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U.S. STRENGTH INDISPENSABLE TO NEGOTIATIONS, DIPLOMATS SAY

It would have been impossible for the 300 editors and broadcasters who attended a high-level briefing on U.S. foreign policies at the State Department last week to miss a point struck by some of America's most experienced diplomats.

The point was that if the United States is to continue to negotiate successfully in the post-Vietnam war period, it can only do so from a position of strength.

This is not the time to abandon old alliances or the strong defense posture that has enabled President Nixon to embark on his goal of an era of negotiations, the veteran diplomats asserted.

The briefing was held in the State Department auditorium on March 29. The speakers included:

-- Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, one of the authors of the United States-People's Republic of China communique, issued at Shanghai last year, which now guides the new Washington-Peking relationship.

-- Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, who painstakingly negotiated the historic agreement that in 1972 removed Berlin as a flash point for a third world war.

-- Assistant Secretary Walter Stoessel, former Ambassador to Poland and Deputy Chief of the U.S. Mission in Moscow, a leading specialist in Eastern European affairs.

Mr. Green, whose special field is Asia, told the editors and broadcasters that "we have learned that successful negotiations -- especially with adversaries like North Vietnam -- require a position of strength, but certainly also a willingness to negotiate a compromise."

He advised that "these components" -- military strength and diplomatic flexibility -- "are necessary for successful negotiations."

Mr. Rush, former Ambassador to Bonn, warned that while "in Europe we have detente going on apace," this does not mean that Moscow has abandoned its objectives. The Soviet aim, he said, is still "to have us withdraw from Europe, to weaken NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and to make a recognition of the division of Germany."

Mr. Rush cautioned that if America unilaterally reduces its troop strength in Europe, as has been suggested by some U.S. Congressmen, "we would no longer be able to convince our (European) allies... that they can safely resist pressures" from Moscow. The "net result," in his judgement, would be to have Western European governments "competing for the favor" of Moscow, thereby fragmenting European unity.

"We cannot afford to become militarily inferior to Russia and at the same time hope to carry on successful negotiations with the Russians or with the Chinese," Mr. Rush asserted.

Assistant Secretary Stoessel developed the theme further by stating that while "there are very promising prospects for East-West detente, the progress we have achieved to date is because we have had a very strong" NATO base in the West.

The United States, he continued, "would like to see" force reductions in Central Europe but only if they are "brought about by an agreed process between East and West."

Mr. Stoessel said it was clear there could be no bargaining process to reduce communist force strength if America unilaterally cut back its own troops.

In sum, it is evident that U.S. negotiators are well aware of what President Nixon calls "one unbreakable rule of international diplomacy."

In a television address March 29, three hours after the State Department briefings ended, Mr. Nixon told the nation:

"You can't get something in a negotiation unless you have something to give. If we cut our defenses before negotiations begin, any incentive for other nations to cut theirs, will be completely removed.

"If the United States reduces its defenses and others do not, it will increase the danger of war.

"It is only a mutual reduction of forces which will reduce the danger of war.

"And that is why we must maintain our strength until we get agreements under which other nations will join us in reducing the burden of armament. A strong United States is not a threat to peace. It is the free world's indispensable guardian of peace and freedom."

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(Following are excerpts from the question-and-answer portion of Deputy Secretary of State Rush's presentation at the State Department foreign policy conference:)

Q: Mr. Secretary, most of the people in Asia have the impression that the withdrawal of the United States is dangerous for all the allies who are the strongest allies of the United States.

A: Well, the President's program, under the Nixon Doctrine, as you know, is that we stick to all of our alliances, we do not abandon our friends; we expect our allies to take care of internal problems themselves; if they are threatened from without we will help them. But we are not in any sense abandoning Taiwan or any of our allies. In fact, as far as peace is concerned and the hope of peace, the President's trip to Peking went a long way to insuring peace in Asia, and went a long way to insuring the security of Taiwan. I think as a result of the President's visit to Peking,

and his very successful visit also to Moscow, both Moscow and China have re-evaluated what are our objectives. They realize that we were not in Vietnam, in South Vietnam, for any kind of imperialistic purpose. We were there to protect an independent country fighting for its freedom. We were not there to fight Russia; we were not there to fight China. I think this realization was a very important thing in the changed attitude that Russia and China have had towards peace in Vietnam, and their willingness to cooperate in bringing about that peace.

I think also the fact that the President has been able to show the Chinese what our real objectives are -- namely, peace -- is a protection for all of our allies, including Taiwan.

Q: Mr. Secretary, recently we sent Ambassador Bruce to China and I understand the Chinese have sent someone here. And I am wondering what we can look forward to in the immediate future as a result of that exchange, what the immediate objectives of this are and maybe the long-range objectives.

A: Well, Mr. Bruce has not yet gone, but he is going to go, and the Chinese have not yet arrived but they are going to arrive. These will be very broad-based. They are called liaison offices; they are not trade offices, they are liaison offices. And they will have a broad scope of power. They will not be diplomatic offices in the strict sense of the term or in the technical sense of the term. But the range of subjects that will be covered by these offices will be very, very broad. I would hope that from this liaison, from this relationship -- and these two offices will symbolize them -- we will go forward towards normalizing our relations with China more and more, which will lead not only to more peaceful relations around the world, but also will lead to benefits in trade, in cultural exchange, in environmental improvements, and all the things that come from a close inter-course and cooperation between great powers.

四月三日

外交家說：美國的力量為談判所不可或缺

未曾會有可能使上週在國務院，參加一項有關美國外交政策的高階層簡報的三百位編輯人和廣播界人士錯失由美國幾位最富經驗的外交家所提出的一個要點。

此一要點是：如果美國要在越戰的戰後時期內繼續成功地從事談判，它僅能從一個實力的地位上做到這點。

這幾位職業外交家力陳，現在還不是時候來放棄歷史悠久的聯盟，或放棄那項使尼克森總統能夠着手他一個談判時代的目標的強大防衛態勢。

此項簡報是於三月二十九日，在國務院禮堂內舉行。發言的人士包括：

——助理國務卿葛瑞恩，他是去年在上海發表的美國——中華人民共和國公報的撰稿人之一，該公報現在是華盛頓——北京新關係的指南。

——副國務卿魯希，他曾努力談判商訂一項歷史性協定，此協定於一九七二年免除了柏林成為第三次世界大戰的一個發火點。

(一)

——助理國務卿史托賽爾，他曾任美國駐波蘭大使和美國駐莫斯科大使館副館長，是東歐事務方面的一位主要的專家。

以亞洲事務為專長的葛瑞恩先生說：「我們已經學習到，成功的談判——特別是跟北越那樣敵對者的談判——需要一個實力的地位，但是，當然也需要一種要談判一項折衷方案的意願。」

他提供意見說，——軍事實力和外交適應性等——「這些成份是成功的談判所必要的。」

前任駐波昂大使魯希警告說，雖然「我們在歐洲正快速地進行各國間緊張關係的緩和，」這並不意味着莫斯科已放棄了它的目標。他說，蘇聯的目標仍是「使我們撤離歐洲、削弱北約（北大西洋公約組織、）以及獲得承認德國的分裂。」

魯希警告說，如果美國一如若干國會議員所倡議的，片面裁減它在歐洲的軍力，那麼「我們將不再可能使我們的（歐洲）各盟國相信：：：它們可以安然無虞地抵禦來自莫斯科的壓力。」根據他的判斷，其「純然的結果」將是能使西歐國家政府們，「競相討好」莫斯科，從而使歐洲的團結分崩離析。

魯希斷言：「我們實不能在軍事上變得較蘇聯低劣，而同時却希望跟俄國人或中國人進行成功的談判。」

助理國務卿史托賽爾進一步地引伸這一主旨說，「東西方緊張情勢緩和的前景雖然頗為樂觀，但是我們迄今所達成的進步，實由於我們在西歐擁有一非常強大的北約基地。」

他又說，美國「樂見在中歐部隊的減少，但是這項減少只有經由東西方間協議的程序始可達成。」

史托賽爾說，顯明的事實是，如果美國片面減少其部隊，那麼在減少共黨國家的軍力上將無談判餘地。

總而言之，顯而易見的是，美國的談判代表充份了解尼克森總統所說的「國際外交上一條顛撲不破的規律。」

尼克森於三月二十九日國務院簡報結束三小時後，在一項電視演說中告訴全國說：

「在談判中除非你有所給予，你就不能有所收穫。如果我們在談判開始以前削減我們的防衛，那麼促使其他國家削減它們防衛的任何誘因將被完全除去。」

「如果美國裁減其防務，而其他國家並不裁減，這就增加了大戰的危險。」

「唯有相互地裁減部隊，方會減少大戰的危險。」

「這就是為什麼我們必須保持力量，直到我們獲得一些協定，使其他國家在這些協定下，跟我們一起減少軍備的重荷為止。一個強大的美國對和平並非一項威脅，而是自由世界和平與自由的不可或缺屏障。」

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（副國務卿魯希在國務院外交政策記者招待會中，問答部份的摘要如下。）

問：副國務卿先生，你談到亞洲的大多數人具有的印象是，美國的撤退對美國所有最堅強的盟國是危險的。

答：誠如你所知道的，總統在尼克森主義下的計劃是，信守我們的所有盟約，並且不背棄我們的友人；我們期望我們的盟國照顧它們自己的內部問題；如果它們遭受到外來的威脅，我們將給予它們協助。而在任何意義上，我們並不背棄台灣或我們的任何盟國。事實上，就和平而言以及和平的希望而言，總統前往北京之行是確保亞洲和平的一項長遠努力，以及確保台灣安全的一項長遠努力。我想，由於總統訪問北京，以及他也是非常成功地訪問莫斯科的結果，莫斯科和中國業已重新估計了我們的目標。他們認識到，我們在越南，在南越，並不是爲了任何一種的帝國主義目標。我們在那裡是爲了保護一個爲自由而戰的獨立國家。我們不是在那裡跟蘇聯作戰；我們不是在那裡跟中國作戰。我想這項認識，對於蘇聯和中國對越南和平態度的轉變，以及對他們合作謀致和平的意願，是非常重要的。

我同樣認爲，事實上，總統得以向中國人顯示我們的真正目標所在——即和平——是對於包括台灣在內的我們所有盟國的一項保護。

問：副國務卿先生，最近我們派布魯斯大使到中國，而我瞭解，中國已派某一人來此間。而我知道，我們能在即刻的將來中所能盼望到的那一交換的結果是甚麼，以及甚麼是，和可能是，長程目標上的即時目標。

答：好。布魯斯先生尙未前往，但他即將前往，而那位中國人尙未來到，但他即將來到。這些將是在非常廣泛的基礎上的。它們是被稱爲聯絡處；它們不是貿易辦事處，它們是聯絡處。而它們將具有廣泛範圍的權力。就嚴格的術語意義而言，或是就術語的技術意義而言，它們將不是外交辦事處。但是，這兩個聯絡處所將涉及的論題範圍却是非常，非常廣泛的。我要希望自這一聯絡，自這一關係——以及這兩個聯絡處將把它們象徵表現出的——我們將愈益地向前推進我們跟中國關係的正常化，它將不僅導致世界各地更爲和平的關係，並且也將導致在貿易、文化交換，環境改善，以及來自兩大強國間交往和合作上所有事物方面的獲益。