

PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF EVENTS  
November 1966

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GENERAL

During November, U.S. strength in country increased from 351,000 to 362,000. Breakdown of U.S. strength by service at the end of November was: Army 226,000; Marine Corps 62,000; Air Force 50,000; Navy/Coast Guard 24,000. Other Free World strength remained about 52,000. Estimated enemy strength in country increased from 279,000 to nearly 280,000.

Known enemy personnel losses (based on partial returns) were over 5,000 killed, over 750 captured and 2,505 Chieu Hoi returnees (a new high for returnees). Impressive quantities of enemy food supplies, munitions and materiel were captured.

Extensive air support of major ground operations highlighted the air activity in the Republic. B-52s joined in support of ground operations to a marked degree during the month.

In North Vietnam, weather was the major factor and restricted the number of missions flown on all but a few days.

GROUND OPERATIONS

Allied forces continued a pattern of operations to find the enemy and destroy his forces, camps and materiel, and provide protection for the population.

III MAF

Operation PRAIRIE continued in Quang Tri Province with 74 enemy killed and one captured during the month.

I FFV

Operation THAYER II, a multi-brigade U.S. search and destroy operation, was initiated 25 October in the area of northern Binh Dinh

Province. The operation, conducted by the 1st Cav Div (AM), by 31 October had resulted in 118 enemy killed and 10 captured, 97 tons of rice and two tons of other food stores. By 30 November the operation had resulted in 446 enemy killed and 12 captured. Friendly casualties remained light as the operation continued into December.

Operation PAUL REVERE IV, a multi-brigade search and destroy and surveillance operation, was initiated 19 October in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces. The operation was conducted by elements of the 2d Bde 4th Inf Div; 3d Bde 25th Inf Div; and 2d Bde 1st Cav Div (AM). By 31 October the operation had accounted for 132 enemy killed and 37 captured. By 30 November results were 888 killed and 82 captured. Friendly casualties remained light as the operation continued into December.

Operation ADAMS, a multi-battalion U.S. search and destroy and rice harvest protection operation, was initiated 26 October in Phu Yen Province by the 1st Bde 4th Inf Div. As of 30 November the operation had resulted in 70 enemy killed and 51 captured. Friendly casualties remained light as the operation continued into December.

Operation MAENG HO 6 was initiated 23 September as a unilateral ROK search and destroy operation to clear the lower Phu Cat Mountain Range in Binh Dinh Province. Cumulative results as of 31 October were 1,127 enemy killed and 499 captured. The operation terminated 9 November with final results of 1,161 enemy killed, 518 captured, 454 individual weapons, 43 crew served weapons and 67 tons of rice captured.

Operation GERONIMO I was initiated 31 October as a multi-battalion U.S. search and destroy operation in Phu Yen Province. The operation, conducted by elements of the 1st Bde 101st Abn Div, as of 30 November had resulted in 110 enemy killed, 74 captured, 98 individual weapons captured and 26 crew served weapons captured. Friendly casualties remained light as the operation continued into December.

## II FFV

Operation ATTLEBORO developed heavy contact in War Zone "C" early in November, expanded rapidly into the largest U.S. operation of the war in terms of troops committed, and terminated 24 November with heavy enemy losses and light friendly casualties.

The operation, which began as a TAOR operation by the 196th Lt Inf Bde, produced no significant contact until the latter part of October when several large caches of enemy rice, salt and other supplies were uncovered in rapid succession in the Dau Tieng area. On 4 November, apparently in reaction, the enemy attacked the 196th Lt Inf Bde base camp with 100-150 rounds of 60mm and 82mm mortar fire and reacted in strength to U.S. penetrations of the dense jungle area NE of Tay Ninh City. Heavy contact developed between company and battalion-sized units.

On 5 November control of the 196th Lt Inf Bde and Operation ATTLEBORO was shifted from the 25th Inf Div to the 1st Inf Div. Heavy contact continued and the operation was reinforced to 11 infantry battalions with an impressive array of artillery support. The operation continued under operational control of II FFV with participating units from: 1st Inf Div, 25th Inf Div, 173d Abn Bde, 3d Bde 4th Inf Div and 11th Armd Cav Regt.

On 8 November, a 1st Inf Div battalion was attacked by a two battalion enemy force 13 miles NNW of Dau Tieng. The resulting three-hour battle cost the enemy over 290 killed.

During the rest of the operation, numerous enemy base camps, food caches, munitions and supplies were uncovered in the operation area. The enemy's reactions to these losses steadily decreased in intensity although he continued to conduct sporadic mortar attacks on U.S. operating bases and command posts in the area.

Operation ATTLEBORO terminated at 2400H on 25 November with final results of 1106 enemy killed, 44 captured and 60 suspects detained. The operation was supported by 1571 tactical air sorties. 2,384 tons of rice and 44 tons of salt were seized from the enemy. Significant enemy equipment captured included: 128 individual weapons, 19 crew served weapons, 514 claymores, over 25000 grenades, 1000 blasting caps, 3000 booby trap igniters, 725 bangalore torpedoes, 15 tons of beans, 151 bicycles, 600

gallons of cooking oil, and much miscellaneous equipment. Significant enemy materiel destroyed included 300 buildings, 502 bunkers, 92 tunnels, a rice silo, 9 base camps, 1 claymore factory, 37 caves, 12 sampans, 25 oxcarts, over 3 tons of fish, 440 gallons of tar, 500 gallons of gasoline, 4½ tons of tobacco, 5 storehouses, 1 rice processing machine, 176 gallons of acid, 1 rice mill, and numerous miscellaneous items.

Friendly casualties in the operation were light. It was the largest U.S. operation of the war to date.

Operation LAM SON II, a battalion-size combined U.S./ARVN operation, was continued in support of revolutionary development in Binh Duong Province. The operation was initiated 23 May. Results as of 31 October were 47 enemy killed, 108 captured, and 939 suspects detained. On 16 November a Viet Cong force attacked a U.S. infantry company but was beaten back by artillery and small arms fire in the 40 minute contact. The action resulted in 43 enemy killed and one captured. Friendly casualties were moderate. Results of the operation as of 30 November were 140 enemy killed, 113 captured and 960 suspects detained. Friendly casualties were light during the month.

#### AIR OPERATIONS

##### NORTH VIETNAM

Weather continued to seriously curtail bombing in North Vietnam during the month. Except for a few good days, weather restricted bombing to targets along the coast and W of the mountains.

Logistics were hit by Navy and Air Force pilots concentrating in the area just N of Thanh Hoa to the DMZ. Some targets in the Dien Bien Phu, Hanoi and Haiphong areas were hit -- including a SAM storage and repair site near Haiphong. The site was struck on 22 November by U.S. Navy pilots of Carrier Air Wing 2. U.S. Air Force pilots hit POL storage near Hanoi early in the month, causing smoke to 8,000 feet.

On 5 November, U.S. Air Force F-4Cs shot down two MIG-21s.

## REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM

Operation ATTLEBORO was supported by the largest total number of U.S. Air Force strike and airlift sorties flown in support of any one ground operation of the war - 1,571 strike sorties and 2,448 airlift sorties.

PAUL REVERE IV was supported by about 1,200 strike sorties during the month; THAYER II was supported by about 550 strike sorties during the month.

About 930 sorties were flown in support of Operation PRAIRIE. The majority were flown by 1st Marine Air Wing pilots. U.S. Marine pilots hit a new high in daily sorties in-country on 24 November when they flew 257.

### B-52 STRIKES

B-52 crews concentrated on the role of direct support of ground operations with 45 out of 49 raids being in the direct support role during the month.

### NAVAL SURFACE OPERATIONS

On 1 November, Viet Cong detonated a water mine on the Long Tau River sinking a U.S. Navy minesweeper boat with heavy casualties to the crew. A companion MSB attempting immediate rescue was fired on from the river bank.

On 4 November, two U.S. Navy destroyers off the coast of North Vietnam were fired on by shore batteries. The ships suffered no casualties. Both ships returned fire with good effect. On 14 November, two other U.S. destroyers off the coast of North Vietnam were fired on by shore batteries. The ships suffered no casualties or damage. The shore batteries were neutralized by air strikes and naval gunfire. On 18 November, two U.S. destroyers fired on a fire control radar site in North Vietnam. The ships used 5-inch naval guns. Several secondary fires were observed in the target area. Later the same day, the two destroyers observed 12 cargo craft on the coast in the same general area. The ships destroyed three of the craft, and damaged three. On 19 November, the same destroyers observed two groups of logistics craft and opened fire. North Vietnamese shore batteries engaged the two ships but promptly received direct hits from the ships' 5-inch naval guns. The ships sank five logistics craft and damaged 15.

## REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT

As November ends, there is still no real evidence that the enemy has changed the course of action he has chosen - a war of attrition by a well-established guerrilla force supported by large formations of VC/NVA conventional troops operating from base areas in difficult terrain. His tactics still focus on the intimidation and terrorizing of the people, the attack of isolated outposts and troop units, and assassination of the key individuals that arise in opposition.

Militarily, the allied forces have dealt the enemy a long series of battlefield defeats, inflicting heavy losses in men and materiel, and have developed the strength and effectiveness to successfully engage him throughout the broad spectrum of the military war.

The "other war" - the Revolutionary Development Program - is a program of nation-building -- a social revolution to transform the Republic of Viet Nam into a unified, free and enduring nation. The program, with special emphasis on the role of the people as participants, ties together all aspects of the struggle into a coordinated program of military, political, economic, social and educational efforts which aim at liberating the people from Viet Cong control, restoring public security, and winning the commitment of the people to progress for themselves and their nation. It is a partnership between the people and the government, forged first and foremost in the rural areas of the Republic.

Because the two wars must be fought at the same time - and they must be - the Revolutionary Development Program's major problem is security. It is a program of nation-building at the most difficult possible time -- when the enemy is still firmly entrenched among the people of the rural areas in full menace. Accordingly, the program emphasizes the responsibility of the military to protect the people and the government representatives as they work together to develop the partnership. At the same time, the program provides for training the people themselves to better protect themselves in order that they may shoulder their share of the responsibility for keeping their area clear.

On May 21, within three months after the Honolulu Conference, the Revolutionary Development Cadre Training School at Vung Tao graduated 4,532 cadres, the first class trained under the new curriculum stressing the role of the people as participants in nation-building. Within another month most of them, formed into 59-man teams, were working in the hamlets.

At present, men and women, 16 to 36, from hamlets and villages throughout Viet Nam, are reporting to the school at Vung Tao to learn what the government has to offer and to take knowledge and skills back to the people as members of well-organized teams trained and motivated to do battle with the Viet Cong infrastructure.

The current class is about 5,000 strong. The three-month course consists of political training (100 hours), paramilitary training (244 hours), administration (18 hours), civil affairs training (30 hours), new life development training (60 hours), census and grievance training (40 hours), motivation (22 hours) and people's common activities course (144 hours).

The Commandant of the Vung Tao Revolutionary Development Cadre School, Major Nguyen Yan Be, trains the cadre to follow the following five-goal procedure in building a hamlet into a responsible community:

1. Eliminate VC elements and sympathizers in the hamlet.
2. Eliminate internal corruption in the hamlet.
3. Develop community spirit.
4. Hold free elections.
5. Organize the people to protect themselves by forming a people's militia.