

A
FILE SUBJ.
DATE SUB-CAT.
475
175

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of February 25

Press release 103 dated February 25

Secretary Kissinger: We will go straight to the questions. Mr. Davis [Spencer Davis, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports coming from Cambodia and Viet-Nam are becoming very bleak. One of your top aides estimates only two more months of survival for Cambodia if they do not receive supplemental assistance. The question is: What good would further supplemental assistance be when so many billions in past assistance has not helped; and, secondly, what is your appraisal on a new American peace initiative that might stop the fighting?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me first separate the problem in Cambodia from the problem in Viet-Nam. In Cambodia, we have an immediate emergency. We have a situation where, if a supplemental is not voted within the next few weeks, it is certain that Cambodia must fall because it will run out of ammunition. Therefore the decision before us is whether the United States will withhold ammunition from a country which has been associated with us and which, clearly, wishes to defend itself. This is a serious responsibility to take.

With respect to Viet-Nam, we are facing a more long-term situation of the same order. The long-term problem in Viet-Nam is this: Throughout the period of the American involvement in Viet-Nam and during the negotiations that were going on, it was never suggested that Viet-Nam would be able to stand by itself without American assistance; the argument at that time was to withdraw American military forces and to enable Viet-Nam, without assistance, to stand on its own. There are many situations in the world which

have no outcome as long as there are neighbors that continue to pursue aggressive designs.

If you go around the world and ask whether the United States can give support only where there is a clear terminal point, there will be many countries that will be in the most severe jeopardy.

Now, in Cambodia the situation is imminently critical. In Viet-Nam, the situation will be critical over a long period of time if we do not give adequate support. If we do give adequate support, then there is the possibility of Viet-Nam defending itself.

With respect to negotiations, the United States has engaged in, and is supporting now, efforts at negotiations both in Cambodia and Viet-Nam. It has been our experience, however, that negotiations cannot be a substitute for a situation on the ground but that they will reflect a situation on the ground. And therefore we have urged the Congress to look at the problem, recognizing the many pressures to which they are exposed—recognizing that the American people may well be tired of many years of exertions but keeping in mind also that sometimes to give in to the mood of the moment may lead to profound regrets later on.

And I would also like to say that this debate, which is a rather solemn one, should be conducted without reference to motives—which seems to become so much of a staple of the Viet-Nam debate.

Lifting the Arms Embargo in South Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you a question which appears to concern not only the relations with the subcontinent of India but the détente between the United States and

Russia, if you could put it in that context, and that is the somewhat bitter criticism that India has made at the decision to lift the 10-year-old arms embargo out there and the allegations that this would start an arms race and the implication that you somehow are guilty of bad faith in this whole thing.

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are two types of comments that have been made from India. One is the comments of the Indian Ambassador in Washington; and the second, the statement of the Foreign Minister of India in the Indian Parliament. We believe that the statement of the Foreign Minister is restrained and statesmanlike and continues the basis for the improving relationship that has characterized Indian-American relations in recent months. The statements made yesterday by the Ambassador are unacceptable.

Now, with respect to the relationship between India and the United States, in a speech in New Delhi last October I pointed out that India, because of its size and its position, has a special role in South Asia which the United States recognizes.

I have also pointed out that the United States has no interest and will not support or engage in an arms race in South Asia.

We maintain both of these statements. It seemed to us, however, that to maintain an embargo against a friendly country with which we have an allied relationship, while its neighbor was producing and acquiring nearly a billion dollars' worth of arms a year, was morally, politically, and symbolically improper.

I repeat, the decision to lift the arms embargo does not mean that the United States will engage in a massive supply of arms to Pakistan or that the United States will engage in arms deliveries that can affect the underlying strategic balance. But it seemed to us an anomaly to embargo one country in the area, to be the only country in the world to be embargoing this country, when its neighbor was not exercising a comparable restraint. But, even with this, we will not engage in massive deliveries of arms.

And, secondly, we place great stress on the improving relationship with India. We

maintain all the principles that we have asserted with respect to India, and we believe that with wisdom and statesmanship on both sides, the natural friendship between these two great democracies can not only be maintained but be strengthened. This is certainly our attitude.

Q. Are you going to ask for the recall of the Ambassador who made the unacceptable remarks?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we will not ask for his recall.

Consultations With Congress

Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent months the Administration has been conducting foreign policy in one way, in one manner, and Congress has been conducting foreign policy in another. And wherever there appears to be a conflict, Congress usually wins. How are you adjusting to this reality?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is inherent in our system that the Congress, having the power of the purse, can impose its will. I believe that in a conflict between the executive and the legislative neither side wins. I believe, as I pointed out in Los Angeles [on January 24], that it is imperative for a new consensus to develop on American foreign policy because nobody wins these conflicts. The difficulties have arisen for a variety of reasons—the effects of Watergate, the internal changes in the Congress, the legacy of many years in which Congress feels that perhaps the executive had been granted too wide-ranging authority.

We are prepared to work out a new relationship with the Congress to avoid these conflicts. We believe that is essential in the national interest. And we believe that there can only be an American foreign policy, not an executive or a legislative foreign policy.

Q. I'd like to follow up. Are you prepared to take Congress into your confidence on the initiation of foreign policy from the outset, or will you continue to put—

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. O'Leary [Jere-

miah O'Leary, Washington Star-News], I think there is a misconception about the degree of congressional consultation that has previously taken place. Since I've become Secretary of State, I have met in 17 months—I've testified over 40 times before congressional committees, met over 25 times with congressional groups outside the formal testimony and over 75 times with informal congressional groups.

The difficulties exist, in part, because the nature of congressional leadership has also changed in the recent year so that the traditional relationship between the executive and the legislative, exercised through the organized leadership of the Congress, has to be modified so that there is a more wide-ranging consultation than previously. I'm prepared to undertake this, and I have been in touch with various congressional groups and various senatorial groups asking for their advice—with whom it is possible to consult and in what manner—in order to achieve this partnership.

The question of advance consultation is easy. Of course we will do this.

In the past, my practice has been before every trip to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee to tell them about what I was planning to do and to report to them within a week of my return. I recognize that these forums are no longer sufficient and that a wider range must be found.

I have been meeting regularly, for example—I plan to meet regularly; I've met twice—with a group headed by Congressman [Donald M.] Fraser that is particularly interested in the problem of human rights. But it is partly a question of congressional organization as well. And I'm prepared, and the Administration is prepared, to work this out in a cooperative spirit and with the attitude that "Of course we will consult ahead of time." But there are also some matters that must be left to the executive, with full knowledge of the Congress, but the day-to-day tactics are very difficult to handle by congressional decisions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I understood your

previous answer correctly, you were saying that as long as North Viet-Nam continues its aggressive policy, the United States should give a billion or a billion and a half dollars a year to South Viet-Nam and Cambodia in aid in an open-ended way. One, is that correct, and, two, what would be the consequences if Cambodia did fall, or if South Viet-Nam did fall?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, I made a distinction between the situation in Cambodia and the situation in Viet-Nam.

In Cambodia, as I have pointed out, we face an immediately critical situation. What will be the consequences if Viet-Nam and Cambodia did fall? It is a debate which has been going on for a long time. I believe, and the Administration believes, that if Viet-Nam falls as a result of an American decision to cut off its aid that this will have, over a period of time, the most serious consequences for the conduct of our foreign policy. This will not be immediately apparent, but over a period of years it must raise the gravest doubts in the minds of many countries that have been associated with us, or of many countries to which the threat cannot be given a terminal date.

Middle East Diplomacy

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the statement in an interview by Syrian President Asad that he would be willing to sign a formal peace treaty is helpful to your step-by-step approach? And if I may just follow that up with one question, do you necessarily exclude an additional step after the one that you are about to leave on, on the Golan Heights between Syria and Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the statement by Syria that it is willing to sign a peace agreement with Israel is a major step forward. I remember the first time I visited Syria in December 1973, the newspapers reported that the Secretary of State arrived from occupied territory, "occupied territory" at that time being Tel Aviv. So I think that this is a hopeful sign.

With respect to negotiations between Syria

and Israel, we have always believed that a peace, to be lasting, must involve all the fronts and must involve a general settlement, and I am certain that Israel shares this view.

Cyprus Negotiations

Q. Mr. Kissinger, the United States has been involved for some time now in the efforts to achieve a settlement on Cyprus. Can you tell us where you think those efforts are now, and what the possibilities are for reconvening a negotiating session between the two sides?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is important to remember that the communal talks only began effectively on January 14, so that there were only three weeks of negotiations before the aid cutoff to Turkey that led to an interruption of these negotiations.

The United States strongly supports these communal talks. The United States has offered all the assistance it can to the parties to bring about a settlement that all parties can live with. We believe that progress is possible. It is our impression, based on very frequent exchanges, that it will be very difficult for the United States to play a useful role in Ankara as long as the aid cutoff continues. And therefore we have urged the Congress to give us the possibility to continue these negotiations by suspending the aid cutoff.

In addition, I have to stress that aid to Turkey and the security of the eastern Mediterranean transcends the Cyprus problem and that the security of the eastern Mediterranean is being jeopardized by the cutoff of aid to Turkey.

But with respect to the Cyprus negotiations, we favor the resumption of these negotiations, with or without the resumption of aid. We strongly support a settlement, but our own influence is being weakened by the aid cutoff.

Ethiopian Request for Assistance

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been some reports that the request by the Ethiopian

Government for ammunition was on the point of being accepted by the U.S. Government. Can you comment on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I read an article today that said that tomorrow there will be a meeting of the Washington Special Action Group which will make a decision. The Washington Special Action Group doesn't make decisions. It analyzes options and submits them to the President for consideration.

The issue that is presented to us by the Ethiopian request is that we have had a military relationship with Ethiopia since 1953. The Eritrean rebellion or independence movement has been going on since 1962. And the United States takes no position on the merits of the particular conflict.

The problem that we have to decide is whether a country whose military establishment has been based on American arms should be cut off from support at the precise moment that it most needs it. It is a difficult decision for us, and we have not come close to making it. And tomorrow's meeting is not to make a decision. Tomorrow's meeting is to sort out what the issues are.

Mr. Kraft [Joseph Kraft, Field Enterprises syndicated columnist].

Proposals To Restrict Petroleum Imports

Q. Mr. Secretary, a major issue in the various energy proposals that are being surfaced now is that some of them propose restricting imports by a tariff—imports of petroleum—and others propose restricting imports by a quota. From the foreign policy standpoint, which of those two avenues does the Department favor and why?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the Department has not been formally asked to take a stand on the difference between a tariff and a quota.

The basic position of the Department from a foreign policy point of view is that conservation of a certain quantity is essential in order to achieve the long-term objective of our energy policy. And within the In-

ternational Energy Agency (IEA), the United States has supported goals to which it must make a major contribution that would achieve those general objectives.

Obviously, as a member of the Cabinet, I support the President's energy plan. I have not personally studied the quota proposal, and therefore I don't feel that I should comment on that. Of the plans that I have seen, at the time that they were being considered, it seemed to me that the fee system seemed the most efficient.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions on U.S.-Soviet relations. Are U.S.-Soviet relations impaired by the breakdown of the trade agreement? And, secondly, are there new obstacles to a SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement in the verification negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: The state of Soviet-American relations is that in the political negotiations that are now going on and in the arms control negotiations that are going on, progress is about what one would have expected.

The SALT negotiations are in a very preliminary phase, and therefore it is too early to tell whether there are any unusual obstacles. My impression is that they are going along in a normal way, but it is a little too early to make a conclusive judgment.

The difficulty that is caused by the interruption of the economic relationship, or by the jeopardizing of the economic relationship, is that the political relations must carry a perhaps undue burden and that therefore the incentives for restraint that might otherwise exist in particular negotiations are being weakened. So, in the long term, I feel that the removal of the economic pillar of our relationship cannot but weaken the long-term trends of détente. In the immediate present, it has not yet visibly happened.

Q. What are your plans for repairing the damage?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have had

preliminary discussions with Members of the Senate and the House to see what the congressional attitude would be. I also had some preliminary discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko when we met in Geneva. I think we should move carefully and thoughtfully in order to avoid another misunderstanding arising between the two branches of our government and between our government and the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a number of reports in recent weeks that you might consider resigning by the end of the year to avoid becoming a focal point of a partisan debate as the '76 campaign gets underway. Are these reports correct?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is a permanent story that appears every year. I believe that one's service should be tied to the period in which one can be useful, and that is a decision that has to be made largely by the President. And I have not made any such decision as these reports indicate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it was reported after your recent meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva that he raised the possibility at this meeting of an accord to limit arms to the Middle East. Are the Russians prepared to cooperate in restraining the flow of arms to the Middle East? And if so, are we going to talk to them about it?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not believe that this report is exactly accurate. But, in principle, the United States has been willing to discuss the principle of a limitation of the flow of arms into the Middle East. Given the interconnection, however, of the Arab world, one now would have to draw the line rather widely, and one could not confine the limitation of arms imports only to the states neighboring Israel, but one would have to include all the states that could possibly transfer their arms into areas where a confrontation might be possible. But as part of a settlement, we would be prepared to explore this, yes.

Q. What is the Russian view toward that possibility?

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand the Soviet view, they are prepared to discuss this as part of an overall settlement. They are not prepared to discuss it at the moment.

Southeast Asia and American Commitments

Q. Mr. Secretary, of the vast amount of aid we have sent to Southeast Asia and our own involvement, why would any country in the world ever have grave doubts about American commitments?

Secretary Kissinger: Because if the collapse of Southeast Asia is caused by an American decision to withhold aid under conditions in which such a decision can have only one outcome, the conclusion will be inevitable that it was the United States which has the responsibility. There is no possible way that Viet-Nam can acquire the arms that are needed to defend itself until its economy has reached a point where perhaps there is sufficient surplus from oil income or other economic developments. And there are many other countries in the world that find themselves in analogous circumstances.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it reasonable to talk about any finite period of time—the three years, for example, that has been suggested by the Administration?

Secretary Kissinger: It is the second-best course. Very often, in these exchanges between the executive and the legislative, one is driven into positions which reflect the best that may be attainable. There is an argument that can be made that if aid is contained for three years at a sufficiently high level that at that period the economy of Viet-Nam could develop to a point where it would have enough surplus revenues to pay for the import of arms by itself.

I have seen these arguments. They seem plausible to me, and I would support them. I must say, quite candidly, that the preferable course is to go the route that I indicated. But, if necessary, we will accept a three-year term with adequate sums.

Question of Guarantees in Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were in Israel on this last trip you said that Israel couldn't be expected to give up its territory without a quid pro quo. Did you come away from your talks with President Sadat [of Egypt] feeling that he acknowledges this principle?

Secretary Kissinger: The fact that I am returning to the Middle East indicates that I believe there is a chance to implement this principle, yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on that, do you think that it will be necessary for there to be American guarantees for the next stage of the disengagement?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The question of an American guarantee can arise only in connection with a final settlement and then not as a substitute for a final settlement but as a backup position to enhance the security of the parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that, if I may briefly, do you have in mind something that would have to be ratified by the Congress, a treaty?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not any specific idea in mind, but it has been axiomatic in all the discussions about peace in the Middle East that a final settlement would have to have some sort of a guarantee. Some people have suggested a Soviet-American guarantee. Others have suggested a Security Council guarantee. Others have suggested a unilateral American guarantee. All that I have suggested is that the United States is studying the problem of what guarantees would be adequate for a final settlement, I repeat, not as a substitute for the sense of security and justice of the parties concerned but as a reinforcement of it once the negotiation has been concluded.

It is inconceivable to me that there could be any American participation in a guarantee that did not have the full support of the Congress of the United States. By what means that is achieved would depend on the nature of the guarantee and on the commit-

ments that it would involve. But there does not yet exist an Administration position either on the nature of the guarantee or on the commitment, nor have we had any discussions with the Israeli Government. All I indicated is that this is a subject we are studying within our government, as we are dutybound to do in the process of moving toward a final peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you speak of a quid pro quo, would that be expressed at this step or at some future stage? And secondly, would it be something directly given to Israel by Egypt or indirectly? And indeed, if it's indirect, is that a quid pro quo?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that Israel has to be the judge of what it considers an adequate arrangement. And that is not for me to say at this moment. It stands to reason that a settlement is not possible until both sides are satisfied with it. It is also clear that, Israel being a democracy, any agreement that is made must have visible parts that can be presented to the Israeli domestic opinion and to the Israeli Parliament.

What combination of direct and indirect assurances will be given must be left to the process of negotiation. But it goes without saying that any settlement, to have any meaning, must be acceptable to both parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you back for a moment to the Viet-Nam problem and the grave doubts that you referred to. You seem to be saying that it is more important for the United States to enjoy credibility abroad than to have credibility at home.

Secretary Kissinger: No. I'm saying that the security of the United States and the security of the many countries in the world that depend on the United States is a matter of the gravest importance to the American people as well. And I therefore believe that, however painful the discussions, however anguished the experiences, that the American people over a period of time will recog-

nize that this distinction cannot be made.

I am as subject to the correspondence as many of the members of the Congress. It is my belief that those who are responsible for national policy are accountable not only for the moment but for how it will look several years from now. And three to five years from now, when the consequences are apparent, I believe that there will be no distinction between credibility at home and credibility abroad.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a series of uncomplimentary remarks about you by former associates of President Nixon, how do you account for these comments? Do you think it's a concerted effort? And what's your reaction to what Mr. [William] Safire and Mr. [Charles W.] Colson have been saying about you?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think the two individuals you mentioned represent different phenomena. I don't believe it is a concerted effort. And in the case of one of them I don't believe that what is being said today is any different from what was being said when we were colleagues. [Laughter.]

European Security Conference

Q. Mr. Secretary, when in Geneva you talked with Foreign Minister Gromyko. You talked about the European Conference, too. From here it looks as if the European Security Conference might be wound up this summer, not so much because of the results it will achieve but because many of the participants are impatient now to wind it up. I would like to ask you what your view is of the timetable. Is there any chance of any firm link with progress in the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is my impression that the overwhelming majority of our European allies is opposed to having any linkage between the European Security Conference and the force reduction talks and therefore this is not an issue that is likely to arise.

As far as the timetable is concerned, the United States favors—as do all the other participants—an expeditious conclusion of the conference. The issues have become so abstruse and esoteric, reaching sometimes such issues as the placement of a comma, that it is hard to explain all of the issues that are now before the conference. And I wouldn't want to speculate in what month there will be a conclusion. The United States will support a rapid conclusion of the conference.

Defense Agreements With Spain and Portugal

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up to date on the U.S. base agreements with Spain and Portugal? Are we being asked to vacate Torrejon? And how do we stand with the U.S. base in the Azores?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, these negotiations are conducted, as you know, by the new Assistant Secretary for congressional liaison [Ambassador at Large Robert J. McCloskey, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations]. We have not been asked to vacate any of the Spanish bases. And therefore this report seems to us at least premature. In fact, it seems to us inaccurate. The discussion has concerned mostly what sort of security assurances the United States might give Spain in return for the continuation of its bases in Spain.

With respect to the Azores, we have not been asked to vacate the base in the Azores. The agreement has not yet been renewed, but under the agreement we can maintain our base there until a new agreement has been made or it is clear that no agreement can be made.

Confidence in U.S. Commitments

Q. Could I just follow that up? The security arrangements that Spain is asking for, is that the sort of thing that you mean other countries will begin to doubt if an

American decision lets Viet-Nam and Cambodia go "down the tube"?

Secretary Kissinger: I was talking about the general ability of other countries to rely on the word of the United States or on the ability of the United States to bring about the security of those countries that rely on it. This has serious consequences. I know it is fashionable to sneer at the word "domino theory." I think this is a very grave matter on which serious people have had a divided opinion. And we've been torn apart by the Viet-Nam war long enough. But I do not believe we can escape this problem by assuming the responsibility of condemning those who have dealt with us to a certain destruction.

The answer to your question is, yes, this is one of the things. But I was talking of a more general problem.

Q. More specifically, the country that's most often discussed in the context of American security is Israel. Do you think Israel perhaps is exempt from this problem because of support in Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not think it is appropriate for me to go around the world asking which countries would be particularly threatened by this attitude. I would say that the questions that are now being asked can be applied to almost any country as far as terminal date is concerned, as far as the end process is concerned. I do not want to apply it to any particular country. And it is, of course, clear that there has been a special relationship between Israel and the United States that can withstand strains that other relationships might not be able to withstand. But it is not a trivial matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, within the spirit of meaningful détente, why haven't you put more pressure on the Russians and the Chinese not to supply Hanoi so abundantly?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I am constantly being asked, "Why don't we bring

pressure here, bring pressure there?" as if the word "pressure" had a concrete significance. When you ask about pressure, you have to ask yourself what concretely the United States can do, what is the "or else" that we are threatening?

Secondly, it has been our policy throughout not to turn these issues into public confrontations on the theory that countries can go along more easily if it is not turned into a public confrontation. I believe that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China know what our view of this matter is. I think it is also important to point out that the scale of the North Vietnamese offensive in the South is not only related to the amount of arms that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic are supplying, it is also related to the fact that, now that there is no longer any interdiction and that the communications system has been improved so enormously, almost the entire input into North Viet-Nam can be moved rapidly to South Viet-Nam together with all of the stockpiles that existed at the end of the war.

Opposition to Discrimination

Q. Mr. Secretary, this morning in New York City the Anti-Defamation League charged that the Army Corps of Engineers is using discriminatory practices by requiring individuals applying for work on projects in Arab countries to state their religion. Would you comment on that and also state what the Administration's policy is and attitudes are on U.S. private investment in Arab countries?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know about this particular charge. And I do not know about the particular practice of the Army Corps of Engineers, which is a question which should be addressed to the Defense Department. I know, however, that the basic policy of the Administration is totally opposed to discrimination in any form.

As far as the Department of State is concerned, for which I am responsible, I know

that officers are assigned without regard to race or religion and that we don't even know their race or religion in making the assignments.

With respect to the U.S. policy of investment in Arab countries, the United States basically favors it. The United States is strongly opposed to any discriminatory practices by the recipient countries as to the firms that might do business. And we are looking into the legal remedies that may exist, together with whatever moral influence we can bring to bear on the banking and other communities to abolish discrimination, which we consider reprehensible.

Q. Is the Chase Manhattan Bank one of those corporations that are being looked into?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not looking into particular corporations. We are looking into the general problem that has been brought to our attention of discrimination against particular firms or banking houses. And we have not yet reached a conclusion either as to the remedies that are available to us or whether there are any particular offending firms.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your earlier responses on the future of Indochina, you dwelled mostly on South Viet-Nam. Is there anything more hopeful that can be looked to in Cambodia, apart from staving off collapse?

Secretary Kissinger: We would do our utmost in Cambodia, if collapse can be staved off, to promote a negotiation. And it is difficult to know whether such a negotiation is possible. We have over the past year made major efforts to promote a compromise settlement, which it would be wrong to detail now. We would continue these efforts, but I will not make any misleading statements as to what is possible. I am putting the issue—whether the United States wants to take the responsibility of cutting off ammunition at this particular moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I didn't quite understand your answer to Mr. Gwertzman's

[Bernard Gwertzman, *New York Times*] question. Were you saying that the Congress might now, indeed, take a harder look at providing military aid to Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to be put into a position in which I am asserting that the lessons of Viet-Nam are going to be applied in any particular area. I see no evidence that the Congress is applying a harder look to aid to Israel now, and I am not bringing these two matters into a relationship.

International Energy Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you comment on the foreign policy implications of the tariff versus the quota, with particular reference to the suggestion that one would be indiscriminate and the other might be used selectively?

Secretary Kissinger: I have really not thought this particular issue through, and I will make sure that our spokesman will say something about it during the week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a related question: You are reported at continuing cross purposes with the Treasury Department on international oil policy. Is there an "Administration" policy, or is it a "Kissinger" policy? And is there going to be a consumer-producer conference in March?

Secretary Kissinger: First, the speech that I delivered—on I believe it was February 3—was done at the request of the President. It was approved in all its particulars by the President. It was gone over by the White House officials that are responsible for economic policy. It was gone over by the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury—the Secretary of the Treasury being out of the country, in England, on that particular weekend. The speech on February 3 reflected the views of the President and reflected the views of the Administration.

Since then, and I have had occasion to review this whole matter with the President again this morning, there is no question that the United States supports a guaranteed

price for alternative sources of energy.

Whether this price is achieved by subsidy or by tariff or by some other method is a matter for negotiation and is, indeed, a matter which we would leave to the decision of each country. And as far as the Department of State is concerned, we have no particular interest in how this guaranteed price is achieved, as long as it is achieved.

It is our conviction that without such a guaranteed price there will not be a sufficient investment in alternative sources—that without an investment in alternative sources, even if there is a break in prices temporarily, that break in prices will only serve to increase the dependence of the consumers on the producers and make them even more subject to a rapid increase in prices.

So the official policy of the Administration, the President's policy, is to have a guaranteed price. The method by which this price is achieved is to be left to each country and is a matter on which no final decision has been taken in this country. But this is a totally secondary issue.

The primary issue is whether the United States favors a guaranteed price, and I can only repeat: When it was proposed, it was the policy of the President; and when it is reiterated today, it is the policy of the President. And therefore I don't know what conflict you are talking about.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Q. There were two other elements there.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. Excuse me, I'm sorry, I didn't answer the question.

On the consumer-producer conference, there will be another meeting of the IEA early in March, in which we believe that progress will be made on the alternative sources. Once this progress has been achieved, we believe that the essential prerequisites for a preparatory meeting of consumers and producers may be met, and we therefore think that good progress is being made toward a consumer-producer preparatory meeting, if not in March, shortly afterwards.

The press: Thank you very much.