key elements:

Party Committee echelons and political officers of key elements such as (crypto, radio, and logistical agencies), combat elements, correspondence sections, sapper, artillery, military intelligence, reconnaissance, and (legal and illegal) signal units must make periodic security checks on the political background of their subordinates to ensure that they are reliable. These activities will enable us to manage our personnel in accordance with the requirements of our missions. Work should not be assigned to personnel who have unclear political backgrounds and suggestions must be immediately sent to the higher echelons for readjustment.

Notice: Records on urgent events must be established for study and investigation.

Major elements (radio, combat, and crypto) must establish records on the political backgrounds of their personnel for continuous investigation. Political officers of c's, d's and district units must coordinate with security sections to guide, investigate, and conclude every urgent case. They must regularly guide and check key elements. When a unit assumes combat tasks, they must carefully check the political background of every member to make sure that they were reliable and then report the results to the higher echelons security section for investigation before they enter a combat campaign.

**III. ACTIVITY PLANS TO BE FULFILLED:**

The implementation will be divided into two stages from now to 30 Jun 71 as follows:

The first stage will last from Feb to 30 Apr 71:

**A. Requirements to be fulfilled:**

a. List the names of all those in the seven types of subjects (from category one through seven including the new recruits for study and investigation).

b. Establish records on all past activities of the previous year to include those that occurred in 1970; for instance, personnel who surrendered, were captured

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or MIA, any disclosures of military secrets, document losses, self-mutilations, suicides etc... ((sic)).

c. Establish individual records for personnel of key elements such as (crypto, radio, TOC ((Tactical Operations Command)), and weapon stores), with detailed personal history statements of each member (note the specific events occurring in each element).

**B. Interrogation, investigation and conclusion:**

1. Interrogate, investigate, and settle the following types of cases: Personnel captured, surrendered, or returning from MIA; Those who previously served as enemy secret agents, security agents, policemen, reconnaissance agents, Special Forces personnel; members of reactionary parties; criminal offenders who had blood debts; and those with relatives in enemy controlled areas.

2. Complete the security checks and evaluate the degree of political awareness of various district agencies, command committees, companies, battalions, district units, province capital ((units)), and important elements such as radio, reconnaissance, military intelligence, sapper, and artillery units.

3. Draft plans for specific measures to indoctrinate, administer and improve the ideological concepts of laggards of the various units (especially individuals of category six).

4. Interrogate and check servicemen who violate political regulations. (Punitive measures should not be automatically taken against these servicemen if they are Party members or cadre. We should wait for instructions from higher echelons).

5. Try to discover and interrogate those individuals who entered our agencies and units suspiciously and then promptly report them to the higher echelons.

The second stage will last from 30 Apr to 20 May 71:

Requirements to be fulfilled:

1. Complete the personal records of all servicemen who fall in any of the seven categories with specific conclusions on every case (except those who have just been discovered in the second stage).

Finish all records concerning 1970 as well as those concerning the first stage (then continue to investigate and settle the new cases).

2. Check and evaluate these cases for the second time and then draw a conclusion on the degree of political awareness of every unit, agency, command committee, squad, platoon, company and battalion cadre, district units, village units, and guerrillas in the armed and paramilitary forces.

In addition, political awareness of important elements' personnel (such as radio, crypto, TOC, and security maintenance personnel) must also be evaluated.

3. We must reevaluate the political background and make security checks of ((friendly)) servicemen who fall into category six,

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whose list has been set up in phases 1 and 2 and who have undergone indoctrination successfully or unsuccessfully, and those of this category whose list has not yet been set up. We should take measures to indoctrinate and cope with them. We must review and gain experiences on these indoctrinations.

4. We must consider suggestions to deal with ((servicemen who do not have a reliable political background)) during phase 1 to find weak and strong points. Then, we must gain experiences to make investigations and conclusions (i.e., to prescribe what guideline or policy to be observed and what measures to be taken to deal with ((servicemen of the categories mentioned above)) ) and continue to handle the remaining cases.

IV. PRELIMINARY AND RECAPITULATIVE REPORTS.

After each phase, we must review ((results obtained)), conduct a preliminary review, gain experiences, and make reports.

From now until 30 Jun 71 we must:

1. Make a report on implementation plans.

After finishing phase 1, we must report results and submit a report on plans for conducting phase 2 (to V.5452 on 30 Apr 71).

2. Make a recapitulative report on each of the two phases,

We must submit a recapitulative report on each of the two phases and plans for implementing the directive concerned during the time period from Jul to Dec 71 to V.5452. The deadline will be 20 May 71.

We must make reports based on the requirements and contents of tasks which have been set forth for each phase. The c, d, and district unit political

commanders are responsible of making reports with the assistance of the security ((guard)) section of their unit. ((They must not let the security section make reports by itself)) and must directly submit reports to higher echelons as prescribed previously by a directive of the political commander of ((VC)) Military Region ((5)).

V. NOTEWORTHY POINTS:

1. The tasks prescribed in this directive are tasks which up to now we have not carried out successfully. This time, we must urgently and carefully carry out these tasks by focussing our thoughts on the requirements and displaying a high sense of responsibility.

2. We should patiently persuade and indoctrinate backward people. We must avoid punishing them severely.

On the contrary, we must take all necessary measures to handle ((friendly)) servicemen whose morale is seriously affected by enemy psywar and Chiếu Hồi activities and those suspected of working for the enemy.

We must promptly report cases where ((friendly)) servicemen are involved in ((suspicious)) political activities to higher echelons for guidance and advice; we must not handle these cases by ourselves.

3. Party Committees and political commanders are in charge of carrying out and managing these tasks and submitting reports to higher echelons.

4. District units and battalions must select qualified cadre to assign them the security guard task which is a pressing requirement of the current missions. The military region ((VC Military Region 5)) Coordination and Operations Committee and the Command Committee of ((Bình Định Province Unit)) have many times called attention to the directive to guide security ((guard)) cadre in the above mentioned tasks.

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Political commanders should fully understand the requirements and contents of the security investigation. They must work out activity plans for each phase and must urge specialized sections to provide assistance to contribute to meeting requirements.

5. After receiving this directive from the commander of ((VC)) Military Region 5, political commanders of units must work out appropriate implementation plans based on this directive. They must make security investigations concerning the Party members, cadre and personnel in charge of important tasks or serving in important elements where complicated affairs usually occur due to lack of vigilance. They must finish security investigations at the prescribed deadline according to the rank, unit, and agency of each member.

5 Feb 71  
 For V.5452  
 Already signed  
 Lương Đại

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Security documents

((VC)) (Secret)

((VC)) Top secret

Signal ((Section))

23 Feb 71

V. 5452

No. 74/CT

IMPLEMENTATION OF DIRECTIVE OF THE THE CURRENT  
AFFAIRS ((VC)) MILITARY REGION ((5)) PARTY COMMITTEE AND  
PEOPLE TO COUNTER ENEMY PSYWAR, ESPIONAGE, AND  
CHIÊU HỒI ACTIVITIES IN PHASE TWO.

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I. ((ENEMY)) SITUATION:

a. Having suffered repeated heavy defeats, the US and Puppet ((RVNAF)) troops are attempting to step up their psychological and Chiêu Hôi activities to ideologically demoralize ((our troops)), disorganize ((our installations)) by ((distributing)) appealing letters, establish contact with ((revolutionary agents)), and plant their penetration agents in our internal organizations.

During the past year, the enemy resorted to many resourceful, brazen and complicated tricks.

He sent Chieu Hoi letters to our cadre and soldiers to appeal to them to surrender. These activities demoralized our cadre and soldiers, and seriously weakened their fighting spirit, especially members of Phú Cát ((District Unit)), D8, D52 ((possibly the 8th and 52nd Battalions)) and some other units.

The enemy also took advantage of traders who moved between the two areas ((possibly VC and GVN controlled areas)) to conduct propaganda, Chiêu Hôi and intelligence activities, established contact with ((revolutionary agents)), investigated and urged families with relatives serving the Revolution to rally to his side.

He recently bribed some of our personnel with women and money. In addition to his propaganda and dissemination of leaflets, the enemy launched continual attacks and sweep operations ((against our forces)).

Although these leaflets did not directly damage our troop morale, they certainly had a bad influence ((on our personnel)). Presently, many of our soldiers (especially the recruits) desire to retain and read enemy leaflets.

When confronted with difficulties, ((some of our backward cadre, whose morale has been affected by ((RVN)) Chiêu Hôi themes, believe the enemy.

Some cadre and soldiers even approved of enemy propaganda themes, (thinking that desertion to the enemy ((RVN)) under the Chiêu Hôi program is a way to avoid death and that remaining in our ranks is to suffer starvation.

This way of thinking will easily lead to defection, desertion, and self-multilation.

Some armed troops did not counter enemy attacks on their fortifications and were easily captured by the enemy.

When captured, they obediently gave him information ((on our situation)) and guided his attacks, thus directly damaging the Revolution.

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((Some cadre and soldiers)) were ideologically weakened. They balked at hardships and making sacrifices or displayed a shirking attitude. ((Higher echelons)) did not know of their activities and therefore could not put an end to these weaknesses.

They displayed a pacifistic and negative attitude. When captured, they joined the enemy through the Chiêu Hồi program to be able to live with their families (such bad actions were prevalent among a small number of cadre and soldiers.) The enemy's psywar and Chieu Hoi activities influenced ((our cadre and soldiers)) and resulted in the above mentioned weak points.

Concerning the organization: The enemy caused us many difficulties in leadership and sowed distrust among our internal organizations.

The enemy obtained some results through these activities; therefore, he adopted requirements for 1970-1971 that approximately 40,000 of our cadre and soldiers should be persuaded to defect through the Chiêu Hồi program, neglect their duties, etc... ((sic)).

Characteristics of enemy psywar activities:

In Nov 70, we initiated a counterpsywar, and spy activity phase. Some units did conduct this activity phase, but it was conducted by cadre, not soldiers.

Therefore, ((our cadre and soldiers' morale)) was still damaged by enemy psywar activities. Some units even failed to execute this phase or report their results ((to higher echelons)). The reason for the above weaknesses is that our Party Committees and commanders failed to thoroughly understand and pay attention to their leadership over this task.

Agents neither realized their main mission of protecting installations nor helped their Party Committees and commanders in their leadership.

b. We must continually motivate the people to counter the enemy psywar, Chiêu Hồi, and spy activities.

The motivation of the people is a basic political task and protection mission. This mission has been implemented poorly and irregularly. As a result, the people's vigilance was not increased and thus their sense of responsibility for the protection of the Party and the army was low. For that reason, the protection of ((our)) internal organizations and countering of ((enemy)) psywar, Chiêu Hồi, and espionage activities was weak.

II. TO BETTER THE LEADERSHIP, INDOCTRINATION, AND MOTIVATION OF THE PEOPLE, THE FOLLOWING MATTERS MUST BE UNDERSTOOD:

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A. Requirements:

The purpose of the indoctrination is to eliminate indefinite attitudes and lack of vigilance against enemy schemes, espionage, psywar and Chiêu Hồi activities. Counter rightist and pessimistic attitudes, poor ethics, and violation of the regulations concerning security maintenance that the enemy could take advantage of ((to attack us)).

We must heighten the class concept and revolutionary ethics, quality, and pride of our cadre. Heighten their vigilance to be ready to counter enemy activities in order to avoid being trapped by the enemy. Avoid rallying ((to the enemy)) or providing information ((for the enemy)). Make everyone thoroughly understand the requirements and missions and clearly see his responsibility to display self-improvement and eagerly participate in ((the attacks against the enemy)).

B. The contents of the indoctrination:

According to the requirements of fighting and strengthening, our army must have firm ideology and tight organization. It must have a high concept of the class struggle. ((Our troops)) must have a high sense of vigilance to unmask the cunning schemes and the extremely reactionary and dangerous nature of the enemy's psychological, espionage, and Chiêu Hồi programs (which ideologically and organizationally sabotage and undermine our ranks).

At the same time, we must point out enemy basic weaknesses and friendly strong points to properly assess the enemy. We must place full confidence in our force and in the people for defeating the enemy scheme.

The reason the enemy achieved victories was because we displayed negligence in indoctrination and failed to provide prompt leadership.

The contents of the indoctrination must be flexible. Concrete examples set by our units in our areas of responsibility must be pointed out to the people during their indoctrination in order to heighten their viewpoint, class struggle, and revolutionary awareness.

In the indoctrination and motivation ((of the people)), we must teach the people how to take precautions ((against the enemy)) and attack him at any time or place.

C. Methods of indoctrination and motivation:

In any case, we must master the following basic requirements:

Promote a sense of struggle and self-critique of cadre and soldiers. Make them reveal their secret thoughts which might affect their combat missions.

In the motivation of the people, we should not use the methods of higher echelons but use methods appropriate to our members and areas. Place emphasis on using methods established by those who are still in our units.

Hold discussions about enemy schemes and friendly activities to point out our strong and weak points.

Heighten our vigilance and prescribe regulations concerning the organization ((of our installations)).

Increase ideological and political guidance for our internal organizations.

D. Based on enemy activity plans and our unit's shortcomings, prescribe countermeasures and regulations.

For instance: Pose the question of why we should not read enemy leaflets, books, papers, see his pictures, and listen to enemy radio stations.

What should we do when receiving letters from our families living in enemy controlled areas?

Why do we not establish relations with reactionary members? (Even though they are our relatives.)

What should we do to counter enemy appeal, propaganda, and enticement of our families?

Should we suppress the bad elements such as enemy henchmen who propagandize and lure our troops?

D. To improve the indoctrination and motivation of the people, the following matters must be understood.

Prior to motivation, we must know the number of cadre in our units who are involved with the enemy. Then make ideological preparations (for cadre and soldiers) to hold self-critique sessions before the people.

Set a good example for the people in the indoctrination. Point out the bad effects of the receipt of letters appealing defection to the enemy side, reading and holding of enemy leaflets, thoughts of surrender, defection to the enemy, fear of combat fierceness and dissemination of enemy propaganda themes.

Try to know enemy schemes and activities in our bivouacking areas and conduct indoctrination for the people.

According to the situation in the local area, the people's weaknesses and the ((cadre and soldiers)) self-critiques, bring out questions for discussion and formulate measures against enemy paywar activities for the people.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE THREE-STEP INDOCTRINATION PLAN.

Missions to be implemented by the Party Committees:

The Party Committee is to indoctrinate its members. The level of their Party spirit will determine the length of indoctrination.

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Anticipate the number of members within the Party Chapters and units who had ((ideological)) shortcomings through indoctrination.

Work out plans for the recruitment and improvement of key cadre.

Missions to be performed by the Party Chapter:

Chapter Party Committee ((members)) must make self-critiques of their Party concepts and secret thoughts to the Party Chapter.

Submit reports on the anticipated number of personnel who had ideological weak points to the Party Chapter.

Party Chapters must motivate the people and help them make self-critiques. (Cadre and Party members must criticize themselves to encourage the people.)

The Group Chapter must have a sense of responsibility to execute the regulations which are prescribed for the servicemen.

Missions set forth for the conference of servicemen:

In motivation tasks, political officers must explain the importance of countering psychological warfare and set forth the requirements for each person.

Promote a high sense of responsibility to make self-critiques and critiques of others.

Make suggestions to successfully work out countermeasures ((against erroneous thoughts)).

Select some questions concerning the unit's situation.

The time scheduled for the conference of servicemen is one day (eight hours).

As for the Party Committee and Party Chapters, they must make the best use of time to conduct a conference for servicemen.

By motivating the people's sense of self-criticism, Party Committee members and political officers will be able to control the activities of their subordinates. Individuals who repeatedly make the same mistakes will report to higher echelons and work out remedial plans to contribute to the people's movement of countering enemy schemes. We must pay attention to the concentration of units in charge of motivating the people. If we fail to concentrate them, try to avoid dispersion.

Once assembled, conduct regular indoctrination and political caucuses for units such as detecting enemy schemes, and disseminating the information to units. Also, work out countermeasures to stop these schemes.

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Upon receiving this directive, Party Committee echelons should disseminate it among cadre and soldiers of units until the end of 30 Mar. Then, reports on the results should be submitted to V.5452 for information and recapitulation.

The units which have not yet initiated ((phase 1)) should study Directive 289/CT, guidance 282/ND, and this directive in order to carry out the indoctrination for cadre and soldiers.

Some units which recently initiated ((phase 1)) should continue to conduct Phase 2 in accordance with this directive.

5 Feb 71

For V.5452

/S/ Lương Đại

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Document for countering enemy Chiêu Hồi activities.

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