



U. S. INFORMATION SERVICE  
PRESS BRANCH

WAR  
FILE SUBJ  
DATE SUB-CAT  
1966

4

(March 7, 1967)

SUMMARY OF  
USMACV NEWS EVENTS  
1966

GENERAL:

Allied forces achieved notable successes against the enemy during 1966, inflicting heavy personnel and materiel losses on his forces, spoiling his preparations for offensives, forcing him to remain on the move, exacting an increasing toll on his logistical efforts, eliminating the VC infrastructure in areas selected for Revolutionary Development. We have taken the initiative away from the enemy and dealt him some heavy blows. Heavier blows will follow. Any hope that the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese may have had of achieving a military victory is gone.

ENEMY SITUATION:

During 1966, the enemy continued to build up his forces by recruiting in the South and by infiltrating from the North. During the year he placed increased reliance upon regular troops from North Vietnam. The infiltration from North Vietnam averaged more than 8,000 per month.

During the year the enemy expanded his military structure to include division-size units. It appears that he now has in being, or in the process of formation, nine divisions. Seven of these divisions are North Vietnamese Army. His total strength in the Republic exceeds 280,000.

87-22

May be reproduced with or without  
attribution to the U. S. Information Service.

AMERICAN EMBASSY - TOKYO

Many of the enemy's units are understrength because of combat losses, sickness and desertion. He lost at least 50,000 killed during 1966 (55% more than in 1965). More than 20,000 VC or VC sympathizers returned to the Government of Vietnam under the Chieu Hoi Program during the year. This is nearly twice the number during the previous year. Nearly 20,000 weapons were captured from the enemy during the year, and this also is nearly twice the number captured during 1965.

Enemy military activity in RVN during first half of 1966 began with the familiar pattern of small unit raids and ambushes, sabotage and interdiction, terrorism and harassment. Beneath this overt activity the enemy increased his potential for initiating major offensives in various areas. As the enemy endeavored to launch these offensives, allied forces countered his preparations with spoiling attacks. Smaller scale enemy attacks were mounted only in favorable tactical situations against isolated or lightly defended objectives. Having been frustrated in their attempt to mount major spring offensives, the enemy increased interdiction of GVN lines of communication, increased guerrilla activity, and retired his major combat units to remote areas.

The enemy's only notable success in battle occurred in mid-March when an NVA regiment overran the A Shau Special Forces Camp at considerable loss to the attacking NVA regiment.

During May, allied units initiated a series of actions which kept the enemy off-balance. New enemy units were infiltrating from NVN and threatening control of the central highlands through domination of Pleiku Province. Operation HAWTHORNE caused heavy losses within an NVA regiment and blunted its drive towards Kontum City and Tou Morong. Preparations of three other NVA regiments to drive towards Pleiku City and Duc To Special Forces Camp were stalled by Operations PAUL REVERE and HOOKER. Operation NATHAN HALE completely disrupted the plans of an NVA regiment in Phu Yen Province.

During July, the 324B NVA Division invaded RVN through the DMZ. Allied forces initiated Operation HASTINGS which resulted in a series of actions with enemy battalions. During the final phase of Operation HASTINGS, the 324B Division broke contact and withdrew to the DMZ area. In August, however, elements of that division again deployed into Quang Tri Province.

In I Force, in late July and early August, enemy activity centered in the western highlands where major units of the 630th NVA Division moved into Pleiku Province. By late August, this division had been dealt severe losses in Operation PAUL REVERE II. In II Force, enemy divisions continued to avoid decisive combat but carried out harassing attacks and reconnoitered potential targets. The 9th VC Division suffered heavy losses 9 July in attempted ambush of the U. S. 1st Infantry Division in Binh Long Province. Major elements of the 5th VC Division remained in Phuoc Tuy Province, but generally avoided contact with allied units on search and destroy operations. In IV CTZ, enemy activity consisted mostly of attacks on outposts and installations, sabotage of bridges and highways and terror acts.

Infiltration of men and materiel from NVN to RVN continued. In late September, allied forces contacted the enemy in northern Quang Tri Province from the eastern to the central portion of the province. Contacts continued into October throughout III MAF, but by the end of that month intelligence indicated that elements of the 324B NVA Division had withdrawn to north of the Ben Hai River.

During September, enemy forces in I Force also avoided engaging friendly forces in combat. Enemy activity consisted principally of mortar attacks on installations and district towns. Operations launched against the 610th Division (Operations THAYER and MAENG HO 6) resulted in heavy enemy losses in Binh Dinh Province that month. In October, elements of the 610th Division attempted to exfiltrate the Phu Cat Mountain operational area. During MAENG HO 6, IRVING and DAI BANG 800, more than 2,240 enemy soldiers were killed. These operations thwarted VC/NVA plans for a southwest monsoon offensive.

In II Force, enemy forces continued to avoid decisive combat through October. The 9th VC Division during this period was probably regrouping, training and replacing losses. During the first half of November, elements of this division suffered 966 KIA as a result of friendly probing operations. In IV CTZ, enemy activity remained at the level of small-scale attacks on outposts and installations, sabotage and terrorism. VC preoccupation with internal problems and ARVN military pressure prevented the enemy from undertaking more ambitious actions.

NVA elements were detected moving back into Quang Tri Province south of the DMZ in November. During Operation RIO BLANCO in Quang Ngai Province, contact was made with a VC battalion that month. In I Force, Operation PAUL REVERE IV apparently thwarted VC plans for offensive action in the highland area. In II Force, Operation ATTLEBORO in Tay Ninh Province resulted in heavy losses to the 9th VC Division and 101st NVA Regiment. Enemy casualties totaled 1,106 killed, 44 captured.

In December, enemy activity was largely guerrilla or local force activity. NVA and VC Main Force units avoided contact, but maintained unit integrity and attempted to rebuild and reinforce.

The enemy was hurt in many areas during 1966, and his principal concentrations near sanctuaries at the DMZ, in the Chu Pong region, and in the Tay Ninh - Binh Long area were contained by allied preemptive operations which inflicted heavy losses. However, the enemy strength increased during 1966 (by some 42,000 men) indicating that he has been more than able to replace losses by infiltration and by conscription.

The enemy has been kept on the defensive and prevented from winning a significant military victory which he badly needs, politically and psychologically. The cost of the conflict increased sharply for the enemy during the year just ended.

#### GROUND OPERATIONS

In III MAF, Operation HASTINGS, and its successor, Operation PRAIRIE, in Quang Tri Province, were particularly significant. They scattered the 324B NVA Division and continued to frustrate enemy plans for military success in that region after massive infiltration across the DMZ during May and June. The same can be said of Operations MACON, ALLEGHENY and COLORADO, and of the hundreds of small unit actions and patrols on the plains and hills around Hue, Da Nang, Chu Lai and Quang Ngai. Conversely, Operation GOLDEN FLEECE 7-1 was primarily a rice harvest protection operation which enabled Vietnamese farmers to harvest over 7,500 tons of rice, which, without protection, would have been claimed by VC.

In the I Force area of the Coastal Plains and Central Highlands, there were numerous significant allied operations. The most outstanding of the year started with coordinated Operations MASHER (later named WHITE WING) and THAN PHONG II in January. These operations accounted for over 1,700 enemy killed in Binh Dinh and Quang Ngai Provinces and part of War Zone "D". Concurrently, Operation VAN BUREN in Phu Yen Province doubled as a rice harvest protection operation wherein over 30,000 tons of rice was gathered by local farmers while friendly forces killed 650 enemy. Operations DAVY CROCKETT and CRAZY HORSE followed in Binh Dinh Province as S&D operations. Operation LINCOLN was a very successful S&D operation in southern Pleiku and northern Darlac Provinces during April. PAUL REVERE operations in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces gained momentum during the late summer and early autumn, frustrating enemy attempts to assemble in large force in those areas and inflicting heavy losses on the NVA 1st (630th) Division as it moved to and from sanctuary. Other operations in the I Force area such as HAWTHORNE and NATHAN HALE produced large numbers of enemy killed. SUBOK, JOHN PAUL JONES and SEWARD helped clear and secure the roads and waterways from Vung Ro Bay north to Tuy Hoa and Qui Nhon. MAENG HO 6, DIA BANG 800 and IRVING made possible the extension of secure areas north through the Phu Cat Mountains to the southern edge of the Siem Giang Valley and the Hung Lac Peninsula in Binh Dinh Province. THAYER in the Bong Son Mountains of Binh Dinh Province is carrying search and destroy operations to the north and west in furtherance of the campaign against the NVA 3rd (610th) Division started earlier in the year.

In II Force, BIRMINGHAM penetrated part of War Zone "C" in Tay Ninh Province during April. The operation resulted in destruction of many base camps and structures, capture of 1,300 tons rice and interdiction of one exit of the Ho Chi Minh Trail. EL PASO II in Binh Long Province had notable success with over 850 enemy killed when it terminated in mid-July. ATTLEBORO produced significant contact in November, with the 9th VC Division and 101st NVA Regiment, and developed into the first U.S. corps-controlled operation in RVN. The enemy took heavy losses in both men and materiel. The operation penetrated and cleared parts of War Zone "C" which had been Communist dominated for over 20 years.

Not so apparent, but equally important, were the results of Operations TOLEDO, HOBART, SMITHFIELD, and others. TOLEDO caused few enemy casualties, but diminished enemy support capability in terms of destroyed fortifications, captured supplies and weapons. SMITHFIELD resulted in 245

enemy killed in a smashing Australian victory in just one afternoon in Phuoc Tuy Province. Operations like HOBART countered the VC infrastructure in central Phuoc Tuy Province.

Two other operations in the II Force area portend the nature of operations in 1967. These two are BATON ROUGE and LANIKAI. BATON ROUGE was a battalion-size operation in the Rung Sat Special Zone. Its contributions to GAME WARDEN in that area and the added security provided the Long Tao River Channel to Saigon have validated this support of ARVN forces.

LANIKAI is a battalion operation with a multiple mission -- search and destroy against VC forces, interdiction of VC traffic, support of local forces and support of Revolutionary Development. LANIKAI proved that U. S. Forces can operate effectively under conditions imposed by Delta geography without upsetting the local order of things. It marks a positive step in a plan to place more emphasis on support of Revolutionary Development.

In the Delta, the enemy has elected to operate primarily in company or platoon strength. Because of this, there have been few major operations there, in terms of enemy killed and materiel captured or destroyed in single operations. CUU LONG 15, in Kien Tuong Province during March, was significant in that over 200 enemy were killed. DAN CHI 219C during April in Chuong Thien Province produced nearly 250 enemy killed. In May, DAN CHI 227 in An Xuyen Province accounted for over 200 enemy killed. DAN CHI 261, in An Xuyen Province and Bac Lieu Province during September, resulted in nearly 500 enemy killed, large amounts of weapons and munitions captured. The impetus was followed up by DAN CHI 263 in Ba Xuyen Province and CUU LONG 22 in Dinh Tuong Province during October wherein combined enemy casualties totaled nearly 300.

The importance of these and smaller operations in the Delta area by the RVNAF cannot be overstressed. Most of the rice produced in this country is produced in the Delta. Similarly, about five and one-half million of the country's approximately 16-1/2 million people live in the area. These operations protect the food producing areas and large numbers of the populace.

Search and destroy operations and spoiling attacks against enemy base camps and marshalling areas have frustrated his battle plans, particularly his hopes for a successful offensive. The enemy has not scored a single major victory since last March when he overran the A Shau Special Forces Camp. GVN, Free World and U.S. control the battlefield and continue to maintain the initiative.

But even more significantly, the GVN and allied military forces in Vietnam have established the overall national level of security required for the conduct of Revolutionary Development -- a program which will have major emphasis in 1967. Battles make the headlines, but real progress in this war will be measured by the success of the total effort to free the Vietnamese people from the specter of violent death, terror, domination, harassment, coercion and the denial of self-determination by the Viet Cong and NVA.

### AIR OPERATIONS

1966 was the year of build-up for air power in Southeast Asia. In North and South Vietnam, the air war damaged the enemy's ability to function effectively and complemented ground efforts in arresting his aggression.

The Air Force added nine new squadrons and a new airfield at Tuy Hoa to the in-country capability, and more than doubled tactical reconnaissance activity.

The growing airlift requirements have been met. The 834th Air Division was activated to handle airlift in the Republic. The new airlift request system provides flexibility in airlift equal to that of the tactical air strikes system.

U. S. tactical fighters have had an all-weather capability since 1 May 1966. Using radar bombing techniques, enemy targets are struck accurately regardless of weather.

FAC pilots constantly look for signs of enemy activity. From over 100 airfields in the Republic, the range of air power is brought to bear on the enemy.

B-52's doubled the number of sorties flown and have shifted emphasis increasingly to a direct support role. Tied directly into the ground commander's plan, the great weight of ordnance delivered by these aircraft can clear large areas of enemy troops. The raids have been followed up with ground sweeps. Use of this essentially strategic weapon in a tactical role is a significant development which is saving many ground soldiers' lives.

At night, AC-47s and flareships respond to the enemy's attacks. Their response to a call for help is immediate and effective.

The growing success of the Chieu Hoi returnee program is related to the increased effectiveness of the psy war effort being conducted by the loud-speaker and leaflet campaigns over enemy positions.

U. S. strike forces are fully capable of supporting ground actions anywhere in the Republic, and the capability is growing. Air support leaves the enemy little opportunity to stop, rest or establish base camps and staging areas from which to attack.

Air action has been instituted in and just north of the DMZ to stop NVA build-up and infiltration.

Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft hammered the 324B NVA Division which attempted to wrest control of Quang Tri Province. The ground-air team thwarted the enemy's offensive plans in this area.

In and just north of the DMZ, air strikes touched off 1,433 secondary explosions, destroyed or damaged 140 trucks and 126 AAA or automatic weapons sites since 20 July. The enemy's storage and staging areas have been under constant air bombardment which destroyed materiel and seriously damaged his ability to launch and sustain an offensive.

U. S. air strikes in North Vietnam have made this war costly for the enemy. Although we have limited these strikes to military targets, the strikes have cost the North Vietnamese in money, equipment and manpower.

The best measure of the effectiveness of the bombing is the intensified propaganda campaign they have launched to get the bombing stopped.

There is no question about the requirement for continued bombing of military targets in North Vietnam. The interdiction campaign has destroyed great quantities of materiel heading toward South Vietnam which would eventually be used against our troops. The destruction of this materiel in North Vietnam helps to prevent U. S. and Free World casualties in South Vietnam.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

(Market Time -- Game Warden)

Game Warden operations were initiated in the Rung Sat Special Zone in early April of 1966. In late April other elements were deployed to the Delta (My Tho - Vinh Long - Can Tho - Sa Dec - Chau Doc). All programmed PBR's (120) have arrived and are operational. This program has been effective in disrupting enemy infiltration and resupply routes in the Rung Sat Special Zone and along the main waterways of the Delta (Co Chien - Mekong - Bassac). Experience gained by PBR crews and Naval Advisors to Vietnamese River Assault Groups (RAG's) is invaluable.

NAVAL OPERATIONS

(Naval Gunfire North)

In October (25th), 1966, a surveillance of the lower coast of North Vietnam was initiated using U. S. Seventh Fleet destroyers. Watercraft traffic in the area under surveillance has become insignificant, except for the two short truce periods when a large number of craft were observed moving supplies and men south. In a little over two months of operation the patrol has accounted for 267 watercraft destroyed and 290 damaged.

## LOGISTICS

Great progress has been made during the past year in improving our logistics posture. As one example, the short tons of cargo moved into RVN (390,000 during December 1965) increased to 600,000 during December 1966. The average waiting time for an unloading berth in December 1965 was more than 10 days. Now it is two days. Thirty percent more of the road net is open to daily traffic now than at this time last year.

At the end of 1965 there were three jet capable airfields in-country. We now have nine. At the end of 1965 there were 15 airfields that were C-130 capable. Now there are 73.

A year ago there were two deep draft ports and five shallow draft ports. Now there are five and seven respectively. During the year, through-put capacity for all ports increased from 375,000 short tons to more than 970,000 short tons. POL capacity increased from 780,000 barrels to 2 million barrels. Square feet of storage for ammunition increased from 550,000 to over 2.5 million. Square feet of covered storage increased from 1.5 million to 2,700,000.

A year ago we handled 51,000 line items in our supply system. We are now handling 182,000 line items.

Our logistics base is now well developed and fully effective in supporting our operational requirements.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR OPERATIONS 1966

Following is the basic reference data for the major U.S. and Free World ground operations of 1966 referred to in this review.

<u>OPERATION</u>	<u>DATA</u>
VAN BUREN	Conducted Jan. 19 - Feb. 21 in I FFV in Phu Yen Province by 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 2nd ROK Mar Bde. Bde-size opn. Results: 679 enemy killed, 49 captured. Frd cas: lt.
MASHER	Conducted Jan. 24 - Feb. 4 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) and Cap ROK Inf Div. Bde+ size opn. Results: 697 enemy killed, 131 captured. Frd cas: lt.
WHITE WING	Conducted Feb. 4 - Mar. 6 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) and Cap ROK Inf Div. Bde+ size opn. Results: 1,047 enemy killed, 445 captured. Frd cas: lt.
LINCOLN	Conducted Mar. 25 - Apr. 8 in I FFV in Pleiku Province by 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) and 3d Bde Task Force, 25th Inf Div. Results: 453 killed, 12 captured. Frd cas: lt.
SU BOK	Conducted Mar. 26 - Sept. 22 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 1st Regt, Cap ROK Inf Div. Results: 299 enemy killed, 33 captured. Frd cas: lt. Bn+ size opn.
BIRMINGHAM	Conducted Apr. 24 - May 17 in II FFV in Tay Ninh Province by 1st Inf Div. Bde+ size opn. Results: 119 enemy killed, 28 captured. Frd cas: lt.
DAVY CROCKETT	Conducted May 4 - May 16 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM). Bde size opn. Results: 374 enemy killed, 82 captured. Frd cas: lt.

OPERATION

DATA

**CRAZY HORSE**

Conducted May 16 - June 5 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 1st Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM) - Capt ROK Inf Div. Results: 478 enemy killed, 27 captured. Frd cas: lt.

**EL PASO II**

Conducted June 2 - June 13 in II FFV in Binh Long Province by 1st and 3d Bdes, 1st Inf Div. Bde+ size opn. Results: 855 enemy killed, 37 captured. Frd cas: lt.

**PAUL REVERE I**

Conducted May 10 - July 31 in I FFV in Pleiku Province by 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div. Bde size opn. Results: 546 enemy killed, 68 captured. Frd cas: mod.

**HAWTHORNE**

Conducted June 3 - June 20 in I FFV in Kontum Province by 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Bn+ size opn. Results: 531 enemy killed, 22 captured. Frd cas: lt.

**NATHAN HALE**

Conducted June 19 - July 1 in I FFV in Phu Yen Province by 1st and 3d Bdes, 1st Cav Div (AM). Bde size opn. Results: 459 enemy killed, 36 captured. Frd cas: lt.

**MACON**

Conducted July 4 - Oct. 28 in III MAF in Thua Thien Province and Quang Nam Province by 9th Mar. Bn size opn. Results: 507 enemy killed, 5 captured. Frd cas: mod.

**HASTINGS**

Conducted July 7 - Aug. 3 in III MAF in Quang Tri Province by Task Force Delta. Bde size opn. Results: 882 enemy killed, 15 captured. Frd cas: mod.

**JOHN PAUL JONES**

Conducted July 21 - Sep. 5 in I FFV in Phu Yen Province by 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div and 2nd ROK Mar Bde. Bn+ size opn. Results: 262 enemy killed, 39 captured. Frd cas: lt.

OPERATION

DATA

HOBART I

Conducted July 24 - July 28 in II FFV in Phuoc Tuy Province by 6th RAR, 1st Aust Task Force. Bn size opn. Results: 8 enemy killed. Frd cas: lt.

PAUL REVERE II

Conducted Aug. 1 - Aug. 25 in I FFV in Pleiku Province by 1st Cav Div (AM) and 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and 3d Bn, Cav Regt, Cap ROK Inf Div. Bde+ size opn. Results: 809 enemy killed, 104 captured. Frd cas: lt.

PRAIRIE

Conducted Aug. 3 - (cont) in III MAF, Quang Tri Province by III MAF units. Bde size opn. Results: continuing.

COLORADO

Conducted Aug. 6 - Aug. 22 in III MAF in Quang Nam and Quang Tin Provinces by 5th Mar. Bn+ size opn. Results: 170 enemy killed, 13 captured. Frd cas: lt.

TOLEDO

Conducted Aug. 10 - Sep. 7 in II FFV in Binh Tuy, Long Khanh and Phuoc Tuy Provinces by 173d Abn Bde (Sep) and 1st Aust Task Force, Bde size opn. Results: 7 enemy killed, 2 captured. Frd cas: lt.

SMITHFIELD

Conducted Aug. 18 - Aug. 21 in II FFV in Phuoc Tuy Province by 1st Aust Task Force. Bn+ size opn. Results: 245 enemy killed, 3 captured. Frd cas: lt.

ALLEGHENY

Conducted Aug. 20 - Aug. 29 in III MAF in Quang Nam Province by 3d Mar. Bn size opn. Results: 113 enemy killed. Frd cas: mod.

PAUL REVERE III

Conducted Aug. 26 - Oct. 18 in I FFV in Pleiku Province by 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div and 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div. Bde size. opn. Results: 36 enemy killed, 20 captured. Frd cas: lt.

BATON ROUGE

Conducted Sept. 4 - Oct. 8 in II FFV in Bien Hoa Province by 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div. Bn size opn. Results: 59 enemy killed. Frd cas: lt.

OPERATION

DATA

SEWARD Conducted Sept. 5 - Oct. 25 in I FFV in Phu Yen Province by 1st Bde, 101st Abn Div. Bde size opn. Results: 239 enemy killed, 34 captured. Frd cas: lt.

THAYER I Conducted Sept. 13 - Oct. 23 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 1st & 2d Bdes, 1st Cav Div (AM). Bde+ size opn. Results: 239 enemy killed, 66 captured. Frd cas: lt.

LANIKAI Conducted Sept. 14 - (cont) in II FFV in Long An Province by 1st Bde, 25th Inf Div. Bn size opn. Results: continuing.

GOLDEN FLEECE 7-1 Conducted Sept. 17 - Sept. 27 in III MAF in Quang Ngai Province by 7th Marines. Bn size opn. Results: 244 enemy killed, 1 captured. Frd cas: lt.

MAENG HO 6 Conducted Sept. 23 - Nov. 9 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 1st & 26th Regts, Cap ROK Inf Div. Bn+ size opn. Results: 1,161 enemy killed, 518 captured. Frd cas: lt.

IRVING Conducted Oct. 2 - Oct. 24 in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by 1st Cav Div (AM), 1st & 3d Bdes. Bde+ size opn. Results: 681 enemy killed, 690 captured. Frd cas: lt.

ATTLEBORO Conducted Oct. 15 - Nov. 25 in II FFV in Tay Ninh Province and Binh Duong Province by II FFV. Bde+ size opn. Results: 1,106 enemy killed, 44 captured. Frd cas: lt.

PAUL REVERE IV Conducted Oct. 18 - Dec. 31 in I FFV in Pleiku Province by 3d Bde, 25th Inf Div, 2d Bde, 4th Inf Div and 2d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM). Bde+ size opn. Results: 977 enemy killed, 90 captured. Frd cas: lt.

THAYER II Conducted Oct. 25 - cont in I FFV in Binh Dinh Province by Div troops and 3d Bde, 1st Cav Div (AM). Bde+ size opn. Results: continuing.

\*\*\*